Full Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ZIXING YANG, Case No.: 3:26-cv-04296-BTM-MSB 12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 13 v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 [ECF NO. 1] 15 CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center; 16 GREGORY J. ARCHAMBEAULT, 17 Field Office Director, San Diego, Office of Detention and Removal, U.S. 18 Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 19 U.S. Department of Homeland Security; TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director, 20 Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 21 U.S. Department of Homeland Security; MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary, 22 U.S. Department of Homeland Security; 23 and TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, Department of Justice; 24 Respondents. 25 26 27 Pending before the Court is Zixing Yang’s petition for the writ of habeas corpus. 28 For the reasons stated below, the petition is DENIED without prejudice. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner Yang was inspected by immigration officials on March 29, 2023, and 3 admitted into the country on a B-1/B-2 nonimmigrant visa. (ECF No. 1-7 (“Decl.”) ¶ 2.) 4 His visa expired on September 28, 2023. (ECF No. 5-1 (“NTA”), at 1.) That same day, 5 the Petitioner filed an application for asylum which remains pending. (Decl. ¶ 3.) Later, 6 the Government granted him a work authorization permit. (Id. ¶ 4.) On May 20, 2025, the 7 Petitioner married a U.S. citizen. (Decl. ¶ 6.) The Petitioner and his wife applied to adjust 8 the Petitioner’s status to lawful permanent resident on July 16, 2026. (Id. ¶ 7.) 9 On July 26, 2026, the Petitioner was detained by military police while delivering 10 packages to Camp Pendleton. (ECF No. 5-2 (“I-213 Rec.”), at 3.) Immigration and 11 Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers interviewed the Petitioner and confirmed that he 12 “did not have legal status” to remain in the U.S. (Id. at 5.) The officers then took the 13 Petitioner into custody without a warrant, prior notice, or a hearing. (Decl. ¶ 8; see I-213 14 Rec., 5.) The following day, the Government served the Petitioner with a warrant. (ECF 15 No. 5-3.) The Government also served the Petitioner with a Notice to Appear for removal 16 proceedings on the charge of being removable for overstaying his visa. (NTA, 1.) See 8 17 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). 18 The Petitioner remains detained at Otay Mesa Detention Center. (Decl. ¶ 9.) He 19 filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus on July 27, 2026. (ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”).) 20 II. DISCUSSION 21 The Petitioner requests that the Court order his release because the Government has 22 violated his constitutional rights. The Government claims that the Petitioner has failed to 23 exhaust his administrative remedies and is lawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 24 (ECF No. 5 (“Return”), at 2–3, 2.) 25 A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 26 Before addressing the merits of the petition, the Court must determine if the 27 Petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies. “[A]s a prudential matter,” the Ninth 28 Circuit requires that “habeas petitioners exhaust available judicial . . . remedies before 1 seeking relief under § 2241.” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2004) (second 2 alteration in original) (citation omitted). The Court may waive the Petitioner’s requirement 3 to request a custody determination if it finds that “administrative remedies are inadequate 4 or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable 5 injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Hernandez v. 6 Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Laing, 370 F.3d at 988). 7 The Court finds that Yang is not required to exhaust his administrative remedies 8 because an Immigration Judge cannot grant him the relief he seeks. Yang argues that the 9 Government’s violation of his Due Process rights may only be remedied by an order of 10 release, not a bond hearing. (Pet. ¶ 42.) A bond hearing, he claims, would “ratify” the 11 Government’s violation of his right to a hearing prior to his detention. (Id. (emphasis 12 omitted)) An Immigration Judge can neither rule on the constitutionality of the Petitioner’s 13 detention nor release him without a bond hearing. Because the Petitioner’s constitutional 14 claim is not “correctable by the administrative tribunal,” the Court finds that his 15 administrative remedies are inadequate and waives his exhaustion requirement. Liu v. 16 Waters, 55 F.3d 421, 426 (9th Cir. 1995) 17 B. Merits 18 The Petitioner brings two claims for relief in his petition. First, he contends that his 19 arrest violated Procedural Due Process because the Government detained him without 20 adequate notice or hearing. (Pet. ¶¶ 43–45.) Second, that his detention violates Substantive 21 Due Process because it is not reasonably related to any legitimate purpose. (Id. ¶ 48.) The 22 Court addresses each claim in turn. 23 i. Procedural Due Process 24 The Fifth Amendment entitles noncitizens1 “to due process of law in deportation 25 proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). Once a noncitizen “passe[s] 26 through our gates,” he may be removed “only after proceedings conforming to traditional 27 1 This order uses the term “noncitizen” as equivalent to the statutory term “alien.” 8 U.S.C. 28 1 standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law.” Shaughnessy v. United States 2 ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953). Due Process also “protects noncitizens from 3 unlawful detention during their removal proceedings.” Esquivel Pacheco v. LaRose, 818 4 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1179 (S.D. Cal. 2026) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 5 (2001)). Here, the Petitioner challenges his detention as contrary to the Due Process 6 Clause. 7 To determine the “specific dictates of due process” in this situation, the Court must 8 consider three factors: 9 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 10 used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 11 safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 12 substitute procedural requirement would entail. 13 14 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Beginning with the first factor, the Court 15 recognizes that the Petitioner’s interest in remaining “free[] from bodily restraint” lies “at 16 the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.” Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 17 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). But “the private interest of a detained alien under § 1226(a) is lower 18 than that of a detained U.S. citizen.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1213 (9th 19 Cir. 2022). Here, the Petitioner remained in the U.S. after the visa authorizing his presence 20 expired. Although he formed strong ties to the community while remaining at liberty, he 21 was not granted release at the discretion of the Government. Cf. Esquivel Pacheco, 818 F. 22 Supp. 3d at 1179 (“By granting release, the government makes an ‘implicit promise’ that 23 liberty will be revoked only for failing to comply with the conditions of release.” (quoting 24 Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 147–49 (1997))). Also, the Petitioner’s applications for 25 asylum and status adjudgment remain pending. The Government has not made an “implicit 26 promise” of continued liberty that the Petitioner could rely on. He did, however, remain at 27 liberty for three years and received work authorization from the Government. The Court 28 finds that the Petitioner has a protectable interest in remaining at liberty that is lower than 1 that of a parolee or citizen. See Li v. Larose, No. 26-cv-1614, 2026 WL 948362, at *2 2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2026) (holding that work authorization does not by itself create a liberty 3 interest that warrants a hearing before an arrest). 4 Second, the Government’s process of detaining the Petitioner created a substantial 5 risk that his liberty interest would be erroneously deprived. The Petitioner was given no 6 prior notice that he would be placed under arrest. He was given no paperwork or warrant 7 at the time of his arrest. The record also contains no indication that the Government 8 arrested the Petitioner because it determined that a change in circumstances warranted his 9 detainment. Instead, the Petitioner was stopped while delivering packages, detained by the 10 military, interviewed by ICE, and immediately placed into custody. ICE officers verified 11 the Petitioner’s biographical information in their databases. (I-213 Rec., 5.) But they did 12 not provide him an opportunity to rebut the information they reviewed before arresting 13 him. Conversely, a Notice to Appear mailed to the Petitioner’s address or other procedural 14 safeguards would have put the Petitioner on notice that his liberty may be revoked and 15 allowed him an opportunity to contest this revocation. 16 Third, the Government maintains a “strong interest” in preventing noncitizens from 17 “remain[ing] in the United States in violation of our law.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 18 1208 (alteration in original) (quoting Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518 (2003)). This 19 applies with greater force to noncitizens that the Government has not initially determined 20 to pose no danger or flight risk, such as the Petitioner. Cf. Mendez Tzoc v. LaRose, No. 21 26-cv-3965, 2026 WL 2227161, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2026) (There, “the 22 Government . . . required [the Petitioner] to submit fingerprints and biometric information, 23 conducted background and security checks . . . .”). The record here does not indicate that 24 the Government conducted a background check for Yang and determined that he was not 25 a danger or a flight risk. To require notice of possible detention and a predetention hearing 26 before the Government could take into custody a person who is in the country illegally, has 27 not received parole but has a work permit, and has not undergone a background check as 28 1 to dangerousness and flight risk would create a tremendous burden on the enforcement of 2 immigration laws and would induce flight by those here illegally. 3 Altogether, the Government detained an individual with substantial liberty interests 4 without any warning. Nonetheless, the Government’s interest in detaining the Petitioner 5 here balances against the Petitioner’s interest in being released from custody. The Court 6 is sympathetic to the Petitioner’s argument that a post-deprivation bond hearing “is 7 insufficient to cure a violation of procedural due process arising from detention without a 8 pre-deprivation hearing.” (Pet. ¶ 40 (citation omitted).) But based on the facts in the 9 record, the Court is “not convinced that Petitioner has demonstrated a liberty interest in his 10 release requiring any additional due process protections than Petitioner has already 11 received.” Li, 2026 WL 948362, at *2. 12 The Petitioner is entitled only to a bond hearing under Section 1226(a) to protect his 13 Due Process rights. Notwithstanding that, from the facts before the Court, the Petitioner 14 has a strong case for release on a bond under the factors set forth in Martinez v. Clark, 124 15 F.4th 775, 783 (9th Cir. 2024), the Court acknowledges that the Petitioner “does not seek, 16 and does not consent to, an order directing a bond hearing in lieu of release.” (Pet. ¶ 41 17 (emphasis omitted).) The Court will not disregard the Petitioner’s request, and so denies 18 this claim in its entirety. The denial is without prejudice to a future request for a bond 19 hearing—in the event that the Petitioner is not given the bond hearing he is statutorily 20 entitled to—or other remedies that the Petitioner may pursue. 21 // 22 // 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 ii. Substantive Due Process 2 The Petitioner claims that civil immigration detention “may serve only two 3 permissible purposes: preventing danger to the community and securing the noncitizen’s 4 appearance at removal proceedings.” (Pet. ¶ 47 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690).) Based 5 on his lack of criminal history and ties to the U.S., the Petitioner claims his detention is not 6 reasonably related to any legitimate purpose and thus violates Substantive Due Process. 7 (Id. ¶ 48.) 8 But the Petitioner’s reliance on Zadvydas is inapposite. Zadvydas analyzed 8 U.S.C. 9 § 1231, whose “basic purpose” is “effectuating an alien’s removal.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 10 at 697. The purpose of Section 1226(a) is to authorize the Government to arrest and detain 11 a noncitizen “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United 12 States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288 (2018) (“Section 13 1226 generally governs the process of arresting and detaining [deportable] aliens pending 14 their removal.”). It is uncontested that the Petitioner has been charged as removable for 15 overstaying his visa, is being held under Section 1226(a), and is in removal proceedings. 16 (Return, 2; ECF No. 6 (“Traverse”), at 3.) Thus, his arrest and detention are related to the 17 statutory purpose of confining him “pending a decision” on whether he will be ordered 18 removed. The Court denies the Petitioner’s Substantive Due Process claim. 19 iii. Other Claims 20 The Petitioner also raised new issues in his Traverse. He contends that his arrest 21 violated 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) and the Fourth Amendment. (Traverse, 2, 5–7.) He also 22 argues that a bond hearing offered under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) improperly places the burden 23 on him to prove he is not a danger or a flight risk. (Id. at 9–10.) 24 The Petitioner forfeited the claims raised for the first time in his reply brief. See 25 Vasquez v. Rackauckas, 734 F.3d 1025, 1054 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Because we do not consider 26 issues raised for the first time in reply briefs, we deem this late-raised argument forfeited.”). 27 Assuming these claims were properly raised, they would fail on the merits. To the extent 28 that the Government improperly arrested the Petitioner without a warrant or probable 1 || cause, see 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)G)-(1), the Government timely 2 ||issued and executed an arrest warrant to detain the Petitioner, see 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) □□□□ 3 || determination will be made within 48 hours of the arrest... whether a notice to appear and 4 || warrant of arrest as prescribed . . . will be issued.”). This “effectively cured the violation 5 |}and terminated any prejudice created by the warrantless detention.” Morales Ortiz v. 6 ||LaRose, No. 26-cv-4127, 2026 WL 2392381, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2026). The 7 ||Petitioner also does not explain why the Court should remedy a Fourth Amendment 8 violation by releasing him from custody instead of excluding evidence from his 9 ||immigration proceedings. Reyes v. Hermosilla, No. C25-2525, 2026 WL 528692, at *2 10 ||(W.D. Wash. Jan. 15, 2026) (“The remedy for an unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth 11 ||}Amendment is suppression of evidence, not release from custody.”), report & 12 || recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 525103 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 25, 2026); see United 13 || States v. Garcia, 974 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The typical remedy for a Fourth 14 |} Amendment violation is the exclusion of evidence discovered as a result of that 15 || violation....”). Lastly, the Ninth Circuit has held that “§ 1226(a)’s procedures satisfy 16 || due process, both facially and as applied.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1213. This includes 17 requirement that a “§ 1226(a) detainee ... demonstrate[] by a preponderance of the 18 || evidence that he is not a flight risk or a danger to the community.” Rodriguez Vazquez v. 19 || Bostock, 183 F.4th 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2026) (citing Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1197). 20 || Thus, the claims raised in the Traverse are denied. 21 If. CONCLUSION 22 For the reasons stated above, Yang’s petition for the writ of habeas corpus is 23 || DENIED. The denial is without prejudice to a claim for a bond hearing or other remedies 24 Yang may pursue in the future. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 : ‘ Dated: October 7, 2026 (ny Fee aces Honoréble Barry Ted Mosko 28 United States District Judge