Full Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-9589 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT November 16, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court ALEXANDRE VEIGA SILVA, Petitioner, v. No. 25-9589 (Petition for Review) TODD BLANCHE, United States Attorney General, Respondent. _________________________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________ Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, PHILLIPS, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. _________________________________ Alexandre Veiga Silva petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision affirming the immigration judge’s denial of his application for cancellation of removal. Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), we deny the petition for review. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined * unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-9589 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 2 I. BACKGROUND A. Factual background Mr. Silva, a native and citizen of Brazil, was admitted to the United States on June 3, 1998, pursuant to a visitor visa, with authorization to remain in the United States until December 3, 1998. Mr. Silva remained in the United States beyond that date without authorization. Mr. Silva and his former wife, Lee Zandra Araujo, have two children, N.S. and O.S., both of whom were born in the United States. Neither child speaks or reads Portuguese. N.S. was diagnosed by a psychologist with attention- deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), moderate oppositional defiant disorder, and unspecified anxiety disorder. The psychologist recommended academic accommodations including provision of a quiet place to complete tasks with one-on- one support, frequent breaks, and assigning special responsibilities in the presence of peer groups. B. Proceedings before the IJ In December 2017, Mr. Silva submitted an asylum application to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) alleging he was harmed several times when he lived in Brazil because he attended military school and because his father was in the military. Mr. Silva also alleged that the police were unable to assist him and he expressed a fear of returning due to ongoing violence in Brazil. USCIS referred his asylum application to an immigration judge (IJ). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) placed Mr. Silva in removal proceedings 2 Appellate Case: 25-9589 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 3 and charged him with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) for remaining in the United States longer than permitted. Mr. Silva, represented by counsel, appeared before an IJ, conceded his removability as charged by DHS, renewed his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection, and applied for cancellation of removal for certain non-permanent residents under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). In September 2019, the IJ held a hearing on all of Mr. Silva’s applications, as well as the similar applications of Ms. Araujo, who at the time was still married to Mr. Silva. At the time of the hearing, N.S. was in fifth grade and O.S. was in second grade. Mr. Silva and Ms. Araujo argued at the hearing, in relevant part, that removing N.S. and O.S. to Brazil would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to them. After the hearing, the IJ issued a decision denying Mr. Silva’s applications. 1 With respect to the application for cancellation of removal, the IJ found that if Mr. Silva and Ms. Araujo were removed, both of their children would accompany them to Brazil. The IJ found that N.S. “ha[d] successfully completed four grades in elementary school,” was “above grade level in some areas and . . . ha[d] accessed accelerated classes,” and was “not currently receiving special education services.” R. vol. 1 at 83. The IJ acknowledged that “notes from [N.S.’s] teachers show[ed] 1 We need not detail the IJ’s reasoning for denying Mr. Silva’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection because Mr. Silva does not challenge those rulings in his petition. 3 Appellate Case: 25-9589 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 4 isolated incidents of problematic behavior.” Id. The IJ noted that Mr. Silva presented evidence indicating that N.S. has ADHD, “has had difficulty paying attention in school,” and had experienced “some behavioral issues, especially in the . . . year” preceding the hearing. Id. at 82. The IJ also found that a psychologist who completed an assessment of N.S. recommended “try[ing] medication to reduce” his “anxiety and impulsivity.” Id. at 83 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the IJ also noted that N.S. had never been assessed for, and thus did not have, an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) at his school. Based upon these findings, the IJ in turn “f[ound] nothing that would indicate” that N.S. had “a compelling special need in school.” Id. The IJ acknowledged “there w[ould] be disruption in [N.S.’s] education if his parents relocate[d]” given that “[h]e does not speak Portuguese.” Id. Although Mr. Silva “expressed concern over whether the Brazilian schools could provide [N.S.] with the level of education he [was] currently receiv[ing],” the IJ found “no evidence that” N.S. or O.S. “would be deprived of an education in Brazil.” Id. The IJ found that both Mr. Silva and Ms. Araujo “are educated and engaged” and “have very significant assets acquired in the U.S. that would enable them to access educational resources in Brazil far above the average citizen.” Id. The IJ found “unpersuasive” Mr. Silva’s testimony expressing pessimism about “his ability to find employment in Brazil.” Id. The IJ “acknowledge[d] that there m[ight] be a decrease in income to the family” because Mr. Silva might “not be able to obtain a job comparable to the one he has” in the United States. Id. The IJ 4 Appellate Case: 25-9589 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 5 also noted that “Mr. Silva estimated his assets in excess of $600,000.” Id. Ultimately, the IJ found that “while the children will likely experience economic hardship to some degree, such hardship is a common experience for families of deportees and therefore is not exceptional nor extremely unusual.” Id. Considering these facts, the IJ found that Mr. Silva and Ms. Araujo “ha[d] not met their burden of proving that their removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to their children.” Id. The IJ therefore denied Mr. Silva’s application for cancellation of removal. C. Proceedings before the BIA Mr. Silva appealed to the BIA. In November 2025, the BIA, via a single- member decision, affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed the appeal. Mr. Silva then filed a petition for review of the BIA’s decision. II. DISCUSSION A. Denial of cancellation of removal Mr. Silva argues that the BIA committed “reversible legal error” in denying his application for cancellation of removal. Pet’r Opening Br. at 14. Generally speaking, “[w]e review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo” and its “factual findings for substantial evidence.” Miguel-Pena v. Garland, 94 F.4th 1145, 1153 (10th Cir. 2024). “When, as here, a single BIA member issues a reasoned decision addressing a petitioner’s arguments on appeal, we confine our review to the BIA’s decision . . . and will not address the IJ’s decision except where the BIA has explicitly incorporated his reasoning.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). 5 Appellate Case: 25-9589 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 6 Notably, the BIA in this case expressly incorporated the IJ’s reasoning in arriving at its decision. R. vol. 1 at 3-4 (“For the reasons stated in his decision, we agree with the [IJ] that” Mr. Silva “did not meet [his] burden[] to establish that [his] removal . . . would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [his] qualifying relatives”). We therefore take into account the IJ’s decision in addressing Mr. Silva’s challenge to the BIA’s decision. To be eligible for cancellation of removal, Mr. Silva had to establish, in relevant part, “that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [his] . . . child, who is a citizen of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i) (providing that noncitizen bears the burden of establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal). “Under this standard,” an applicant such as Mr. Silva “must establish hardship that is ‘substantially different from, or beyond, that which would normally be expected from the deportation of an alien with close family members here.’” Martinez v. Garland, 98 F.4th 1018, 1021 (10th Cir. 2024) (quoting In re Monreal- Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 65 (B.I.A. 2001)). “For example, the BIA has noted that an applicant whose child has ‘very serious health issues, or compelling special needs in school’ might qualify.” Id. (quoting Monreal, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 63). “But economic detriment or diminished educational opportunities are insufficient.” Id. The hardship determination is a “mixed question” of law and fact that “is primarily factual” and that we review under a “deferential” standard. Id. (quoting Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 225 (2024)). Under this standard, “[t]he facts 6 Appellate Case: 25-9589 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 7 underlying any determination on cancellation of removal” are “unreviewable.” Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 225. “For instance, an IJ’s factfinding on credibility, the seriousness of a family member’s medical condition, or the level of financial support a noncitizen currently provides remain unreviewable. Only the question whether th[e] established facts satisfy the statutory eligibility standard is subject to judicial review.” Id. Mr. Silva argues that the BIA “erred in upholding the IJ’s decision denying [his] cancellation on . . . on the basis that [he] is ‘wealthy,’ has fewer [qualifying relatives], and failed to show enough hardship to the [qualifying relatives] . . . when the cancellation statute does not condition eligibility on the number of children a noncitizen has or financial status.” Pet’r Opening Br. at 13. In other words, Mr. Silva argues that the BIA “essentially created a ‘wealth bar’ and a ‘numerosity requirement’ that Congress never enacted.” Id. at 24. We reject these arguments. To be sure, the IJ noted the fact that Mr. Silva has two qualifying relatives, i.e., N.S. and O.S., and “ha[s] very significant assets acquired in the U.S. that would enable [him] to access educational resources in Brazil far above the average citizen.” R. vol. 1 at 83. But the IJ did not treat either of these facts as bars to relief. Rather, the IJ considered these facts, along with many other facts, especially the details of N.S.’s purported educational difficulties, in determining whether Mr. Silva met his burden of proving that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his two children. 7 Appellate Case: 25-9589 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 8 Mr. Silva next argues that the BIA’s “decision was legally deficient because it treated N.S.’s condition,” i.e., his “severe ADHD,” and “both children’s language deficiency as generalized ‘common hardships,’ rather than a specific set of interactive disabilities,” and because it assumed that Mr. Silva’s wealth can mitigate those concerns and “substitute for specialized legal and educational rights.” Pet’r Opening Br. at 26-27. These arguments find no support in the record. To begin with, the IJ found, and the BIA agreed, that there was no evidence indicating N.S. had “a compelling special need in school.” R. vol. 1 at 83. The IJ likewise found, and the BIA agreed, “that the evidence presented on [N.S.’s] ADHD [wa]s insufficient to establish an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” Id. Thus, the IJ and the BIA did not address, nor did they need to, the differences that Mr. Silva now highlights between the American and Brazilian education systems in terms of how they address a student’s ADHD. Nor did the IJ or the BIA treat ADHD as a “common hardship.” As for the children’s inability to speak Portuguese, the IJ expressly took that fact into account but nevertheless concluded there was no evidence that the children “would be deprived of an education in Brazil.” Id. In reaching that conclusion, the IJ noted that Mr. Silva and Ms. Araujo “are educated and engaged,” and “have very significant assets . . . that would enable them to access educational resources in Brazil far above the average citizen.” Id. Notably, Mr. Silva does not dispute that his assets could allow him to access resources that would help his children learn Portuguese and adapt to their new educational environment. 8 Appellate Case: 25-9589 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 9 In sum, giving deferential review to the BIA’s decision, we conclude the BIA did not err in determining that Mr. Silva failed to establish that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his children. B. Ineffective assistance of counsel Mr. Silva seeks to assert an ineffective assistance claim (IAC) against the attorney who represented him during the proceedings before the BIA. According to Mr. Silva, that attorney, who is now an IJ with the BIA, learned while Mr. Silva’s appeal was pending before the BIA that an IEP was developed for N.S. in 2020 (i.e., after the IJ issued his decision and while the appeal was pending before the BIA). Mr. Silva further alleges that his former attorney prepared a motion to remand highlighting N.S.’s IEP, but never filed that motion with the BIA. Mr. Silva concedes the IAC claim is “unpreserved and unexhausted” because it was never decided by the BIA. Pet’r Opening Br. at 12. He nevertheless asks us to review the IAC claim on the merits, arguing that “the administrative remedy,” i.e. filing a motion to reopen with the BIA on the basis of his IAC claim, “is both inadequate and futile” because the attorney who he claims was ineffective “is now a sitting IJ within the . . . same agency tasked with adjudicating” any motion to reopen. Id. at 15. More specifically, Mr. Silva argues that “[e]xpecting the BIA . . . to impartially adjudicate a claim of professional misconduct against one of its own sitting officers violates the core principles of Due Process” and “this Court is the only forum capable of providing a neutral and final determination.” Id. at 16. 9 Appellate Case: 25-9589 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 10 We decline Mr. Silva’s request and conclude that the IAC claim is not properly before us. We have previously held that, “[b]ecause the [BIA] has created in [In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (B.I.A. 1988)] a mechanism for hearing due- process based claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, such claims must first be presented to the [BIA].” Galvez Piñeda v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 833, 837 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The appropriate method of presentation is a motion to reopen the case before the BIA.” 2 Id. And following that procedure creates an administrative record that allows us to later review the IAC claim. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (limiting our review to “the administrative record on which the order of removal is based”). It is true that the Supreme Court held in Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 413 (2023), that a petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) does not deprive this court of jurisdiction. The Court also held that a petitioner need not file a discretionary motion to reopen to fulfill the § 1252(d)(1) exhaustion requirement. See id. at 429-31 & n.9. But although the exhaustion requirement is subject to waiver or forfeiture because it is not jurisdictional, it remains “mandatory.” Miguel-Peña, 94 F.4th at 1155. And nothing in Santos-Zacaria establishes a right to initial judicial adjudication of an IAC claim where, as here, that claim requires factual development outside the administrative record. Indeed, given that Mr. Silva represents he has since filed a motion to reopen 2 According to Mr. Silva, he has “lodged” a motion to reopen with the BIA. Pet’r Reply Br. at 12-14. 10 Appellate Case: 25-9589 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 Page: 11 with the BIA, we see no reason that we would overlook his failure to exhaust administrative remedies, even if we had discretion to do so. Cf. Miguel-Peña, 94 F.4th at 1158 (“We decline to deprive the agency of the opportunity to address [the petitioner’s] arguments in the first instance.”). Finally, we reject Mr. Silva’s argument that the BIA is incapable of impartially resolving his IAC claim. It is of course true that “a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process” that “applies to administrative agencies which adjudicate.” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted). But it is equally true that we recognize “a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators” in administrative agencies, and Mr. Silva has offered nothing that would persuade us that this presumption has been overcome in his case. Id. at 47. III. CONCLUSION We deny the petition for review. We also deny the pending motions filed by Mr. Silva. Entered for the Court Jerome A. Holmes Chief Judge 11