Silva v. Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket25-9589
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT November 16, 2026
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
ALEXANDRE VEIGA SILVA,
Petitioner,
v. No. 25-9589
(Petition for Review)
TODD BLANCHE, United States Attorney
General,
Respondent.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
_________________________________
Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, PHILLIPS, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Alexandre Veiga Silva petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ decision affirming the immigration judge’s denial of his application for
cancellation of removal. Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), we
deny the petition for review.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
*
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual background
Mr. Silva, a native and citizen of Brazil, was admitted to the United States on
June 3, 1998, pursuant to a visitor visa, with authorization to remain in the United
States until December 3, 1998. Mr. Silva remained in the United States beyond that
date without authorization.
Mr. Silva and his former wife, Lee Zandra Araujo, have two children, N.S. and
O.S., both of whom were born in the United States. Neither child speaks or reads
Portuguese. N.S. was diagnosed by a psychologist with attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), moderate oppositional defiant disorder, and
unspecified anxiety disorder. The psychologist recommended academic
accommodations including provision of a quiet place to complete tasks with one-on-
one support, frequent breaks, and assigning special responsibilities in the presence of
peer groups.
B. Proceedings before the IJ
In December 2017, Mr. Silva submitted an asylum application to the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) alleging he was harmed several
times when he lived in Brazil because he attended military school and because his
father was in the military. Mr. Silva also alleged that the police were unable to assist
him and he expressed a fear of returning due to ongoing violence in Brazil.
USCIS referred his asylum application to an immigration judge (IJ). The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) placed Mr. Silva in removal proceedings
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and charged him with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) for remaining in
the United States longer than permitted.
Mr. Silva, represented by counsel, appeared before an IJ, conceded his
removability as charged by DHS, renewed his application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and CAT protection, and applied for cancellation of removal for certain
non-permanent residents under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).
In September 2019, the IJ held a hearing on all of Mr. Silva’s applications, as
well as the similar applications of Ms. Araujo, who at the time was still married to
Mr. Silva. At the time of the hearing, N.S. was in fifth grade and O.S. was in second
grade. Mr. Silva and Ms. Araujo argued at the hearing, in relevant part, that
removing N.S. and O.S. to Brazil would result in exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship to them.
After the hearing, the IJ issued a decision denying Mr. Silva’s applications. 1
With respect to the application for cancellation of removal, the IJ found that if
Mr. Silva and Ms. Araujo were removed, both of their children would accompany
them to Brazil. The IJ found that N.S. “ha[d] successfully completed four grades in
elementary school,” was “above grade level in some areas and . . . ha[d] accessed
accelerated classes,” and was “not currently receiving special education services.”
R. vol. 1 at 83. The IJ acknowledged that “notes from [N.S.’s] teachers show[ed]
1
We need not detail the IJ’s reasoning for denying Mr. Silva’s applications for
asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection because Mr. Silva does not
challenge those rulings in his petition.
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isolated incidents of problematic behavior.” Id. The IJ noted that Mr. Silva
presented evidence indicating that N.S. has ADHD, “has had difficulty paying
attention in school,” and had experienced “some behavioral issues, especially in
the . . . year” preceding the hearing. Id. at 82. The IJ also found that a psychologist
who completed an assessment of N.S. recommended “try[ing] medication to reduce”
his “anxiety and impulsivity.” Id. at 83 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the
IJ also noted that N.S. had never been assessed for, and thus did not have, an
Individualized Education Plan (IEP) at his school. Based upon these findings, the IJ
in turn “f[ound] nothing that would indicate” that N.S. had “a compelling special
need in school.” Id.
The IJ acknowledged “there w[ould] be disruption in [N.S.’s] education if his
parents relocate[d]” given that “[h]e does not speak Portuguese.” Id. Although
Mr. Silva “expressed concern over whether the Brazilian schools could provide
[N.S.] with the level of education he [was] currently receiv[ing],” the IJ found “no
evidence that” N.S. or O.S. “would be deprived of an education in Brazil.” Id. The
IJ found that both Mr. Silva and Ms. Araujo “are educated and engaged” and “have
very significant assets acquired in the U.S. that would enable them to access
educational resources in Brazil far above the average citizen.” Id.
The IJ found “unpersuasive” Mr. Silva’s testimony expressing pessimism
about “his ability to find employment in Brazil.” Id. The IJ “acknowledge[d] that
there m[ight] be a decrease in income to the family” because Mr. Silva might “not be
able to obtain a job comparable to the one he has” in the United States. Id. The IJ
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also noted that “Mr. Silva estimated his assets in excess of $600,000.” Id.
Ultimately, the IJ found that “while the children will likely experience economic
hardship to some degree, such hardship is a common experience for families of
deportees and therefore is not exceptional nor extremely unusual.” Id.
Considering these facts, the IJ found that Mr. Silva and Ms. Araujo “ha[d] not
met their burden of proving that their removal would result in exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship to their children.” Id. The IJ therefore denied
Mr. Silva’s application for cancellation of removal.
C. Proceedings before the BIA
Mr. Silva appealed to the BIA. In November 2025, the BIA, via a single-
member decision, affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed the appeal.
Mr. Silva then filed a petition for review of the BIA’s decision.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Denial of cancellation of removal
Mr. Silva argues that the BIA committed “reversible legal error” in denying
his application for cancellation of removal. Pet’r Opening Br. at 14. Generally
speaking, “[w]e review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo” and its “factual findings
for substantial evidence.” Miguel-Pena v. Garland, 94 F.4th 1145, 1153 (10th Cir.
2024). “When, as here, a single BIA member issues a reasoned decision addressing a
petitioner’s arguments on appeal, we confine our review to the BIA’s decision . . .
and will not address the IJ’s decision except where the BIA has explicitly
incorporated his reasoning.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Notably, the BIA in this case expressly incorporated the IJ’s reasoning in arriving at
its decision. R. vol. 1 at 3-4 (“For the reasons stated in his decision, we agree with
the [IJ] that” Mr. Silva “did not meet [his] burden[] to establish that [his] removal . . .
would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [his] qualifying
relatives”). We therefore take into account the IJ’s decision in addressing Mr. Silva’s
challenge to the BIA’s decision.
To be eligible for cancellation of removal, Mr. Silva had to establish, in
relevant part, “that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship to [his] . . . child, who is a citizen of the United States.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1)(D); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i) (providing that noncitizen
bears the burden of establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal).
“Under this standard,” an applicant such as Mr. Silva “must establish hardship
that is ‘substantially different from, or beyond, that which would normally be
expected from the deportation of an alien with close family members here.’”
Martinez v. Garland, 98 F.4th 1018, 1021 (10th Cir. 2024) (quoting In re Monreal-
Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 65 (B.I.A. 2001)). “For example, the BIA has noted
that an applicant whose child has ‘very serious health issues, or compelling special
needs in school’ might qualify.” Id. (quoting Monreal, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 63). “But
economic detriment or diminished educational opportunities are insufficient.” Id.
The hardship determination is a “mixed question” of law and fact that “is
primarily factual” and that we review under a “deferential” standard. Id. (quoting
Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 225 (2024)). Under this standard, “[t]he facts
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underlying any determination on cancellation of removal” are “unreviewable.”
Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 225. “For instance, an IJ’s factfinding on credibility, the
seriousness of a family member’s medical condition, or the level of financial support
a noncitizen currently provides remain unreviewable. Only the question whether
th[e] established facts satisfy the statutory eligibility standard is subject to judicial
review.” Id.
Mr. Silva argues that the BIA “erred in upholding the IJ’s decision denying
[his] cancellation on . . . on the basis that [he] is ‘wealthy,’ has fewer [qualifying
relatives], and failed to show enough hardship to the [qualifying relatives] . . . when
the cancellation statute does not condition eligibility on the number of children a
noncitizen has or financial status.” Pet’r Opening Br. at 13. In other words,
Mr. Silva argues that the BIA “essentially created a ‘wealth bar’ and a ‘numerosity
requirement’ that Congress never enacted.” Id. at 24.
We reject these arguments. To be sure, the IJ noted the fact that Mr. Silva has
two qualifying relatives, i.e., N.S. and O.S., and “ha[s] very significant assets
acquired in the U.S. that would enable [him] to access educational resources in Brazil
far above the average citizen.” R. vol. 1 at 83. But the IJ did not treat either of these
facts as bars to relief. Rather, the IJ considered these facts, along with many other
facts, especially the details of N.S.’s purported educational difficulties, in
determining whether Mr. Silva met his burden of proving that his removal would
result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his two children.
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Mr. Silva next argues that the BIA’s “decision was legally deficient because it
treated N.S.’s condition,” i.e., his “severe ADHD,” and “both children’s language
deficiency as generalized ‘common hardships,’ rather than a specific set of
interactive disabilities,” and because it assumed that Mr. Silva’s wealth can mitigate
those concerns and “substitute for specialized legal and educational rights.” Pet’r
Opening Br. at 26-27.
These arguments find no support in the record. To begin with, the IJ found,
and the BIA agreed, that there was no evidence indicating N.S. had “a compelling
special need in school.” R. vol. 1 at 83. The IJ likewise found, and the BIA agreed,
“that the evidence presented on [N.S.’s] ADHD [wa]s insufficient to establish an
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” Id. Thus, the IJ and the BIA did not
address, nor did they need to, the differences that Mr. Silva now highlights between
the American and Brazilian education systems in terms of how they address a
student’s ADHD. Nor did the IJ or the BIA treat ADHD as a “common hardship.”
As for the children’s inability to speak Portuguese, the IJ expressly took that
fact into account but nevertheless concluded there was no evidence that the children
“would be deprived of an education in Brazil.” Id. In reaching that conclusion, the
IJ noted that Mr. Silva and Ms. Araujo “are educated and engaged,” and “have very
significant assets . . . that would enable them to access educational resources in
Brazil far above the average citizen.” Id. Notably, Mr. Silva does not dispute that
his assets could allow him to access resources that would help his children learn
Portuguese and adapt to their new educational environment.
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In sum, giving deferential review to the BIA’s decision, we conclude the BIA
did not err in determining that Mr. Silva failed to establish that his removal would
result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his children.
B. Ineffective assistance of counsel
Mr. Silva seeks to assert an ineffective assistance claim (IAC) against the
attorney who represented him during the proceedings before the BIA. According to
Mr. Silva, that attorney, who is now an IJ with the BIA, learned while Mr. Silva’s
appeal was pending before the BIA that an IEP was developed for N.S. in 2020
(i.e., after the IJ issued his decision and while the appeal was pending before the
BIA). Mr. Silva further alleges that his former attorney prepared a motion to remand
highlighting N.S.’s IEP, but never filed that motion with the BIA.
Mr. Silva concedes the IAC claim is “unpreserved and unexhausted” because it
was never decided by the BIA. Pet’r Opening Br. at 12. He nevertheless asks us to
review the IAC claim on the merits, arguing that “the administrative remedy,” i.e.
filing a motion to reopen with the BIA on the basis of his IAC claim, “is both
inadequate and futile” because the attorney who he claims was ineffective “is now a
sitting IJ within the . . . same agency tasked with adjudicating” any motion to reopen.
Id. at 15. More specifically, Mr. Silva argues that “[e]xpecting the BIA . . . to
impartially adjudicate a claim of professional misconduct against one of its own
sitting officers violates the core principles of Due Process” and “this Court is the
only forum capable of providing a neutral and final determination.” Id. at 16.
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We decline Mr. Silva’s request and conclude that the IAC claim is not properly
before us. We have previously held that, “[b]ecause the [BIA] has created in [In re
Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (B.I.A. 1988)] a mechanism for hearing due-
process based claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, such claims must first be
presented to the [BIA].” Galvez Piñeda v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 833, 837 (10th Cir.
2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The appropriate method of presentation is
a motion to reopen the case before the BIA.” 2 Id. And following that procedure
creates an administrative record that allows us to later review the IAC claim. See
generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (limiting our review to “the administrative record
on which the order of removal is based”).
It is true that the Supreme Court held in Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S.
411, 413 (2023), that a petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies under
8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) does not deprive this court of jurisdiction. The Court also held
that a petitioner need not file a discretionary motion to reopen to fulfill the
§ 1252(d)(1) exhaustion requirement. See id. at 429-31 & n.9. But although the
exhaustion requirement is subject to waiver or forfeiture because it is not
jurisdictional, it remains “mandatory.” Miguel-Peña, 94 F.4th at 1155. And nothing
in Santos-Zacaria establishes a right to initial judicial adjudication of an IAC claim
where, as here, that claim requires factual development outside the administrative
record. Indeed, given that Mr. Silva represents he has since filed a motion to reopen
2
According to Mr. Silva, he has “lodged” a motion to reopen with the BIA.
Pet’r Reply Br. at 12-14.
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with the BIA, we see no reason that we would overlook his failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, even if we had discretion to do so. Cf. Miguel-Peña,
94 F.4th at 1158 (“We decline to deprive the agency of the opportunity to address
[the petitioner’s] arguments in the first instance.”).
Finally, we reject Mr. Silva’s argument that the BIA is incapable of impartially
resolving his IAC claim. It is of course true that “a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a
basic requirement of due process” that “applies to administrative agencies which
adjudicate.” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975) (internal quotation marks
omitted). But it is equally true that we recognize “a presumption of honesty and
integrity in those serving as adjudicators” in administrative agencies, and Mr. Silva
has offered nothing that would persuade us that this presumption has been overcome
in his case. Id. at 47.
III. CONCLUSION
We deny the petition for review. We also deny the pending motions filed by
Mr. Silva.
Entered for the Court
Jerome A. Holmes
Chief Judge
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