Rosas-Arenas v. Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket24-4213
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LUZ TERESA ROSAS-ARENAS; No. 24-4213
MAREYLI ALEXANDRA TORRES- Agency Nos.
ROSAS, A246-756-408
A246-756-409
Petitioners,
MEMORANDUM*
v.
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 18, 2026**
San Francisco, California
Before: S.R. THOMAS, FRIEDLAND, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Luz Teresa Rosas-Arenas,1 a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of
an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her motion to
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1
Rosas-Arenas is the lead Petitioner, but her application also listed her
minor daughter as a derivative beneficiary.
reopen her BIA appeal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Applying a
“deferential, abuse-of-discretion standard of review,” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S.
233, 242 (2010), we deny the petition.
Rosas-Arenas applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the Convention Against Torture. An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied each
claim for relief. In response, Rosas-Arenas timely filed a Notice of Appeal. On
the Notice of Appeal form, Rosas-Arenas checked a box indicating that she
“intend[ed] to file a separate written brief or statement.” Below that box was a
warning to petitioners who indicate on the form that they will submit such a filing:
the BIA may “summarily dismiss your appeal if you do not file a brief or statement
within the time set in the briefing schedule.” Rosas-Arenas did not submit a brief
by the March 7, 2024 deadline. Approximately two months later, when a brief had
still not arrived, the BIA summarily dismissed the appeal for that procedural
failure, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E), as well as for the lack of “specific
reasons” in the Notice of Appeal for contesting the IJ decision, see id.
§ 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(A).
Rosas-Arenas then filed a motion to reopen the proceedings. In it, she
argued that (1) a fee dispute with her lawyer prevented her from filing the brief on
time, and (2) there was “good cause” for the BIA to extend the deadline, including
because the Government would not be prejudiced by the BIA’s acceptance of a
2 24-4213
delayed brief. The BIA denied the motion to reopen and accordingly declined to
consider the late-filed brief. We hold that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by
doing so.
First, the BIA concluded that “a fee dispute between the respondents and
their counsel is not a basis to reopen these proceedings.” We have previously held
that ineffective assistance of counsel can be a basis for reopening, see Correa-
Rivera v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1128, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2013), but as the BIA noted,
Rosas-Arenas made no allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel here. See
Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639-40 (B.I.A. 1988) (outlining procedural
requirements for a motion to reopen or reconsider based on ineffective assistance
of counsel and requiring a showing of prejudice). The BIA’s decision to reject the
fee-dispute rationale falls within its “broad discretion, conferred by the Attorney
General, ‘to grant or deny a motion to reopen.’” Kucana, 558 U.S. at 250 (quoting
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)).
Second, the BIA concluded that Rosas-Arenas’s additional arguments for
reopening—including that accepting the brief would not cause unfair prejudice to
the Government—were “unpersuasive.” Contrary to Rosas-Arenas’s suggestion,
the BIA was also within its discretion to make that determination. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(a) (“The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider is
3 24-4213
within the discretion of the Board.”); Kucana, 558 U.S. at 250.2
Petition DENIED.3
2
To the extent that Rosas-Arenas has also argued that the fee dispute was an
“extraordinary circumstance” that should have entitled her to equitable tolling of
the deadline, the BIA appropriately rejected that argument for the same reasons.
3
The motion to stay removal, Dkt. No. 2, is denied.
4 24-4213