Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT LUZ TERESA ROSAS-ARENAS; No. 24-4213 MAREYLI ALEXANDRA TORRES- Agency Nos. ROSAS, A246-756-408 A246-756-409 Petitioners, MEMORANDUM* v. TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted November 18, 2026** San Francisco, California Before: S.R. THOMAS, FRIEDLAND, and BRESS, Circuit Judges. Luz Teresa Rosas-Arenas,1 a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her motion to * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 1 Rosas-Arenas is the lead Petitioner, but her application also listed her minor daughter as a derivative beneficiary. reopen her BIA appeal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Applying a “deferential, abuse-of-discretion standard of review,” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 242 (2010), we deny the petition. Rosas-Arenas applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied each claim for relief. In response, Rosas-Arenas timely filed a Notice of Appeal. On the Notice of Appeal form, Rosas-Arenas checked a box indicating that she “intend[ed] to file a separate written brief or statement.” Below that box was a warning to petitioners who indicate on the form that they will submit such a filing: the BIA may “summarily dismiss your appeal if you do not file a brief or statement within the time set in the briefing schedule.” Rosas-Arenas did not submit a brief by the March 7, 2024 deadline. Approximately two months later, when a brief had still not arrived, the BIA summarily dismissed the appeal for that procedural failure, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E), as well as for the lack of “specific reasons” in the Notice of Appeal for contesting the IJ decision, see id. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(A). Rosas-Arenas then filed a motion to reopen the proceedings. In it, she argued that (1) a fee dispute with her lawyer prevented her from filing the brief on time, and (2) there was “good cause” for the BIA to extend the deadline, including because the Government would not be prejudiced by the BIA’s acceptance of a 2 24-4213 delayed brief. The BIA denied the motion to reopen and accordingly declined to consider the late-filed brief. We hold that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by doing so. First, the BIA concluded that “a fee dispute between the respondents and their counsel is not a basis to reopen these proceedings.” We have previously held that ineffective assistance of counsel can be a basis for reopening, see Correa- Rivera v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1128, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2013), but as the BIA noted, Rosas-Arenas made no allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel here. See Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639-40 (B.I.A. 1988) (outlining procedural requirements for a motion to reopen or reconsider based on ineffective assistance of counsel and requiring a showing of prejudice). The BIA’s decision to reject the fee-dispute rationale falls within its “broad discretion, conferred by the Attorney General, ‘to grant or deny a motion to reopen.’” Kucana, 558 U.S. at 250 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)). Second, the BIA concluded that Rosas-Arenas’s additional arguments for reopening—including that accepting the brief would not cause unfair prejudice to the Government—were “unpersuasive.” Contrary to Rosas-Arenas’s suggestion, the BIA was also within its discretion to make that determination. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (“The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider is 3 24-4213 within the discretion of the Board.”); Kucana, 558 U.S. at 250.2 Petition DENIED.3 2 To the extent that Rosas-Arenas has also argued that the fee dispute was an “extraordinary circumstance” that should have entitled her to equitable tolling of the deadline, the BIA appropriately rejected that argument for the same reasons. 3 The motion to stay removal, Dkt. No. 2, is denied. 4 24-4213