Full Opinion

13-795 Wang v. Blanche BIA A089 253 373 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 3 rd day of November, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: DENNY CHIN, WILLIAM J. NARDINI, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ ZHU CHAO WANG, Petitioner, v. 13-795 NAC TODD BLANCHE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________ FOR PETITIONER: Patrick A. Metcalf, Metcalf & Associates, P.C., Hoffman Estates, IL. FOR RESPONDENT: Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General; Cindy S. Ferrier, Assistant Director; Janette Allen Perea, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. Petitioner Zhu Chao Wang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a February 6, 2013, decision of the BIA denying Wang’s motion to reopen her removal proceedings. In re Zhu Chao Wang, No. A 089 253 373 (B.I.A. Feb. 6, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. “[O]ur review is limited to the BIA’s decision not to reopen petitioner’s removal proceedings.” Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir. 2005). We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen “deferentially for abuse of discretion” and any finding as to country conditions “only for substantial evidence.” Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation modified). 2 A movant may generally move to reopen no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Wang’s July 19, 2012, motion was untimely because she filed it more than two years after her March 12, 2010, final removal order. However, the time limit does not apply if the motion seeks reopening to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). To obtain reopening, the movant must also demonstrate prima facie eligibility for the relief sought. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 168; see also I.N.S. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104 (1988) (holding that the failure to establish “a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought” is an “independent ground[]” for the BIA to “deny a motion to reopen”). Wang sought reopening to reapply for asylum based on her conversion to and practice of Christianity in the United States after her appeal was denied. The BIA found that Wang failed to establish eligibility for relief because her “sparse 3 evidence is insufficient to establish a prima facie asylum case and meet the ‘heavy burden’ to justify reopening her case more than 2 years after the Board’s final decision.” Certified Admin. R. at 3. The BIA further concluded that Wang’s “religious conversion” constituted “a personal circumstance,” and noted that “a change in personal circumstances does not establish an exception to the restrictions imposed on motions brought before the Board.” Id. at 3-4. Wang does not challenge—or indeed even mention—these aspects of the BIA’s decision in her brief on appeal.1 These dispositive issues have thus been abandoned, and the petition is denied on that basis. See Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d Cir. 2023) (“We consider abandoned any claims not adequately presented in an appellant’s brief, and an appellant’s failure to make legal or factual arguments constitutes abandonment.” (citation modified)); see also Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104. We need not reach the BIA’s alternative holding regarding changed country conditions. 1 Wang presents the sole issue to be decided by this Court as: “Did the BIA abuse its discretion by denying Petitioner’s Motion to Reopen without meaningfully considering Petitioner’s evidence of the changed conditions in China?” Pet’r’s Br. at iv. 4 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 5