Full Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0437n.06 Case No. 25-3882 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Oct 27, 2026 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk MIGUEL SALDANA-YADAICELA, ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM ) THE UNITED STATES BOARD OF ) TODD W. BLANCHE, Attorney General, IMMIGRATION APPEALS ) ) Respondent. OPINION ) ) ) Before: GIBBONS, LARSEN, and RITZ, Circuit Judges. JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Miguel Saldana-Yadaicela, a noncitizen living in the United States, applied for cancellation of his removal. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Saldana-Yadaicela’s application because he did not establish that his U.S.-citizen children would face extreme hardship if he were removed. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision. Saldana-Yadaicela now seeks our review of the BIA’s decision. Seeing no error, we deny Saldana-Yadaicela’s petition for review. I. Miguel Saldana-Yadaicela, a native and citizen of Ecuador, entered the United States without inspection in 1996. Saldana-Yadaicela is married to Rosa Florencia Salto-Yadaicela, a native and citizen of Ecuador also unlawfully present in the United States, and they share four daughters, who are all U.S. citizens. At the time of the IJ’s decision in 2021, Saldana-Yadaicela’s No. 25-3882, Saldana-Yadaicela v. Blanche nineteen-year-old daughter attended community college, and his other three daughters—aged fifteen, nine, and seven—attended private Catholic school. Saldana-Yadaicela’s second-youngest daughter, Emily, has experienced developmental delays affecting her speech and language abilities. Emily receives extra help in class, and her school recommended that she be enrolled in public school, where she would have access to special education classes. Emily has, however, remained in private school. At one point, Emily attended private speech therapy, though she no longer does. In 2011, the government initiated removal proceedings against Saldana-Yadaicela and designated Ecuador as the country of removal. Saldana-Yadaicela then applied for cancellation of removal. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allows the Attorney General to cancel the deportation of an otherwise deportable noncitizen1 if that noncitizen establishes four preconditions to relief: (1) continuous physical presence for a minimum of 10 years prior to the cancellation application; (2) he has been a person of “good moral character” during that period; (3) he has no convictions of a disqualifying offense; and (4) he has established that “removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the [noncitizen’s] spouse, parent, or child” who is a U.S. citizen or lawfully admitted permanent resident. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A)-(D); see Singh v. Rosen, 984 F.3d 1142, 1147 (6th Cir. 2021). After a hearing, the IJ denied Saldana-Yadaicela’s application. Although the IJ found that Saldana-Yadaicela was credible and that he established continuous presence in United States for ten years, good moral character, and the lack of any disqualifying criminal conviction, the IJ concluded that Saldana-Yadaicela had not established that removal would cause extreme hardship 1 We use the term “noncitizen” as equivalent to the statutory term “alien.” Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 414 n.1 (2023). -2- No. 25-3882, Saldana-Yadaicela v. Blanche to his children. Saldana-Yadaicela appealed, but the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision. Saldana-Yadaicela then petitioned this court for review. II. “Where, as here, the [BIA] adopts the IJ’s reasoning but adds its own gloss in a separate opinion, we deem the [BIA’s] decision as the final agency determination, while simultaneously considering the IJ’s decision to the extent the [BIA] adopted it.” Baltazar Us v. Blanche, 174 F.4th 509, 512 (6th Cir. 2026) (citing Mateo-Esteban v. Garland, 125 F.4th 762, 766 (6th Cir. 2025)). Upon a petition for review of a cancellation decision, our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing “constitutional claims or questions of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). We review questions of law de novo. Singh, 984 F.3d at 1148. “[T]he statutory term ‘questions of law’” also encompasses mixed questions of law and fact. Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221, 228, 234 (2020). We may therefore review the BIA’s “‘ultimate hardship conclusion’ in a cancellation-of-removal proceeding” under the substantial-evidence standard. Araujo-Padilla v. Garland, 854 F. App’x 646, 649 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Singh, 984 F.3d at 1154); Baltazar Us, 174 F.4th at 512–13. But we may not review any factual findings underlying the BIA’s decision. Singh, 984 F.3d at 1154; Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 225 (2024). III. A. Saldana-Yadaicela first argues that the BIA erred by failing to consider any hardship to Saldana-Yadaicela’s eldest daughter, Erica. To be a qualifying relative for the purposes of cancellation of removal, a child must be under twenty-one years of age. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1). -3- No. 25-3882, Saldana-Yadaicela v. Blanche The correct time to ascertain the age of a qualifying child is when the IJ issues her decision. Perez- Perez v. Bondi, 160 F.4th 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2025). Erica was 19 years old at the time of the IJ’s decision and turned 21 years old while Saldana-Yadaicela’s appeal to the BIA was pending. Thus, the BIA should have considered hardship to Erica. Still, remand is not necessary because the BIA’s error was harmless. See Abdulahad v. Garland, 99 F.4th 275, 294–95 (6th Cir. 2024). The IJ included Erica in her hardship analysis, and the BIA addressed the emotional and financial hardships that Saldana-Yadaicela’s other daughters would face, which equally apply to Erica. The BIA determined that these hardships are to be expected and are not extremely unusual. See Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland, 124 F.4th 416, 422 (6th Cir. 2024); In re Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319, 323 (B.I.A. 2002). Thus, “there is no reason to believe . . . remand might lead to a different result.” Abdulahad, 99 F.4th at 295 (citation modified). B. Next, Saldana-Yadaicela argues that “[the IJ’s] factual determinations were clearly erroneous in several respects,” specifically regarding the severity of Emily’s disability and the availability of services in the United States and Ecuador. CA6 R. 10, Pet’r Br., at 14–18. We lack jurisdiction to disturb the IJ’s factual determinations. Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 225; see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), (a)(2)(D) (precluding judicial review of “any judgment regarding the granting of [discretionary] relief” from removal except for “constitutional claims or questions of law”). That said, we acknowledge that “some courts have held that an error of law occurs where material facts have been ‘totally overlooked’ or ‘seriously mischaracterized.’” Navarro v. Holder, 505 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mendez v. Holder, 566 F.3d 316, 323 (2d Cir. -4- No. 25-3882, Saldana-Yadaicela v. Blanche 2009)). We entertained that argument in Navarro but ultimately concluded that material facts in that case were neither “overlooked” nor “mischaracterized.” Id. at 446–47. Since Navarro, however, the Supreme Court has instructed that the INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provision “precludes judicial review of factual findings that underlie a [discretionary] denial of relief” from removal and gave no indication that there is a carveout for sufficiently off-base factual findings. Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 331 (2022). As a result, another panel of our court recently held that Navarro did not survive Patel. See Allotey v. Blanche, No. 25-4022, 2026 WL 2870779, at *2 (6th Cir. Sep. 21, 2026). As unpublished authority, neither Navarro nor Allotey bind us. And we need not choose between them here. Even if the rule from Navarro were correct, Saldana-Yadaicela identifies no severe factual errors. The BIA acknowledged Saldana-Yadaicela’s argument that the IJ mischaracterized Emily’s disability and later held that, “even assuming that Emily suffers from severe speech and language developmental delays, the respondent has not demonstrated exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative.” AR 4, BIA Decision. The BIA therefore did not overlook vital evidence or rely on mischaracterized evidence regarding the severity of Emily’s disability. Additionally, the IJ did not severely err when it found that Saldana-Yadaicela “is refusing to take advantage of” the special education opportunities available to Emily in the public school system by keeping her in private school. AR 57, IJ Decision. This is supported by documentation from Columbus (Ohio) City Schools that indicates that, despite the fact that Emily may be enrolled in public school for special education services “at any time,” the family “refuses” to enroll Emily in services through an Individualized Education Program “due to parental choice and will continue to keep their child enrolled in a non-public school.” AR 269, 2019 Evaluation Team Report. -5- No. 25-3882, Saldana-Yadaicela v. Blanche Saldana-Yadaicela argues that no special education services were available at that time, but even if that is true, the IJ’s finding is not a serious mischaracterization, as the IJ ultimately concluded that “regardless” of why Emily is not in public school, she is not currently receiving any special education service offered by the public school system. AR 57, IJ Decision. Saldana-Yadaicela also claims that the IJ ignored the opinions of Dr. Brahms and Dr. Gildersleeve-Neumann about the opportunities for Emily to receive therapy and other services in Ecuador. But the BIA referenced an email exchange between Dr. Brahms and Dr. Gildersleeve- Neumann, in which Dr. Gildersleeve-Neumann discussed the minimal services available for Emily in Ecuador. AR 4, BIA Decision; AR 312, IJ Ex. 4. The BIA nonetheless concluded that Saldana- Yadaicela did not demonstrate that educational assistance and speech therapy were not reasonably available in Ecuador. AR 4, BIA Decision. Moreover, Saldana-Yadaicela testified that he did not think his daughters would accompany him to Ecuador, rendering the conditions in Ecuador less important.2 AR 150, 169–70, Hr’g Tr. The IJ also noted that the court was “unaware” if Saldana-Yadaicela would take advantage of any special education plans if they were available in public schools in Ecuador. AR 57–58, IJ Decision. Saldana-Yadaicela asserts that there is “zero support” for the IJ’s “prediction” but does not point to anything in the record indicating that he would take advantage of any such services. CA6 R. 10, Pet’r Br., at 17. It is therefore not clear that the IJ’s statement is a mischaracterization, much less a serious one. 2 To demonstrate hardship based on the health of a family member, “an applicant needs to establish that the relative has a serious medical condition and, if he or she is accompanying the applicant to the country of removal, that adequate medical care for the claimed condition is not reasonably available in that country.” In re J-J-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 808, 811 (B.I.A. 2020) (footnote omitted). “It is the applicant’s burden to establish that a qualifying relative will accompany him or her to the country of removal.” Id. at 811 n.3. -6- No. 25-3882, Saldana-Yadaicela v. Blanche In sum, we do not have jurisdiction to address any of Saldana-Yadaicela’s arguments regarding the IJ’s and BIA’s factual determinations. C. Finally, Saldana-Yadaicela attacks the BIA’s hardship conclusion, arguing that substantial evidence demonstrates that his removal would exacerbate Emily’s disability.3 But “the [BIA’s] determination is ‘conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Baltazar Us, 174 F.4th at 512 (quoting Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S. 537, 545 (2026)). Saldana-Yadaicela argues that “[the IJ’s] factual errors in assessing Emily’s condition led to the [IJ] erring by finding Mr. Saldana had not shown she would suffer the required level of hardship.” CA6 R. 10, Pet’r Br., at 20. As discussed above, though, we cannot disturb the BIA’s factual findings. And based on those findings, we cannot conclude that any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude that Saldana-Yadaicela’s “removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” for his children. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). For instance, Saldana-Yadaicela has support networks in Ecuador and the United States, including his wife. See In re Calderon-Hernandez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 885, 886 (B.I.A. 2012) (“It is reasonable in such cases to assume that the child will be cared for and supported by the parent who remains here, absent evidence to the contrary.”). And because Emily was not in therapy or enrolled in special education through an Individualized Education Program, any threat to the availability of these services caused by her father’s removal is less compelling. 3 Saldana-Yadaicela also claims that the BIA did not review his arguments de novo. But the BIA recited and applied the correct standard. The fact that the BIA agreed with the IJ does not mean that the BIA did not review the arguments de novo. -7- No. 25-3882, Saldana-Yadaicela v. Blanche This in no way minimizes the hardships that Saldana-Yadaicela’s children may face. It is simply the case that “many severe hardships resulting from deportation aren’t rare, but expected— like the loss of financial prospects, separation from loved ones, and reduced educational opportunities.” Moctezuma-Reyes, 124 F.4th at 422. In other words, demonstrating both a lack of substantial evidence for a decision and extreme and unusual hardship is a difficult burden for petitioners to meet. Id. We must therefore defer to the BIA’s decision. IV. For the foregoing reasons, we deny Saldana-Yadaicela’s petition for review. -8-