Alfredo Cazales-Lopez v. Todd Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket26-3111
JudgeEric L. Clay; Eric E. Murphy
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 26a0470n.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
) Nov 20, 2026
ALFREDO CAZALES-LOPEZ,
) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW
) FROM THE BOARD OF
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, ) IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Respondent. )
) OPINION
Before: CLAY, MURPHY, and FLOWERS, Circuit Judges.
FLOWERS, Circuit Judge. Alfredo Cazales-Lopez petitions for review of a decision by
the Board of Immigration Appeals. Cazales-Lopez says that he is entitled to cancellation of
removal and that the Board erred in concluding otherwise. We lack jurisdiction to consider some
of his arguments and reject the rest on the merits. We thus dismiss in part and deny in part his
petition for review.
I
Alfredo Cazales-Lopez is a native and citizen of Mexico. He entered the United States
without admission or parole.
After the United States initiated removal proceedings, Cazales-Lopez appeared before an
immigration judge and conceded his removability. But he applied for cancellation of removal.
Cancellation of removal is a type of relief available to qualifying aliens. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).
An alien seeking this relief must “establish[] that removal would result in exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship” to certain family members, such as the applicant’s U.S.-citizen
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children. Id. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). An applicant must also show that he has “been a person of good
moral character” for the ten years preceding his application. Id. § 1229b(b)(1)(B).
Cazales-Lopez urged that his four U.S.-citizen children would suffer exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship if he were removed. At a merits hearing, Cazales-Lopez voiced
concern about leaving his two oldest children in the United States to finish school while the rest
of the family—his wife and their two younger children—relocated to Mexico. Cazales-Lopez also
worried about how his children would fare in Mexico given the high rate of poverty, lack of work
and educational opportunities, and his children’s limited Spanish.
The immigration judge denied Cazales-Lopez’s application for two independent reasons.
First, the immigration judge found that Cazales-Lopez had not established that his children
would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Cazales-Lopez’s removal would put
the family to a choice: they could either stay in America or leave for Mexico with him. If they
remained stateside, then the children—all of whom are healthy and free of “educational
concerns”—“would continue to receive Government funded education,” “continue to receive
health insurance,” and would “likely be eligible for other public assistance.” AR 61. Although
Cazales-Lopez’s wife “maintains the home and runs the children to school,” she is physically able
to take a job outside the home, which would allow her to earn money to support the family. Id.
Alternatively, Cazales-Lopez’s family could move to Mexico with him. While Cazales-Lopez
expressed concerns about the quality of a Mexican education, he failed to demonstrate that he had
“done any research into educational opportunities for his children in Mexico.” Id. Moreover, the
children all speak Spanish at home, aiding their ability to gain an education in Mexico. The
immigration judge further observed that three of the four children are younger than 12 and
determined that their youth would ease their ability to acclimate to a new environment. Based on
these determinations, the immigration judge concluded that Cazales-Lopez failed to “show[] a
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hardship that would be distinguishable from the hardship that all families in [Cazales-Lopez’s]
family situation ordinarily experience.” AR 62.
Second, the immigration judge determined that Cazales-Lopez lacked the requisite good
moral character. The judge observed that Cazales-Lopez had several alcohol-related encounters
with American law enforcement. The judge also expressed concern about whether Cazales-Lopez
properly reported his business earnings when filing federal tax returns.
Cazales-Lopez sought review from the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Board upheld
the judge’s denial on both grounds. As to hardship, the Board adopted the immigration judge’s
reasoning. And regarding Cazales-Lopez’s moral character, the Board bolstered the judge’s
conclusion. It determined that Cazales-Lopez lacked the required good moral character because
of his “multiple encounters with law enforcement over a period of years based on . . . issues of
drinking and driving.” AR 4. Thus, Cazales-Lopez could not demonstrate the requisite moral
character even setting aside (a) his tax issues and (b) one 2006 drunk-driving conviction that the
immigration judge considered despite its occurring “outside the 10-year period for which good
moral character had to be shown.” Id.
Cazales-Lopez timely petitioned for our review.
II
We first consider our jurisdiction to take up Cazales-Lopez’s petition.
The Immigration and Nationality Act grants federal circuit courts jurisdiction to review
final orders of removal entered by the Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1);
Morris v. Blanche, 179 F.4th 489, 495 (6th Cir. 2026). But the Act limits the types of challenges
that we may consider. Relevant here, when an alien petitions for review of a decision denying
cancellation of removal, we have jurisdiction only insofar as the petition for review raises
“questions of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), (D). The phrase “questions of law” extends to
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mixed questions of law and fact. Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 218–19 (2024); Hernandez
v. Garland, 59 F.4th 762, 763 (6th Cir. 2023). But we lack jurisdiction to review the Board’s
factual determinations. See Singh v. Rosen, 984 F.3d 1142, 1149 (6th Cir. 2021).
Given these jurisdictional limits, we must disregard arguments disputing the factual
findings that the immigration judge made and the Board adopted. Three such arguments appear
most prominently. First, we cannot consider whether the immigration judge (and thus the Board)
erred by finding that Cazales-Lopez’s wife is able to work. Second, we cannot gainsay the
immigration judge’s finding that Cazalez-Lopez failed to demonstrate his inability to work in
Mexico. Third, we lack jurisdiction to reconsider the immigration judge’s determinations
regarding the quality of educational opportunities available to Cazales-Lopez’s children in
Mexico.
We retain jurisdiction over other arguments—specifically, those challenging the Board’s
application of law to the immigration judge’s factual findings. See Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 217.
We turn to those next.
III
To establish “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” of the sort required to justify
cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), an applicant must show that his qualifying
U.S.-citizen or lawful-permanent-resident family members would face hardship “significantly
different from or greater than the hardship that a deported alien’s family normally experiences,”
Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland, 124 F.4th 416, 422 (6th Cir. 2024). This means that “many severe
hardships resulting from deportation,” such as “the loss of financial prospects, separation from
loved ones, and reduced educational opportunities,” are not enough to support an application for
cancellation of removal. Id.
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When an alien petitions for review of a decision denying cancellation of removal, we apply
a deferential substantial-evidence standard. Baltazar Us v. Blanche, 174 F.4th 509, 512–13 (6th
Cir. 2026). Under this standard, the Board’s hardship determination is “conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. at 513 (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). When the Board adopts the immigration judge’s reasoning as its own,
we review the incorporated determinations of the immigration judge through the same deferential
lens. Sy v. Bondi, 168 F.4th 828, 833–34 (6th Cir. 2026).
Cazales-Lopez cannot make the demanding showing this deferential standard requires.
Recall the immigration judge’s findings, which the Board adopted as its own. Cazales-
Lopez and his family have two options following his removal. First, his family can remain in
America. His children “would continue to receive Government funded education and continue to
receive health insurance and likely be eligible for other public assistance.” AR 61. While Cazales-
Lopez cannot work in America after being removed, he can work in Mexico and send money to
his family. Beyond that, Cazales-Lopez’s wife can work outside the home, thereby earning money
to support her children. Second, Cazales-Lopez’s family can accompany him to Mexico. Cazales-
Lopez raised concerns about the education his children would receive in that country. But he failed
to demonstrate that he conducted “any research into [the] educational opportunities” they would
have. Id. Beyond that, none of his kids have “mental health problems or educational concerns,”
all of them speak Spanish at home already, and three of the four are young enough that the
immigration judge determined they would have an easier time acclimating to a new environment.
Id. Meanwhile, Cazales-Lopez failed to demonstrate that he would be unable to “find some sort
of employment to support himself or his family.” Id. He and his family would “likely” be able to
“live with his parents for a short time frame” upon relocating to Mexico. Id. Though Cazales-
Lopez asserts that he and his family would not be able to stay with his parents for long, he produced
no evidence that he would struggle to find alternative housing. Thus, the Board (through the
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immigration judge) determined that Cazales-Lopez and his children would have a known place,
with family, to regroup before seeking more permanent accommodations.
These findings prevent us from concluding that “any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude” that Cazales-Lopez is entitled to cancellation of removal based on the
hardship his removal would cause his family. See Baltazar Us, 174 F.4th at 513 (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B)). Indeed, the hardships identified are similar to those presented in the kiln-run
removal case involving a parent of minor children. At bare minimum, the Board reasonably
concluded that the hardships Cazales-Lopez’s children will face are not “significantly different
from or greater than the hardship that a deported alien’s family normally experiences.”
Moctezuma-Reyes, 124 F.4th at 422.
Cazales-Lopez makes no persuasive contrary arguments. Instead, his contrary arguments
stress precisely the sort of hardships that many families of deported aliens face. For example, he
claims it is “undisputed” that he would “not earn a significant salary in Mexico” and that he would
therefore “struggle to provide [his] family of six with life’s basic necessities.” Pet. Br. 7–8. He
says that, if his wife stayed in America and began working outside the home, his family would
face new costs in the form of childcare. He notes that his children will lose their current
government-provided health insurance if they move to Mexico. He asserts that his children would
suffer “educational and social hardship” by relocating to Mexico. Id. at 9. And he insists, without
developing any argument on the issue, that conditions in Mexico are “unsafe.” Id. at 4.
These hardships do not compel us to say that the Board erred: whether considered
individually or together, they are not significantly greater than the hardships presented by typical
removal cases.
Regarding Cazales-Lopez’s concerns about the income he can earn in Mexico,
“financial . . . strains are the typical results of removal.” Moctezuma-Reyes, 124 F.4th at 423. The
same insight defeats Cazales-Lopez’s appeal to childcare and healthcare costs. The significance
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of his children’s healthcare costs is further diminished because Cazales-Lopez’s children are
physically and mentally healthy. Beyond that, some degree of “reduced access to medical
treatments” is a common effect of removal. Baltazar Us, 174 F.4th at 513. And regardless,
Cazales-Lopez’s children, rather than relocating to Mexico, can remain in the United States—a
possibility that Cazales-Lopez acknowledged—where they would remain eligible for government-
funded medical insurance.
As for the educational concerns, we have held that when children have some facility in the
language of a new country, have some family there, and are young enough to adapt more easily to
life in a new environment, the social challenges those children will face do not amount to
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Tolentino-Hernandez v. Garland, No. 20-4021, 2021
WL 4782689, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 13, 2021). The Board reasonably reached the same conclusion
here. The fact that Cazales-Lopez’s children can live with their grandparents for at least a while
upon moving to Mexico further weakens any argument for extreme hardship. See Trinidad-
Contreras v. Bondi, No. 22-3352, 2025 WL 2732495, at *4 (6th Cir. Sep. 25, 2025).
That leaves only Cazales-Lopez’s claim that the Board erred in addressing “unsafe country
conditions” in Mexico. Pet. Br. 4. He forfeited this argument by failing to develop it in his brief.
See Gen. Star Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 289 F.3d 434, 441 (6th Cir.
2002). Regardless, “countrywide social concerns generally do not establish exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship.” Baltazar Us, 174 F.4th at 514.
In addition to raising the just-discussed arguments, Cazales-Lopez sporadically alludes to
facts that have no bearing on the hardship his children would face from his removal. For example,
he stresses his age (43 years) and his community ties without linking these points to his children’s
situation. Such considerations have no bearing on the hardship question the Board decided.
In the end, we have no basis to upset the Board’s determination that Cazales-Lopez’s
children will not suffer the sort of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” needed to justify
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cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). As that determination independently
defeated Cazales-Lopez’s application, we need not review the Board’s determination that Cazales-
Lopez also failed to demonstrate the good moral character required for cancellation of removal.
See Rahman v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 399, 409 (6th Cir. 2025).
Before concluding, we address the government’s contention that Cazales-Lopez failed to
exhaust before the Board certain arguments that we considered and rejected above. Non-
exhaustion matters because the Act prohibits us from granting relief on non-exhausted grounds.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Shafo v. Wilkinson, 844 F. App’x 791, 794 (6th Cir. 2021). But
exhaustion is not a jurisdictional requirement. Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 416–17
(2023). Thus, while we cannot grant a petition for review without addressing exhaustion, we may
deny relief on the merits without deciding whether the petitioner exhausted his arguments. Yousif
v. Garland, 53 F.4th 928, 936 n.3 (6th Cir. 2022); see also Allen v. Highlands Hosp. Corp., 545
F.3d 387, 403 (6th Cir. 2008). We do so here.
IV
The petition for review is dismissed to the extent that it presents unreviewable factual
arguments and otherwise denied.
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