Antonio Cabrera Angel v. Todd Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket25-4038
JudgeJeffrey S. Sutton; David W. McKeague; Richard Allen Griffin
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 26a0467n.06
Case No. 25-4038
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Nov 19, 2026
) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
ANTONIO CABRERA ANGEL; MARIA DE
LOURDES BLAS PABLO, )
)
Petitioners,
) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW
) FROM THE UNITED STATES
v.
) BOARD OF IMMIGRATION
) APPEALS
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General,
)
Respondent. ) OPINION
)
Before: SUTTON, McKEAGUE, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
SUTTON, Circuit Judge. An immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals
denied the applications of Antonio Cabrera Angel and Maria de Lourdes Blas Pablo for
cancellation of removal. Because substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision, we deny
their petition for review.
I.
Angel and Blas Pablo are Mexican citizens. When Angel illegally entered the United States
in 1998, immigration authorities caught him and deported him. He returned two days later, settled
in Smyrna, Tennessee, and has lived there ever since. Blas Pablo entered the United States illegally
in 2004 and likewise settled in Smyrna. The two met there, and they married in 2009. By then,
No. 25-4038, Cabrera Angel et al. v. Blanche
Blas Pablo already had a daughter, who is now 21 years old. Together, the couple has had two
more children, now 16 and 14 years old. All three children are U.S. citizens.
Angel provides the family’s main source of income. In 2010, while working as a forklift
operator, a forklift struck him and seriously injured his left leg. Doctors amputated the leg, leaving
him with a prosthesis. After the injury, he continued to work as a floor supervisor at the same
company while sometimes operating forklifts in a seated posture. Blas Pablo works at a hot tub
factory where she installs electrical equipment on the tubs.
The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against the couple in
2017. Conceding that they both entered the country illegally and thus could be removed, Angel
and Blas Pablo applied for cancellation of removal based on the hardship their departure would
impose on their three children, who would relocate with them. They maintained that life in Mexico
would expose their children to worse healthcare and education, a greater risk of crime, and a
diminished family income due to the employment barriers Angel would face with his disability.
The immigration judge denied their applications in 2019. He concluded that petitioners
had not shown that their removal would cause their children exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship. He also found that Angel lacked the good moral character required for cancellation
because, for several years, he had used an alias at work. The Board of Immigration Appeals then
rejected the couple’s appeal based on the lack of any unusual hardship to the children caused by
the family’s removal.
II.
Congress has authorized the Attorney General to cancel an immigrant’s removal if the
immigrant (1) has maintained continuous physical presence in the United States for at least ten
years, (2) has demonstrated “good moral character” during that period, (3) has not committed any
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disqualifying offenses, and (4) has “establishe[d] that removal would result in exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship” to family members who are U.S. citizens or lawful permanent
residents. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). The parties dispute the second and fourth requirements.
As to the second requirement—whether the immigration judge correctly found that Angel
lacked good moral character—we have no basis for reviewing it. The Board did not take a stand
on this finding. As a general rule, we will not “consider issues that the Board did not reach.”
Nwosu v. Blanche, 177 F.4th 732, 738 (6th Cir. 2026). Nor did the Board err by declining to reach
the issue, which would not have affected “the outcome” of the case given the Board’s view
that the couple failed to satisfy the fourth requirement. Rahman v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 399, 409 (6th
Cir. 2025).
As to the fourth requirement—unusual hardship to the family—that is not an easy hurdle
to clear. The Immigration and Nationality Act does not excuse removal whenever a family faces
hardship. It requires more: hardship “significantly different from or greater than the hardship that
a deported alien’s family normally experiences.” Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland, 124 F.4th 416,
422 (6th Cir. 2024). Deportation, by its nature, routinely and customarily “presents many severe
hardships.” Baltazar Us v. Blanche, 174 F.4th 509, 513 (6th Cir. 2026) (quotation omitted).
Because removals often send families to less economically developed countries, “the loss of
financial prospects . . . and reduced educational opportunities” alone do not satisfy this imposing
standard. Moctezuma-Reyes, 124 F.4th at 422. The question, then, is not whether Angel and Blas
Pablo’s children would fare worse in Mexico. It is whether the relocation would put them in a
class separate and apart from the hardship ordinarily imposed on children who move to a country
that has fewer economic opportunities and a less sturdy social safety net than the United States.
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We review the Board’s hardship determination for substantial evidence. Baltazar Us, 174
F.4th at 513. That standard does not leave room for casual second-guessing of the Board’s work.
We may reverse only if “any reasonable adjudicator” would be compelled to reach the opposite
conclusion. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). Because the Board expressly affirmed the
immigration judge’s decision, we review the immigration judge’s reasoning alongside the Board’s
additional comments. Elias v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 444, 449 (6th Cir. 2007).
Angel and Blas Pablo have not cleared this “high bar.” Baltazar Us, 174 F.4th at 513. We
do not doubt, and have considerable sympathy for, their principal concern: diminished economic
prospects. The unfortunate reality is that this fear is not an unusual consequence of removing
individuals who came to this country for this precise reason: to improve their economic prospects.
Indeed, Angel has continued working in the United States for over 15 years despite his prosthesis
and retains the ability to operate a forklift and supervise others using one. And he identifies no
cognizable reason why he could not find suitable work in Mexico. Nor does Mexican law with
respect to disability discrimination change this calculus. The immigration judge found that
Mexican law provides sanctions for disability discrimination. Even if Mexican law provides
comparatively less protection for employees with disabilities than its American counterpart, that
reality does not by itself establish the requisite hardship. See Tolentino-Hernandez v. Garland,
No. 20-4021, 2021 WL 4782689, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 13, 2021) (explaining that “adverse country
conditions . . . generally will be insufficient in themselves” (quotation omitted)). Regardless, any
diminished legal protections for employees with disabilities would affect Angel directly, not his
children. Any resulting hardship to his children would be indirect, arising only insofar as those
diminished protections impair Angel’s ability to secure employment. And the “loss of financial
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prospects” alone does not satisfy the statute’s exacting hardship standard. Moctezuma-Reyes, 124
F.4th at 422.
Blas Pablo faces a similar problem when it comes to employment prospects. She has
worked for years, reports no health condition that would prevent her from working in Mexico, and
has several work experiences that could help her there: working in a factory, cleaning homes, and
selling food. Her years in the United States have only broadened her employment options. She
acknowledged that she may find better work in Mexico, whether through a referral for
housecleaning or a position at a factory. Whatever the employment challenges that may (or may
not) await the couple in Mexico, they are customary challenges of removal, not exceptional ones.
See id. at 423.
Petitioners fare no better when it comes to potential differences between the healthcare
system in this country and in Mexico. Even if we assume for the sake of argument that Mexico
offers less effective medical care, none of their children has a serious medical condition that would
make that disparity especially consequential. Petitioners identify no particular medical need that
Mexico’s healthcare system could not adequately address. Reduced access to the American
healthcare system and safety net are common side effects of removal, not exceptional and
extremely unusual ones. Tolentino-Hernandez, 2021 WL 4782689, at *2.
Relative differences in access to a sound public education between the United States and
Mexico present a similar situation. Angel and Blas Pablo identify no serious academic difficulties
or special educational needs among their children that Mexico’s schools could not accommodate.
The possibility of a less robust education, without more, does not transform an ordinary
consequence of removal into an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Moctezuma-Reyes,
124 F.4th at 422.
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Nor does the claimed prospect of exposure to more crime in Mexico carry petitioners over
the statutory threshold. “[C]ountrywide social concerns” rarely establish exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship. Baltazar Us, 174 F.4th at 514. Petitioners point to the risk that
criminals will target their children under the assumption that the parents of returning families have
more money than others in the country. But that risk is “commonly faced by citizens upon a
family member’s removal.” Id. On this record, no reasonable decisionmaker would be compelled
to disagree with the Board’s finding that the family will not face unusual and extreme hardship
upon returning to Mexico.
Angel and Blas Pablo resist that conclusion. They argue that the immigration judge
imposed too demanding a standard when he observed that, although it would “be difficult for
[Angel] to find employment in Mexico [,]. . . the court is not persuaded that it would be impossible
for him to do so.” A.R. at 95–96. While it is unclear what the immigration judge meant by this
comment, the opinions of the immigration judge and the Board confirm that they did not impose
an impossibility requirement. The immigration judge acknowledged the employment challenges
Angel would face, found “insufficient evidence” that he “would be unable to find employment in
Mexico,” and emphasized that Blas Pablo’s experience also made her well-suited to find work
there. A.R. at 96. In affirming these conclusions, the Board explained that, whatever difficulty
Angel might encounter finding work in Mexico, a deportation order would not cause the children
to suffer hardship “substantially different from, or beyond, that which would normally be expected
from the deportation of an alien with close family members in the United States.” A.R. at 4
(quotation omitted). That formulation tracks the governing standard almost word for word. The
Board thus did not demand that Angel show that it would be impossible to find work in Mexico.
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It instead asked whether his employment prospects would produce hardship beyond what
ordinarily accompanies removal.
Petitioners also seek a remand because, in their view, the immigration judge failed to
consider the hardship factors cumulatively. No such failure occurred. The immigration judge
considered “how a lower standard of living or diminished educational opportunities, lessened
medical care, and other adverse conditions in [Mexico] might affect the respondents and their
family members.” A.R. at 96. The Board did likewise. It reviewed the asserted hardships and the
immigration judge’s treatment of each, then concluded, “after considering all the hardship factors
in this case cumulatively,” that petitioners failed to meet their statutory burden. A.R. at 4. No
error occurred.
We deny the petition for review.
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