Full Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0467n.06 Case No. 25-4038 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Nov 19, 2026 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ANTONIO CABRERA ANGEL; MARIA DE LOURDES BLAS PABLO, ) ) Petitioners, ) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW ) FROM THE UNITED STATES v. ) BOARD OF IMMIGRATION ) APPEALS TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, ) Respondent. ) OPINION ) Before: SUTTON, McKEAGUE, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges. SUTTON, Circuit Judge. An immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals denied the applications of Antonio Cabrera Angel and Maria de Lourdes Blas Pablo for cancellation of removal. Because substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision, we deny their petition for review. I. Angel and Blas Pablo are Mexican citizens. When Angel illegally entered the United States in 1998, immigration authorities caught him and deported him. He returned two days later, settled in Smyrna, Tennessee, and has lived there ever since. Blas Pablo entered the United States illegally in 2004 and likewise settled in Smyrna. The two met there, and they married in 2009. By then, No. 25-4038, Cabrera Angel et al. v. Blanche Blas Pablo already had a daughter, who is now 21 years old. Together, the couple has had two more children, now 16 and 14 years old. All three children are U.S. citizens. Angel provides the family’s main source of income. In 2010, while working as a forklift operator, a forklift struck him and seriously injured his left leg. Doctors amputated the leg, leaving him with a prosthesis. After the injury, he continued to work as a floor supervisor at the same company while sometimes operating forklifts in a seated posture. Blas Pablo works at a hot tub factory where she installs electrical equipment on the tubs. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against the couple in 2017. Conceding that they both entered the country illegally and thus could be removed, Angel and Blas Pablo applied for cancellation of removal based on the hardship their departure would impose on their three children, who would relocate with them. They maintained that life in Mexico would expose their children to worse healthcare and education, a greater risk of crime, and a diminished family income due to the employment barriers Angel would face with his disability. The immigration judge denied their applications in 2019. He concluded that petitioners had not shown that their removal would cause their children exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. He also found that Angel lacked the good moral character required for cancellation because, for several years, he had used an alias at work. The Board of Immigration Appeals then rejected the couple’s appeal based on the lack of any unusual hardship to the children caused by the family’s removal. II. Congress has authorized the Attorney General to cancel an immigrant’s removal if the immigrant (1) has maintained continuous physical presence in the United States for at least ten years, (2) has demonstrated “good moral character” during that period, (3) has not committed any 2 No. 25-4038, Cabrera Angel et al. v. Blanche disqualifying offenses, and (4) has “establishe[d] that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to family members who are U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). The parties dispute the second and fourth requirements. As to the second requirement—whether the immigration judge correctly found that Angel lacked good moral character—we have no basis for reviewing it. The Board did not take a stand on this finding. As a general rule, we will not “consider issues that the Board did not reach.” Nwosu v. Blanche, 177 F.4th 732, 738 (6th Cir. 2026). Nor did the Board err by declining to reach the issue, which would not have affected “the outcome” of the case given the Board’s view that the couple failed to satisfy the fourth requirement. Rahman v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 399, 409 (6th Cir. 2025). As to the fourth requirement—unusual hardship to the family—that is not an easy hurdle to clear. The Immigration and Nationality Act does not excuse removal whenever a family faces hardship. It requires more: hardship “significantly different from or greater than the hardship that a deported alien’s family normally experiences.” Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland, 124 F.4th 416, 422 (6th Cir. 2024). Deportation, by its nature, routinely and customarily “presents many severe hardships.” Baltazar Us v. Blanche, 174 F.4th 509, 513 (6th Cir. 2026) (quotation omitted). Because removals often send families to less economically developed countries, “the loss of financial prospects . . . and reduced educational opportunities” alone do not satisfy this imposing standard. Moctezuma-Reyes, 124 F.4th at 422. The question, then, is not whether Angel and Blas Pablo’s children would fare worse in Mexico. It is whether the relocation would put them in a class separate and apart from the hardship ordinarily imposed on children who move to a country that has fewer economic opportunities and a less sturdy social safety net than the United States. 3 No. 25-4038, Cabrera Angel et al. v. Blanche We review the Board’s hardship determination for substantial evidence. Baltazar Us, 174 F.4th at 513. That standard does not leave room for casual second-guessing of the Board’s work. We may reverse only if “any reasonable adjudicator” would be compelled to reach the opposite conclusion. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). Because the Board expressly affirmed the immigration judge’s decision, we review the immigration judge’s reasoning alongside the Board’s additional comments. Elias v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 444, 449 (6th Cir. 2007). Angel and Blas Pablo have not cleared this “high bar.” Baltazar Us, 174 F.4th at 513. We do not doubt, and have considerable sympathy for, their principal concern: diminished economic prospects. The unfortunate reality is that this fear is not an unusual consequence of removing individuals who came to this country for this precise reason: to improve their economic prospects. Indeed, Angel has continued working in the United States for over 15 years despite his prosthesis and retains the ability to operate a forklift and supervise others using one. And he identifies no cognizable reason why he could not find suitable work in Mexico. Nor does Mexican law with respect to disability discrimination change this calculus. The immigration judge found that Mexican law provides sanctions for disability discrimination. Even if Mexican law provides comparatively less protection for employees with disabilities than its American counterpart, that reality does not by itself establish the requisite hardship. See Tolentino-Hernandez v. Garland, No. 20-4021, 2021 WL 4782689, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 13, 2021) (explaining that “adverse country conditions . . . generally will be insufficient in themselves” (quotation omitted)). Regardless, any diminished legal protections for employees with disabilities would affect Angel directly, not his children. Any resulting hardship to his children would be indirect, arising only insofar as those diminished protections impair Angel’s ability to secure employment. And the “loss of financial 4 No. 25-4038, Cabrera Angel et al. v. Blanche prospects” alone does not satisfy the statute’s exacting hardship standard. Moctezuma-Reyes, 124 F.4th at 422. Blas Pablo faces a similar problem when it comes to employment prospects. She has worked for years, reports no health condition that would prevent her from working in Mexico, and has several work experiences that could help her there: working in a factory, cleaning homes, and selling food. Her years in the United States have only broadened her employment options. She acknowledged that she may find better work in Mexico, whether through a referral for housecleaning or a position at a factory. Whatever the employment challenges that may (or may not) await the couple in Mexico, they are customary challenges of removal, not exceptional ones. See id. at 423. Petitioners fare no better when it comes to potential differences between the healthcare system in this country and in Mexico. Even if we assume for the sake of argument that Mexico offers less effective medical care, none of their children has a serious medical condition that would make that disparity especially consequential. Petitioners identify no particular medical need that Mexico’s healthcare system could not adequately address. Reduced access to the American healthcare system and safety net are common side effects of removal, not exceptional and extremely unusual ones. Tolentino-Hernandez, 2021 WL 4782689, at *2. Relative differences in access to a sound public education between the United States and Mexico present a similar situation. Angel and Blas Pablo identify no serious academic difficulties or special educational needs among their children that Mexico’s schools could not accommodate. The possibility of a less robust education, without more, does not transform an ordinary consequence of removal into an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Moctezuma-Reyes, 124 F.4th at 422. 5 No. 25-4038, Cabrera Angel et al. v. Blanche Nor does the claimed prospect of exposure to more crime in Mexico carry petitioners over the statutory threshold. “[C]ountrywide social concerns” rarely establish exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Baltazar Us, 174 F.4th at 514. Petitioners point to the risk that criminals will target their children under the assumption that the parents of returning families have more money than others in the country. But that risk is “commonly faced by citizens upon a family member’s removal.” Id. On this record, no reasonable decisionmaker would be compelled to disagree with the Board’s finding that the family will not face unusual and extreme hardship upon returning to Mexico. Angel and Blas Pablo resist that conclusion. They argue that the immigration judge imposed too demanding a standard when he observed that, although it would “be difficult for [Angel] to find employment in Mexico [,]. . . the court is not persuaded that it would be impossible for him to do so.” A.R. at 95–96. While it is unclear what the immigration judge meant by this comment, the opinions of the immigration judge and the Board confirm that they did not impose an impossibility requirement. The immigration judge acknowledged the employment challenges Angel would face, found “insufficient evidence” that he “would be unable to find employment in Mexico,” and emphasized that Blas Pablo’s experience also made her well-suited to find work there. A.R. at 96. In affirming these conclusions, the Board explained that, whatever difficulty Angel might encounter finding work in Mexico, a deportation order would not cause the children to suffer hardship “substantially different from, or beyond, that which would normally be expected from the deportation of an alien with close family members in the United States.” A.R. at 4 (quotation omitted). That formulation tracks the governing standard almost word for word. The Board thus did not demand that Angel show that it would be impossible to find work in Mexico. 6 No. 25-4038, Cabrera Angel et al. v. Blanche It instead asked whether his employment prospects would produce hardship beyond what ordinarily accompanies removal. Petitioners also seek a remand because, in their view, the immigration judge failed to consider the hardship factors cumulatively. No such failure occurred. The immigration judge considered “how a lower standard of living or diminished educational opportunities, lessened medical care, and other adverse conditions in [Mexico] might affect the respondents and their family members.” A.R. at 96. The Board did likewise. It reviewed the asserted hardships and the immigration judge’s treatment of each, then concluded, “after considering all the hardship factors in this case cumulatively,” that petitioners failed to meet their statutory burden. A.R. at 4. No error occurred. We deny the petition for review. 7