Full Opinion

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-3232 JUANA ELIZALDE CASTILLO, et al., Petitioners, v. TODD W. BLANCHE, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent. ____________________ Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Nos. A206-915-261, A206-915-262, A206-915-263 ____________________ SUBMITTED SEPTEMBER 15, 2026 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 20, 2026 ____________________ Before BRENNAN, Chief Judge, and SYKES and JACKSON- AKIWUMI, Circuit Judges. BRENNAN, Chief Judge. Juana Elizalde Castillo is subject to a final order of removal from this country. She petitions this court to review a Board of Immigration Appeals order deny- ing her motions to reopen and to reconsider. But the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Castillo’s motions. Fur- ther, her briefs suggest the use of generative artificial 2 No. 25-3232 intelligence, so we order her counsel to show cause why sanc- tions are not warranted. I A Juana Elizalde Castillo and her sons, Armando Uribe Elizalde and Jose Manuel Uribe Elizalde, are natives and citi- zens of Mexico. 1 Castillo was born in Tuxpan, Michoacán, Mexico, and was previously married to Armando Uribe Reyes. She entered the United States without inspection in November 2007, one year after her husband, and remained for seven years while her two sons lived in Tuxpan with her sis- ter, Lilia Castillo. 2 While in the United States, Castillo and her husband sent money to Lilia for their sons’ care. In 2010, Lilia received three or four threatening phone calls from unknown individuals who said they knew Castillo and her husband were sending money from the United States for their sons. Lilia did not respond and hung up, fearing the callers would kidnap and harm Castillo’s sons. She changed her phone number several times and did not report the calls to the police. The sons, young at the time, remained unaware of the calls. After telling Castillo about the calls, Lilia and the children attempted to enter the United States in September 1 Castillo’s sons are derivative applicants on the request for asylum. Armando Uribe Elizalde filed a separate application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal on October 28, 2015, but that application was later withdrawn. 2 We will refer to Lilia by her first name to differentiate her from Juana. No. 25-3232 3 2010, but they were detained at the border and returned to Mexico. Lilia did not receive any calls between 2010 and 2014. Cas- tillo believed this was because the Mexican military was pre- sent and pursuing criminal organizations in the area. In 2014, the threatening calls to Lilia resumed. The callers said they knew the parents of the sons were sending money and that they knew which schools the sons attended. Castillo’s son Ar- mando learned of the calls and, fearing kidnapping, refused to walk the fifteen to twenty minutes to school. Castillo had her other son, Jose Manuel, move in with Castillo’s other sis- ter, Jasmine, and attend school in a different town where Cas- tillo’s brother taught and her niece was a student. Castillo’s husband died in September 2014, and she re- turned to Mexico with his body for burial. She also began the process of collecting on a life insurance policy. Castillo then received three or four threatening calls from unknown indi- viduals, similar to the calls Lilia had received. The callers said they knew she had been working in the United States and that she was about to collect on her husband’s life insurance. Each time Castillo hung up immediately. She did not report the calls to the police. In November 2014, Castillo traveled to the Mexico-United States border with her two sons and requested asylum at the San Ysidro Port of Entry south of San Diego, California. She had not collected the life insurance proceeds. Neither she nor her sons possessed or presented valid immigration visas, reentry permits, border crossing identification cards, or other valid entry documents. So, the Department of Homeland Se- curity issued each a Notice to Appear and initiated removal proceedings. 4 No. 25-3232 B At a master calendar hearing in July 2015, Castillo and her sons appeared with counsel, admitted the factual allegations contained in the Notices to Appear, and conceded removabil- ity as charged. The court found that alienage and removabil- ity had been established by clear and convincing evidence. Castillo declined to designate a country of removal, so the court specified she return to Mexico, her country of citizen- ship. In October 2015, Castillo filed an application for Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and Protection under the Conven- tion Against Torture (CAT). In support, she alleged that she suffered past persecution and had a well-founded fear of fu- ture persecution due to her membership in a particular social group: “Mexican nationals who have remitted money for sup- port of family and are perceived to have wealth.” 1. Immigration Judge (IJ) In February 2019, a hearing was conducted on the merits of Castillo’s applications. The IJ who presided found Castillo credible and that she testified responsively and plausibly. But in its May 2020 decision, the IJ denied Castillo relief on four grounds. First, Castillo did not sufficiently show that she had suf- fered past harm amounting to persecution. The telephone callers to her and her sister had never pursued Castillo in per- son, she was never threatened in person, and she was never physically harmed. Because the calls were not sufficiently im- minent or severe enough to rise above mere harassment, they did not rise to the level of persecution. No. 25-3232 5 Second, assuming the telephone calls did rise to the level of past persecution, Castillo’s claims still failed because she did not demonstrate that the harm was on account of a pro- tected ground in the Immigration and Nationality Act. Her proposed group (“Mexican nationals who have remitted money for support of family and are perceived to have wealth”) was not cognizable because there was no evidence that the unknown callers were concerned with any character- istic other than Castillo’s perceived ability to pay. Moreover, Castillo testified that callers like these extort anyone with family in the United States or any business owner who is per- ceived to be able to pay the extortion demands. The IJ observed that all members of Mexican society who were viewed to have wealth shared the danger of extortion with Castillo, and there was no evidence that Castillo’s risk was distinct because of another distinguishing marker. Cas- tillo could not claim to be a refugee based on fear of extortion that affects a wide range of society in a country, and a general fear of crime or violence is not a basis for asylum. Thus, the IJ did not find enough evidence to conclude that Castillo’s per- secutors were motivated by her membership in a particular social group. Third, Castillo did not show that the Mexican government was unable or unwilling to protect her from the harm she suf- fered. Neither Castillo nor her sister Lilia had reported any of the calls they received to the police. The IJ acknowledged country reports describing the judiciary and police as “largely ineffective” and identifying a cultural “norm” of impunity for crime and human rights abuses. But this did not establish that the government was unwilling or unable to protect Castillo. 6 No. 25-3232 Fourth, the IJ found that Castillo had not demonstrated a well-founded fear of future persecution in Mexico on account of a protected ground. She had never been physically con- fronted by the callers, and they remained unknown to her, so she could not show a reasonable possibility of being singled out individually for persecution. Further, she failed to demonstrate that it would be unreasonable for her to relocate within Mexico to avoid the harm she feared—especially given her testimony that her son had relocated within Mexico with- out incident. Castillo also did not prove a pattern or practice of persecution of individuals similarly situated to her. Alto- gether, because she did not show a nexus to a protected ground or that the Mexican government would be unable or unwilling to protect her, her claim of future persecution failed. Because Castillo did not show eligibility for asylum, she necessarily failed to meet the more stringent requirements of withholding of removal. Castillo’s CAT protection claim was denied because her allegations were too speculative. 2. Board of Immigration Appeals Castillo appealed, arguing that the IJ erred in not finding that Castillo suffered past persecution. She asked for a re- mand for further fact-finding and legal analysis. In March 2025, the Board affirmed the IJ without opinion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4). The Board’s order thus made the IJ’s decision the agency’s final determination. Castillo did not petition for review of that order. In April 2025, Castillo filed a motion to reconsider and re- open the Board’s decision, with a request for a stay of No. 25-3232 7 removal. In November 2025, the Board denied the motion in all respects. On the motion to reconsider, the Board ruled that it was “barred by regulation because it appears to be based solely on an argument that the case should not have been affirmed without opinion.” Further, Castillo had not identified an error of fact or law in the Board’s prior decision to warrant recon- sideration. The Board also denied the motion to reopen. Castillo “in- cluded a psychological report regarding the lead respond- ent’s mental state, which she asserts is a direct result of her fear of returning to Mexico.” But “[w]hile the respondents de- scribed changed conditions in Mexico, they have not submit- ted country conditions evidence.” Comparing then-existing conditions against those existing at the merits hearing, the Board found “at most … an incremental change with regards to crime in Mexico.” So, Castillo had not shown a material change in country conditions. The Board also observed that Castillo was previously de- nied relief because she was unable to establish a nexus be- tween the alleged harm and a protected ground. Castillo failed to establish how the outcome of her case would change if reopened, given that she continued to fear general violence from criminals. To the extent the motion challenged the IJ’s decision, the Board explained that the motion to reopen was not an oppor- tunity to repeat previously rejected arguments or advance claims that could have been raised earlier. Because Castillo had not established prima facie eligibility for the relief sought, the Board declined to reopen proceedings. 8 No. 25-3232 Castillo petitions this court to review the Board’s latest de- cision. II The only order properly before us is the Board’s Novem- ber 2025 denial of the combined motion to reopen and to re- consider. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). Castillo’s challenge to the de- nial of the motion to reconsider fails because she has not iden- tified an error of law or fact. And her dispute with the denial of the motion to reopen falls short because she did not estab- lish a prima facie case for relief. The Board’s stated rationale is adequate to resolve the remainder of Castillo’s petition. We review the Board’s “denial of a motion to reconsider and a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.” Lopez-Garcia v. Barr, 969 F.3d 749, 752 (7th Cir. 2020). The Board abuses its discretion if its decision was “made without a rational expla- nation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.” Id. (quoting Salim v. Holder, 728 F.3d 718, 720 (7th Cir. 2013)). A First, we consider whether the Board abused its discretion in denying Castillo’s motion to reconsider. Title 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(3) provides that “[a] motion to reconsider based solely on an argument that the case should not have been af- firmed without opinion by a single Board Member, or by a three-Member panel, is barred.” To the Board, her motion to reconsider “appears to be based solely” on that argument. Castillo argues the term “solely” cannot be satisfied when the motion to reconsider raised six arguments, five of which have nothing to do with the affirmance procedure. She adds that the Board “hedged” by saying the motion “appears” to No. 25-3232 9 be based solely on the point, and that “an appearance is not a finding.” But her reasoning does not follow. Consider the six argu- ments themselves: Two dispute the IJ’s decision; those should have been raised in a direct appeal, and this court cannot re- view them now. The next two pertain to the motion to reopen. Because they depend on new evidence, they cannot be the ba- sis for reconsideration. See Matter of O-S-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 56, 57–58 (BIA 2006) (“A motion to reconsider contests the cor- rectness of the original decision based on the previous factual record, as opposed to a motion to reopen, which seeks a new hearing based on new or previously unavailable evidence.”). Setting aside those four, what remains are two arguments that the IJ should not have been affirmed without opinion. But those two are foreclosed by § 1003.2(b)(3). So, the Board’s characterization was not irrational. Lopez-Garcia, 969 F.3d at 752. Even more, her contention that such an affirmance with- out opinion violates due process is foreclosed. See Qureshi v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 985, 991 (7th Cir. 2006) (“As we have previ- ously held, the BIA’s use of the streamlining procedure does not violate due process where the facts of the case present no substantial issue of law.”). The Board’s alternative finding that Castillo failed to iden- tify an error of fact or law in its prior decision to warrant re- consideration was independently sufficient to dispose of the motion. A motion to reconsider “shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent author- ity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). “To be within a mile of being granted,” such a motion “has to give the tribunal to which it 10 No. 25-3232 is addressed a reason for changing its mind.” Mabuneza v. Gar- land, 16 F.4th 1222, 1228 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Ahmed v. Ash- croft, 388 F.3d 247, 249 (7th Cir. 2004)). The motion cannot be a vehicle to raise legal arguments that could have been raised earlier or to reiterate arguments already considered and re- jected. Id. (citing Matter of O-S-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 58). Here, the motion to reconsider argued that the IJ erred in rejecting the proposed social group and incorrectly analyzed nexus, government-protection, and internal-relocation. But those arguments should have been raised on direct appeal from the IJ’s decision and did not amount to an error of law in the prior Board decision. Matter of Medrano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 216, 219 (BIA 1990). Besides the contentions that pertain to the motion to reo- pen (addressed below), nothing else in the motion to recon- sider identified an error of law or fact in the Board’s March 2025 order, as 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) requires. That is inde- pendently fatal to the motion to reconsider. See Mungongo v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 531, 535 (7th Cir. 2007) (concluding the Board did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to re- consider when the motion “did not present any ‘additional legal arguments, a change of law, or an argument that was overlooked’”) (quoting Patel v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 1011, 1015 (7th Cir. 2006)). The Board gave two independently sufficient rationales, so it did not abuse its discretion in denying Cas- tillo’s motion to reconsider. B Next up is whether the Board abused its discretion in denying Castillo’s motion to reopen. Motions to reopen are disfavored because “delay works to the advantage of the No. 25-3232 11 deportable alien who wishes merely to remain in the United States.” INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992). So, “the mov- ing party bears a heavy burden.” INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988). “There are at least three independent grounds on which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen.” Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104–05. First, the Board may hold that the movant has not established a prima facie case for the underlying relief. Id. Sec- ond, it may hold that the movant has not introduced previ- ously unavailable, material evidence. Id. Third, in cases in which the ultimate grant of relief is discretionary, “the BIA may leap ahead, as it were, over the two threshold concerns (prima facie case and new evidence/reasonable explanation), and simply determine that even if they were met, the movant would not be entitled to the discretionary grant of relief.” Id. Because these are independent grounds, any one of them can support denial, and the Board need not reach the others. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976). In Castillo’s case, the Board denied on the first ground, and that ground resolves her challenge here. The Board ra- tionally concluded that Castillo had not established prima fa- cie eligibility, and it explained its logic. The IJ partly denied relief because the harm Castillo feared was not on account of a protected ground. The Board reasoned correctly—Castillo had “not established how the outcome … would change if it were reopened given” the con- tinued fear of general violence from criminals. When new evidence would not change the result, denying a motion to reopen is not an abuse of discretion. Gamero v. Barr, 929 F.3d 464, 471–72 (7th Cir. 2019). 12 No. 25-3232 Castillo responds that the February 2025 designation of La Nueva Familia Michoacana (LNFM) as a Foreign Terrorist Or- ganization transforms what was generalized crime into per- secution of her. But that argument falls short. A designation says nothing about a claim in which the persecutor was not identified. See Gamero, 929 F.3d at 471–72. The IJ found that Castillo “was never physically confronted by the callers, and they remain unknown to her.” Indeed, Castillo’s motion to the Board described the identification as only an inference—the extortion “is likely by the La Familia cartel based on the pat- tern of threats and the geographic location of the incidents.” Castillo’s theory fails for another reason. A designation reveals a possible persecutor, but not why a petitioner was targeted. The nexus requirement inquires why this applicant, rather than someone else, was singled out. INS v. Elias-Zaca- rias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992). Castillo attempted to answer that question at the merits hearing by contending that callers like these extort anyone with family in the United States or any business owner. Yet pointing to a criminal organization does not reveal its motive to persecute. The Board did not abuse its discretion in denying Castillo relief based on her failure to establish prima facie eligibility. That is dispositive of her challenge to the denial of reopening. III Unfortunately, we must raise concerns with the briefs Cas- tillo’s attorney filed with this court. Those submissions con- tain numerous indications they were created using generative artificial intelligence (AI). These are apparent on the face of the filings and are not merely stylistic. No. 25-3232 13 Separately, we issue an Order to Show Cause detailing the possibly AI-generated material and seeking a response as to why sanctions are not warranted. We will not repeat those de- tails here, but they include:  Incorrect statements about what Castillo’s motion to reopen contains;  Citation to and argument about a case that does not discuss or hold the statements rep- resented in the briefs;  Reference to a notice in the Federal Register which does not contain the findings or quo- tations represented in Castillo’s briefs;  Attributions of findings to the IJ that the judge did not make; and  Citations in the motion to reconsider and to reopen, appended to the opening brief, at- tributing holdings and quotations to actual cases that do not contain them. Regrettably, the government in its response brief makes no mention of these problems. We also note that these observations are based on our cur- rent review of Castillo’s filings. We will await a response to the Order to Show Cause before reaching a judgment on this topic. IV For these reasons, we DENY Castillo’s petition. By separate Order, Castillo’s attorney must SHOW CAUSE why he should not be subject to sanctions.