Full Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 24-2918 ___________________________ Zoila Sucelly Saavedra-Villanueva Petitioner v. Todd Blanche, Attorney General of the United States 1 Respondent ------------------------------ Battered Women’s Justice Project; NIWAP, Inc.; Yadira Baez-Lockard Amici on Behalf of Petitioner ___________________________ No. 25-1662 ___________________________ Zoila Sucelly Saavedra-Villanueva Petitioner v. Todd Blanche, Attorney General of the United States Respondent 1 Todd Blanche is automatically substituted as respondent in place of Pamela Bondi pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2). ------------------------------ Battered Women’s Justice Project; NIWAP, Inc.; Yadira Baez-Lockard Amici on Behalf of Petitioner ____________ Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals ____________ Submitted: March 20, 2026 Filed: November 10, 2026 ____________ Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and KOBES, Circuit Judges. ____________ KOBES, Circuit Judge. Zoila Sucelly Saavedra-Villanueva, a citizen of Guatemala, was a lawful permanent resident of the United States. She became concerned about her sixteen- year-old niece, who was living with Saavedra-Villanueva’s father. She checked his phone and found naked photos and videos of her niece. Instead of calling police, she took pictures and videos of the pornographic images using her own phone and then sent them to her niece’s mother, who was living in Guatemala. When Saavedra- Villanueva’s father was arrested for sex crimes, her niece came to live with Saavedra-Villanueva. After a few months, her niece reported to police that Saavedra-Villanueva was using the photos and videos as leverage against her and to protect her father. Police searched Saavedra-Villanueva’s phone and found the images. She was convicted of child exploitation under Indiana law. Ind. Code § 35- 42-4-4(b)(1) (2019) (amended 2026).2 2 The statute changed after July 1, 2026, but we consider the version she was convicted under. -2- The Department of Homeland Security charged Saavedra-Villanueva as removable for committing an aggravated felony (sexual abuse of a minor), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(A) and 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and a crime of child abuse, § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). An immigration judge ordered her removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed her appeal and then denied her motion for reconsideration. Saavedra-Villanueva petitions this court for review of both orders. Reviewing de novo, Bannister v. Barr, 960 F.3d 492, 494 (8th Cir. 2020) (standard of review), we deny her petitions. We use the categorical approach to determine whether a state conviction is a removable offense under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Id. That means “we look ‘not to the facts of the particular prior case, but instead to whether the state statute defining the crime of conviction categorically fits within the generic federal definition.’” Huynh v. Garland, 102 F.4th 943, 944 (8th Cir. 2024) (quoting Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190 (2013)). We start with Indiana law. At the time, it prohibited “knowingly or intentionally manag[ing], produc[ing], sponsor[ing], present[ing], exhibit[ing], photograph[ing], film[ing], videotap[ing], or creat[ing] a digitized image of any performance or incident that includes sexual conduct by a child under eighteen (18) years of age.” Ind. Code § 35-42-4-4(b)(1) (2019) (amended 2026) (cleaned up). “Sexual conduct” was defined to include “exhibition of . . . uncovered genitals[] or . . . female breast . . . intended to satisfy or arouse the sexual desires of any person.” § 35-42-4-4(a)(4)(C) (2019) (amended 2026). At a minimum, this criminalized knowingly taking a digital photo of a pre-existing nude image of a minor. Next, federal law. The INA provides for the removal of “[a]ny alien who at any time after admission is convicted of a crime of domestic violence, a crime of stalking, or a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment.” § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). The INA does not define “child abuse,” but the BIA has interpreted it to include “any offense involving an intentional, knowing, reckless, or -3- criminally negligent act or omission that constitutes maltreatment of a child or that impairs a child’s physical or mental well-being, including sexual abuse or exploitation.” Sandoval Argueta v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 265, 273 (5th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). We owe no deference to the BIA’s statutory interpretation, Loper-Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 400 (2024), but the Fifth and Fourth Circuits have held, “without invoking Chevron deference, [that] the best reading of § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) confirms the BIA’s broad interpretation of ‘crime of child abuse.’” Id. (quoting Cruz v. Garland, 101 F.4th 361, 365–66 (4th Cir. 2024)). The Seventh and Ninth Circuits agree. Reynoso-Salgado v. Blanche, 191 F.4th 521, 526–27 (7th Cir. 2026) (“We find the reasoning reflected in the decisions of our sister circuits to be persuasive.”); Leon-Briviesca v. Blanche, 179 F.4th 1180, 1192– 96 (9th Cir. 2026) (same). We previously deferred to the BIA’s interpretation of “child abuse,” but we have not expressly held that it is the best read of the statute. See, e.g., Peh v. Garland, 5 F.4th 867, 869 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503, 512 (BIA 2008)). To decide that issue, we first look to the statute’s text and structure. The title mentions three types of crimes: “Domestic violence, stalking, and child abuse.” § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). This tripartite structure is repeated in the text. The phrase “a crime of” appears three times: (1) “a crime of domestic violence”; (2) “a crime of stalking”; and (3) “a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment.” Id. (emphasis added). “The third category is a broad one,” which “must be given a reading that sweeps those child-specific offenses within the same category of ‘crime’ articulated by the statute.” Sandoval Argueta, 137 F.4th at 273. The “common denominator” among the three child-specific offenses listed in the statute is that they “create a high risk of harm to a child, either by injuring the child directly or by putting the child in a situation likely to lead to injury.” Id. (citation omitted). This indicates that actual harm to the child is not necessary for a state conviction to qualify as a crime of child abuse under the INA; it is enough if an offense puts the child in a situation likely to lead to injury. See Ibarra v. Holder, 736 F.3d 903, 915 (10th Cir. 2013) (“In 1996, forty-eight states and the District of Columbia had statutes that -4- criminalized endangering or neglecting children without facially requiring a resulting injury.”). Linguistic context confirms this broad scope. Section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) was added to the INA in 1996, and contemporary dictionaries defined “child abuse” as injuring a child physically or emotionally. See Abuse, Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999); see also Child, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (defining “child abuse” as “maltreatment of a child, esp. by beating, sexual interference, or neglect”). “Child neglect” was defined as a “failure of a person responsible for a minor to care for the minor’s emotional or physical needs.” Child Neglect, Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999); see also Webster’s II New College Dictionary 194 (1995) (defining “child neglect” as a “[f]ailure on the part of a parent or parental substitute to supervise a child and provide requisite care and protection”). And “abandonment” of a child was understood to mean a “failure to communicate with or provide financial support for one’s child over a period of time that shows a purpose to forgo parental duties and rights.” Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law 1 (1996); see also Abandonment, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (defining “children desertion” as “[d]esertion or willful forsaking[;] [f]orgoing parental duties”). These definitions point to situations that are likely to lead to a child’s injury. Accordingly, we join our sister circuits and hold that “child abuse” in § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), includes any offense involving an intentional, knowing, reckless, or criminally negligent act or omission that constitutes maltreatment of a child or that impairs a child’s physical or mental well-being, including sexual abuse or exploitation. Next, we consider whether Saavedra-Villanueva’s conviction under Indiana Code § 35-42-4-4(b)(1) fits within the broad definition of “child abuse.” We have gone about that two ways: “the Mowlana view,” Mowlana v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 923, 925 (8th Cir. 2015), and “the Gonzalez view,” Gonzalez v. Wilkinson, 990 F.3d 654, 660 (8th Cir. 2021). Banyee v. Bondi, 165 F.4th 1086, 1092, 1096 (8th Cir. 2026) (establishing framework for deciding which applies). -5- Per Gonzalez, when a state statute unambiguously criminalizes conduct not covered by the generic federal offense, the alien is not removable. Huynh, 102 F.4th at 944–45 (citing Gonzalez, 990 F.3d at 661). But when the state statute’s “reach is ambiguous and amorphous,” or when a petitioner’s “arguments show” that the “statute allows for ‘fanciful hypotheticals’ or ‘theoretical possibilities’” about whether it reaches beyond the generic federal offense, we apply “the Mowlana view” instead. Banyee, 165 F.4th at 1096. Under Mowlana, “the court looks beyond the plain language of the statute, requiring the noncitizen to demonstrate ‘a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime.’” Id. at 1092 (citation omitted). “Demonstrating a realistic probability requires citation to relevant cases,” meaning the petitioner’s own case or other cases where “state courts in fact did apply the statute in the special (nongeneric) manner for which [the petitioner] argues.” Id. (citation omitted). Saavedra-Villanueva claims that the Indiana statute is unambiguously broader than the generic federal offense. She questions whether her crime of conviction necessarily results in harm to a child, and she relies on the theoretical possibility that the statute could criminalize the conduct of a “Good Samaritan” like an “investigative journalist . . . [who is] obtaining photographic evidence of child sex trafficking” or a “child who shares images with her mother” to seek advice. Her argument illustrates that the statute “allow[ed] for ‘fanciful hypotheticals’ and ‘theoretical possibilities.’” Banyee, 165 F.4th at 1092. That means Mowlana directs our analysis, which in turn means she is required to (1) articulate how the Indiana statute could go beyond the generic federal definition, and (2) must “demonstrate ‘a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime.’” Id. at 1092, 1096 (citation omitted). First, Saavedra-Villanueva emphasizes that she only took photos and a video of pre-existing nude images instead of taking an entirely new photo. She also suggests that the conduct does not result in harm to a child if it is done by people -6- like journalists and parents to “help, rather than to harm the child.” Pet’r’s Br. 39 (emphasis omitted). We disagree. Regardless of the photographer’s subjective intent, “[t]he distribution of duplicate images increases the supply and availability of child pornography just as the distribution of unique images does.” United States v. Sampson, 606 F.3d 505, 510 (8th Cir. 2010). Taking duplicate images “compound[s] the effect of an original act of sexual exploitation of a child by increasing the quantity and thus the availability of the image.” Id. The child “suffers continuing and grievous harm,” and “[t]he unlawful conduct of everyone who reproduces, distributes, or possesses the images of the victim’s abuse . . . plays a part in sustaining and aggravating this tragedy.” Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 457 (2014). The Supreme Court agrees that similar images are “harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child.” Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109 (1990) (citation omitted). Second, even if Saavedra-Villanueva showed how Indiana’s statute criminalizes conduct that our broad understanding of “child abuse” does not, her argument independently fails under Mowlana because she cannot show a “realistic probability” that Indiana would “apply the statute in the special (nongeneric) manner for which [s]he argues” by prosecuting journalists who cooperate with police and concerned parents. Banyee, 165 F.4th at 1092 (citation omitted). Because the Indiana statute makes it a crime to knowingly or intentionally do an act that impairs a child’s well-being, it fits within the generic federal child-abuse offense. And because Saavedra-Villanueva violated that statute when she knowingly took digital photos and a video of pre-existing nude images of her niece, the BIA was correct that Saavedra-Villanueva committed a “crime of child abuse” and so was removable. Saavedra-Villanueva’s remaining arguments are also unconvincing. She argues that the BIA erred by deciding that she had committed a “particularly serious crime” and so mistakenly concluded that she is not eligible for withholding of removal or protection from removal under the Convention Against Torture. “A -7- noncitizen has two vehicles by which [s]he can obtain withholding of removal—8 U.S.C. § 1231 (statutory withholding of removal) and CAT—and the particularly serious crime bar prohibits both.” Shazi v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 441, 446–47 (8th Cir. 2021). “The Board possesses some discretion to decide whether an alien has been convicted of a particularly serious crime, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B), although not the sort of ‘specified’ discretion that makes the decision unreviewable.” Al-Masaudi v. Garland, 44 F.4th 1079, 1084 (8th Cir. 2022). We therefore review for abuse of discretion. Id. The BIA applied the correct legal standards and found that Saavedra- Villanueva committed “a particularly serious crime barring [her] from withholding of removal based on the underlying facts and circumstances.” This was due in part to Saavedra-Villanueva’s documented hostility to the child victim—not only duplicating the pornographic images but using them as leverage—and Saavedra- Villanueva’s decision “to protect her father” instead of the victim. For example, the BIA highlighted that Saavedra-Villanueva never “t[old] the police about finding the images,” and instead kept them for her own use. And despite Saavedra-Villanueva’s arguments to the contrary, there is no requirement that the BIA make a separate determination of future dangerousness before it can conclude that her offense was particularly serious. See Tian v. Holder, 576 F.3d 890, 897 (8th Cir. 2009). Rather, “the fact that the alien has committed a particularly serious crime makes the alien dangerous within the meaning of the statute.” Crespo-Gomez v. Richard, 780 F.2d 932, 934 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). On this record, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that Saavedra-Villanueva committed a “particularly serious crime.” See Jama v. Wilkinson, 990 F.3d 1109, 1116 (8th Cir. 2021) (crimes against persons are more likely to be particularly serious); see also Al-Masaudi, 44 F.4th at 1084 (impairment of child’s well-being makes an offense more likely to be particularly serious); cf. Meza-Barhona v. Lynch, 614 F. App’x 908, 909–10 (9th Cir. 2015) (While a “child pornography conviction” is not “per se a particularly serious offense,” “the specific facts involved” can lead to being “barred from obtaining withholding of removal.”). She was therefore properly barred from -8- withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) and the Convention Against Torture. We deny Saavedra-Villanueva’s petitions for review. ______________________________ -9-