Eliana Tuyo Quispe v. Attorney General United States of America
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-3508
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 25-3508
ELIANA DOLORES TUYO QUISPE,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
_____________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the BIA
(Agency No. A212-941-690)
Immigration Judge: Sarah B. Mazzie
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, PORTER, and MASCOTT, Circuit Judges
Submitted: Nov. 18, 2026; Filed: Nov. 20, 2026
_____________________________
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION*
MASCOTT, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Eliana Tuyo Quispe is a citizen of Peru. She
petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order that affirmed the
Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her motion to reopen removal proceedings. Because
neither the IJ nor the BIA abused their discretion in denying the motion to reopen, we will
deny the petition for review.
I.
As a citizen of Peru, Quispe crossed the Texas border in 2002, but she did not cross
at a point of entry. While in the United States, Quispe had two daughters: one in 2011, and
one in 2015. Both daughters are U.S. citizens.
*
This is not an opinion of the full Court and, under 3d Cir. IOP 5.7, is not binding precedent.
In August 2017, the Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear to
Quispe, charging her with entering the United States without being admitted or paroled and
without entering at a port of entry. Quispe conceded removability, but applied for
cancellation of removal, arguing that her removal would pose an “exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship” on her daughters because it would require her to take both
daughters to Peru rather than leaving them with their father (and Quispe’s partner).
After holding a hearing, the IJ denied Quispe’s application for cancellation of
removal in October 2020, concluding that her removal to Peru would not pose an
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” for her two daughters and, therefore, did not
satisfy the statutory requirements for cancellation of removal. In reaching its conclusion,
the IJ acknowledged (1) that Peru has “a lower standard of living” and more “diminished
educational opportunities” than the United States; (2) that “there is a possibility that the
children will struggle in school because they speak very little Spanish and do not know
how to write in Spanish”; (3) that one child has eczema; and (4) that “it may be emotionally
difficult for [Quispe]’s daughters to move to another country and be separated from their
father.” AR.140–41. But the IJ reasoned that (1) “Peru’s educational system has
improved”; (2) Quispe’s daughters “do not have a learning disability” and “will likely be
able to adjust to the language differences” because “they speak some Spanish”; (3) there is
no evidence about the severity of the one daughter’s eczema or about the inability to obtain
the essential medications or medical care for that eczema; and (4) the emotional difficulty
of being separated from the father is not “substantially” greater than “the ordinary hardship
2
that would be expected when a close family member leaves or remains in the country.”
AR.140–41. Accordingly, the IJ ordered Quispe removed.
Rather than appealing to the BIA, Quispe moved to reopen the removal proceedings1
in January 2021, arguing that because of COVID-19 country conditions in Peru had
dramatically deteriorated in the thirteen-month gap between the final hearing and the IJ’s
earlier decision. Eight months later, the IJ denied Quispe’s motion to reopen. The IJ
acknowledged that COVID-19 had negatively impacted Peru but stated that it had also
negatively impacted the United States and the rest of the world. In addition, Quispe’s
evidence showed that organizations were providing assistance to Peru and that Peru was
“continuing to educate its children” and “provide its citizens with the health resources that
they need.” AR.46. “Therefore,” the IJ concluded, “the hardship that [Quispe]’s children
would experience in Peru may be no different than the hardship that they are currently
experiencing now in the United States due to the pandemic.” AR.46. As a result, the IJ
denied Quispe’s motion to reopen her cancellation of removal proceedings.
Having lost again, Quispe appealed to the BIA in October 2021. The BIA affirmed
the denial of Quispe’s motion to reopen and dismissed the appeal. In particular, the BIA
held that Quispe had not shown that her removal would cause an exceptional and extremely
1
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)–(B) (stating that “[a]n alien may file one motion to
reopen proceedings under this section,” subject to an exception, and that “[t]he motion to
reopen shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is
granted[] and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material”).
3
unusual hardship for her daughters under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D)2 or that she was
eligible for cancellation of removal because the IJ had adequately considered Quispe’s
arguments finding them nonmeritorious. Quispe now petitions for review.
II.
The BIA had jurisdiction over Quispe’s appeal under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). We have
jurisdiction over the BIA’s denial of reopening, which constitutes a final order of removal.3
In removal proceedings, “[a]s a general rule, motions to reopen are granted only
under compelling circumstances.”4 They “are especially disfavored” on the merits.5 To
satisfy the changed-country-conditions exception under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii),6
Quispe must show that her new evidence “is material” by “alleg[ing] facts that ‘would be
2
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (providing that “[t]he Attorney General may cancel
removal . . . if [an] alien . . . . establishes that removal would result in exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the
United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence”).
3
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); see also Jahjaga v. Att’y Gen., 512 F.3d 80, 82 (3d Cir.
2008) (“The denial of a motion to reopen is itself a final order of removal.” (citing Cruz v.
Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 2006))); Mata v. Lynch, 576 U.S. 143, 147 (2015)
(“[C]ircuit courts have jurisdiction when an alien appeals from the Board’s denial of a
motion to reopen a removal proceeding.” (citing Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 242, 253
(2010))); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(6) (“[A]ny review sought of a motion to reopen or reconsider
[a removal order] shall be consolidated with review of the [underlying] order.”).
4
Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 561 (3d Cir. 2004).
5
Darby v. Att’y Gen., 1 F.4th 151, 159 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting INS v. Doherty, 502
U.S. 314, 323 (1992)).
6
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (“There is no time limit on the filing of a motion to
reopen if the basis of the motion is to apply for relief under sections 1158 or 1231(b)(3) of
this title and is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality
or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not
available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.”).
4
sufficient, if proved, to change the result’ of their application.”7 When assessing a motion
to reopen, “we review a denial of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider for abuse
of discretion, regardless of the underlying basis of the alien’s request for relief.” 8 A BIA
“denial of a motion to reopen may only be reversed if it is ‘arbitrary, irrational, or contrary
to law.’”9
III.
The IJ and the BIA have not abused their discretion here. Quispe contends that “the
IJ failed to ‘meaningfully consider’ the risks to life and limb faced by the Petitioner and
her children from COVID-19”; that the IJ “failed completely to acknowledge the extent of
the risk the family would have faced had the Petitioner been relocated in Peru at this time
(together with her daughters)”; that “Peru was the deadliest country on earth due to the
COVID-19 pandemic”; and that “[p]hysical presence alone in a country with the highest
death rate in the world from a pandemic is or should be sufficient, in Petitioner’s view, to
establish ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.’” Appellant’s Br. 6–8.
But both the IJ and the BIA considered the changed-country conditions and
specifically reviewed the evidence in reaching the conclusion to deny reopening. The IJ
specifically pointed to the “general country condition evidence demonstrating how
7
Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 496 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Kaur v. BIA, 413
F.3d 232, 234 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam)).
8
Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2011) (first citing Doherty, 502
U.S. at 323–24; and then citing Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 409 (3d Cir. 2003)).
9
Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Sevoian v. Ashcroft,
290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002)).
5
C[OVID]-19 has impacted Peru,” and the IJ “acknowledge[d]” how COVID-19 “has
negatively impacted Peru.” See AR.46. Pointing to one report that Quispe provided as
evidence, the IJ even recognized that COVID-19 “had an impact on education” in Peru.
AR.46.
The IJ observed that COVID-19 “has also negatively impacted the rest of the world,
including the United States.” AR.46. Recognizing potential specific negative impacts on
Peru, the IJ relied on the evidence Quispe submitted to explain that organizations are
“providing assistance to Peru” and that “Peru, with assistance from [those organizations],
is continuing to educate its children, as well as provide its citizens with the health resources
that they need.” AR.46. According to the IJ, “the hardship that [Quispe]’s children would
experience in Peru may be no different than the hardship that they are currently
experiencing now in the United States due to the pandemic.” AR.46. Therefore, by looking
at all the evidence, the IJ concluded that Quispe “failed to demonstrate how [her] children
would specifically experience exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if they moved
to Peru.” AR.46.
Like the IJ, the BIA considered the evidence Quispe provided and explained why it
denied reopening. The BIA stated that “the record does not support the . . . contention that
the Immigration Judge did not meaningfully consider [Quispe’s] arguments as to the
COVID-19 Pandemic . . . .” AR.3. According to the BIA, the IJ acknowledged the
negative impact that the pandemic had on the country of Peru and concluded that this
general evidence did not speak to any specific hardship Quispe’s daughters would
experience if they accompanied Quispe to Peru. The BIA explained that a hardship for a
6
cancellation-of-removal “must be ‘substantially different from, or beyond, that which
would normally be expected from the deportation.’” AR.4 (quoting In re Monreal-
Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 65 (BIA 2001)). Consequently, the BIA concluded that
Quispe had not shown an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship for her daughters
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) or eligibility for cancellation of removal.
Because both the IJ and the BIA meaningfully considered the evidence and
arguments Quispe presented, did not ignore evidence favorable to Quispe, considered her
new evidence, and explained why any evidence was rejected,10 Quispe has not shown that
the IJ’s decision or the BIA’s decision was “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”11 And
because Quispe has not shown a prima facie case for relief, the agency did not abuse its
discretion in denying the motion to reopen.12
*****
For these reasons, we will deny Quispe’s petition for review.
10
See Liem v. Att’y Gen., 921 F.3d 388, 395 (3d Cir. 2019).
11
See Filja, 447 F.3d at 251 (quotation omitted).
12
See Darby, 1 F.4th at 159–60.
7