Full Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 25-3508 ELIANA DOLORES TUYO QUISPE, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA _____________________________ On Petition for Review of an Order of the BIA (Agency No. A212-941-690) Immigration Judge: Sarah B. Mazzie Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, PORTER, and MASCOTT, Circuit Judges Submitted: Nov. 18, 2026; Filed: Nov. 20, 2026 _____________________________ NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION* MASCOTT, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Eliana Tuyo Quispe is a citizen of Peru. She petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order that affirmed the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her motion to reopen removal proceedings. Because neither the IJ nor the BIA abused their discretion in denying the motion to reopen, we will deny the petition for review. I. As a citizen of Peru, Quispe crossed the Texas border in 2002, but she did not cross at a point of entry. While in the United States, Quispe had two daughters: one in 2011, and one in 2015. Both daughters are U.S. citizens. * This is not an opinion of the full Court and, under 3d Cir. IOP 5.7, is not binding precedent. In August 2017, the Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear to Quispe, charging her with entering the United States without being admitted or paroled and without entering at a port of entry. Quispe conceded removability, but applied for cancellation of removal, arguing that her removal would pose an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” on her daughters because it would require her to take both daughters to Peru rather than leaving them with their father (and Quispe’s partner). After holding a hearing, the IJ denied Quispe’s application for cancellation of removal in October 2020, concluding that her removal to Peru would not pose an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” for her two daughters and, therefore, did not satisfy the statutory requirements for cancellation of removal. In reaching its conclusion, the IJ acknowledged (1) that Peru has “a lower standard of living” and more “diminished educational opportunities” than the United States; (2) that “there is a possibility that the children will struggle in school because they speak very little Spanish and do not know how to write in Spanish”; (3) that one child has eczema; and (4) that “it may be emotionally difficult for [Quispe]’s daughters to move to another country and be separated from their father.” AR.140–41. But the IJ reasoned that (1) “Peru’s educational system has improved”; (2) Quispe’s daughters “do not have a learning disability” and “will likely be able to adjust to the language differences” because “they speak some Spanish”; (3) there is no evidence about the severity of the one daughter’s eczema or about the inability to obtain the essential medications or medical care for that eczema; and (4) the emotional difficulty of being separated from the father is not “substantially” greater than “the ordinary hardship 2 that would be expected when a close family member leaves or remains in the country.” AR.140–41. Accordingly, the IJ ordered Quispe removed. Rather than appealing to the BIA, Quispe moved to reopen the removal proceedings1 in January 2021, arguing that because of COVID-19 country conditions in Peru had dramatically deteriorated in the thirteen-month gap between the final hearing and the IJ’s earlier decision. Eight months later, the IJ denied Quispe’s motion to reopen. The IJ acknowledged that COVID-19 had negatively impacted Peru but stated that it had also negatively impacted the United States and the rest of the world. In addition, Quispe’s evidence showed that organizations were providing assistance to Peru and that Peru was “continuing to educate its children” and “provide its citizens with the health resources that they need.” AR.46. “Therefore,” the IJ concluded, “the hardship that [Quispe]’s children would experience in Peru may be no different than the hardship that they are currently experiencing now in the United States due to the pandemic.” AR.46. As a result, the IJ denied Quispe’s motion to reopen her cancellation of removal proceedings. Having lost again, Quispe appealed to the BIA in October 2021. The BIA affirmed the denial of Quispe’s motion to reopen and dismissed the appeal. In particular, the BIA held that Quispe had not shown that her removal would cause an exceptional and extremely 1 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)–(B) (stating that “[a]n alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings under this section,” subject to an exception, and that “[t]he motion to reopen shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted[] and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material”). 3 unusual hardship for her daughters under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D)2 or that she was eligible for cancellation of removal because the IJ had adequately considered Quispe’s arguments finding them nonmeritorious. Quispe now petitions for review. II. The BIA had jurisdiction over Quispe’s appeal under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). We have jurisdiction over the BIA’s denial of reopening, which constitutes a final order of removal.3 In removal proceedings, “[a]s a general rule, motions to reopen are granted only under compelling circumstances.”4 They “are especially disfavored” on the merits.5 To satisfy the changed-country-conditions exception under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii),6 Quispe must show that her new evidence “is material” by “alleg[ing] facts that ‘would be 2 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (providing that “[t]he Attorney General may cancel removal . . . if [an] alien . . . . establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence”). 3 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); see also Jahjaga v. Att’y Gen., 512 F.3d 80, 82 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The denial of a motion to reopen is itself a final order of removal.” (citing Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 2006))); Mata v. Lynch, 576 U.S. 143, 147 (2015) (“[C]ircuit courts have jurisdiction when an alien appeals from the Board’s denial of a motion to reopen a removal proceeding.” (citing Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 242, 253 (2010))); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(6) (“[A]ny review sought of a motion to reopen or reconsider [a removal order] shall be consolidated with review of the [underlying] order.”). 4 Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 561 (3d Cir. 2004). 5 Darby v. Att’y Gen., 1 F.4th 151, 159 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992)). 6 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (“There is no time limit on the filing of a motion to reopen if the basis of the motion is to apply for relief under sections 1158 or 1231(b)(3) of this title and is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.”). 4 sufficient, if proved, to change the result’ of their application.”7 When assessing a motion to reopen, “we review a denial of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion, regardless of the underlying basis of the alien’s request for relief.” 8 A BIA “denial of a motion to reopen may only be reversed if it is ‘arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.’”9 III. The IJ and the BIA have not abused their discretion here. Quispe contends that “the IJ failed to ‘meaningfully consider’ the risks to life and limb faced by the Petitioner and her children from COVID-19”; that the IJ “failed completely to acknowledge the extent of the risk the family would have faced had the Petitioner been relocated in Peru at this time (together with her daughters)”; that “Peru was the deadliest country on earth due to the COVID-19 pandemic”; and that “[p]hysical presence alone in a country with the highest death rate in the world from a pandemic is or should be sufficient, in Petitioner’s view, to establish ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.’” Appellant’s Br. 6–8. But both the IJ and the BIA considered the changed-country conditions and specifically reviewed the evidence in reaching the conclusion to deny reopening. The IJ specifically pointed to the “general country condition evidence demonstrating how 7 Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 496 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 234 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam)). 8 Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2011) (first citing Doherty, 502 U.S. at 323–24; and then citing Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 409 (3d Cir. 2003)). 9 Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002)). 5 C[OVID]-19 has impacted Peru,” and the IJ “acknowledge[d]” how COVID-19 “has negatively impacted Peru.” See AR.46. Pointing to one report that Quispe provided as evidence, the IJ even recognized that COVID-19 “had an impact on education” in Peru. AR.46. The IJ observed that COVID-19 “has also negatively impacted the rest of the world, including the United States.” AR.46. Recognizing potential specific negative impacts on Peru, the IJ relied on the evidence Quispe submitted to explain that organizations are “providing assistance to Peru” and that “Peru, with assistance from [those organizations], is continuing to educate its children, as well as provide its citizens with the health resources that they need.” AR.46. According to the IJ, “the hardship that [Quispe]’s children would experience in Peru may be no different than the hardship that they are currently experiencing now in the United States due to the pandemic.” AR.46. Therefore, by looking at all the evidence, the IJ concluded that Quispe “failed to demonstrate how [her] children would specifically experience exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if they moved to Peru.” AR.46. Like the IJ, the BIA considered the evidence Quispe provided and explained why it denied reopening. The BIA stated that “the record does not support the . . . contention that the Immigration Judge did not meaningfully consider [Quispe’s] arguments as to the COVID-19 Pandemic . . . .” AR.3. According to the BIA, the IJ acknowledged the negative impact that the pandemic had on the country of Peru and concluded that this general evidence did not speak to any specific hardship Quispe’s daughters would experience if they accompanied Quispe to Peru. The BIA explained that a hardship for a 6 cancellation-of-removal “must be ‘substantially different from, or beyond, that which would normally be expected from the deportation.’” AR.4 (quoting In re Monreal- Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 65 (BIA 2001)). Consequently, the BIA concluded that Quispe had not shown an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship for her daughters under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) or eligibility for cancellation of removal. Because both the IJ and the BIA meaningfully considered the evidence and arguments Quispe presented, did not ignore evidence favorable to Quispe, considered her new evidence, and explained why any evidence was rejected,10 Quispe has not shown that the IJ’s decision or the BIA’s decision was “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”11 And because Quispe has not shown a prima facie case for relief, the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen.12 ***** For these reasons, we will deny Quispe’s petition for review. 10 See Liem v. Att’y Gen., 921 F.3d 388, 395 (3d Cir. 2019). 11 See Filja, 447 F.3d at 251 (quotation omitted). 12 See Darby, 1 F.4th at 159–60. 7