Yoan Aguiar-Fernandez v. U.S. Attorney General
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket24-12318
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
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FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-12318
____________________
YOAN AGUIAR-FERNANDEZ,
YENISLEY GONZALEZ-SANABRIA,
ESSINED YOANA AGUIAR-GONZALEZ,
Petitioners,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
____________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Agency No. A220-281-837
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-12318
Before BRANCH, BRASHER, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
BRASHER, Circuit Judge:
The main question in this appeal is whether Cuban nationals
who have been released on their own recognizance from immigra-
tion detention with documents citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226 as the basis
for release are eligible for relief under the Cuban Adjustment Act
of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1255 note). The Aguiar-Fernandez family—Yoan Aguiar-
Fernandez, his wife Yenisley Gonzalez-Sanabria, and his daughter
Essined Yoana Aguiar-Gonzalez—were apprehended by border
patrol officers, charged with being removable, and released on con-
ditional parole under section 1226. They applied for an adjustment
of status under the CAA. An immigration judge concluded that
they are not eligible, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed,
and the Aguiar-Fernandez family petitioned this Court for review.
We conclude that to be eligible for relief under the CAA, the
Aguiar-Fernandez family, as aliens who had not been inspected and
admitted into the United States, had to receive humanitarian parole
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Release from immigration deten-
tion under section 1226’s conditional parole provision does not suf-
fice. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review.
I.
The Aguiar-Fernandez family, all Cuban citizens, unlawfully
entered the United States near San Luis, Arizona, on June 25, 2021.
After “jump[ing] the border,” the family “turned [themselves] in to
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24-12318 Opinion of the Court 3
the border patrol.” They were briefly detained by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, and each was issued a Form I-220A
Order of Release on Recognizance. The Form I-220A Orders cited
8 U.S.C. § 1226 as the basis for their release.
Each member of the Aguiar-Fernandez family received a
Form I-862 Notice to Appear, charging them with removability un-
der 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as aliens who entered the United
States without admission or parole. The family conceded remova-
bility at a hearing before an immigration judge.
Aguiar-Fernandez applied for asylum, withholding of re-
moval, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. His
wife and daughter were listed as joint applicants. Aguiar-Fernandez
submitted that his family “ha[d] suffered past persecution on ac-
count of [their] political opinion in opposition to the Cuban re-
gime” and that Aguiar-Fernandez’s “life and freedom would be
threatened on account of [his] political beliefs” if returned to Cuba.
Each member of the family filed a Form I-485 Application to
Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, seeking to adjust
their status under the CAA. They separately sought humanitarian
parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
The family appeared before an immigration judge for a mer-
its hearing. During the hearing, the immigration judge noted that
DHS had denied the family’s request for humanitarian parole un-
der section 1182(d)(5)(A) earlier that day, though the family resub-
mitted their request soon after.
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4 Opinion of the Court 24-12318
Aguiar-Fernandez then testified about the events preceding
his family’s unlawful entry into the United States. He testified that
he lived in Venezuela from 2010 to 2013 while on a service mission
on behalf of the Cuban government. He sought to abandon the
mission after being asked to persuade Venezuelan citizens to vote
for the Venezuelan government, and he returned to Cuba in March
2013 after his colleagues informed the Cuban government of his
intentions to leave the mission. Although Aguiar-Fernandez’s mis-
sion passport—which authorized travel only to Venezuela—was
confiscated upon returning to Cuba, he was never arrested or in-
terrogated and remained employed by the same government
agency. He also obtained a license from the Cuban government to
operate an auto body shop from his residence. Aguiar-Fernandez’s
wife also was never arrested or interrogated and continued work-
ing as a nurse practitioner.
Aguiar-Fernandez further testified that Captain Cordero, a
Cuban police captain, visited his auto body shop five or six times.
Captain Cordero threatened to jail Aguiar-Fernandez and “tell[]
everybody” that he abandoned the mission in Venezuela if he did
not fix Cordero’s car. During Captain Cordero’s last visit to the
shop, he struck Aguiar-Fernandez twice with a baton, prompting a
scuffle during which both men fell to the ground. A May 14, 2016,
medical report documented bruises to Aguiar-Fernandez’s chest
and scratches to his legs.
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24-12318 Opinion of the Court 5
The Cuban authorities never cited or arrested Aguiar-Fer-
nandez over his altercation with Captain Cordero. Aguiar-Fernan-
dez then remained in Cuba for another two years without incident.
Captain Cordero never again visited Aguiar-Fernandez after the al-
tercation, and Aguiar-Fernandez did not experience issues with any
other Cuban police officer. Moreover, Aguiar-Fernandez and his
family obtained personal Cuban passports and ultimately left for
Mexico in August 2018, where they remained until they illegally
crossed the border into the United States on June 25, 2021. Though
Cuban police visited his in-laws for an unspecified reason in 2019,
and officials once questioned Aguiar-Fernandez’s brother about his
whereabouts, “nothing else has happened” since then.
Despite finding Aguiar-Fernandez’s testimony credible, the
immigration judge (1) pretermitted the applications for adjustment
of status under the CAA; (2) denied Aguiar-Fernandez’s application
for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection; and
(3) ordered the family removed from the United States to Cuba.
For the adjustment-of-status applications, the immigration
judge concluded that the Aguiar-Fernandez family was “released
on condition of parole, rather than humanitarian parole.” Doc. 8 at
221. The immigration judge reasoned that conditional parole un-
der 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) is distinct from humanitarian parole under
section 1182(d)(5)(A). And the immigration judge concluded the
CAA requires release through humanitarian parole under sec-
tion 1182(d)(5)(A), not conditional parole under section 1226(a).
Consequently, the family was ineligible for relief.
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6 Opinion of the Court 24-12318
The immigration judge also denied Aguiar-Fernandez’s ap-
plication for asylum because he failed to establish past persecution
or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his po-
litical opinion. The immigration judge similarly denied Aguiar-Fer-
nandez’s request for withholding of removal, reasoning that he had
failed to prove that Cuba would be “unable or unwilling” to protect
him. The immigration judge further denied Aguiar-Fernandez’s re-
quest for protection under CAT because he failed to establish that
he “would be tortured in the future by or at the acquiesce [sic] and
consent or instigation of any public official or other person acting
in an official capacity.” Id. at 226.
The Aguiar-Fernandez family appealed to the BIA. They ar-
gued that the immigration judge erred in pretermitting their appli-
cations for adjustment of status under the CAA because, contrary
to the paperwork granting them conditional parole under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226, their release “constituted a humanitarian parole under [8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)].” They also challenged the immigration
judge’s decision to deny Aguiar-Fernandez’s application for asy-
lum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection.
The BIA summarily affirmed the immigration judge’s rul-
ing. This petition for review followed.
II.
“Where the BIA issues a decision, we review that decision,
except to the extent that it expressly adopts the [immigration
judge’s] opinion.” Chen v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1228, 1230 (11th
Cir. 2006). Because the BIA summarily affirmed the immigration
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24-12318 Opinion of the Court 7
judge’s decision, we review the immigration judge’s decision as if
it were the BIA’s. Id.
We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo and factual
findings under the “highly deferential” substantial evidence test.
See A.P.A. v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 104 F.4th 230, 236 (11th Cir. 2024); Serra
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 60 F.4th 653, 658 (11th Cir. 2023). Under this test,
we “must affirm the BIA’s decision if it is supported by reasonable,
substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a
whole.” A.P.A., 104 F.4th at 236. To reverse factual findings, “we
must find that the record not only supports reversal, but compels
it.” Mendoza v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 327 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003)
(emphasis added) (citing Fahim v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 278 F.3d 1216,
1218 (11th Cir. 2002)). “[I]n the language of the [INA], the agency’s
determination whether a given set of undisputed facts rises to the
level of persecution . . . is generally ‘conclusive unless any reason-
able adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”
Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S. 537, 545 (2026) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B)).
III.
The Aguiar-Fernandez family challenges the immigration
judge’s determinations, which the BIA adopted, in two main re-
spects. First, they argue that the immigration judge should not
have pretermitted their applications for adjustment of status under
the CAA. They contend that they are eligible for adjustment of sta-
tus under the CAA because, as a matter of law, they received hu-
manitarian parole when they were released from custody after
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8 Opinion of the Court 24-12318
crossing the border. Second, they say that Aguiar-Fernandez will
be subjected to persecution or torture upon removal to Cuba. They
therefore contend that they should receive asylum, withholding of
removal, or protection under the Convention Against Torture. We
address each issue in turn.
A.
We begin with the Aguiar-Fernandez family’s applications
for adjustment of status. The BIA did not err when it determined
that each member of the family is ineligible for relief under the
CAA.1
The general adjustment of status provision, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255(a), establishes a legal framework for aliens already inside the
United States to become permanent residents without leaving the
country. Arevalo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 872 F.3d 1184, 1191 (11th
Cir. 2017). By enacting the CAA, Congress created a specific path-
way for eligible Cubans to obtain lawful permanent residence be-
yond this general framework. Specifically, the CAA grants the At-
torney General discretion to adjust the status of an individual who
1 We ordinarily lack jurisdiction to review “judgment[s] regarding the granting
of relief under” 8 U.S.C. § 1255, which is the general statute for adjustment of
status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). But we have previously held that adjust-
ment of status under the CAA is separate and apart from adjustment of status
under section 1255. See Perez v. USCIS, 774 F.3d 960, 967–68 (11th Cir. 2014).
Moreover, the Aguiar-Fernandez family raises questions of law about their el-
igibility for relief under the CAA. We have jurisdiction to address those legal
questions even if they arise from the denial of adjustment of status. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(D), (b)(9).
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24-12318 Opinion of the Court 9
(1) “is a native or citizen of Cuba”; (2) “has been inspected and ad-
mitted or paroled into the United States subsequent to January 1,
1959”; (3) “has been physically present in the United States for at
least one year”; and (4) is “eligible to receive an immigrant visa and
is admissible to the United States for permanent residence.” 8
U.S.C. § 1255 note. Its provisions also apply to “the spouse and
child of any alien” who qualifies under the Act. Id.
The dispute in this appeal centers on the second element of
the CAA: whether each member of the Aguiar-Fernandez family
has “been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United
States.” Id. The government argues that to satisfy this element and
be eligible for CAA relief, each member of the family must have
been granted humanitarian parole under section 1182(d)(5)(A). But
because DHS released the family on conditional parole under sec-
tion 1226(a)(2)(B), the government contends that they do not meet
that requirement. The Aguiar-Fernandez family argues that, as a
matter of law, they received humanitarian parole under sec-
tion 1182(d)(5)(A) because their initial detention was governed by
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and humanitarian parole is the only mech-
anism for releasing an alien under that provision. As such, they ar-
gue that they are eligible for CAA relief.
Other circuits have held that aliens who have not been in-
spected and admitted into the United States are eligible for adjust-
ment of status under section 1255(a) only if they have been “pa-
roled into the United States” under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). See
Cruz-Miguel v. Holder, 650 F.3d 189, 195–96, 198–200 (2d Cir. 2011);
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Delgado-Sobalvarro v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 625 F.3d 782, 786 (3d Cir.
2010); Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111, 1116–20 (9th
Cir. 2007); Texas v. Biden, 20 F.4th 928, 995–96 (5th Cir. 2021), rev’d
on other grounds, 597 U.S. 785 (2022); see also Matter of Castillo-Padilla,
25 I. & N. Dec. 257, 258, 263 (BIA 2010). These circuits have rea-
soned that the statute’s use of the phrase “paroled into the United
States” compels this result.
We agree and adopt the same rule for the CAA. Like sec-
tion 1255(a) itself, the CAA uses the term of art “paroled into the
United States.” “Paroled into the United States” tracks the wording
of the humanitarian parole provision, section 1182(d)(5)(A). Com-
pare 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (Attorney General may adjust the status of
“an alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United
States” (emphasis added)), and id. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (Secretary of
Homeland Security has discretion to “parole into the United States
. . . for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit
any alien applying for admission to the United States” (emphasis
added)), with id. § 1255 note (Attorney General may adjust the sta-
tus “of any alien who is a native or citizen of Cuba and who has
been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States subse-
quent to January 1, 1959 . . .” (emphasis added)). Unless statutory
context counsels otherwise, we presume that “language carries the
same meaning as does the same language in related statutes.”
United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181, 1201 (11th Cir. 2019); see also
United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445, 458 (2019). And there is no rea-
son to believe the phrase “paroled into the United States” should
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24-12318 Opinion of the Court 11
carry different meanings in the CAA, section 1255(a), and the hu-
manitarian parole provision, section 1182(d)(5)(A).
Although conditional release under section 1226(a) may be
a type of generic parole, it does not authorize “parole[] into the
United States.” Section 1226(a)(2)(B) provides for “conditional pa-
role,” which permits the release of aliens “arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the
United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Like the Second Circuit con-
cluded in Cruz-Miguel while interpreting section 1255(a), “[t]his tex-
tual distinction by itself signals that Congress intended the phrase
‘paroled into the United States’ . . . to reference persons granted
‘parole into the United States’ under § 1182(d)(5)(A), not those re-
leased on ‘conditional parole’ under § 1226(a)(2)(B).” Cruz-Miguel,
650 F.3d at 196; see also Iraola & CIA, S.A. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,
232 F.3d 854, 859 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen Congress uses different
language in similar sections, it intends different meanings.”). For
these reasons, we conclude that humanitarian parole—that is, “pa-
role into the United States”—under section 1182(d)(5)(A) is re-
quired for CAA eligibility.
We next ask whether the members of the Aguiar-Fernandez
family were granted such parole. They were not. The record re-
flects that DHS never granted humanitarian parole to the family.
Instead, DHS expressly released them on conditional parole under
section 1226(a)(2)(B). The Form I-220A Orders governing their re-
lease from immigration detention cite the federal regulations cor-
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12 Opinion of the Court 24-12318
responding to section 1226; the applications for adjustment of sta-
tus directly list the Form I-220A Orders as the basis for their pres-
ence in the United States; and no member of the family was ever
given an I-94 card, which humanitarian parolees normally receive.
See Ortega-Cervantes, 501 F.3d at 1115. When they asked for human-
itarian parole during their removal proceedings, that parole was
expressly denied by DHS.
Even so, the Aguiar-Fernandez family argues that they were
granted humanitarian parole under section 1182(d)(5)(A) as a mat-
ter of law. Under their theory, DHS’s detention authority derived
from section 1225(b)(2)(A), and the only form of parole available
under section 1225(b)(2)(A) is humanitarian parole. Thus, the fam-
ily reasons, they were granted humanitarian parole as a matter of
law when they were released from custody.
We disagree with this theory. Whether DHS has granted hu-
manitarian parole under section 1182(d)(5)(A) is a question of his-
torical fact. That determination depends on the agency’s rationale
for releasing the alien. It is not a legal question that turns on the
agency’s detention authority. Like any other factual question,
whether the agency has granted humanitarian parole is primarily
resolved by the record. An agency’s detention authority might be
relevant in a case where the rationale for the parole decision is un-
clear on the record. Cf. Williams v. United States, 985 F.3d 813, 817
(11th Cir. 2021) (district court’s reason for imposing a sentence is
one of “historical fact” that may be proved by direct evidence, such
as record of decision, or indirect evidence, such as the state of the
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24-12318 Opinion of the Court 13
law at the time of the decision). But the question remains a factual
question about whether and why the agency granted parole.
Other circuits have likewise treated this question as one of
historical fact. For example, the Ninth Circuit addressed a similar
circumstance in Ortega-Cervantes, 501 F.3d at 1115–16. There, after
a Mexican citizen crossed the U.S.-Mexico border and was appre-
hended, the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued a war-
rant for his arrest under section 1226. Id. at 1115. Later, as here, the
petitioner received a Form I-220A Order releasing him on his own
recognizance under section 1226. Id. (“It is apparent that the INS
used the phrase ‘release on recognizance’ as another name for ‘con-
ditional parole’ under § 1226(a).”). And, as here, the petitioner in
Ortega-Cervantes never received any form referencing “parole into
the United States” under section 1182(d)(5)(A). Nor did “immigra-
tion officials . . . issue [him] an I-94 card, which is typically given to
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) parolees.” Id. (citation modified). Because it saw
“no indication that the government intended to parole [the peti-
tioner] into the United States pursuant to § 1182(d)(5)(A),” the
Ninth Circuit concluded that he had not been granted humanitar-
ian parole. Id. at 1116 (citation modified).
Here, the record establishes that the Aguiar-Fernandez fam-
ily was granted conditional parole under section 1226 rather than
humanitarian parole under section 1182(d)(5)(A). The family is
therefore ineligible for adjustment of status under the CAA.
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14 Opinion of the Court 24-12318
B.
We now turn to the Aguiar-Fernandez family’s requests for
asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture
protection. The BIA did not err when it determined that the family
was not entitled to any form of relief.
To qualify for asylum, an alien must present “credible evi-
dence” establishing “(1) past persecution on account of her political
opinion or any other protected ground, or (2) a ‘well-founded fear’
that her political opinion or any other protected ground will cause
future persecution.” Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226,
1230–31 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a), (b)).
The burden for withholding of removal and CAT relief is
higher than the burden for asylum. See Lingeswaran v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 969 F.3d 1278, 1293 & n.10 (11th Cir. 2020). To receive with-
holding of removal, an alien must prove that his “life or freedom
would be threatened in [the] country [of removal] because of [his]
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion.” Id. at 1232 (citation modified) (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)). CAT relief likewise carries a higher burden
than for asylum eligibility and requires proving “that it is more
likely than not that [the alien] would be tortured if removed to the
proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (citation
modified).
The Aguiar-Fernandez family has not satisfied any of those
standards here. As for past persecution, although Aguiar-Fernan-
dez argues on appeal that he was surveilled and interrogated after
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24-12318 Opinion of the Court 15
returning to Cuba from the Venezuela mission, the record fails to
provide any evidence that Aguiar-Fernandez or his wife was ar-
rested or interrogated. Instead, both remained employed, and
Aguiar-Fernandez was able to continue working for the same gov-
ernment-sponsored organization until he voluntarily chose to
leave to operate an auto body shop, for which the government is-
sued him an occupational license. Moreover, Aguiar-Fernandez
was never cited, arrested, or interrogated for his altercation with
Captain Cordero. The record also contains no evidence that he had
any further interactions with Cordero or any other Cuban police
officer following the incident. And despite abandoning the Vene-
zuela mission and his altercation with Captain Cordero, Aguiar-
Fernandez and his family were issued passports and traveled to
Mexico in August 2018 without incident.
The family points us to Aguiar-Fernandez’s interactions
with Captain Cordero as establishing past persecution. But the rec-
ord suggests that Cordero acted in a private capacity. Ruiz v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1258 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[E]vidence that
either is consistent with acts of private violence . . . or that merely
shows that a person has been the victim of criminal activity, does
not constitute evidence of persecution based on a statutorily pro-
tected ground.”). And, in any event, our past decisions make clear
that Aguiar-Fernandez’s interactions with Cordero do not rise to
the level of persecution. See Murugan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 10 F.4th
1185, 1192–93 (11th Cir. 2021) (no past persecution where a Sri
Lankan petitioner was “detained three times and, during a [] [four]-
day detention, tied to a chair, slapped, and kicked”); Djonda v. U.S.
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16 Opinion of the Court 24-12318
Att’y Gen., 514 F.3d 1168, 1171, 1173–74 (11th Cir. 2008) (no past
persecution despite testimony that the Togolese petitioner was ar-
rested, beaten, detained for thirty-six hours, hospitalized for two
days, and threatened with rearrest); see also Martinez v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 992 F.3d 1283, 1291 (11th Cir. 2021) (“Persecution is an ‘ex-
treme concept’ requiring evidence of ‘more than a few isolated in-
cidents of verbal harassment or intimidation.’” (quoting Sepulveda,
401 F.3d at 1231)).
The Aguiar-Fernandez family’s arguments about future per-
secution, a threat to their life or freedom, or the likelihood of tor-
ture fare no better. The family has not established why the BIA’s
conclusion about the likelihood of future persecution or torture
warrants reversal. In any event, the record confirms that the family
is not entitled to asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT protec-
tion based on a fear of future persecution or torture upon removal
to Cuba. Accordingly, we reject the family’s requests for those
forms of relief.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is DENIED.