Full Opinion

24-1102 Ventura-Granados v. Blanche BIA Douchy, IJ A206 729 300 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 20th day of November, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: GERARD E. LYNCH, MYRNA PÉREZ, MATTHEW A. SCHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ NOE ISMAEL VENTURA-GRANADOS, Petitioner, v. 24-1102 NAC TODD BLANCHE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________ FOR PETITIONER: Nicholas J. Mundy, Esq., Brooklyn, NY. FOR RESPONDENT: Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General; Kohsei Ugumori, Senior Litigation Counsel; Rosanne M. Perry, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. Petitioner Noe Ismael Ventura-Granados, a native and citizen of Honduras, seeks review of a March 26, 2024, decision of the BIA affirming a February 4, 2020, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Noe Ismael Ventura-Granados, No. A 206 729 300 (B.I.A. Mar. 26, 2024), aff’g No. A 206 729 300 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Feb. 4, 2020). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions. See Singh-Kar v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 94, 100 (2d Cir. 2025). We review the agency’s factual findings concerning nexus and the likelihood of future torture for substantial evidence. See Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103, 114–15 (2d Cir. 2022); Al Saidi v. Blanche, 185 2 F.4th 286, 307 (2d Cir. 2026). “[A]dministrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). An applicant for asylum “must establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b). Similarly, an applicant seeking withholding of removal must establish that his “life or freedom would be threatened . . . because of” the same protected grounds. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). “To succeed on a particular social group claim, the applicant must establish both that the group itself was cognizable and that the alleged persecutors targeted the applicant ‘on account of’ h[is] membership in that group.” Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)). A “political opinion” involves “some support for or disagreement with the belief system, policies, or practices of a government and its instrumentalities; an entity that seeks to directly influence laws, regulations, or policy; an organization that aims to overthrow the government; or a group that plays some other similar role in society.” Zelaya-Moreno v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 190, 199–200 (2d Cir. 2021) 3 (citations omitted). To show a nexus between alleged harm and political opinion (or imputed opinion), an applicant must “differentiate himself from all persons who suffer harm from civil disturbances or widespread criminality.” Id. at 203 (citation modified). “A protected ground cannot be ‘incidental’ or ‘tangential’ to another reason for harm.” Quituizaca, 52 F.4th at 114–15 (quoting In re J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2007)). In 2013, Ventura-Granados moved to a Honduran town for work and was stopped in a park by three men who put a knife to his side and told him to leave town. In 2014, he moved to another town for work, and gang members robbed him, told him to run, and shot towards his feet. He fled Honduras shortly thereafter. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that the harm Ventura-Granados suffered was not on account of his membership in a social group of people having to work outside their neighborhoods, of being a male between 12 and 30, or of an imputed anti-gang political opinion. During the first incident, the attackers told him that they did not want strangers in the neighborhood. The second incident involved demands for money followed by 4 robbery. On this record, the evidence does not compel a finding of the requisite nexus for either asylum or withholding of removal. See id. Because the agency’s nexus determination is dispositive of asylum and withholding of removal, we need not decide whether Ventura-Granados’s proposed social groups are cognizable or whether his past harm rose to the level of persecution. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam). Unlike asylum and withholding of removal, CAT relief does not require a nexus to a protected ground. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Instead, an applicant must show that he “more likely than not” will be tortured “by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of,” a public official if removed to the proposed country of removal. Id. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1); see also Garcia- Aranda v. Garland, 53 F.4th 752, 758–59 (2d Cir. 2022). The applicant must establish that “someone in his particular alleged circumstances is more likely than not to be tortured.” Mu-Xing Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 144 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasis omitted), superseded on other grounds by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4). Ventura-Granados’s counseled brief does not develop a challenge to the agency’s finding that he failed to show that any future torture would occur with official consent or acquiescence. We therefore deem his CAT claim abandoned 5 and need not address whether Ventura-Granados otherwise established that future torture was more likely than not. See Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d Cir. 2023) (per curiam). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 6