Granados v. Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket24-1102
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
24-1102
Ventura-Granados v. Blanche
BIA
Douchy, IJ
A206 729 300
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
Square, in the City of New York, on the 20th day of November, two thousand
twenty-six.
PRESENT:
GERARD E. LYNCH,
MYRNA PÉREZ,
MATTHEW A. SCHWARTZ,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
NOE ISMAEL VENTURA-GRANADOS,
Petitioner,
v. 24-1102
NAC
TODD BLANCHE, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Nicholas J. Mundy, Esq., Brooklyn, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General;
Kohsei Ugumori, Senior Litigation Counsel;
Rosanne M. Perry, Trial Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, United States
Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.
Petitioner Noe Ismael Ventura-Granados, a native and citizen of Honduras,
seeks review of a March 26, 2024, decision of the BIA affirming a February 4, 2020,
decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). In re Noe Ismael Ventura-Granados, No. A 206 729 300 (B.I.A. Mar. 26,
2024), aff’g No. A 206 729 300 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Feb. 4, 2020). We assume the
parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.
We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions. See Singh-Kar v.
Bondi, 137 F.4th 94, 100 (2d Cir. 2025). We review the agency’s factual findings
concerning nexus and the likelihood of future torture for substantial evidence.
See Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103, 114–15 (2d Cir. 2022); Al Saidi v. Blanche, 185
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F.4th 286, 307 (2d Cir. 2026). “[A]dministrative findings of fact are conclusive
unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
An applicant for asylum “must establish that race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least
one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see
8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b). Similarly, an applicant seeking withholding of removal
must establish that his “life or freedom would be threatened . . . because of” the
same protected grounds. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). “To
succeed on a particular social group claim, the applicant must establish both that
the group itself was cognizable and that the alleged persecutors targeted the
applicant ‘on account of’ h[is] membership in that group.” Paloka v. Holder, 762
F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)).
A “political opinion” involves “some support for or disagreement with the belief
system, policies, or practices of a government and its instrumentalities; an entity
that seeks to directly influence laws, regulations, or policy; an organization that
aims to overthrow the government; or a group that plays some other similar role
in society.” Zelaya-Moreno v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 190, 199–200 (2d Cir. 2021)
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(citations omitted). To show a nexus between alleged harm and political opinion
(or imputed opinion), an applicant must “differentiate himself from all persons
who suffer harm from civil disturbances or widespread criminality.” Id. at 203
(citation modified). “A protected ground cannot be ‘incidental’ or ‘tangential’ to
another reason for harm.” Quituizaca, 52 F.4th at 114–15 (quoting In re J-B-N- &
S-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2007)).
In 2013, Ventura-Granados moved to a Honduran town for work and was
stopped in a park by three men who put a knife to his side and told him to leave
town. In 2014, he moved to another town for work, and gang members robbed
him, told him to run, and shot towards his feet. He fled Honduras shortly
thereafter.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that the harm
Ventura-Granados suffered was not on account of his membership in a social
group of people having to work outside their neighborhoods, of being a male
between 12 and 30, or of an imputed anti-gang political opinion. During the first
incident, the attackers told him that they did not want strangers in the
neighborhood. The second incident involved demands for money followed by
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robbery. On this record, the evidence does not compel a finding of the requisite
nexus for either asylum or withholding of removal. See id.
Because the agency’s nexus determination is dispositive of asylum and
withholding of removal, we need not decide whether Ventura-Granados’s
proposed social groups are cognizable or whether his past harm rose to the level
of persecution. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam).
Unlike asylum and withholding of removal, CAT relief does not require a
nexus to a protected ground. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Instead, an applicant
must show that he “more likely than not” will be tortured “by, or at the instigation
of, or with the consent or acquiescence of,” a public official if removed to the
proposed country of removal. Id. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1); see also Garcia-
Aranda v. Garland, 53 F.4th 752, 758–59 (2d Cir. 2022). The applicant must
establish that “someone in his particular alleged circumstances is more likely than
not to be tortured.” Mu-Xing Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 144 (2d Cir. 2003)
(emphasis omitted), superseded on other grounds by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4).
Ventura-Granados’s counseled brief does not develop a challenge to the
agency’s finding that he failed to show that any future torture would occur with
official consent or acquiescence. We therefore deem his CAT claim abandoned
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and need not address whether Ventura-Granados otherwise established that
future torture was more likely than not. See Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684
(2d Cir. 2023) (per curiam).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending
motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
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