Full Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 24-1099 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/19/2026 Pg: 1 of 16 PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 24-1099 MOHAMMAD FAWWAZ QAIYMAH, Petitioner, v. TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Argued: January 29, 2025 Decided: October 19, 2026 Before WILKINSON, HARRIS, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges. Petition for review denied by published opinion. Judge Rushing wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Harris joined. ARGUED: Joseph M. Colley, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA SCHOOL OF LAW, Athens, Georgia, for Petitioner. Anthony Jason Nardi, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Benjamin J. Osorio, MURRAY OSORIO PLLC, Fairfax, Virginia; Thomas V. Burch, Appellate Litigation Clinic, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA SCHOOL OF LAW, Athens, Georgia, for Petitioner. Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Leslie McKay, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. USCA4 Appeal: 24-1099 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/19/2026 Pg: 2 of 16 RUSHING, Circuit Judge: Mohammad Fawwaz Qaiymah, a native and citizen of Jordan, petitions for review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals denying his application for asylum, humanitarian asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the regulations implementing the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). Qaiymah claims that two men in Jordan sexually assaulted him and that he fears persecution by his assailants if he were to return. For the reasons explained below, we deny the petition. I. Qaiymah lawfully entered the United States in 2014 as the unmarried child of a U.S. citizen. Five years later, he was convicted of obtaining money by false pretenses based on his role in a fraudulent credit card scheme in Virginia. In November 2019, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged Qaiymah with removability for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A). DHS proved removability, and Qaiymah applied for asylum, humanitarian asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1)(iii), 1208.16(c), 1208.18. At a hearing before the immigration judge (IJ), Qaiymah testified that he fears returning to Jordan because of sexual abuse he suffered there. 1 Specifically, Qaiymah 1 Qaiymah also testified that he fears returning to Jordan because he believes his father will kill him for telling the Virginia criminal court about his father’s involvement in the credit card fraud scheme. The IJ did not find this testimony credible and found that the 2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1099 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/19/2026 Pg: 3 of 16 testified that he fears two men, Abdul and Anas. As outlined primarily in his psychological evaluation report, Qaiymah alleges that when he was 15 or 16 years old, Abdul raped him and videotaped the encounter. Qaiymah believes Abdul preyed on him because he was poor and came from an abusive household, making him an easy target. Abdul, by contrast, was wealthy, ten years older than Qaiymah, and worked for the Jordanian government in an investigations department. Qaiymah reports that after the initial assault, Abdul raped him repeatedly for approximately six years and blackmailed Qaiymah into remaining silent by threatening to show the video to others. In 2011, Anas joined Abdul in raping Qaiymah at knifepoint. This time, Qaiymah escaped his attackers and reported both Abdul and Anas to the police. At the removal hearing, Qaiymah testified that, because he feared being blamed for what happened, he did not tell his family or prosecutors that the men had actually raped him but only that they had attempted to do so. According to Jordanian criminal records, officials arrested both Abdul and Anas, and Anas was eventually convicted of indecent assault and sentenced to a term of hard labor. Qaiymah testified that Abdul, on the other hand, was never formally charged. Qaiymah left Jordan in 2014, after Anas had been convicted. Qaiymah testified that he has returned to Jordan on three separate occasions, with each visit lasting approximately one month. In 2014 or 2015, he visited Jordan to marry his girlfriend and then returned not long afterward to get divorced, allegedly because his wife came to believe he was homosexual. He returned to Jordan again in 2015 or 2016 to evidence did not sufficiently corroborate his father’s presence in Jordan. Qaiymah does not challenge these findings on appeal, so we do not consider this basis for his application. 3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1099 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/19/2026 Pg: 4 of 16 complete a course necessary to graduate from college. Qaiymah testified that during this return trip, Abdul learned that he was back in Jordan and twice came to the college campus, where he “was trying to let [Qaiymah] get in the car with him.” J.A. 160. Qaiymah declined and was not harmed. He testified that if he returned to Jordan, Abdul would find out because “people talk” and because, as a government employee, Abdul has access to information. J.A. 157–158. The IJ denied Qaiymah’s application and ordered him removed to Jordan. In a written decision, the IJ found Qaiymah’s testimony and evidence about the sexual assaults credible but determined that he did not qualify for any form of relief. As relevant to his asylum and withholding claims here, the IJ found that Qaiymah had not established a nexus between past or future persecution and his proposed particular social group of “imputed homosexuals.” 2 J.A. 96. The IJ also found that Qaiymah had not shown “that it is more likely than not he would be raped by Abdul” if returned to Jordan and so denied CAT relief. J.A. 100. The IJ acknowledged that torture can be inflicted mentally but observed that Qaiymah had testified that he fears physical torture and, in any event, it was not probable “that Abdul would intentionally inflict mental torture” on him. J.A. 100. Qaiymah appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which affirmed the IJ’s decision denying relief. Regarding asylum, humanitarian asylum, and withholding of removal, the Board reasoned that Qaiymah had not demonstrated a nexus between past or 2 The IJ also rejected Qaiymah’s proposed particular social group of “sexual assault victims who participated in criminal proceedings against their assailants,” finding it lacked particularity. J.A. 97. Qaiymah does not challenge that ruling on appeal. 4 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1099 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/19/2026 Pg: 5 of 16 future persecution and his proposed particular social group of “imputed homosexuals.” J.A. 4. As the Board explained, “the record reflects that Abdul was motivated to target” Qaiymah because of his “vulnerabilities of age, low self-esteem, and poor economic status. Homophobic attitudes in Jordan and Abdul’s ability to coerce [Qaiymah] do not demonstrate either that Abdul believed [Qaiymah] was gay or that that belief was one central reason Abdul targeted” him. J.A. 4 (citation omitted). The Board rejected Qaiymah’s argument that “people in Jordan could believe him to be gay if they become aware of the Jordanian criminal proceeding that was based on his report of attempted rape years ago,” finding it “speculative” and no reason “to disturb the [IJ’s] decision.” J.A. 4. Finally, the Board affirmed the IJ’s finding that Qaiymah had not established a sufficient probability of torture, noting that the last sexual assault occurred in 2011 even though Qaiymah did not leave Jordan until 2014 and then voluntarily returned three times for approximately 30 days on each occasion. The Board further observed that, although Abdul twice drove to Qaiymah’s college, he did not harm Qaiymah or force him into the car. And the Board rejected Qaiymah’s assertion that “ongoing harm” from the assaults he had suffered was, by itself, a sufficient ground for CAT relief. J.A. 6. Qaiymah petitioned this Court for review. Without conceding error, the Government moved to remand the case to the Board “for further consideration” of Qaiymah’s claims. Dkt. 22 at 2. Qaiymah opposed the Government’s motion, arguing that the Board had already considered his claims and rejected them. A panel of this Court agreed with Qaiymah and denied the Government’s motion. See Dkt. 27. 5 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1099 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/19/2026 Pg: 6 of 16 II. We have jurisdiction to review the Board’s final order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). When, as here, the Board adopts and affirms the IJ’s decision “but supplements it with its own reasoning, we review both decisions,” limiting our consideration of the IJ’s opinion “to the portions that have been adopted and incorporated into the Board’s decision.” Arita-Deras v. Wilkinson, 990 F.3d 350, 356 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our review of removal orders is limited. The agency’s factual findings—including nexus and likelihood of torture—“are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see Flores-Turcios v. Blanche, 182 F.4th 332, 338 (4th Cir. 2026). Under this “highly deferential” standard, Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2020), we review factual findings for substantial evidence, asking “whether the administrative record, considered as a whole, ‘contains sufficien[t] evidence to support the agency’s factual determinations,’” Nolasco v. Garland, 7 F.4th 180, 186 (4th Cir. 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019)). Thus, “‘even if the record plausibly could support two results,’” reversal is appropriate only where the evidence “‘not only supports [the petitioner’s] conclusion, but compels it.’” Tang v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2016) (original alterations omitted) (quoting Mulyani v. Holder, 771 F.3d 190, 197 (4th Cir. 2014)). We review legal conclusions de novo. Nolasco, 7 F.4th at 186. And “we review for abuse of discretion claims that the agency ‘failed to offer a reasoned explanation for its decision’ or ‘distorted or disregarded important aspects of the applicant’s claim.’” Ponce-Flores v. 6 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1099 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/19/2026 Pg: 7 of 16 Garland, 80 F.4th 480, 484 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Tassi v. Holder, 660 F.3d 710, 719 (4th Cir. 2011)). In its brief, the Government again asks the Court to remand this case for further consideration by the agency, although the Government does “not concede error in the . . . ultimate denial . . . of relief.” Oral Arg. at 20:39–20:48. Qaiymah continues to oppose the Government’s request for a remand and urges us to conclude that the Board erred in denying his claims. We again agree with Qaiymah that the agency already considered his claims, although as explained below, we ultimately agree with the Government that the agency did not reversibly err in denying Qaiymah relief. III. We first consider Qaiymah’s challenge to the denial of his application for asylum, humanitarian asylum, and withholding of removal. The Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in their discretion, to grant asylum to any “refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). To qualify as a refugee, an applicant must demonstrate that he “is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself . . . of the protection of, [his native] country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b) (eligibility for asylum, including humanitarian asylum). An applicant who fails to satisfy the requirements for asylum necessarily “will be unable to satisfy the higher standard for showing withholding of removal,” which requires a “clear probability of persecution on account of” a protected 7 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1099 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/19/2026 Pg: 8 of 16 ground. Lopez-Benitez v. Garland, 91 F.4th 763, 768 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Both asylum and withholding of removal require an applicant to establish a nexus between the protected ground and his persecution by showing that the protected ground was or will be “at least one central reason” for his persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see id. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Diaz-Hernandez v. Garland, 104 F.4th 465, 476–477 (4th Cir. 2024) (holding that the nexus standards for asylum and withholding-of-removal claims are equally demanding). Qaiymah takes issue with the agency’s factual finding that he failed to establish a nexus between his past or future persecution and his asserted particular social group of “imputed homosexuals.” He emphasizes that more than one reason may motivate a persecutor’s actions, that a persecutor’s motives may change over time or differ for separate acts of persecution, and that “being young, poor, and vulnerable is not mutually exclusive with being perceived as a homosexual.” Opening Br. 17. We do not doubt any of those premises. See Madrid-Montoya v. Garland, 52 F.4th 175, 181 (4th Cir. 2022) (“[W]e have recognized [that] more than one central reason may, and often does, motivate a persecutor’s actions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cordova v. Holder, 759 F.3d 332, 339 (4th Cir. 2014) (acknowledging that causes of persecution may change over time and between incidents); Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 127 (4th Cir. 2011) (explaining that an applicant need not show that his protected ground was “the central reason or even a dominant central reason” for his persecution, so long as that ground was “more than an incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate reason for his persecution” (internal quotation marks omitted)). But they do not lead to vacatur or reversal here, 8 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1099 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/19/2026 Pg: 9 of 16 because the agency did not run afoul of these principles and its findings are supported by substantial evidence. The Board found no clear error in the IJ’s determination “that Abdul was not motivated to target and sexually assault [Qaiymah] by imputed homosexuality.” J.A. 4. Rather, “Abdul was motivated to target [Qaiymah] for sexual abuse because of [his] vulnerability of age, low self-esteem, and poor economic status.” J.A. 4. The Board did not treat these motivations and imputed homosexuality as mutually exclusive. Nor did it “fail[] to consider the intertwined reasons for the persecution.” Perez Vasquez v. Garland, 4 F.4th 213, 224 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the Board and the IJ considered whether “Abdul believed [Qaiymah] was gay or . . . that belief was one central reason Abdul targeted” him and rejected those conclusions as unsupported by the factual record. J.A. 4. Substantial evidence in the record supports that factual determination. See, e.g., J.A. 727–728 (Qaiymah’s evidence recounting that he “believes he was an easy target for Abdul to exploit” because “he was a lonely and isolated child,” he “had been abused by this father,” “his self-esteem was dismal,” he “did not have a lot of friends or self-confidence,” he was “very poor,” and it “seemed like Abdul wanted . . . to be his friend”); J.A. 728 (Qaiymah’s evidence recounting that “Abdul had eight to ten other victims. He preyed upon young men from poor families who had no power and no one to defend them. He used his privilege to entice them.”); J.A. 158 (Qaiymah testifying that he believes Abdul and Anas would assault him again “[b]ecause they love to harm people” and “[t]hey’re sick”). 9 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1099 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/19/2026 Pg: 10 of 16 Qaiymah argues that Abdul’s motivation changed after the first assault, as demonstrated by the fact that he filmed the abuse and then blackmailed Qaiymah with the recording even after he was no longer a minor. But this is not the only finding a “reasonable adjudicator” could reach, and sufficient evidence supports the agency’s contrary conclusion. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). The IJ considered Qaiymah’s argument that Abdul “used the video” to hold him “in submission out of fear that others” would believe he “was homosexual.” J.A. 97 (internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise, the Board considered “[h]omophobic attitudes in Jordan and Abdul’s ability to coerce” Qaiymah but concluded that they did not demonstrate that Abdul believed Qaiymah was homosexual “or that that belief was one central reason Adbul targeted” him. J.A. 4. A factfinder could reason, as Qaiymah does, that Abdul continued to abuse Qaiymah in part because the blackmail video, and the threat that others might impute homosexuality to Qaiymah if they saw it, made him easy prey. But that reasoning does not undermine the Board’s conclusion that Abdul’s assaults were not motivated by a belief or perception that Qaiymah was homosexual. And when, as here, a claim of persecution is based on an imputed characteristic, “the relevant inquiry” is “the persecutor’s subjective perception” of the victim. Alvarez Lagos v. Barr, 927 F.3d 236, 254 (4th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added). Turning to future persecution, Qaiymah argues that the agency did not address whether unidentified “people in Jordan who might persecute [him] could become aware of his past sexual assaults and then perceive him as a homosexual.” Opening Br. 23. Yet contrary to this assertion, the Board explicitly acknowledged that, although Qaiymah “did not tell anyone about the years of sexual assault by Abdul,” he “argue[d] on appeal that 10 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1099 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/19/2026 Pg: 11 of 16 people in Jordan could believe him to be gay if they become aware of the Jordanian criminal proceeding that was based on his report of attempted rape years ago.” J.A. 4. The Board found his argument “speculative” and not a basis “to disturb the [IJ’s] decision” that “record evidence does not indicate that [Qaiymah] would be persecuted in the future on account of imputed homosexuality.” J.A. 4, 97. In this Court, Qaiymah hypothesizes that Abdul might tell others about the assaults or they might learn about his report of “attempted” rape and “assume that [he] is gay.” Opening Br. 23. The evidence, however, does not “compel[]” a finding that it is reasonably possible that unidentified people would become aware of Qaiymah’s past assaults, perceive him to be homosexual, and persecute him on that basis. Tang, 840 F.3d at 180 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted); see Crespin-Valladares, 632 F.3d at 126 (a “well- founded fear” of persecution requires a “reasonable possibility” of persecution). The record supports the Board’s conclusion that Qaiymah did not “establish either a well- founded fear of persecution (for asylum) or a clear probability of persecution (for withholding of removal) based on imputed homosexuality.” J.A. 4. We do not diminish the severity of the abuse Qaiymah has suffered or the grievousness of the crimes against him. But asylum and withholding of removal are available only when persecution is on account of a protected ground. The Board found no nexus between Qaiymah’s past assaults or feared future persecution and his asserted particular social group. Its determination is supported by substantial evidence and is therefore “conclusive.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 11 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1099 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/19/2026 Pg: 12 of 16 IV. We turn now to the Board’s denial of Qaiymah’s application for protection under the regulations implementing the CAT. An applicant seeking CAT relief “‘bears the burden to prove that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured if removed and that this torture will occur at the hands of government or with the consent or acquiescence of government.’” Ponce-Flores, 80 F.4th at 484 (quoting Nolasco, 7 F.4th at 190); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1). In assessing whether it is more likely than not that an applicant will be tortured in the country of removal, the agency considers “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture,” including evidence of past torture, evidence that the applicant could relocate within the country, evidence of human rights violations within the country, and other relevant country conditions information. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). Qaiymah contends that the agency’s CAT analysis was deficient because it “never weighed” his “past torture claim, his inability to relocate, or Jordan’s country conditions.” Opening Br. 26. We disagree. Beginning with past torture, the Board and the IJ credited Qaiymah’s evidence about the sexual assaults he suffered. The IJ recognized that Qaiymah “fears the physical torture of being raped by Abdul” if he returns to Jordan. J.A. 100. In assessing the likelihood of future rape, the IJ considered Qaiymah’s past assaults, when they stopped, and whether he had been able to avoid further harm since then. Like the IJ, the Board never questioned Qaiymah’s representation that his past abuse qualified as torture. Indeed, the Board addressed what it called “the risk of torture from Abdul,” both “sexual assault” and “mental 12 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1099 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/19/2026 Pg: 13 of 16 torture.” J.A. 5–6. Regarding the risk of physical torture, the Board agreed with the IJ’s description that the assaults ended in 2011 and that Abdul had not harmed Qaiymah since then, even though Qaiymah remained in Jordan until 2014, returned three times after that, and encountered Abdul twice during his most recent visit. The agency also explicitly addressed “[e]vidence that the applicant could relocate to a part of the country of removal where he or she is not likely to be tortured.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)(ii). Observing that Qaiymah “claims he cannot avoid torture by internal relocation because Abdul is in the military and has government connections to find him anywhere in the country,” the IJ concluded “it does not appear likely that Abdul will torture [Qaiymah] anywhere in the country.” J.A. 100–101. In support, the IJ explained that Qaiymah “was able to avoid torture even without relocation by refusing to get into Abdul’s car on two separate occasions,” that “Abdul did not physically harm [Qaiymah] on these occasions when [he] refused to get into his car,” and that “Abdul did not torture [Qaiymah] in their hometown during any of the times [he] returned to Jordan for 30 days each.” J.A. 101. The Board adopted the IJ’s ruling, also noting that, “[d]espite [Qaiymah’s] testimony about Abdul’s connections, [he] did not state that Abdul attempted to harm him at any other time during his three 30-day voluntary returns to Jordan.” J.A. 5. Contrary to Qaiymah’s assertion, then, the agency did “meaningfully engage” with the parties’ evidence about the possibility of relocation. Rodriguez-Arias v. Whitaker, 915 F.3d 968, 975 (4th Cir. 2019). Although Qaiymah would weigh that evidence differently than the Board did, “we do not reweigh the evidence on a petition for review.” Nolasco, 7 F.4th at 191. 13 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1099 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/19/2026 Pg: 14 of 16 As for country conditions evidence, the agency did not address it and did not need to do so. Before the IJ and the Board, Qaiymah focused his argument for CAT protection exclusively on the risk of torture from his father and Abdul. He cited country conditions evidence only to support his claim that future torture by either or both of these men would occur “by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). The IJ found that Qaiymah had not proven it was more likely than not he would be tortured in Jordan by his father or Abdul individually or in the aggregate, and the Board affirmed that finding. “Having found [Qaiymah] ha[d] not demonstrated a more likely than not probability he would be tortured if removed,” the IJ did “not reach the issue of government acquiescence” and so did not address Qaiymah’s evidence on that score. J.A. 101. The IJ was not required to make findings about government acquiescence because a decision on that issue was “unnecessary to the result[]” the IJ reached. INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976). And because Qaiymah raised the country conditions evidence only with respect to government acquiescence, the IJ was not required to address it. Accordingly, the agency considered and addressed all of the CAT factors relevant to its decision. Trying a different tack, Qaiymah alternatively argues that “being sexually abused as a child created a permanent and continuing harm that entitle[s him], without more, to protection under [the] CAT.” Opening Br. 30 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Reply Br. 8 (arguing that, “regardless” whether Qaiymah “will likely be tortured in the future,” he is entitled to CAT protection based on “his past abuse” “without more”). As the Board recognized when it rejected Qaiymah’s novel argument, he “does not rely on any case law 14 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1099 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/19/2026 Pg: 15 of 16 from [the] Fourth Circuit to support his assertion.” J.A. 6. In fact, Qaiymah does not identify any authority, from the Board or any court, holding that the requirements for CAT protection can be satisfied by a showing of past torture regardless of the likelihood of future acts of torture. Cf., e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (an applicant for CAT protection must establish that he “would be tortured if removed to the proposed county”); id. § 1208.16(c)(3) (the IJ shall consider “evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture”); id. § 1208.18(a)(1) (defining torture as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as” obtaining information or a confession, punishing, intimidating, coercing, or “for any reason based on discrimination,” when “inflicted by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of” a person acting in an official capacity); id. § 1208.18(a)(6) (“[T]o constitute torture an act must be directed against a person in the offender’s custody or physical control.”); id. § 1208.18(a)(7) (acquiescence requires that the public official, “prior to the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activity and thereafter breach” his legal responsibility to intervene to prevent it). The one Fourth Circuit decision Qaiymah cites reveals that his argument is more akin to a request for humanitarian asylum than CAT protection. In that case, this Court addressed an applicant’s argument that, “even in the absence of a well-founded fear of future persecution, the severity of his persecution alone makes him eligible for asylum” under 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii), known as humanitarian asylum. Gonahasa v. INS, 181 F.3d 538, 543 (4th Cir. 1999). The Court explained that “asylum based on severity of persecution alone” is reserved for the “rare case where past persecution is so severe that it 15 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1099 Doc: 49 Filed: 10/19/2026 Pg: 16 of 16 would be inhumane to return the alien even in the absence of any risk of future persecution,” citing examples like “the German Jews, the victims of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, [and] survivors of the Cambodian genocide.” Id. at 544 (internal quotation marks omitted). The CAT regulations do not contain a provision like the humanitarian asylum regulation, which authorizes asylum “in the absence of” a likelihood of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii). As previously discussed, the Board permissibly rejected Qaiymah’s application for humanitarian asylum based on his failure to establish a nexus between his persecution and a protected ground. Relief under the regulations implementing the CAT does not require a nexus to a protected ground. But it does require a showing that the applicant is likely to be tortured if he is removed to the designated country. Id. § 1208.16(c)(2). The Board therefore did not err in rejecting Qaiymah’s argument that his past abuse entitled him to CAT protection despite his failure to show that he likely would be tortured in the future if removed to Jordan. V. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. 16