Singh v. Blanche

23-6716 Singh v. Blanche BIA Segal, IJ A208 927 735 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 2 Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley 3 Square, in the City of New York, on the 13th day of November, two thousand 4 twenty-six. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 JOHN M. WALKER, JR., 8 MICHAEL H. PARK, 9 BETH ROBINSON, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 JASPAL SINGH, 14 Petitioner, 15 16 v. 23-6716 17 NAC 18 TODD BLANCHE, UNITED STATES 19 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 Respondent. 21 _____________________________________ 22 23 24  1 FOR PETITIONER: Judy Resnick, Law Office of Judy Resnick, Far 2 Rockaway, NY. 3 4 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant 5 Attorney General; Jennifer R. Khouri, Senior 6 Litigation Counsel; Stephanie L. Groff, Trial 7 Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, 8 Civil Division, United States Department of 9 Justice, Washington, DC. 10 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of 11 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 12 DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. 13 Petitioner Jaspal Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a June 14 5, 2023, decision of the BIA affirming a January 31, 2019, decision of an 15 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of 16 removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jaspal 17 Singh, No. A208 927 735 (B.I.A. June 5, 2023), aff’g No. A208 927 735 (Immigr. Ct. 18 N.Y.C. Jan. 31, 2019). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts 19 and procedural history. 20 We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan 21 Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). We review factual findings and 22 the application of law to fact for substantial evidence and pure questions of law de 23 novo. See Al Saidi v. Blanche, 185 F.4th 286, 296–97. (2d Cir. 2026); see also Urias- 2  1 Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S. 537, 543 n.1, 545 (2026). “[T]he administrative findings 2 of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to 3 conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Singh has abandoned all 4 dispositive issues. 5 The agency concluded that Singh had suffered persecution when members 6 of a rival political party assaulted him, but then denied relief, finding that he could 7 safely relocate within India. Given the past persecution, Singh was entitled to a 8 presumption of a well-founded fear and likelihood of future persecution as 9 required for asylum and withholding of removal. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1) 10 (asylum), 1208.16(b)(1) (withholding of removal). However, that presumption 11 may be rebutted where a preponderance of the evidence establishes that the 12 applicant can “avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of the 13 applicant’s country of nationality . . . , and under all the circumstances, it would 14 be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), (ii); 15 see also id. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B), (ii); Surinder Singh v. BIA, 435 F.3d 216, 219 (2d Cir. 16 2006) (“Asylum in the United States is not available to obviate re-location to 17 sanctuary in one’s own country.”). 18 As the Government argues, Singh has abandoned review of asylum and 19 withholding of removal by failing to adequately address the agency’s relocation 3  1 finding. Singh’s brief broadly challenges the denial of asylum and withholding of 2 removal touching on grounds that the IJ did not rely on, such as cognizability of a 3 particular social group of “his family.” Though the brief acknowledges the 4 relocation finding and labels it “erroneous” and based on “impermissible 5 speculation,” Singh does not meaningfully challenge it by explaining how or why 6 it is erroneous. Accordingly, he has abandoned review of the relocation finding, 7 which is dispositive of asylum and withholding of removal. See Debique v. Garland, 8 58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d Cir. 2023) (“We consider abandoned any claims not 9 adequately presented in an appellant’s brief, and an appellant’s failure to make 10 legal or factual arguments constitutes abandonment.” (quotation marks omitted)); 11 Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (deeming a claim 12 abandoned where petitioner “devote[d] only a single conclusory sentence to the 13 argument”); see also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (requiring appellant’s brief to 14 contain arguments “with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on 15 which the appellant relies”). 16 Singh has similarly abandoned review of his CAT claim by failing to make 17 any arguments in his brief identifying error in the agency’s CAT analysis. See 18 Debique, 58 F.4th at 684. 19 Singh’s remaining arguments fail. He contends that the IJ showed 4  1 “impermissible bias and speculation” and that his due process rights were violated 2 because the IJ and the BIA decisions are “manifestly contrary to law.”. These 3 allegations are too conclusory to raise a meaningful challenge on appeal. He 4 alleges that the agency’s relocation finding was based on impermissible bias, but 5 he gives no examples beyond the denial of relief, and unfavorable rulings alone 6 are not a basis for a bias claim. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). 7 Similarly, his due process claim—that he will be unable to live safely in India—is 8 essentially a broad challenge to the IJ’s denial of relief. He does not meaningfully 9 argue that he “was denied a full and fair opportunity to present [his] claims or that 10 the IJ or BIA otherwise deprived [him] of fundamental fairness.” Burger v. 11 Gonzales, 498 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted) (identifying 12 requirements for a due process claim). 13 As the Government argues, Singh’s arguments regarding membership in a 14 particular social group of his family and a defective Notice to Appear (“NTA”) are 15 unexhausted because he did not raise them before the agency. See Vera Punin v. 16 Garland, 108 F.4th 114, 124 (2d Cir. 2024) (“[W]hen an argument made to this Court 17 cannot be closely matched up with a specific argument made to the BIA, it has not 18 been properly exhausted and we cannot hear it.”); Ud Din v. Garland, 72 F.4th 411, 19 419–20 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2023) (reiterating that issue exhaustion is mandatory where 5  1 the Government raises it). Moreover, whether Singh was a member of a 2 cognizable particular social group has no bearing on the dispositive relocation 3 determination. And the omission of a hearing date and time in the NTA does not 4 affect agency jurisdiction where, as here, a subsequent hearing notice provided the 5 information. See Cupete v. Garland, 29 F.4th 53, 57 (2d Cir. 2022). 1 6 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending 7 motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED. 8 FOR THE COURT: 9 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 10 Clerk of Court 1 The brief filed by Petitioner’s counsel, Judy Resnick, fails to support factual claims with citations to the record. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A). And, as stated above, it fails to meaningfully address the dispositive ground for the agency’s denial of relief. Petitioner’s counsel has previously been warned about deficient briefing. We reiterate that similar deficiencies in future filings may result in disciplinary proceedings. 6