Full Opinion

24-1370 Hu v. Blanche BIA A206 736 831 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 12th day of November, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: DENNY CHIN, WILLIAM J. NARDINI, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ CHANG BING HU, Petitioner, v. 24-1370 NAC TODD BLANCHE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________ FOR PETITIONER: Joshua Bardavid, New York, NY. FOR RESPONDENT: Yaakov M. Roth, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division; Jessica Burns, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation; Nelle M. Seymour, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. Petitioner Chang Bing Hu, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an April 17, 2024, decision of the BIA affirming a February 27, 2020, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Chang Bing Hu, No. A 206 736 831 (B.I.A. Apr. 17, 2024). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). We review pure questions of law de novo. Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). We “review the 2 entirety of the agency’s conclusions—both the underlying factual findings and the application of the INA to those findings—for substantial evidence.” Al Saidi v. Blanche, 185 F.4th 286, 297 (2d Cir. 2026) (citation modified); see Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 607 U.S. 537, 543 n.1, 545 (2026). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). To obtain asylum, Hu had to establish either past persecution or a “well- founded fear” of future persecution. Id. § 1101(a)(42); see also id. § 1158(b)(1)(A), (B)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b). I. Past Persecution Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Hu was not credible as to his claim of past persecution. “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the statements were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements 3 with other evidence of record . . . , and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Hu alleged that he was detained and beaten for attending an underground church in China. The agency reasonably relied on Hu’s multiple inconsistent statements and omissions in determining that this claim was not credible. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). First, Hu provided varying accounts of the raid at which he was arrested. In his written statement and at his hearing, for example, Hu alleged that he was beaten while trying to stop the police from beating an elderly church member whereas during his credible fear interview he stated that he was beaten while trying to resist arrest and did not mention trying to help another person. Second, Hu was also inconsistent about the number of times that he was physically harmed 4 by the police and how the police harmed him. Third, Hu was inconsistent about whether he returned to church in China after his release. Lastly, Hu testified inconsistently about whether he received medical attention. The agency was not required to accept Hu’s explanations—that he was not asked about these details and that he was nervous—because “an alien’s mere recitation that he was nervous . . . will not automatically prevent the IJ or BIA from relying on statements . . . when making adverse credibility determinations.” Yun- Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 397 n.6 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam); see Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (quotation marks omitted)). The agency reasonably relied on Hu’s failure to rehabilitate his testimony about past persecution with reliable corroborating evidence. “An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam). 5 The agency did not err in granting limited weight to the letters from Hu’s wife and brother-in-law because they were interested parties unavailable for cross- examination. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (deferring to agency’s decision to afford little weight to letter from petitioner’s spouse because it was unsworn and from an interested witness). And the agency did not err in according diminished weight to Hu’s additional supporting documentation for his past persecution claim because the documents were not sufficiently authenticated. “[W]e afford IJs considerable flexibility in determining the authenticity of . . . documents from the totality of the evidence[.]” Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2008). In sum, the multiple inconsistencies regarding events central to Hu’s claim of past persecution and lack of reliable corroboration provide substantial evidence for the adverse credibility determination. See Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ was compelled to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude even more forcefully.”); Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273; Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. 6 II. Future Persecution The agency credited Hu’s testimony that he currently practices Christianity. Because Hu was not credible as to his claim of past persecution, he had the burden of establishing a well-founded fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). To make that showing, an applicant must “establish that his fear is objectively reasonable.” Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004). “Objective reasonableness entails a showing that a reasonable person in the petitioner’s circumstances would fear persecution if returned to his native country.” Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam). A fear is not objectively reasonable “[i]n the absence of solid support in the record.” Id. at 129. An applicant can establish a well-founded fear by showing either (1) a reasonable possibility that he would be “singled out individually for persecution” or (2) a “pattern or practice” of persecution of a group of “persons similarly situated” to the applicant. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); see Kyaw Zwar Tun v. U.S. INS, 445 F.3d 554, 564 (2d Cir. 2006); In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 (B.I.A. 7 2005) (defining a pattern or practice of persecution as the “systemic or pervasive” persecution of a group). Where a claim is premised on activities undertaken after the applicant’s arrival in the United States, it requires “some showing that authorities in his country of nationality are either aware of his activities or likely to become aware of his activities.” Hongsheng Leng, 528 F.3d at 143. Hu conceded that Chinese officials did not know about his religious activities in the United States, but alleged that he would be identified and persecuted because he would attend an underground church and proselytize in China. The agency did not err in concluding that Hu failed to establish that the agency was likely to learn of his Christian practice based solely on his intent to attend an unregistered church given the large number of Christians practicing in such churches. The agency took administrative notice of a State Department report for 2018, which reflects that there are tens of millions of Christians in China who are unaffiliated with a state-sanctioned church. See U.S. Dep't of State, China 2018 Int’l Religious Freedom Rep. 3–4 (2018), https://www.state.gov/wp- content/uploads/2019/05/CHINA-INCLUSIVE-2018-INTERNATIONAL- RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf. And substantial evidence supports the 8 agency’s conclusion that Hu’s claim that he would be identified and persecuted for proselytizing was speculative. Hu testified that he proselytizes in the United States and would continue to do so in China, but provided no further information about when and how he would proselytize, and thus did not show that this intention sets him apart from the large number of Christians practicing in China. The agency also did not err in concluding that Hu failed to establish a pattern or practice of persecution of Christians who attend underground churches in China. While the record includes some evidence of surveillance, arrests, and beatings of church members, the agency reasonably concluded that the record of such abuses in Hu’s native Fujian Province was limited and did not amount to “systemic or pervasive” persecution of people similarly situated to Hu. In re A- M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 741; see Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 149, 169–70 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding no error in the agency’s requirement that an applicant demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution specific to his or her local area when persecutory acts vary according to locality); see also Jian Liang v. Garland, 10 F.4th 106, 117 (2d Cir. 2021) (concluding that applicant failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution because “the treatment of Christians in China 9 varies by locality” and the applicant did not provide evidence of persecution in his home province of Fujian). Because he failed to establish the chance of persecution required for asylum, Hu “necessarily” failed to meet the higher burden for withholding of removal and CAT relief. Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76 (“Where the same factual predicate underlies a petitioner’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT, an adverse credibility determination forecloses all three forms of relief.”). Hu’s argument that the agency was required to provide additional analysis for his CAT claim is thus meritless. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 10