Geraldine Faizuly Doza Castro v. Todd Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket26-3157
JudgeR. Guy Cole, Jr.; Jeffrey S. Sutton; Amul R. Thapar
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 26a0464n.06
Case No. 26-3157
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
) Nov 18, 2026
GERALDINE FAIZULY DOZA CASTRO, et KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
al., )
)
Petitioners,
) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW
) FROM THE UNITED STATES
v.
) BOARD OF IMMIGRATION
) APPEALS
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General,
)
Respondent. ) OPINION
)
Before: COLE, SUTTON, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.
SUTTON, Circuit Judge. Geraldine Faizuly Doza Castro and her minor child, both
Colombian citizens, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture. The immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals
rejected the requested relief. Seeing no reason to disturb these conclusions, we deny the petition
for review.
I.
In December 2021, Doza Castro and her family witnessed several people rob and assault a
taxi driver in their hometown of San Pablo, Colombia. Doza Castro’s sister called the police, and
officers arrived within 20 minutes. A few days after that, the police followed up and asked whether
the family could identify the criminals. Doza Castro’s mother identified one of the robbers by
No. 26-3157, Doza Castro v. Blanche
name. That statement apparently sparked a campaign of threats and intimidation against the Castro
family from the identified suspect and his fellow gang members. They threw rocks at the Castros’
home, threatened the lives of Doza Castro and her relatives, and demanded that the family recant
the identification. Neither Doza Castro nor her family members ever reported these threats to the
police. Instead, Doza Castro’s mother requested a protection order from the Colombian
ombudsman’s office, which stressed the need for an investigation and placed the request on a
waitlist.
In the aftermath of these incidents, Doza Castro and her young child entered the United
States without permission in 2022. She sought relief from removal on behalf of herself and her
child on several grounds: (1) asylum on the ground that she faced persecution as a witness to a
crime in Colombia, (2) withholding of removal on the same ground, and (3) protection under the
Convention Against Torture based on threats against her family.
After a hearing, the immigration judge denied Doza Castro’s application for relief on all
scores. He rejected her asylum and withholding of removal claims because “witness[es] to a
crime” do not form a cognizable social group. R.12 at 65–69. And he rejected her Convention
Against Torture claim because Doza Castro failed to show that the Colombian government
acquiesced in the torture.
The Board denied relief to Doza Castro on appeal. Because Doza Castro’s appellate brief
failed to challenge the immigration judge’s conclusion that the proposed social group lacked
particularity or social distinctiveness, the Board deemed this theory of relief forfeited. It rejected
the asylum and withholding of removal claims on this ground. The Board also rejected her
challenge to the immigration judge’s resolution of the Convention Against Torture claim,
reasoning that the Castro family did not report the threats to the police.
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II.
In assessing this petition, we review the Board’s opinion and, to the extent the Board
adopted the immigration judge’s findings and reasoning, his opinion as well. Gamas-Vicente v.
Blanche, 172 F.4th 484, 490 (6th Cir. 2026). The “highly deferential substantial-evidence
standard” applies to the agency’s factual findings, and we apply fresh review to questions of law.
Id. (quotation omitted).
Asylum. Only refugees may receive asylum. Cristales-de Linares v. Bondi, 161 F.4th 401,
407 (6th Cir. 2025); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b). “A refugee is a person who is unable or unwilling to
return to her home country because of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.” Sebastian-Sebastian v. Garland, 87 F.4th 838, 847 (6th Cir. 2023) (quotations omitted).
This case hinges on the phrase “particular social group.” An applicant must show that her proposed
group “(1) shares a common immutable characteristic other than the fact that it is targeted for
persecution; (2) is particular and defined with sufficient precision to delimit its membership; and
(3) is socially distinct such that members of the group are perceived as a group by society.”
Cristales-de Linares, 161 F.4th at 408 (quotation omitted).
The problem for Doza Castro is that she never established membership within a cognizable
social group. She proposed only one social group: “witness to a crime.” R.12 at 126–27. The
immigration judge rejected this proposed group because it lacked particularity and social
distinctiveness.
Rather than contest these twin conclusions, Doza Castro’s brief before the Board addressed
only the immutable nature of being a crime witness. The immigration judge, however, didn’t rest
his conclusion on an absence of immutability. By failing to develop an argument as to the
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particularity or social distinctiveness of her proposed group before the Board, Doza Castro
forfeited the argument. It is a central principle of immigration law that our review is limited to
claims that a petitioner adequately presented and developed before the Board. Herrera v. Bondi,
162 F.4th 617, 621 (6th Cir. 2025); Osabas-Rivera v. Bondi, 161 F.4th 446, 455 (6th Cir. 2025).
Newly raised issues face the prospect of forfeiture. Osabas-Rivera, 161 F.4th at 455. Regrettably
for Doza Castro, that’s just what happened here.
True, Doza Castro’s brief before the Board offered one line asserting that her proposed
group is “particular[] and socially distinct.” R.12 at 18. But that mere conclusion does not suffice.
Alluding to issues in a general and perfunctory manner does not count as reasonable development.
See Suarez-Diaz v. Holder, 771 F.3d 935, 945 (6th Cir. 2014). The Board justifiably concluded
that Doza Castro failed to meaningfully develop arguments concerning the dispositive inquiries of
particularity and social distinctiveness. The challenge thus fails.
Withholding of Removal. An applicant seeking a withholding of removal must
“demonstrate that her life or freedom would be threatened because of her race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Cristales-de Linares, 161 F.4th at
408 (quotations omitted). Because Doza Castro has not demonstrated membership in a particular
social group, her withholding of removal claim falls short as well. See id. at 412; Gamas-Vicente,
172 F.4th at 491.
Convention Against Torture. When “it is more likely than not that [an applicant] would be
tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal,” the Convention Against Torture prohibits
the applicant’s removal. Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 491, 501 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting 8
C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)). Torture includes “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted . . . when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at
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the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in
an official capacity.” Id. (quotation omitted). The key imperative for today’s purposes is that
there must be “a likelihood that public officials, aware of the risk of torture, would shirk their
duties to intervene and prevent such activity.” Patel v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 377, 382 (6th Cir. 2025).
Substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that Doza Castro has not shown that
public officials participated in, or acquiesced in, torture of Doza Castro or her family. Neither
Doza Castro nor her relatives, notably, reported the threats they received to the police. That
omission makes it difficult to show that the police knew about any torture, let alone willfully turned
a blind eye to it or participated in it. See id.
While a path to relief remains available when “additional evidence . . . conclusively shows
the government would not have responded to the call of duty and instead would have acquiesced
in the violence against the claimants,” id. (quotations and alterations omitted), the record in this
case paints a picture of official action, not inaction. Consider the police’s response to the robbery.
According to Doza Castro’s telling, the police arrived within 20 minutes of the reported robbery,
conducted an investigation, and criminally charged at least one suspect. All of this cuts against
the idea that the police would have supported or acquiesced in the investigation-related threats if
Doza Castro had reported them.
Doza Castro faults the immigration judge for not providing more detailed reasoning before
rejecting her claim. But both the immigration judge and the Board walked through the police’s
response to the underlying robbery, discussed Doza Castro’s failure to contact the police about the
threats, and explained why this inaction undermined her claim. Both decisions sufficiently
explained why they did what they did. See Vasquez-Rivera v. Garland, 96 F.4th 903, 908–09 (6th
Cir. 2024).
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Doza Castro points to the United States Department of State’s warning that the Colombian
police do not effectively respond to serious crimes. The State Department reports that “drug-
trafficking gangs[] continue[] to operate” within Colombia, leading to torture and threats of
violence. R.12 at 240. At the same time, the Colombian government has “investigated these
actions and prosecuted those responsible to the extent possible.” R.12 at 240. A country’s work
to prevent torture, even if unsuccessful in some cases, does not constitute acquiescence. See Patel,
131 F.4th at 383; Sabastian-Andres v. Garland, 96 F.4th 923, 932 (6th Cir. 2024). What’s more,
“general evidence of country conditions” does not suffice to show torture when the specific
evidence in the case—the failure to tell the police about the threats in this instance—offers a sound
explanation for why the police did nothing more. Patel, 131 F.4th at 382 (quotation omitted).
Doza Castro maintains that her mother’s interaction with the ombudsman’s office shows
the government’s acquiescence to torture. But Doza Castro testified that the ombudsman’s office
is “separate from the police.” R.12 at 167. On appeal, she does not delineate the purview of the
ombudsman’s office or identify evidence that she could not have contacted the police. The
ombudsman’s office, at all events, did not acquiesce to torture. It placed the family’s request for
a protection order on a waitlist and explained the need for a thorough investigation. The reality
that this waitlist may be lengthy does not necessitate a finding of acquiescence on the part of
Colombian officials. Doza Castro’s arguments, in short, do not compel a finding that public
officials acquiesced to torture.
We deny the petition for review.
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