Full Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0464n.06 Case No. 26-3157 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED ) Nov 18, 2026 GERALDINE FAIZULY DOZA CASTRO, et KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk al., ) ) Petitioners, ) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW ) FROM THE UNITED STATES v. ) BOARD OF IMMIGRATION ) APPEALS TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, ) Respondent. ) OPINION ) Before: COLE, SUTTON, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges. SUTTON, Circuit Judge. Geraldine Faizuly Doza Castro and her minor child, both Colombian citizens, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals rejected the requested relief. Seeing no reason to disturb these conclusions, we deny the petition for review. I. In December 2021, Doza Castro and her family witnessed several people rob and assault a taxi driver in their hometown of San Pablo, Colombia. Doza Castro’s sister called the police, and officers arrived within 20 minutes. A few days after that, the police followed up and asked whether the family could identify the criminals. Doza Castro’s mother identified one of the robbers by No. 26-3157, Doza Castro v. Blanche name. That statement apparently sparked a campaign of threats and intimidation against the Castro family from the identified suspect and his fellow gang members. They threw rocks at the Castros’ home, threatened the lives of Doza Castro and her relatives, and demanded that the family recant the identification. Neither Doza Castro nor her family members ever reported these threats to the police. Instead, Doza Castro’s mother requested a protection order from the Colombian ombudsman’s office, which stressed the need for an investigation and placed the request on a waitlist. In the aftermath of these incidents, Doza Castro and her young child entered the United States without permission in 2022. She sought relief from removal on behalf of herself and her child on several grounds: (1) asylum on the ground that she faced persecution as a witness to a crime in Colombia, (2) withholding of removal on the same ground, and (3) protection under the Convention Against Torture based on threats against her family. After a hearing, the immigration judge denied Doza Castro’s application for relief on all scores. He rejected her asylum and withholding of removal claims because “witness[es] to a crime” do not form a cognizable social group. R.12 at 65–69. And he rejected her Convention Against Torture claim because Doza Castro failed to show that the Colombian government acquiesced in the torture. The Board denied relief to Doza Castro on appeal. Because Doza Castro’s appellate brief failed to challenge the immigration judge’s conclusion that the proposed social group lacked particularity or social distinctiveness, the Board deemed this theory of relief forfeited. It rejected the asylum and withholding of removal claims on this ground. The Board also rejected her challenge to the immigration judge’s resolution of the Convention Against Torture claim, reasoning that the Castro family did not report the threats to the police. 2 No. 26-3157, Doza Castro v. Blanche II. In assessing this petition, we review the Board’s opinion and, to the extent the Board adopted the immigration judge’s findings and reasoning, his opinion as well. Gamas-Vicente v. Blanche, 172 F.4th 484, 490 (6th Cir. 2026). The “highly deferential substantial-evidence standard” applies to the agency’s factual findings, and we apply fresh review to questions of law. Id. (quotation omitted). Asylum. Only refugees may receive asylum. Cristales-de Linares v. Bondi, 161 F.4th 401, 407 (6th Cir. 2025); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b). “A refugee is a person who is unable or unwilling to return to her home country because of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Sebastian-Sebastian v. Garland, 87 F.4th 838, 847 (6th Cir. 2023) (quotations omitted). This case hinges on the phrase “particular social group.” An applicant must show that her proposed group “(1) shares a common immutable characteristic other than the fact that it is targeted for persecution; (2) is particular and defined with sufficient precision to delimit its membership; and (3) is socially distinct such that members of the group are perceived as a group by society.” Cristales-de Linares, 161 F.4th at 408 (quotation omitted). The problem for Doza Castro is that she never established membership within a cognizable social group. She proposed only one social group: “witness to a crime.” R.12 at 126–27. The immigration judge rejected this proposed group because it lacked particularity and social distinctiveness. Rather than contest these twin conclusions, Doza Castro’s brief before the Board addressed only the immutable nature of being a crime witness. The immigration judge, however, didn’t rest his conclusion on an absence of immutability. By failing to develop an argument as to the 3 No. 26-3157, Doza Castro v. Blanche particularity or social distinctiveness of her proposed group before the Board, Doza Castro forfeited the argument. It is a central principle of immigration law that our review is limited to claims that a petitioner adequately presented and developed before the Board. Herrera v. Bondi, 162 F.4th 617, 621 (6th Cir. 2025); Osabas-Rivera v. Bondi, 161 F.4th 446, 455 (6th Cir. 2025). Newly raised issues face the prospect of forfeiture. Osabas-Rivera, 161 F.4th at 455. Regrettably for Doza Castro, that’s just what happened here. True, Doza Castro’s brief before the Board offered one line asserting that her proposed group is “particular[] and socially distinct.” R.12 at 18. But that mere conclusion does not suffice. Alluding to issues in a general and perfunctory manner does not count as reasonable development. See Suarez-Diaz v. Holder, 771 F.3d 935, 945 (6th Cir. 2014). The Board justifiably concluded that Doza Castro failed to meaningfully develop arguments concerning the dispositive inquiries of particularity and social distinctiveness. The challenge thus fails. Withholding of Removal. An applicant seeking a withholding of removal must “demonstrate that her life or freedom would be threatened because of her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Cristales-de Linares, 161 F.4th at 408 (quotations omitted). Because Doza Castro has not demonstrated membership in a particular social group, her withholding of removal claim falls short as well. See id. at 412; Gamas-Vicente, 172 F.4th at 491. Convention Against Torture. When “it is more likely than not that [an applicant] would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal,” the Convention Against Torture prohibits the applicant’s removal. Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 491, 501 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)). Torture includes “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted . . . when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at 4 No. 26-3157, Doza Castro v. Blanche the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Id. (quotation omitted). The key imperative for today’s purposes is that there must be “a likelihood that public officials, aware of the risk of torture, would shirk their duties to intervene and prevent such activity.” Patel v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 377, 382 (6th Cir. 2025). Substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that Doza Castro has not shown that public officials participated in, or acquiesced in, torture of Doza Castro or her family. Neither Doza Castro nor her relatives, notably, reported the threats they received to the police. That omission makes it difficult to show that the police knew about any torture, let alone willfully turned a blind eye to it or participated in it. See id. While a path to relief remains available when “additional evidence . . . conclusively shows the government would not have responded to the call of duty and instead would have acquiesced in the violence against the claimants,” id. (quotations and alterations omitted), the record in this case paints a picture of official action, not inaction. Consider the police’s response to the robbery. According to Doza Castro’s telling, the police arrived within 20 minutes of the reported robbery, conducted an investigation, and criminally charged at least one suspect. All of this cuts against the idea that the police would have supported or acquiesced in the investigation-related threats if Doza Castro had reported them. Doza Castro faults the immigration judge for not providing more detailed reasoning before rejecting her claim. But both the immigration judge and the Board walked through the police’s response to the underlying robbery, discussed Doza Castro’s failure to contact the police about the threats, and explained why this inaction undermined her claim. Both decisions sufficiently explained why they did what they did. See Vasquez-Rivera v. Garland, 96 F.4th 903, 908–09 (6th Cir. 2024). 5 No. 26-3157, Doza Castro v. Blanche Doza Castro points to the United States Department of State’s warning that the Colombian police do not effectively respond to serious crimes. The State Department reports that “drug- trafficking gangs[] continue[] to operate” within Colombia, leading to torture and threats of violence. R.12 at 240. At the same time, the Colombian government has “investigated these actions and prosecuted those responsible to the extent possible.” R.12 at 240. A country’s work to prevent torture, even if unsuccessful in some cases, does not constitute acquiescence. See Patel, 131 F.4th at 383; Sabastian-Andres v. Garland, 96 F.4th 923, 932 (6th Cir. 2024). What’s more, “general evidence of country conditions” does not suffice to show torture when the specific evidence in the case—the failure to tell the police about the threats in this instance—offers a sound explanation for why the police did nothing more. Patel, 131 F.4th at 382 (quotation omitted). Doza Castro maintains that her mother’s interaction with the ombudsman’s office shows the government’s acquiescence to torture. But Doza Castro testified that the ombudsman’s office is “separate from the police.” R.12 at 167. On appeal, she does not delineate the purview of the ombudsman’s office or identify evidence that she could not have contacted the police. The ombudsman’s office, at all events, did not acquiesce to torture. It placed the family’s request for a protection order on a waitlist and explained the need for a thorough investigation. The reality that this waitlist may be lengthy does not necessitate a finding of acquiescence on the part of Colombian officials. Doza Castro’s arguments, in short, do not compel a finding that public officials acquiesced to torture. We deny the petition for review. 6