Caal De Pop v. Blanche

24-1232 Hoo-Caal De Pop v. Blanche BIA Poczter, IJ A201 412 835/836 & 215 585 333/334 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 2 Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley 3 Square, in the City of New York, on the 26th day of October, two thousand 4 twenty-six. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 RICHARD C. WESLEY, 8 GERARD E. LYNCH, 9 MYRNA PÉREZ, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 ELUVIA HOO-CAAL DE POP, MARITZA 14 LETICIA POP-HOO, SIMON POB- 15 CHUB, ELMER YOVANNY POP-HOO, 16 Petitioners, 17 18 v. 24-1232 19 NAC 20 TODD BLANCHE, UNITED STATES 21 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 22 Respondent. 23 _____________________________________ 24 1 FOR PETITIONERS: Wade M. German, The Law Offices of Wade 2 M. German, PLLC, New York, NY. 3 4 FOR RESPONDENT: Yaakov M. Roth, Acting Assistant Attorney 5 General; Corey L. Farrell, Assistant Director; 6 Jaclyn G. Hagner, Trial Attorney, Office of 7 Immigration Litigation, United States 8 Department of Justice, Washington, DC. 9 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of 10 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 11 DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. 12 Petitioners Eluvia Hoo-Caal De Pop, Simon Pob-Chub, and their children, 13 all natives and citizens of Guatemala, seek review of a BIA decision affirming a 14 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Pob-Chub’s application for 15 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 16 (“CAT”). In re Eluvia Hoo-Caal De Pop, et al., Nos. A 201 412 835/836 & 215 585 17 333/334 (B.I.A. Apr. 4, 2024), aff’g Nos. A 201 412 835/836 & 215 585 333/334 18 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Nov. 25, 2019). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 19 underlying facts and procedural history. 20 We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified and supplemented by the 21 BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005); Yan 22 Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). We review factual findings for 2 1 substantial evidence and pure questions of law de novo. See Urias-Orellana v. 2 Bondi, 607 U.S. 537, 543 n.1, 544–45 (2026) (holding, with respect to a persecution 3 determination, that “both the underlying factual findings and the application of 4 the INA to those findings” are reviewed “for substantial evidence”). “[T]he 5 administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator 6 would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 7 “We consider abandoned any claims not adequately presented in an 8 appellant’s brief, and an appellant’s failure to make legal or factual arguments 9 constitutes abandonment.” Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d Cir. 2023) 10 (quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[w]here the agency properly applies its 11 own waiver rule,” our “review is limited to whether the BIA erred in deeming the 12 argument waived.” Prabhudial v. Holder, 780 F.3d 553, 555–56 (2d Cir. 2015) 13 (citation omitted). Similarly, “when an argument made to this Court cannot be 14 closely matched up with a specific argument made to the BIA, it has not been 15 properly exhausted and we cannot hear it.” Vera Punin v. Garland, 108 F.4th 114, 16 124 (2d Cir. 2024). 17 Pob-Chub claimed that he was targeted by his brother-in-law because he 18 was a successful farmer. His brief does not meaningfully challenge two 3 1 independently dispositive bases for the IJ’s denial of asylum and withholding of 2 removal: the cognizability of his proposed social group and nexus. 1 An applicant 3 for asylum and withholding of removal must establish either past persecution or 4 a fear of future persecution and “that race, religion, nationality, membership in a 5 particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central 6 reason for persecuting the applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (asylum); see also 7 id. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (withholding); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b), 1208.16(b); Quituizaca v. 8 Garland, 52 F.4th 103, 109–14 (2d Cir. 2022) (holding that asylum’s “one central 9 reason” standard also applies to withholding of removal). An applicant, like Pob- 10 Chub, who asserts membership in a particular social group as a protected ground 11 must establish that the group is cognizable, that he is a member of the group, and 12 that his group membership is one central reason for the feared harm. See Paloka 13 v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195–97 (2d Cir. 2014). 14 Here, the IJ found that Pob-Chub’s proposed social group of “indigenous, 15 uneducated landowner[s] from Guatemala engaged in production of corn who 1 He initially also identified religion as a basis for asylum and withholding of removal, but that basis is unexhausted and abandoned because he did not raise it before the BIA and does not raise it or challenge the BIA’s waiver determination here. See Vera Punin, 108 F.4th at 124; Debique, 58 F.4th at 684; Prabhudial, 780 F.3d at 555–56. 4 1 [are] not able to work [their] land because [their] relative does not allow [them] to 2 continue and the judicial system or the government has failed to protect [them]” 3 was not cognizable because he did not show that Guatemalan society perceived 4 such individuals as a distinct group, noting that Pob-Chub and his wife 5 “appear[ed] to be the only two members of their purported group,” and because 6 the group was circularly defined by the alleged harm. Additionally, the IJ found 7 that Pob-Chub did not establish a nexus to a protected ground, as the evidence 8 demonstrated that he and his wife “were involved in a personal dispute with a 9 private actor, namely [Pob-Chub’s] brother-in-law, who was jealous of [his] 10 successful com crop and wished to appropriate [Pob-Chub’s] inherited land for 11 himself.” Certified Admin. Record at 74. In his brief here, Pob-Chub’s argument 12 is limited to the following: 13 The BIA erred in concluding that the Lead Petitioner failed to 14 establish his membership in a particular social group. Summarily, the 15 Lead Petitioner’s claimed particular social group is a Guatemalan- 16 indigenous (Qeqchi), uneducated landowner who harvests corn. 17 Here, the Lead Petitioner was targeted by his Persecutor, who was 18 motivated to target him, because of the immutable characteristics 19 inveterate to the Lead Petitioner: His Qeqchi ethnicity, his lack of 20 education, and his status as a landowner who cultivates produce. The 21 evidence in the records demonstrates that Guatemalan society views 22 Qeqchi’s [sic] as marginalized minorities and a distinct group, as well 23 as uneducated landowners. 24 5  1 Petitioners’ Br. at 22–23. Thus, Pob-Chub does not meaningfully address social 2 distinction or circularity (the bases for the IJ’s cognizability finding), and he does 3 not support his claim that his brother-in-law targeted him “because of the 4 immutable characteristics inveterate to [him]”; accordingly, he has abandoned his 5 claims for asylum and withholding of removal by failing to sufficiently argue these 6 issues. See Debique, 58 F.4th at 684; Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 7 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that petitioner abandoned a claim where brief 8 “devote[d] only a single conclusory sentence to the argument”). 9 Because Pob-Chub has abandoned dispositive grounds for the agency’s 10 denial of asylum and withholding of removal, we do not reach his other challenges 11 to the denial of those forms of relief—whether his past harm was sufficiently 12 severe so as to constitute persecution and whether he demonstrated that the 13 Guatemalan government was or would be unable or unwilling to protect him. See 14 INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies 15 are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary 16 to the results they reach.”). Similarly, Pob-Chub has abandoned his CAT claim 17 as he has not addressed it here. See Debique, 58 F.4th at 684. And we find no 18 support for his position that remand is warranted because the Department of 6 1 Homeland Security (“DHS”) did not oppose his appeal to the BIA, as there is no 2 requirement that DHS file a response brief in an appeal to the BIA. See BIA 3 Practice Manual Chapt. 4.6(f) (“When the appealing party files an appeal brief, the 4 other party may file a ‘response brief.’” (emphasis added)); see also 8 U.S.C. 5 § 1229a(c)(4)(A) (placing burden of proof on applicant for relief from removal). 6 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending 7 motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED. 8 FOR THE COURT: 9 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 10 Clerk of Court 7