Full Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0423n.06 Case No. 25-3919 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED ) Oct 20, 2026 CLAUDIVIAN GOMES-BATISTA, ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk Petitioner, ) ) v. ) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM ) THE UNITED STATES BOARD OF TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, ) IMMIGRATION APPEALS Respondent. ) ) OPINION ) ) Before: GRIFFIN, READLER, and RITZ, Circuit Judges. RITZ, Circuit Judge. Claudivian Gomes-Batista applied for asylum, withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture, and cancellation of his removal. An Immigration Judge denied the claims. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed and also denied Gomes-Batista’s request for administrative closure of his proceedings. We deny Gomes-Batista’s petition for review. BACKGROUND I. Factual background Claudivian Gomes-Batista is a native and citizen of Brazil who entered the United States without documentation in February 2010. Gomes-Batista is also a supporter of the Brazilian Social Democrat Party (PSDB). Although he was never a registered member, he attended meetings and served as a recruiter. No. 25-3919, Gomes-Batista v. Blanche During proceedings in immigration court, Gomes-Batista testified that his involvement in PSDB led him to be targeted by the opposing PT Party, or Worker’s Party, in Brazil. For example, in May 2009, he received a threatening phone call stating that he would regret any continued support of PSDB. He filed a police report but was dissuaded by a police officer from getting involved with any PT Party members. That same evening, four men came to Gomes-Batista’s home and severely beat him with a bat, telling him to stop supporting PSDB. Gomes-Batista then requested a work transfer and moved an hour-and-a-half away. But in November 2009, the men from the previous incident found and severely beat him again. They told him that if he did not end his support for PSDB, he would end up like a politician the PT Party had purportedly assassinated. Gomes-Batista filed another police report but did not follow up with the police. Gomes-Batista left Brazil in December 2009. His mother, three siblings, thirteen-year-old daughter, and his daughter’s mother still live there. They have not been harmed since he left. Neither have his associates, except for one who recruited him to PSDB.1 II. Procedural history Gomes-Batista was apprehended shortly after he entered the United States without inspection in February 2010. An asylum officer determined that Gomes-Batista’s fear of persecution was credible. Shortly after, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against Gomes-Batista, citing that he was in violation of § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Gomes-Batista appeared before the Immigration Judge (IJ) in January 2014 and conceded removability. But he indicated that he would pursue a 1 The IJ found that Gomes-Batista’s PSDB associate, Juan Pedro, had been harmed since Gomes-Batista came to the United States. But in his testimony, Gomes-Batista clarified that Juan Pedro was only harmed when Gomes-Batista was in Brazil. -2- No. 25-3919, Gomes-Batista v. Blanche previously filed application for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection. In December 2020, Gomes-Batista also filed an application for cancellation of removal using Form EOIR-42B. A. Proceedings before the Immigration Judge On February 2 and March 22, 2021, Gomes-Batista testified in support of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. He claimed relief due to the harm and fears he suffered on account of his support of PSDB. He testified in support of his cancellation application on October 14, 2021. On December 17, 2021, the IJ denied Gomes-Batista’s applications. She found that Gomes-Batista was not credible and therefore ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. The IJ also addressed his claims on the merits. As to the asylum claim, the IJ determined that Gomes-Batista had not met his burden to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future prosecution on a protected ground or his political opinion. In particular, he had failed to establish that he suffered harm in Brazil due to his political opinion or membership in the PSDB. Nor had he demonstrated that the Brazilian authorities were unable or unwilling to control his persecutors. While Gomes-Batista had reported his threatening phone call to the police, he did not follow up or report the subsequent assault that occurred that night. So there was no indication “that the Brazilian authorities had an opportunity to respond to the alleged abuse and subsequently condoned it,” or that reporting the abuse would have been futile. AR 199, IJ Decision. The IJ then found that Gomes-Batista had not established that he could not relocate within Brazil to avoid the harm he feared, including to a place where the PSDB was in political control. Because the evidence did not prove an asylum claim, it could not satisfy the more stringent standard of proof for withholding of removal. -3- No. 25-3919, Gomes-Batista v. Blanche B. The BIA’s ruling In January 2022, Gomes-Batista appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). During the pendency of his appeal, Gomes-Batista filed a motion to administratively close his proceedings. He stated that his wife, a naturalized U.S. citizen, had filed an I-130 visa petition on his behalf, and upon its approval, he planned to file an I-601A provisional unlawful presence waiver to adjust his status as undocumented. In July 2023, he notified the BIA that his I-130 visa petition had been approved. On November 4, 2025, the BIA dismissed the appeal and denied Gomes-Batista’s motion for administrative closure. The BIA assumed without deciding that Gomes-Batista was credible. But the BIA found that he did not meaningfully challenge the IJ’s determination that he failed to establish that the Brazilian government was unable or unwilling to protect him and that he could relocate within Brazil to avoid future harm. Therefore, the BIA agreed with the IJ that Gomes-Batista was not eligible for asylum or withholding of removal. The BIA also found he waived his CAT and cancellation application arguments on appeal. As for the motion for administrative closure, the BIA determined that Gomes-Batista had not established a likelihood of success on his Form I-601A, “as he ha[d] not explained how he [would] establish the requisite extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.” AR 6, BIA Decision. In doing so, it cited the IJ’s finding that Gomes-Batista had a large support network in Brazil that could mitigate the hardship of his family’s relocation. And an administrative closure of unknown duration was not warranted given the “strong public interest in promptly bringing litigation to a close.” Id. This petition for review followed. -4- No. 25-3919, Gomes-Batista v. Blanche ANALYSIS Gomes-Batista makes three arguments. The first two relate to his asylum and withholding claims. He argues that the IJ erred in (1) making an adverse credibility finding against him and (2) finding that he failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution because of his political opinion. The third maintains that the BIA abused its discretion when it denied his motion to administratively close his proceedings. We address each argument in turn, noting that Gomes-Batista has otherwise forfeited his CAT and cancellation of removal claims.2 See Guzman-Torralva v. Bondi, 154 F.4th 880, 883-84 (6th Cir. 2025). I. Standard of review When, as here, the BIA “reviews the [IJ] decision and issues a separate opinion, rather than summarily affirming the [IJ] decision, we review the BIA’s decision as the final agency determination.” Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in Seldon v. Garland, 120 F.4th 527, 531 (6th Cir. 2024). But where the BIA adopted the IJ’s reasoning, we “also review[] the [IJ] decision.” Sanchez-Robles v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 688, 692 (6th Cir. 2015). “We review the BIA’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard and treat them as conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Spindola v. Blanche, 184 F.4th 852, 858 (6th Cir. 2026) (citation modified). This standard “requires [the court] to defer to the agency’s findings of fact ‘if supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.’” 2 In his opening brief, Gomes-Batista describes the legal standard for his CAT claim, and states in a section header that the agency’s decision “affirming [the] IJ’s denial of application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT is erroneous.” CA6 R. 18, Pet. Br., at 31, 41. But he provides no further substantive analysis or discussion of the issue. And in any event, the BIA deemed his CAT application waived on appeal, foreclosing our review. See Cruz-Ibarra v. Lynch, 632 F. App’x 824, 829 (6th Cir. 2015). -5- No. 25-3919, Gomes-Batista v. Blanche Abdurakhmanov v. Holder, 735 F.3d 341, 345 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mikhailevitch v. I.N.S., 146 F.3d 384, 388 (6th Cir. 1998)). We will not “supplant the agency’s findings merely by identifying alternative findings that could be supported by substantial evidence.” Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 113 (1992). We review de novo the BIA’s legal determinations. Singh v. Rosen, 984 F.3d 1142, 1148 (6th Cir. 2021). As for the BIA’s denial of a motion for administrative closure, we review that decision under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. See Matias-Cifuentes v. Whitaker, 755 F. App’x 539, 542 (6th Cir. 2018). The BIA abuses its discretion when it acts “without a rational explanation, inexplicably depart[s] from established policies, or rest[s] [its decision] on an impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination against a particular race or group.” Trujillo Diaz v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 244, 248 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation modified). II. Asylum and withholding of removal claims Gomes-Batista argues that the IJ erred by denying his applications for asylum and withholding of removal. “These forms of relief are similar—they protect a non-citizen from removal based on the noncitizen’s membership in a protected group.” Sebastian v. Blanche, No. 25-3736, 2026 WL 1166895, at *5 (6th Cir. Apr. 29, 2026). The government may grant asylum to an applicant who establishes that he is a refugee, which requires a showing of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(a); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13, 1240.8(d). “An applicant lacks a well-founded fear of persecution if [he] could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of [his] country of nationality.” Cristales-de Linares v. Bondi, 161 F.4th 401, 407 (6th Cir. 2025) (citation modified). In addition, “[w]hen an asylum claim focuses on non-governmental conduct, -6- No. 25-3919, Gomes-Batista v. Blanche the applicant must show that the alleged persecutor is either aligned with the government or that the government is unwilling or unable to control him.” Juan Antonio v. Barr, 959 F.3d 778, 793 (6th Cir. 2020). To qualify for withholding of removal, the applicant “must meet a more stringent standard and demonstrate a clear probability that [he] will be persecuted on account of one of the protected grounds.” El Ghorbi v. Mukasey, 281 F. App’x 514, 516 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984)). Like an asylum claim, “[a]n applicant’s reasonable ability to relocate within [his] country of origin defeats that showing.” Cristales-de Linares, 161 F.4th at 408. A. Credibility determination As a threshold matter, Gomes-Batista contests the IJ’s determination that he was not credible and therefore ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. He contends that the IJ prevented him from explaining inconsistencies in his testimony by limiting his ability to describe the trauma he faced on his journey to the United States. But Gomes-Batista’s argument is moot. In affirming the IJ’s decision, the BIA assumed that Gomes-Batista was credible and otherwise addressed his claims on the merits. Its affirmance did not hinge on any of the IJ’s credibility-related determinations. And the IJ similarly addressed the merits of Gomes-Batista’s claims in the alternative. To the extent Gomes-Batista is arguing that the IJ exhibited bias, that argument also fails. An IJ retains “broad discretion” in conducting a removal hearing. Lin v. Holder, 565 F.3d 971, 979 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation modified). A due process violation only occurs “when the proceeding is so fundamentally unfair that the applicant was prevented from reasonably presenting his case.” Kada v. Barr, 946 F.3d 960, 964 (6th Cir. 2020). The BIA properly concluded that the IJ’s choice “to focus [Gomes-Batista’s] testimony on his experiences in Brazil,” Gomes-Batista’s country of -7- No. 25-3919, Gomes-Batista v. Blanche origin, and the source of his persecution, rather than on his journey to the United States, did not constitute a “fundamentally unfair” decision that affected her assessment of his claims. AR 4, BIA Decision. B. Past or well-founded fear of persecution Gomes-Batista next argues that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s findings that he suffered no past persecution and did not present a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his membership in the PSDB in Brazil. Yet he does not engage with the IJ’s findings that the evidence did not show that the Brazilian police were unable or unwilling to put an end to any persecution, and that Gomes-Batista could avoid persecution through relocation. Because those determinations were dispositive of his applications, the BIA did not need to address the remaining requirements for asylum. See Ortiz-Cervantes v. Holder, 596 F. App’x 429, 433 (6th Cir. 2015). 1. Past persecution First, Gomes-Batista argues that the BIA offered a cursory statement that he did not suffer from persecution, despite his testimony regarding the threats and physical harm he faced in Brazil. But any finding of “persecution” is dependent on a showing that the Brazilian government was “unable or unwilling” to protect Gomes-Batista. Ortiz v. Garland, 6 F.4th 685, 688 (6th Cir. 2021). As the IJ found, Gomes-Batista failed to follow up with the police after reporting the threatening phone call and did not report the May 2009 beating, instead leaving his hometown altogether. Gomes-Batista responds that the IJ erred in finding that he failed to report his assault, given that a police report was entered into the record. He argues that the fact that he reported the assault to the police and was not protected is evidence that they were unable or unwilling to protect him. But again, Gomes-Batista points to no evidence or testimony that he did in fact report the May 2009 beating to authorities. And the police record he submitted regarding the remainder of his -8- No. 25-3919, Gomes-Batista v. Blanche incidents contains only vague descriptors of his assailants as “unknown,” supporting the IJ’s underlying point that the police may have failed to arrest his attackers due to a lack of information, rather than an unwillingness to act. See, e.g., AR 199, IJ Decision; AR 876, Nov. 2009 Police Report; AR 879, May 2009 Police Report. Thus, we conclude that substantial evidence supported the IJ’s finding that Gomes-Batista had not shown that the government was unable or unwilling to help him. 2. Well-founded fear of persecution Second, Gomes-Batista argues that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s finding that he did not have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his membership in the PSDB in Brazil. He argues that he was effectively a member despite not being registered, given his recruitment activities and letters of support detailing his political engagement, and was targeted as a result.3 “An individual who can avoid persecution by relocating to another area of the country does not have a well-founded fear of persecution.” Ibrahim v. Holder, 544 F. App’x 635, 639 (6th Cir. 2013). Gomes-Batista does not rebut the IJ’s finding that he could reasonably relocate to another part of Brazil not under the PT Party’s control. His only argument to the contrary is that the same men who attacked him in May 2009 attacked him again in November 2009 after he moved, demonstrating that relocation would be futile. But his experience moving to another city does not preclude him moving to another state “out of his perceived persecutor’s reach.” AR 200, IJ Decision. 3 Gomes-Batista also states that he can establish a well-founded fear of persecution because “[the] government of Brazil has a pattern or practice of persecuting similarly situated persons or an individualized risk of persecution.” CA6 R. 18, Pet. Br., at 45; see 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii). But the BIA already found that this “pattern or practice” claim was never presented to the IJ, and therefore not properly before it. As a result, we do not consider it here. See Reyes-Cardona v. Holder, 565 F. App’x 366, 368 (6th Cir. 2014). -9- No. 25-3919, Gomes-Batista v. Blanche To reverse the BIA’s factual determinations, we would have to “find that the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion but indeed compels it.” Klawitter v. I.N.S., 970 F.2d 149, 152 (6th Cir. 1992). We cannot do so here. And because substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Gomes-Batista did not demonstrate eligibility for asylum, he has also necessarily failed to meet the higher burden for withholding of removal. See Ben Hamida v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 734, 741 (6th Cir. 2007). III. Motion for administrative closure While Gomes-Batista’s appeal was pending with the BIA, he filed a motion for administrative closure of his proceedings. He asserted that his wife, a naturalized U.S. citizen, had filed a Form I-130 visa petition on his behalf, which can “trigger [a] qualification for a visa and eventually a Green Card.” Privett v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 865 F.3d 375, 378 (6th Cir. 2017). Gomes-Batista indicated that, if and when the I-130 petition was approved, he would file a Form I-601A provisional unlawful presence waiver to adjust his status and pursue consular processing of his immigrant visa. His I-130 petition was later approved. In certain circumstances, it may be appropriate to administratively close proceedings so an alien may pursue a Form I-601A with DHS. See Garcia-DeLeon v. Garland, 999 F.3d 986, 991- 93 (6th Cir. 2021). The factors relevant to an IJ or BIA decision to administratively close a case include, but are not limited to: (A) The reason administrative closure is sought; (B) The basis for any opposition to administrative closure; (C) Any requirement that a case be administratively closed in order for a petition, application, or other action to be filed with, or granted by, DHS; (D) The likelihood the alien will succeed on any petition, application, or other action that the alien is pursuing, or that the alien states in writing or on the record at a hearing that they plan to pursue, outside of proceedings before the [BIA]; (E) The anticipated duration of the administrative closure; - 10 - No. 25-3919, Gomes-Batista v. Blanche (F) The responsibility of either party, if any, in contributing to any current or anticipated delay; (G) The ultimate anticipated outcome of the case pending before the [BIA]; and (H) The ICE detention status of the alien. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(l)(3)(i). The IJ or BIA may also consider other factors where appropriate, and no single factor is dispositive. Id. Gomes-Batista claims that the BIA erred in finding that the fourth factor, “[t]he likelihood the alien will succeed on any petition, application, or other action,” weighed against administrative closure. The government responds that a successful Form I-601A required Gomes-Batista to establish extreme hardship for a qualifying relative in the absence of a waiver. See INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(v); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v). Because Gomes-Batista did not offer any evidence on this point, the government argues that the BIA was within its authority to deny administrative closure. We agree with the government that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion based on the evidence that was presented to it. See, e.g., Young Hee Kwak v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1140, 1144 (6th Cir. 2010). Gomes-Batista made no argument in his initial motion that he could or would meet the hardship requirement. And while he provided the IJ with an update that his then-pending Form I-130 visa petition had been approved, he did not point to any evidence accompanying that update of extreme hardship. He merely stated that his petition had been granted and attached a copy. Gomes-Batista argues that after the BIA’s decision, he submitted an I-212 application to reapply for admission following any deportation or removal by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and that application was approved. He claims the I-212 application was based on - 11 - No. 25-3919, Gomes-Batista v. Blanche demonstrating extreme medical, psychological, and financial hardship to his U.S. citizen wife, rendering incorrect the BIA’s determination that success was speculative. But it is unclear when Gomes-Batista submitted his Form I-212, and the record does not contain a copy of the granted application in full, much less the evidence on which it has been based. And in any event, the proper vehicle to present evidence that Gomes-Batista obtained after the BIA issued its decision would be a motion to reopen with the BIA, not a request for remand from this court. See, e.g., Ndayisaba v. Holder, 457 F. App’x 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2012). Finally, Gomes-Batista asserts that the BIA erred in relying on the likelihood of success factor, because “no single factor is dispositive” under the regulation. CA6 R. 21, Pet. Reply, at 3. But the BIA examined the likelihood of success in concert with the fifth factor, the anticipated duration of the administrative closure, finding that the “unknown anticipated duration of the closure” counseled in favor of “promptly bringing the litigation to a close.” AR 6, BIA Decision. And the BIA also noted that the “entry of a removal order would not preclude [Gomes-Batista] from pursuing or obtaining a provisional unlawful presence waiver, thereby . . . demonstrating that such closure is not a prerequisite for filing or obtaining relief from DHS.” Mohamady-Abdelghaffar v. Att’y Gen., No. 25-1848, 2026 WL 2475900, at *2 (3d Cir. Aug. 24, 2026) (citation modified). The BIA “need not evaluate every factor in detail and acts within its discretion so long as it weighs the relevant factors.” Id. (citation modified). On this record, we cannot say that the BIA abused its discretion. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we deny Gomes-Batista’s petition for review. - 12 -