Guillen v. Blanche

23-7010 Rodas-Guillen v. Blanche BIA Zagzoug, IJ A206 251 828 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 2 Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley 3 Square, in the City of New York, on the 4 th day of November, two thousand 4 twenty-six. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 REENA RAGGI, 8 SUSAN L. CARNEY, 9 ALISON J. NATHAN, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 DEYSI ELIZABETH RODAS-GUILLEN, 14 15 Petitioner, 16 17 v. 23-7010 18 NAC 19 TODD BLANCHE, UNITED STATES 20 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 21 Respondent. 22 _____________________________________ 23 24  1 FOR PETITIONER: Steven Haskos, Esq., Relles Law, PLLC, White 2 Plains, NY. 3 4 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant 5 Attorney General; Jennifer Khouri, Senior 6 Litigation Counsel; Allison Frayer, Trial 7 Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, 8 United States Department of Justice, 9 Washington, DC. 10 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of 11 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 12 DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. 13 Petitioner Deysi Elizabeth Rodas-Guillen, a native and citizen of El 14 Salvador, seeks review of an August 4, 2023, decision of the BIA affirming a 15 September 5, 2019, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her 16 application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention 17 Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Rodas-Guillen, No. A 206 251 828 (B.I.A. Aug. 4, 18 2023), aff’g No. A 206 251 828 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 5, 2019). We assume the 19 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. 20 We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified and supplemented by the 21 BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005); Yan 22 Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). We review an adverse 2  1 credibility determination “under the substantial evidence standard.” Hong Fei 2 Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). “[T]he administrative findings of 3 fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to 4 conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 5 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a 6 trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or 7 responsiveness of the applicant . . . , the consistency between the applicant’s or 8 witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under 9 oath, and considering the circumstances under which the statements were made), 10 the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements 11 with other evidence of record . . . , and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such 12 statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood 13 goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.” Id. 14 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony 15 may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an 16 applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into 17 question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). “We defer . . . 18 to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it 3  1 is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility 2 ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei 3 Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility 4 determination. 5 The IJ reasonably relied on inconsistencies and an omission between Rodas- 6 Guillen’s statements at her credible fear interview and her subsequent written 7 statement and hearing testimony. See Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 725 (2d 8 Cir. 2009) (“Where the record of a credible fear interview displays the hallmarks 9 of reliability, it appropriately can be considered in assessing an alien’s 10 credibility.”). Rodas-Guillen stated in the interview that she believed the gang 11 members who threatened her belonged to the 18th Street gang, but her written 12 statement and hearing testimony were that they belonged to MS-13. Her 13 explanation that she misidentified the name of the gang is not compelling because 14 she did not admit that before the IJ, but instead testified that the gangs sometimes 15 worked together. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A 16 petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation for [her] inconsistent 17 statements to secure relief; [s]he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder 18 would be compelled to credit [her] testimony.” (quotation marks omitted)). And 4  1 the IJ reasonably rejected her explanation that the gangs worked together given 2 evidence the gangs are rivals who have engaged in violent territorial struggles in 3 El Salvador. See id. 4 Additionally, at the credible fear interview, Rodas-Guillen alleged threats 5 by two gang members in May and July of 2013, but she testified in immigration 6 court that there were three gang members and that the threats occurred earlier, in 7 December of 2012 and March of 2013. And her credible fear interview statements 8 omitted her later allegation that gang members shot at her home in July of 2013. 9 See Singh v. Garland, 6 F.4th 418, 428 (2d Cir. 2021) (explaining that whether 10 statements “are inconsistent depends in part on the importance that the omitted 11 fact would have had for the purpose of the earlier telling”). Rodas-Guillen does 12 not challenge these findings. See Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d Cir. 13 2023) (“We consider abandoned any claims not adequately presented in an 14 appellant’s brief, and an appellant’s failure to make legal or factual arguments 15 constitutes abandonment.” (quotation marks omitted)); Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529 16 F.3d 141, 146–47 (2d Cir. 2008) (abandonment is particularly significant where 17 unchallenged “findings could, by themselves, support an adverse credibility 18 determination”). 5  1 The IJ also reasonably relied on additional inconsistencies and omissions 2 between Rodas-Guillen’s statements and her supporting evidence. See 8 U.S.C. 3 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). She testified that her nephew was killed because he refused 4 to join the gang, but her sister Evelin’s statement was that he disappeared shortly 5 after refusing to disclose Evelin’s location to the gang. And both Rodas-Guillen’s 6 written statements and some documentary evidence omitted key facts. The 7 agency did not err in relying on the omission of Evelin’s cooperation with the 8 police from Rodas-Guillen’s written statement and her parents’ letter, given that 9 Rodas-Guillen claimed she was targeted due to Evelin’s role as a witness against 10 the gang. See Singh, 6 F.4th at 428. Moreover, the IJ reasonably found that the 11 police records did not corroborate that cooperation because (1) an initial police 12 report did not name Evelin as a witness, (2) the witness protection documents refer 13 to a witness code named “Justin,” with no indication that the name refers to Evelin, 14 and (3) a police summary of Rodas-Guillen’s statements in 2013 contains 15 information regarding events which occurred after that date. See Y.C. v. Holder, 16 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of 17 the weight to be afforded an applicant’s documentary evidence.”). While 18 Evelin’s cooperation and time in witness protection are discussed in Evelin’s 6  1 written statement, that evidence does not compel the conclusion that Rodas- 2 Guillen’s testimony was credible, because the statement was from Evelin’s own 3 removal proceedings, in which she was an interested party, and it did not resolve 4 why the police records only identified a witness named Justin. See Xiu Xia Lin, 5 534 F.3d at 167; Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80. 6 The multiple inconsistencies and omissions, as well as the lack of reliable 7 corroboration for key allegations, provide substantial evidence for the IJ’s adverse 8 credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 9 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an 10 alien from showing that an IJ was compelled to find [her] credible. Multiple 11 inconsistencies would so preclude even more forcefully.”); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 12 167; Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273. Because “the same factual predicate underlies . . . 13 [the] claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT, 14 [the] adverse credibility determination forecloses all three forms of relief.” Hong 15 Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Thus, we do not reach Rodas-Guillen’s remaining 16 arguments. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts 17 and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is 18 unnecessary to the results they reach.”). 7 1 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending 2 motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED. 3 FOR THE COURT: 4 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 5 Clerk of Court 8