Full Opinion

23-8086 Palaquibay-Luna v. Blanche BIA Christensen, IJ A220 684 308 & 240 476 560/561 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 28th day of October, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, MYRNA PÉREZ, ALISON J. NATHAN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ GERALDINE YAJAIRA PALAQUIBAY- LUNA, K. J. G.-P., S. E. G.-P., Petitioners, v. 23-8086 NAC TODD BLANCHE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent.* _____________________________________ * The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption accordingly. FOR PETITIONERS: Michael Borja, Borja Law Firm, P.C., Jackson Heights, NY. FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; John S. Hogan, Assistant Director; Matthew A. Spurlock, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. Petitioners Geraldine Yajaira Palaquibay-Luna and her minor children, all citizens of Ecuador, seek review of a November 27, 2023, decision of the BIA affirming a February 10, 2023, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Geraldine Yajaira Palaquibay-Luna, et al., Nos. A 220 684 308 & 240 476 560/561 (B.I.A. Nov. 27, 2023), aff’g Nos. A 220 684 308 & 240 476 560/561 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Feb. 10, 2023). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). We review fact-finding “under 2 the substantial evidence standard,” and questions of law and the application of law to fact de novo. Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). A. Asylum and Withholding of Removal As to asylum and withholding of removal, we may review the IJ’s past persecution, nexus, and state action findings despite the BIA’s determination that Palaquibay-Luna waived those issues because the BIA also found no clear error in the IJ’s decision. See Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 296–97 (2d Cir. 2006) (excusing the failure to raise an issue before the BIA where the BIA addressed the claim anyways). Still, there is no error in the IJ’s determination that Palaquibay-Luna’s claim lacks a sufficient nexus to a protected ground. See Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103, 109–14 (2d Cir. 2022) (both asylum and withholding of removal require a showing that the protected ground was or will be “one central reason” for the harm suffered or feared). The IJ determined that the people who extorted Palaquibay-Luna were motivated by ordinary criminal incentives or financial gain, not a protected ground. Indeed, the record reflects only general criminal 3 motives. See Garcia-Aranda v. Garland, 53 F.4th 752, 758 (2d Cir. 2022) (a “perceived ability to pay” extortion is not a protected ground); Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007) (“When the harm visited upon members of a group is attributable to the incentives presented to ordinary criminals rather than to persecution, the scales are tipped away from considering those people a ‘particular social group’ within the meaning of the INA.”). The lack of a sufficient nexus is dispositive of asylum and withholding of removal. B. CAT Palaquibay-Luna has abandoned her CAT claim by failing to challenge the agency’s likely torture finding. A CAT applicant must show that she “more likely than not” will be tortured by or with the acquiescence of government officials. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1); see Garcia-Aranda, 53 F.4th at 758–59 (“Analysis of a CAT claim boils down to a two-step inquiry”—namely, a showing of likely torture and “sufficient state action”). She challenges only the acquiescence finding here and has thus abandoned a dispositive ground for the denial of CAT relief. See Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d Cir. 2023); Garcia- Aranda, 53 F.4th at 758. Therefore, we need not reach the remaining acquiescence arguments. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts 4 and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”). C. Briefing Deficiencies We address the remaining arguments to the extent necessary to highlight deficiencies in the brief prepared by counsel Michael Borja. Rather than challenging the dispositive nexus finding for the asylum and withholding of removal claims, the brief argues that the proposed particular social group was cognizable. But the agency made no cognizability findings, particularly because Palaquibay-Luna was pro se before the IJ and did not identify a protected ground on her application. Counsel also asserts here that the “[p]etitioners were repeatedly threatened and attacked,” but the only instance of physical harm that Palaquibay-Luna alleges was an assault on her brother. The brief also raises previously rejected legal arguments. Counsel contends that withholding of removal has a less-stringent nexus standard than asylum. But as noted above, the “one central reason” standard applies both to asylum and withholding of removal, see Quituizaca, 52 F.4th at 109–14, and we have previously rejected counsel’s argument, see, e.g., Chamba-Alvarez v. Garland, No. 21-6072, 2023 WL 6439401, at *1 & n.1 (2d Cir. Oct. 3, 2023) (summary order); 5 Acero-Guaman v. Garland, No. 21-6606, 2024 WL 1734054, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 23, 2024) (summary order). Additionally, we have rejected as unsupported and insufficiently argued Mr. Borjas’ argument that CAT relief does not require government acquiescence. See, e.g., Guarchaj-Guachiac v. Blanche, No. 24-128, 2026 WL 1210065, at *2 (2d Cir. May 1, 2026) (summary order). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. Given the defects in briefing by Michael Borja, a copy of this order will be forwarded to the Grievance Panel. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 6