Full Opinion

25-588 Bushgjokaj v. Blanche BIA Bratton, IJ A226 027 724/744/757/782 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 20th day of November, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, ALISON J. NATHAN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ MIRA BUSHGJOKAJ, ARMIR BUSHGJOKAJ, KLEJVIS BUSHGJOKAJ, DAVIDE BUSHGJOKAJ, Petitioners, v. 25-588 NAC TODD BLANCHE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________ FOR PETITIONERS: Patrick Crowley, Esq., New York, NY. FOR RESPONDENT: Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General; Brianne W. Cohen, Senior Litigation Counsel; Lindsay Corliss, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. Petitioner Armir Bushgjokaj, his wife, and their minor children, all citizens of Albania, seek review of a decision of the BIA affirming a decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Bushgjokaj’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Bushgjokaj, Nos. A 226 027 724/744/757/782 (B.I.A. Feb. 25, 2025), aff’g Nos. A 226 027 724/744/757/782 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y. City Oct. 10, 2024). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision. We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented and modified by the BIA. See Al Saidi v. Blanche, 185 F.4th 286, 296 (2d Cir. 2026). Accordingly, the only issues before us are the adverse credibility determination and Bushgjokaj’s 2 due process claim. Id. We review the adverse credibility determination under the substantial evidence standard, deferring to the administrative findings of fact “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018) (applying substantial evidence standard to adverse credibility determination). “[A] trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record . . . , and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact- finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. As an initial matter, the BIA applied the correct standard by reviewing the IJ’s adverse credibility determination for clear error. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (“Facts determined by the immigration judge, including findings as to the credibility of testimony, shall be reviewed only to determine whether the findings of the immigration judge are clearly erroneous.”). The decision also reflects that 3 the BIA considered the record in finding no clear error in specific omissions and inconsistences. And, as set forth below, substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination. The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies between Bushgjokaj’s testimony and application and on omissions from the application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Bushgjokaj’s application reported he lived in Lezhe, Albania from August 1984, when he was born, through January 2024, when he left for the United States. However, he testified that between 2009 and 2024 he primarily lived in Italy and that he left for the United States from Italy. Bushgjojak’s misrepresentation that he lived in Albania his entire life is a material inconsistency because it calls into question whether he was politically active in Albania during the alleged persecution. See Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 294–95 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding inconsistences material where applicant had “testified to a significantly different event that was nowhere outlined in his . . . application” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 77 (“A trivial inconsistency or omission that has no tendency to suggest a petitioner fabricated his or her claim will not support an adverse credibility determination.” (emphasis added)). The agency did not err in rejecting Bushgjokaj’s explanations – that he was a non-English speaker, and that he did not include his time in Italy 4 on his application because he thought it was trivial – as they are not compelling; he confirmed that the application was prepared by counsel, reviewed with him in Albanian, and that it was correct, and the application form explicitly requested information about where he lived and when he left Albania. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The application also contained notable omissions. Bushgjokaj did not fully respond to questions on the application: he did not include the locations of employment between 2002 and 2024; he listed only an Albanian address instead of providing the address where he last lived before coming to the United States; and he provided only a New York address instead of addresses for the five years preceding the application. The agency did not err in relying on these omissions as they would have required Bushgjokaj to reveal that he had been living in Italy for much of the time that he was allegedly politically active and being targeted in Albania for his political activities. See Xian Tuan Ye, 446 F.3d at 294–95; Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 78 (“[T]he probative value of a witness’s prior silence on particular 5 facts depends on whether those facts are ones the witness would reasonably have been expected to disclose.”). The adverse credibility determination is further bolstered by the IJ’s finding that Bushgjokaj failed to rehabilitate his claim with reliable corroborating evidence. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.”). Bushgjokaj has abandoned review of this finding. See Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d Cir. 2023) (“We consider abandoned any claims not adequately presented in an appellant’s brief, and an appellant’s failure to make legal or factual arguments constitutes abandonment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Taken cumulatively, the inconsistencies and omissions and the unchallenged corroboration finding constitute substantial evidence for the adverse credibility determination. See Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ was compelled to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude even more forcefully.”); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. The adverse credibility determination is dispositive of Bushgjokaj’s asylum, withholding of 6 removal, and CAT claims because each of those claims is based on the same non- credible testimony. See Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Finally, we find no merit in Bushgjokaj’s due process claim. Due process in removal proceedings requires that the respondent “be afforded the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Burger v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To establish a violation of due process, an alien must show that [he] was denied a full and fair opportunity to present [his] claims or that the IJ or BIA otherwise deprived [him] of fundamental fairness.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The record reflects that Bushgjokaj was provided the opportunity to make corrections to his application at the beginning of his hearing, that he made two corrections, and that he was given the opportunity to explain inconsistencies and omissions during the hearing. See id. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 7