Bushgjokaj v. Blanche
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-588
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
25-588
Bushgjokaj v. Blanche
BIA
Bratton, IJ
A226 027 724/744/757/782
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
Square, in the City of New York, on the 20th day of November, two thousand
twenty-six.
PRESENT:
GUIDO CALABRESI,
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
ALISON J. NATHAN,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
MIRA BUSHGJOKAJ, ARMIR
BUSHGJOKAJ, KLEJVIS BUSHGJOKAJ,
DAVIDE BUSHGJOKAJ,
Petitioners,
v. 25-588
NAC
TODD BLANCHE, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONERS: Patrick Crowley, Esq., New York, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General;
Brianne W. Cohen, Senior Litigation Counsel;
Lindsay Corliss, Trial Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, United States
Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.
Petitioner Armir Bushgjokaj, his wife, and their minor children, all citizens
of Albania, seek review of a decision of the BIA affirming a decision of an
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Bushgjokaj’s application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). In re Bushgjokaj, Nos. A 226 027 724/744/757/782 (B.I.A. Feb. 25, 2025),
aff’g Nos. A 226 027 724/744/757/782 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y. City Oct. 10, 2024). We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history,
to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision.
We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented and modified by the
BIA. See Al Saidi v. Blanche, 185 F.4th 286, 296 (2d Cir. 2026). Accordingly, the
only issues before us are the adverse credibility determination and Bushgjokaj’s
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due process claim. Id. We review the adverse credibility determination under
the substantial evidence standard, deferring to the administrative findings of fact
“unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67,
76 (2d Cir. 2018) (applying substantial evidence standard to adverse credibility
determination).
“[A] trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency
between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the internal
consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements with other
evidence of record . . . , and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements.” 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination
unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-
finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534
F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.
As an initial matter, the BIA applied the correct standard by reviewing the
IJ’s adverse credibility determination for clear error. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)
(“Facts determined by the immigration judge, including findings as to the
credibility of testimony, shall be reviewed only to determine whether the findings
of the immigration judge are clearly erroneous.”). The decision also reflects that
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the BIA considered the record in finding no clear error in specific omissions and
inconsistences. And, as set forth below, substantial evidence supports the
adverse credibility determination.
The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies between Bushgjokaj’s
testimony and application and on omissions from the application. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Bushgjokaj’s application reported he lived in Lezhe, Albania
from August 1984, when he was born, through January 2024, when he left for the
United States. However, he testified that between 2009 and 2024 he primarily
lived in Italy and that he left for the United States from Italy. Bushgjojak’s
misrepresentation that he lived in Albania his entire life is a material inconsistency
because it calls into question whether he was politically active in Albania during
the alleged persecution. See Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289,
294–95 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding inconsistences material where applicant had
“testified to a significantly different event that was nowhere outlined in his . . .
application” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 77
(“A trivial inconsistency or omission that has no tendency to suggest a petitioner
fabricated his or her claim will not support an adverse credibility determination.”
(emphasis added)). The agency did not err in rejecting Bushgjokaj’s explanations
– that he was a non-English speaker, and that he did not include his time in Italy
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on his application because he thought it was trivial – as they are not compelling;
he confirmed that the application was prepared by counsel, reviewed with him in
Albanian, and that it was correct, and the application form explicitly requested
information about where he lived and when he left Albania. See Majidi v.
Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a
plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must
demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his
testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The application also contained notable omissions. Bushgjokaj did not fully
respond to questions on the application: he did not include the locations of
employment between 2002 and 2024; he listed only an Albanian address instead
of providing the address where he last lived before coming to the United States;
and he provided only a New York address instead of addresses for the five years
preceding the application. The agency did not err in relying on these omissions
as they would have required Bushgjokaj to reveal that he had been living in Italy
for much of the time that he was allegedly politically active and being targeted in
Albania for his political activities. See Xian Tuan Ye, 446 F.3d at 294–95; Hong Fei
Gao, 891 F.3d at 78 (“[T]he probative value of a witness’s prior silence on particular
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facts depends on whether those facts are ones the witness would reasonably have
been expected to disclose.”).
The adverse credibility determination is further bolstered by the IJ’s finding
that Bushgjokaj failed to rehabilitate his claim with reliable corroborating
evidence. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An
applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility,
because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to
rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.”). Bushgjokaj
has abandoned review of this finding. See Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d
Cir. 2023) (“We consider abandoned any claims not adequately presented in an
appellant’s brief, and an appellant’s failure to make legal or factual arguments
constitutes abandonment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Taken cumulatively, the inconsistencies and omissions and the
unchallenged corroboration finding constitute substantial evidence for the
adverse credibility determination. See Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d
Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing
that an IJ was compelled to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so
preclude even more forcefully.”); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. The adverse
credibility determination is dispositive of Bushgjokaj’s asylum, withholding of
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removal, and CAT claims because each of those claims is based on the same non-
credible testimony. See Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.
Finally, we find no merit in Bushgjokaj’s due process claim. Due process
in removal proceedings requires that the respondent “be afforded the opportunity
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Burger v.
Gonzales, 498 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To
establish a violation of due process, an alien must show that [he] was denied a full
and fair opportunity to present [his] claims or that the IJ or BIA otherwise deprived
[him] of fundamental fairness.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The
record reflects that Bushgjokaj was provided the opportunity to make corrections
to his application at the beginning of his hearing, that he made two corrections,
and that he was given the opportunity to explain inconsistencies and omissions
during the hearing. See id.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending
motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
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