Full Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 22-2114 Doc: 68 Filed: 11/02/2026 Pg: 1 of 19 PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 22-2114 SINTIA DINES NIVAR SANTANA, Petitioner, v. TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, Respondent. On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States. (S. Ct. No. 24-46) Argued: September 15, 2026 Decided: November 2, 2026 Before KING, THACKER, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges. Petition for review granted by published opinion. Judge Thacker wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Heytens joined. ARGUED: Hans Christian Linnartz, LINNARTZ LAW OFFICE, P.A., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Petitioner. Gregory Michael Kelch, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Benjamin R. Winograd, IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE APPELLATE CENTER, LLC, Alexandria, Virginia; Jeffrey L. Fisher, Menlo Park, California, Parisa Sadeghi, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP, New York, New York, for Petitioner. Yaakov M. Roth, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Walter Bocchini, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. USCA4 Appeal: 22-2114 Doc: 68 Filed: 11/02/2026 Pg: 2 of 19 THACKER, Circuit Judge: Sintia Dines Nivar Santana (“Petitioner”), a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, applied for adjustment of status after she was placed in removal proceedings. An immigration judge (“IJ”) determined Petitioner was ineligible for adjustment of status because she had falsely claimed to be a United States citizen when she executed an employment eligibility form. Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, the IJ held that Petitioner was required to establish her admissibility clearly and beyond doubt, rather than by a preponderance of the evidence. Finding Petitioner did not meet that standard, the IJ denied her application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed. Petitioner previously sought our review of the BIA’s final order. We denied her petition for review and concluded the IJ and BIA did not err in applying the clearly and beyond doubt standard in these proceedings. In making this determination, we deferred to the BIA pursuant to Chevron. 1 After we issued our prior opinion in this case, the Supreme Court of the United States vacated that prior opinion and remanded for reconsideration in light of Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, which held it is up to “the reviewing court – not the agency whose action it reviews – [] to decide all relevant questions of law and interpret statutory provisions.” 603 U.S. 369, 398 (2024) (cleaned up) (emphasis in original). Upon reconsideration, we conclude that adjustment of status applicants like Petitioner bear the burden of proving admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence. 1 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (requiring courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute if that interpretation was based on a permissible construction of the statute). 2 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2114 Doc: 68 Filed: 11/02/2026 Pg: 3 of 19 Because we hold the IJ and BIA erred in requiring Petitioner to prove admissibility clearly and beyond doubt, we grant the petition and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. A. Petitioner and her minor son were admitted into the United States in 2000 with B- 1/B-2 visitor visas. They both remained in the United States past the expiration of their visas. In 2014, Petitioner’s son naturalized through honorable service in the United States Army and sponsored Petitioner’s initial adjustment of status application by filing a form I- 130 on her behalf. In March 2016, United States Customs and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) denied Petitioner’s initial adjustment of status application, ruling that she was inadmissible for falsely claiming to be a United States citizen when she executed an employment eligibility form upon applying for a job in 2013 at Golden Horizons, an elder-care provider in Connecticut. That is, on the employment eligibility form apparently bearing Petitioner’s signature, there was a checked box corresponding to an affirmative response that said: “I attest, under penalty of perjury, that I am . . . [a] citizen of the United States.” J.A. 184. 2 In January 2017, nearly a year after her adjustment of status application was denied, USCIS served Petitioner a notice to appear before an IJ, charging her with removability for overstaying her visa, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). 2 Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal. 3 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2114 Doc: 68 Filed: 11/02/2026 Pg: 4 of 19 B. 1. At a preliminary hearing before the IJ in July 2018, Petitioner conceded removability on the ground that she had overstayed her visa, but she renewed her adjustment of status application based on the same form I-130 which had been approved by the USCIS when her naturalized son initially submitted it on her behalf. At a subsequent hearing in August 2018, Petitioner’s lawyer advised the IJ that an employee of Golden Horizons who assisted Petitioner with completing the eligibility form was “eager” and “willing to come and give” testimony that Petitioner did not falsely claim to be a United States citizen on the employment eligibility form, and that someone else had inappropriately made that assertion therein. J.A. 76. The IJ calendared an evidentiary hearing for October 29, 2018, and advised the parties that any evidence to be considered had to be filed with the immigration court at least 15 days before the hearing. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) did not submit any documentary evidence. Petitioner, however, filed evidence with the immigration court, including her affidavit of September 28, 2018. In her affidavit, Petitioner acknowledged that her initial application for adjustment of status had been denied on grounds that she had falsely claimed to be a citizen. But she swore that she had examined a copy of the employment eligibility form, that she did not recognize it as “something that [she had] ever read or signed,” and that she had never “knowingly checked the box that says I am a citizen of the United States.” J.A. 194. Neither party submitted the employment eligibility form to the court prior to the evidentiary hearing. 4 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2114 Doc: 68 Filed: 11/02/2026 Pg: 5 of 19 On October 29, 2018, the IJ conducted an evidentiary hearing on the merits of Petitioner’s adjustment of status application. During the hearing, Petitioner asserted that the applicable standard was proof by a preponderance of the evidence, but the IJ advised Petitioner that she was required to demonstrate “clearly and beyond doubt” that she was admissible. J.A. 85. When Petitioner was on the witness stand, her lawyer attempted to show her the employment eligibility form at issue. However, the IJ advised that he had “never been provided with a copy” of the employment eligibility form by either party. J.A. 98. DHS opined that the employment eligibility form “should have been in the record already,” but the IJ indicated he had never seen it and could not locate it in the record. Id. at 99. DHS then provided a copy of the employment eligibility form to the IJ, and the IJ accepted it into evidence. Petitioner objected to the admission of the form on authenticity grounds, and DHS replied that the employment eligibility form had “been litigated” and was “kept in the regular course.” Id. at 100. The IJ overruled Petitioner’s objection and accepted the employment eligibility form into evidence. Thereafter, Petitioner’s lawyer asked Petitioner if she recognized the employment eligibility form, and she responded, “Yes, I think I fill[ed] it out.” J.A. 103–04. She then clarified that she had filled out only “the top part” and, upon questioning by the IJ, admitted that she recognized her handwriting. Id. at 104–05. But Petitioner testified that she did not remember checking the box indicating that she was “[a] citizen of the United States.” Id. at 105, 184. 5 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2114 Doc: 68 Filed: 11/02/2026 Pg: 6 of 19 Kathy DeVeau -- an administrator for Golden Horizons elder care -- also testified. DeVeau acknowledged that she recognized the employment eligibility form related to Petitioner’s hiring. She further recognized her own handwriting on the portion of the employment eligibility form that includes Petitioner’s driver’s license information. She also recognized the handwriting of her supervisor -- Jan Hamilton, an Assistant President of Golden Horizons -- on the social security portion of the employment eligibility form. When asked if Petitioner had checked the box indicating that she was a United States citizen, DeVeau testified that she did not know. She went on to testify that she believed that Hamilton “probably” placed the checkmark on the employment eligibility form. J.A. 161. DeVeau believed this because she had seen Hamilton “do [that to] other documents.” Id. at 166. According to DeVeau, Petitioner never claimed to be a United States citizen and, to the contrary, had disclosed to DeVeau that she was not a citizen. Additionally, Petitioner submitted a letter from Hamilton. Hamilton said that she did not place the checkmark on the employment eligibility form herself. Instead, she asserted that it might have been DeVeau that checked the box. Further, Hamilton said that she “would be surprised if [Petitioner] knowingly checked the box claiming to be a [United States] citizen” because (1) Petitioner had never claimed to be a citizen; (2) she and Petitioner had talked about Petitioner’s family in the Dominican Republic; and (3) Petitioner was a “completely honest individual.” J.A. 189. 2. In November 2018, the IJ denied Petitioner’s renewed application for adjustment of status and ordered her removed. In denying Petitioner’s application, the IJ ruled that 6 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2114 Doc: 68 Filed: 11/02/2026 Pg: 7 of 19 Petitioner was “in the position of a[ noncitizen] applying for admission to the United States.” J.A. 58 (quoting Crocock v. Holder, 670 F.3d 400, 403 (2d Cir. 2012)). As such, according to the IJ, Petitioner bore the burden of establishing “clearly and beyond doubt [she was] entitled to be admitted and is not inadmissible.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A)). From there, the IJ reasoned that Petitioner was inadmissible for falsely claiming to be a citizen on the employment eligibility form because the record evidence was “inconclusive.” Id. at 59. Ultimately, with no one confirming who had checked the box on the employment eligibility form, the IJ ruled that Petitioner had not proved clearly and beyond doubt that she had not checked the box claiming citizenship. C. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal with the BIA. Petitioner maintained that she only needed to demonstrate her admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence, and not by evidence that was clear and beyond doubt. She also challenged the IJ’s admission of the employment eligibility form, along with the IJ’s weighing of the evidence. In October 2022, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. The BIA reasoned that its precedent, as well as that of our court, makes clear that Petitioner’s burden is to satisfy the clearly and beyond doubt standard. The BIA reiterated that an applicant for adjustment of status must satisfy the higher burden because that type of applicant is in a similar position to a noncitizen seeking entry. J.A. 5 (citing Matter of Bett, 26 I&N Dec. 437, 440 (BIA 2014); Dakura v. Holder, 772 F.3d 994, 998 (4th Cir. 2014)). The BIA also ruled that the IJ had not erred in admitting the employment eligibility 7 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2114 Doc: 68 Filed: 11/02/2026 Pg: 8 of 19 form into evidence because Petitioner had not shown that its admission was fundamentally unfair. The BIA emphasized that Petitioner recognized the employment eligibility form as a document she had “fill[ed] out” and that Petitioner conceded that her handwriting was on the employment eligibility form. Id. at 6. Moreover, the BIA concluded that the IJ’s “questioning of the [Petitioner] with regard to the [employment eligibility form] was consistent with his adjudicatory role to ensure that admission of the document would be ‘fundamentally fair’ to” Petitioner. Id. Finally, the BIA upheld the IJ’s weighing of the evidence and was satisfied that the IJ had not erred. The BIA ruled that, although Petitioner asserted that she did not check the box on the employment eligibility form claiming citizenship, “the record was inconclusive as to who did.” J.A. 7. The BIA emphasized that neither DeVeau nor Hamilton had definitively identified who checked the box, leaving the evidence as equivocal at best, and falling short of being proof that was “clear[ ] and beyond doubt.” Id. After being denied relief by the BIA, Petitioner sought review in this court, and we denied her petition for review. In doing so, we accorded Chevron deference to the BIA’s longstanding practice of assimilating noncitizens applying for adjustment of status to the position of an applicant for admission. We also cited Dakura, in which we stated, a “[noncitizen] bears the burden of proving that he ‘clearly and beyond doubt . . . is not inadmissible under [8 U.S.C. §] 1182.’” 772 F.3d at 998 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A)). 8 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2114 Doc: 68 Filed: 11/02/2026 Pg: 9 of 19 Because the Supreme Court later invalidated Chevron, it granted Petitioner’s petition for certiorari, vacated our decision, and remanded for further consideration in light of Loper Bright. See Santana v. Garland, 145 S. Ct. 1042 (2025). II. Whether the BIA or the IJ applied the proper legal standard is a question of law subject to de novo review. See Perez Vasquez v. Garland, 4 F.4th 213, 221 (4th Cir. 2021). It is up to “the reviewing court – not the agency whose action it reviews – [] to decide all relevant questions of law and interpret statutory provisions.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 398 (2024) (cleaned up). III. Petitioner raises a single issue on remand. She argues that the IJ and BIA erred in requiring her -- an applicant for adjustment of status who had been previously admitted to the United States -- to prove her admissibility clearly and beyond doubt, rather than by a preponderance of the evidence. Petitioner raises two arguments in support of her position. First, she argues that the best reading of the relevant Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) statutory provisions is that a previously admitted noncitizen seeking relief from removal by adjustment of status need only prove she satisfies the applicable eligibility requirements -- including admissibility -- by a preponderance of the evidence. Second, she argues that the articulation of the applicable standard of proof when determining an adjustment of status applicant’s admissibility in Dakura was dicta. Conversely, the Government argues that we are bound by our decision in Dakura and that, even if we are not bound by Dakura, 9 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2114 Doc: 68 Filed: 11/02/2026 Pg: 10 of 19 requiring adjustment of status applicants to prove admissibility clearly and beyond doubt represents the best reading of the INA. A. Adjustment of Status Process We begin with an overview of the adjustment of status process. If approved, adjustment of status grants an eligible noncitizen legal status as a lawful permanent resident (“LPR”). This new legal status is significant because LPRs are eligible to naturalize and ultimately become citizens of the United States. The threshold eligibility requirement in most adjustment of status cases is having been previously “inspected and admitted . . . into the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). Here, Petitioner was previously admitted, so this threshold eligibility requirement has been met. Once inspected and admitted, the noncitizen’s status may be adjusted to that of an LPR if: (1) the [noncitizen] makes an application for such adjustment, (2) the [noncitizen] is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately available to [her] at the time [her] application is filed. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). Once those requirements are satisfied and the noncitizen’s application is approved, “the Attorney General shall record the [noncitizen’s] lawful admission for permanent residence as of the date the order of the Attorney General approving the application for the adjustment of status is made.” 8 U.S.C. § 1255(b). 10 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2114 Doc: 68 Filed: 11/02/2026 Pg: 11 of 19 A noncitizen may also apply for adjustment of status during removal proceedings. There are two stages to every removal proceeding. At stage one, the IJ determines whether a noncitizen is removable. In assessing removability, different burdens of proof apply to different categories of noncitizens. An “applicant for admission” must prove that she “is clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A). If a noncitizen was previously admitted to the United States, she must prove “by clear and convincing evidence” that she “is lawfully present in the United States pursuant to [the] prior admission.” Id. § 1229a(c)(2)(B). And if she proves she is lawfully present pursuant to a prior admission, the burden then shifts to the Government to prove “by clear and convincing evidence” that the noncitizen is nonetheless removable. Id. § 1229a(c)(3)(A). If the IJ concludes that the noncitizen is not removable at stage one, the removal proceedings are terminated. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(d)(1)(i)(A). But if a noncitizen is deemed removable, or concedes removability at stage one, she may then apply for relief from removal during stage two. While there is no exhaustive list of applications for relief from removal, the most common are adjustment of status, cancellation of removal, withholding of removal, asylum, and voluntary departure. Each application has its own unique eligibility criteria that must be proven by the noncitizen during the second stage of removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4). A noncitizen applying for adjustment of status during the second stage of removal proceedings must show she satisfies the various threshold eligibility requirements established by Congress. First, the noncitizen must prove she was previously inspected and admitted into the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). Second, the noncitizen must 11 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2114 Doc: 68 Filed: 11/02/2026 Pg: 12 of 19 submit an adjustment of status application. Id. Third, the noncitizen must prove she is admissible and eligible to receive an immigrant visa. Id. Lastly, a visa must be available to the noncitizen at the time the application is filed. Id. And generally, noncitizens seeking any of the various forms of relief from removal must prove they satisfy the eligibility requirements applicable to the form of relief they pursue “by a preponderance of the evidence.” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4) (explaining that the noncitizen “applying for relief or protection from removal has the burden of proof”). Despite this, a noncitizen seeking adjustment of status as a form of relief from removal has been previously required to prove the third eligibility requirement, that she is admissible, clearly and beyond doubt. This aberration from the general rule that noncitizens seeking relief from removal must prove they satisfy the applicable eligibility requirements by a preponderance of the evidence was born from the BIA’s longstanding interpretation that adjustment of status applicants are assimilated to the position of applicants for admission who are seeking entry at the border. And pursuant to the INA, “if the [noncitizen] is an applicant for admission,” then she bears the burden of proving “clearly and beyond doubt [she is] entitled to be admitted and is not inadmissible under [§] 1182 of [Title 8].” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A). B. The Best Reading of the Statute In the present case, during the first stage of her removal proceedings Petitioner conceded removability for overstaying her visa. At the second stage, Petitioner sought relief from removal by applying for adjustment of status. And because Petitioner was 12 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2114 Doc: 68 Filed: 11/02/2026 Pg: 13 of 19 already inspected and admitted into the United States, she argues that she is not an applicant for admission and must therefore prove the third eligibility requirement for adjustment of status, admissibility, only by a preponderance of the evidence. Congress specified that an “application for admission” refers “to the application for admission into the United States and not to the application for the issuance of an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(4). “Admission” and “admitted” are defined as “the lawful entry of the [noncitizen] into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). And “‘when Congress takes the trouble to define the term it uses,’ courts are obligated to use that definition rather than the ordinary meaning of the term of art wherever it appears in the text.” Lopez Garcia v. Guadian, -- F.4th -- , 2026 WL 2661092, at *9 (4th Cir. Sept. 10, 2026) (quoting Dep't of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42, 59 (2024)). Applying the statutory definition of “admission” and “admitted,” we previously concluded that neither term “includes an adjustment of status; instead, both contemplate a physical crossing of the border following the sanction and approval of United States authorities.” Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380, 385 (4th Cir. 2012). Moreover, in Azumah v. United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., we concluded, “the phrase ‘lawfully admitted for permanent residence,’ as used in the INA, has nothing to do with ‘admission’ at all.” 107 F.4th 272, 276 (4th Cir. 2024); see also Aremu v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 450 F.3d 578, 583 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that the date of a noncitizen’s adjustment of status 13 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2114 Doc: 68 Filed: 11/02/2026 Pg: 14 of 19 does not constitute a date of admission in situations where the applicant was previously admitted). We recognize that, without further context, § 1255 could be read to suggest that applicants for adjustment of status are also applicants for admission -- they must be “admissible,” 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (emphasis supplied), and the date of their adjustment of status is recorded as their date of “lawful admission,” id. § 1255(b) (emphasis supplied). But, when read in context, our case law confirms that is not the case. For example, in Aremu, we explained the difference between proving admissibility and achieving an “admission” into the United States as it is statutorily defined. 450 F.3d at 582. We reasoned that the INA defines “admission” as “the lawful entry of the [noncitizen] into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” Id. at 581 (emphasis in original). And while “only an admissible [noncitizen] can be admitted . . . it does not follow that to require a[ noncitizen] to possess the qualifications [to be] labeled ‘admissib[le],’ is to ‘admit’ the [noncitizen]. An ‘admissible’ [noncitizen] is simply one who is eligible for admission.” Id. at 582. Therefore, while an adjustment of status applicant in Petitioner’s case must prove admissibility, that does not mean she is seeking or obtaining admission into the United States. Additionally, while the term “applicant for admission” does not appear in the definitional section of the INA, we recently concluded, “the phrase ‘applicants for admission’” is best understood as a “term of art” as it is defined in Section 1225(a)(1). Lopez Garcia, 2026 WL 2661092, at *10. Section 1225(a)(1) provides: 14 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2114 Doc: 68 Filed: 11/02/2026 Pg: 15 of 19 A[ noncitizen] present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including a[ noncitizen] who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters) shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Thus, Section 1225(a)(1) provides two categories of applicants for admission: (1) a noncitizen “present in the United States who has not been admitted;” and (2) a noncitizen “who arrives in the United States.” 3 See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 109 (2020) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)). Neither category applies to an adjustment of status applicant like Petitioner because: (1) Petitioner was previously admitted into the United States; and (2) Petitioner resides within the United States and is not applying for admission after crossing the border. Consequently, pursuant to our reading of the INA in Lopez Garcia, previously admitted adjustment of status applicants like Petitioner are not “applicants for admission” as it is statutorily defined. Under the regulatory provisions governing burdens of proof in removal proceedings, the clearly and beyond doubt standard applies only to “arriving [noncitizens]” and “[noncitizens] present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(b)–(c). These two categories mirror the two categories of applicants for admission found in Section 1225(a)(1). And because Petitioner does not fall under either category of applicants for admission, her burden of proof in removal proceedings is not 3 A noncitizen “‘arrives in the United States’ only when he ‘crosses the border.’” Mullin v. Al Otro Lado, 609 U.S. 258, 268 (2026). 15 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2114 Doc: 68 Filed: 11/02/2026 Pg: 16 of 19 clearly and beyond doubt. Rather, because she is seeking relief from removal in the form of adjustment of status, Petitioner is required to prove she satisfies all of the applicable eligibility requirements, including admissibility, by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at § 1240.8(d) In sum, because Petitioner is not seeking admission into the United States and is not an applicant for admission, Section 1255(a)’s admissibility requirement is best read to require proof from Petitioner that she “possess[es] the qualifications labeled ‘admissibility.’” Aremu, 450 F.3d at 582. In other words, in the case of Petitioner who was already admitted and is applying for adjustment of status, proving that she is “admissible to the United States for permanent residence” is accomplished by a present showing that she is not inadmissible under Section 1182. And because she is not an applicant for admission, her burden of proof in making that showing is a preponderance of the evidence. C. Dicta in Dakura But, the Government argues that we are bound by Dakura to uphold the BIA’s practice of assimilating adjustment of status applicants to the position of applicants for admission seeking entry into the United States at the border and, concomitantly, the BIA’s use of the clearly and beyond doubt standard. We disagree. Our statement on the applicable burden of proof in Dakura was dicta. Dictum is a “statement in a judicial opinion that could have been deleted without seriously impairing the analytical foundations of the holding.” United States v. Horsley, 16 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2114 Doc: 68 Filed: 11/02/2026 Pg: 17 of 19 105 F.4th 193, 212 (4th Cir. 2024). That is because the statement, “being peripheral, may not have received the full and careful consideration of the court that uttered it.” Payne v. Taslimi, 998 F.3d 648, 654–55 (4th Cir. 2021). However, “[i]f necessary to the outcome, a precedent’s reasoning must be followed; otherwise, we are not so bound.” Id. (quoting Taslimi, 998 F.3d at 654–55). First and foremost, the burden of proof was not at issue in Dakura. Rather, the overarching issue was “whether a[ noncitizen] who falsely claims citizenship on [an employment eligibility form] is thereby rendered inadmissible pursuant to the false claim bar.” Dakura v. Holder, 772 F.3d 994, 998 (4th Cir. 2014). In Dakura, at the outset of our analysis, we stated as follows: The INA requires that, in order for [a noncitizen] to adjust his status to that of a lawful permanent resident, he must be admissible. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). The [noncitizen] bears the burden of proving that he “clearly and beyond doubt . . . is not inadmissible under [8 U.S.C. §] 1182.” Id. § 1229a(c)(2)(A); see also Hashmi v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 700, 702 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that [a noncitizen] applying for adjustment of status “is in a similar position to [a noncitizen] seeking entry into the United States,” and therefore shoulders the burden of establishing admissibility). Id. Critically, the noncitizen in Dakura “[did] not dispute[]” that he previously claimed to be a United States citizen on the employment eligibility form. 772 F.3d at 1000. In fact, the noncitizen testified during removal proceedings that he claimed United States citizenship and never disputed this factual finding “to either the BIA or in this petition.” Id. Thus, in Dakura, the noncitizen argued only that the false claim bar did not apply to 17 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2114 Doc: 68 Filed: 11/02/2026 Pg: 18 of 19 him because: (1) he used another person’s identity when claiming citizenship; (2) his employment was not an immigration benefit because all of his wages were paid to a bank account he did not own or have access to; and (3) he claimed citizenship while acting under duress. Id. at 1000–01. As a result, we neither analyzed the weight of the evidence against the noncitizen on appeal nor did we analyze whether the noncitizen met his burden to prove he was admissible clearly and beyond doubt because it was not “necessary to the outcome.” Payne, 998 F.3d at 654–55. Dakura held only that the false claim bar forms a legal basis for rendering applicants for adjustment of status inadmissible -- even if the noncitizen used a different identity, did not receive payment for the employment they gained, or acted under duress when claiming citizenship. Beyond that, given that the noncitizen’s claim of being a United States citizen was undisputed in Dakura, the standard of proof would have been satisfied even if the burden was a preponderance of the evidence. Dakura, 772 F.3d at 1001. This again underscores the point that the burden of proof was not “necessary to the outcome” in Dakura. Payne, 998 F.3d at 654–55. Therefore, we reject the Government’s argument that we are bound by Dakura to uphold the BIA’s interpretation that adjustment of status applicants are assimilated to the position of applicants for admission and must prove admissibility clearly and beyond doubt. IV. Because the best reading of the relevant statutory provisions is that adjustment of status applicants must prove admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence, and our 18 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2114 Doc: 68 Filed: 11/02/2026 Pg: 19 of 19 statement of the applicable burden of proof in Dakura was dicta, we conclude that the IJ and BIA erred in requiring Petitioner to prove admissibility clearly and beyond doubt. The Petition for Review is GRANTED. 19