Badar Suri v. Donald Trump

USCA4 Appeal: 25-1560 Doc: 133 Filed: 07/23/2026 Pg: 1 of 86 PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 25-1560 BADAR KHAN SURI, Petitioner - Appellee, v. DONALD TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; ROBERT GUADIAN, in his official capacity as Field Office Director of Washington, Immigration and Customs Enforcement; DAVID J. VENTURELLA, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; MARKWAYNE MULLIN, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security; MARCO RUBIO, in his official capacity as Secretary of State; TODD BLANCHE, in his official capacity as Acting Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Respondents - Appellants, and JEFFREY CRAWFORD, in his official capacity as Warden of Farmville Detention Center, Respondent, THE INTERCEPT MEDIA, INC, Movant. ------------------------------ IMMIGRATION LAWYERS, LAW PROFESSORS, AND SCHOLARS; HABEAS SCHOLARS; FREE SPEECH FOR PEOPLE, Amici Supporting Appellee. USCA4 Appeal: 25-1560 Doc: 133 Filed: 07/23/2026 Pg: 2 of 86 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Patricia Tolliver Giles, District Judge. (1:25-cv-00480-PTG-WBP) Argued: March 17, 2026 Decided: July 23, 2026 Before WILKINSON, HARRIS, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Benjamin wrote the opinion, in which Judge Harris joined. Judge Wilkinson wrote a dissenting opinion. ARGUED: Drew Curtis Ensign, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Noor Zafar, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, New York, New York; Geri Greenspan, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Brett Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, William C. Peachey, Director, Yamileth G. Davila, Assistant Director, David J. Byerley, Brandon D. Zeller, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Erik S. Siebert, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellants. Hassan Ahmad, THE HMA LAW FIRM, PLLC, Sterling, Virginia; Astha Sharma Pokharel, Baher Azmy, New York, New York, Jessica Myers Vosburgh, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, Birmingham, Alabama; Nermeen Saba Arastu, Immigrant & Non-Citizen Rights Clinic, CUNY SCHOOL OF LAW, Long Island City, New York; Eden Heilman, Sophia Leticia Gregg, Vishal Agraharkar, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia; Brett Max Kaufman, Scarlet Kim, Brian Hauss, Esha Bhandari, Sidra Mahfooz, Michael K.T. Tan, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, New York, New York, for Appellee. Amber Qureshi, LAW OFFICE OF AMBER QURESHI, LLC, Columbia, Markyland; Elora Mukherjee, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, New York, New York; Fatma Marouf, TEXAS A&M SCHOOL OF LAW, Fort Worth, Texas; Ahilan Arulanantham, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, Los Angeles, California, for Amici Immigration Lawyers, Law Professors, and Scholars. Jennifer Brooke Condon, Jon Romberg, Jonathan Hafetz, Center for Social Justice, SETON HALL UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Newark, New Jersey; Lawrence S. Lustberg, Madhulika Murali, GIBBONS P.C., Newark, New Jersey, for Amici Habeas Scholars Marc D. Falkoff, Eric M. Freedman, Paul Halliday, Randy A. Hertz, Aziz Z. Huq, Lee Kovarsky, Nancy Morawetz, Jessica Rofé, Stephen I. Vladeck, and Larry Yackle. Suparna Reddy, John Bonifaz, Ben Clements, Courtney Hostetler, FREE SPEECH FOR PEOPLE, Sharon, Massachusetts, for Amicus Free Speech for People. 2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1560 Doc: 133 Filed: 07/23/2026 Pg: 3 of 86 DEANDREA GIST BENJAMIN, Circuit Judge: Dr. Badar Khan Suri came to the United States after receiving a J-1 exchange visa for a postdoctoral fellowship at Georgetown University. He and his wife reside in Rosslyn, Virginia, and have publicly opposed the war in the Gaza Strip on social media. As a result of their social media posts and associations, Suri was detained outside of his home by masked Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers and was informed that he would be deported from the country. After detaining him, the Government—unbeknownst to Suri’s family and counsel—moved him from state to state and detention center to detention center over the span of just a few days. Suri filed a habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, where he lived, was first detained, and where the first three detention facilities holding him were located. The Government sought to dismiss Suri’s habeas petition, contending that the district court lacked habeas jurisdiction because Suri was no longer detained in Virginia. The district court denied the Government’s motion, finding that it had jurisdiction. The Government appeals, asserting that habeas jurisdiction was not established, and even if it was, certain provisions of the immigration code stripped the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. We disagree with the Government and affirm the district court in full. The district court had jurisdiction to hear Suri’s habeas petition, and no provision within the immigration code deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction. 3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1560 Doc: 133 Filed: 07/23/2026 Pg: 4 of 86 I. Background A. Dr. Suri & His Arrest by ICE Dr. Badar Khan Suri is an Indian national. He earned a Ph.D. in Peace and Conflict Studies at Jamia Millia Islamia, a university in New Delhi. After Suri completed his Ph.D., he applied for and received a postdoctoral fellowship at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. In 2022, Suri arrived in the United States on a J-1 exchange visa 1 to begin the fellowship. At Georgetown, Suri taught a course on Majoritarianism and Minority Rights in South Asia. His wife, Mapheze Saleh, and his three children arrived in the United States soon after he began his fellowship. His children were admitted to the United States on derivative J-2 visas and thus are dependent on their father’s status to enter and remain in the country. At the time of Suri’s arrest, he and his family resided in Rosslyn, Virginia. Saleh is a United States citizen of Palestinian descent; her father and some of her family still live in Gaza. During the war in Gaza, Saleh lost several family members and friends and often publicly voiced her opposition to the war on social media. On “a handful of occasions,” Suri also made social media posts “expressing support for the Palestinian 1 Suri was participating in the J-1 exchange visitor program as a “research scholar,” which is “a foreign national whose primary purpose is conducting research, observing, or consulting in connection with a research project at research institutions, corporate research facilities, museums, libraries, post-secondary accredited academic institutions, or similar types of institutions. 22 C.F.R. § 62.4(f). “A research scholar may also teach or lecture where authorized by the sponsor.” Id. 4 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1560 Doc: 133 Filed: 07/23/2026 Pg: 5 of 86 people, criticizing the death toll in Gaza, affirming international law principles, and criticizing U.S. support for Israel’s war in Gaza.” J.A. 105. 2 In early March 2025, the United States Department of State announced a new program called “Catch and Revoke,” where it would use artificial intelligence to review “tens of thousands of student visa holders’ social media accounts” for evidence of “alleged terrorist sympathies.” J.A. 110. The goal was to “cancel the visas of foreign nationals who appear to support Hamas or other designated terror groups.” Id. Once identified, Secretary of State Marco Rubio would issue a determination, finding that the noncitizen’s presence in the United States compromises American foreign policy interests. The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would then work to locate, apprehend, detain, and, ultimately, seek to deport these individuals. The government proceeded to put its program into action, detaining students and scholars like Mahmoud Khalil, Rümeysa Öztürk, and others on the stated basis of their political speech and associations. See Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors v. Rubio, 802 F. Supp. 3d 120 (D. Mass. 2025). Suri became one of the government’s first targets under this program. DHS Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Tricia McLaughlin announced on the social media platform X, that: Suri was a foreign exchange student at Georgetown University actively spreading Hamas propaganda and promoting antisemitism on social media. Suri has close connections to a known or suspected terrorist, who is a senior advisor to Hamas. The Secretary of State issued a determination on March 15, 2025 that Suri’s activities and presence in the United States rendered him 2 Citations to “J.A.” refer to the joint appendix filed by the parties. The J.A. contains the record on appeal from the district court. Page numbers refer to the “J.A. #” pagination. 5 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1560 Doc: 133 Filed: 07/23/2026 Pg: 6 of 86 deportable under INA [Immigration and Nationality Act] section 237(a)(4)(C)(i). J.A. 302–03. 3 DHS then made a custody determination that Suri would be detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides that a noncitizen “may be . . . detained pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); J.A. 84. On March 17, 2025, at approximately 9:30 p.m., 4 Suri was returning home after teaching and observing iftar, the evening meal that ends the daily Ramadan fast. He noticed several black, unmarked cars near his apartment building. Before he could enter his apartment building, a man wearing a face covering and dark clothing approached him and asked if he was Badar. He responded that he was. Suri then called his wife to come downstairs. The masked officers told Suri and his wife that they were from DHS; that Suri’s “student visa” had been revoked; and that he was being arrested because of his 3 McLaughin mistakenly wrote that Suri was a foreign exchange student, as he was a J-1 research scholar. And the Government has yet to disclose Rubio’s March 15 determination memorandum on the record in this case. That said, the court takes judicial notice that this memo appears to have been disclosed as part of litigation in the District of Massachusetts, and it states that Suri was designated removable as a foreign policy threat solely based on what Secretary Rubio determined to be his “direct connection to Hamas leadership,” his “involvement in antisemitic activities” on campus, and his “actively spread[ing] [Hamas] propaganda and promot[ing] antisemitism on social media.” Certified Administrative Record, Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors v. Rubio, No. 25-cv-10685-WGY (D. Mass. Jan. 22, 2026), ECF No. 315 at 56–57. Unless otherwise specified, all references to time are in Eastern Daylight Time 4 (“EDT”). 6 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1560 Doc: 133 Filed: 07/23/2026 Pg: 7 of 86 “social media.” J.A. 113–14. Suri clarified that he had a J-1 exchange visa, but the officer told him that “it was the same thing, and that it was also revoked.” J.A. 114. Suri was then escorted into the dark-colored SUV. During the transport, officers informed him that “someone high up in the Secretary of State’s office doesn’t want you here,” and that he would be deported “today.” J.A. 135. B. Movement Between States and Detention Centers Over the first 11 hours after Suri’s arrest, he was moved to three different detention centers. Suri was first taken directly to ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”) Washington Field Office in Chantilly, Virginia. At the ICE field office in Chantilly, officers presented Suri with his notice to appear (“NTA”). 5 The NTA listed “1209 Sunflower Ln, Alvarado, Texas 760092810” as his current residence—an address Suri had neither lived at nor been to. That address turned out to be the address of the Prairieland Detention Center in Texas. Suri asked about the incorrect Texas address, and an officer explained to him that it “was just computer generated, and it might be changed later on.” J.A. 135. The NTA also listed a hearing date for May 6, 2025, before an immigration judge at “27991 Buena Vista Blvd, Los Fresnos, Texas 78566, Prairieland Detention Center.” However, that address is not the Prairieland Detention Center but the Port Isabel Detention Center, which is approximately 500 miles away from the Prairieland 5 The NTA was issued around 9:47 p.m. on March 17, 2025—while Suri was still in Chantilly, Virginia. Suri v. Trump (Suri II), 785 F. Supp. 3d 128, 135 (E.D. Va. 2025). 7 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1560 Doc: 133 Filed: 07/23/2026 Pg: 8 of 86 Detention Center. Soon after, Suri was told that he would be transferred to Farmville, Virgina. He was allowed to call Saleh to inform her that he was being taken to Farmville, and that he had an immigration hearing in Texas on May 6, 2025. The next day, March 18, at approximately 2:30 a.m., Suri arrived at the Farmville Detention Center. After only a few hours in Farmville, he was transferred again, this time to Richmond, Virginia. Suri reached the ERO Washington Office near Richmond, Virginia at 7:50 a.m. The officers did not allow him to call his wife to inform her of his new location. They also did not explain the reason for his transfer. Suri’s stay in Richmond, however, was brief. Suri was removed from his cell in Richmond, shackled, put in a van, and driven away. When he asked an officer where they were going, the officer replied that he was not supposed to tell. After about an hour, Suri arrived at an airport and was put onto an airplane, along with several other shackled detainees. The airplane departed for Louisiana at 2:47 p.m. On March 18 at 5:03 p.m., Suri arrived in Alexandria, Louisiana. At 6:42 p.m., he was booked into the Alexandria Staging Facility—a “super deportation center” where he could be “deported at any time.” Suri was detained in Louisiana for three nights. After his first transfer from Chantilly to Farmville, Suri was unable to contact his wife or anyone else regarding his rapid transfers across state lines. On March 20, Suri was told that he would be transferred to New York the next day, presumably to be deported. But on the morning of March 21, Suri was told that he instead would be driven to Texas. That evening at approximately 7:30 p.m., Suri arrived at the 8 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1560 Doc: 133 Filed: 07/23/2026 Pg: 9 of 86 Prairieland Detention Center. It would be Suri’s longest stop, as he was held there until his release on May 14, 2025. C. Suri’s Representation & Habeas Petition On the evening Suri was arrested by ICE officers, Saleh’s friend, Ashraf Nubani, notified attorney Hassan Ahmad of what had occurred. The next morning, Ahmad formally agreed to represent Suri. Ahmad discussed the details of Suri’s arrest and detention with Saleh. She believed that Suri was being held in the Farmville Detention Center, since that was the last thing Suri shared with her about his location. On March 18 at 2:11 p.m., Ahmad entered his appearance in Suri’s immigration proceedings, which allowed him to view Suri’s NTA. Although the NTA listed a Texas address as Suri’s current residence, Ahmad did not rely on it (as Suri had never lived there) and continued to believe Suri was detained in Virginia, based on Saleh’s information. Ahmad, working with other counsel, immediately began drafting a habeas petition. The team repeatedly checked the ICE online detainee locator, but Suri did not appear in the system. Unbeknownst to Ahmad, on the afternoon of March 18, Suri was in Richmond but en route to board a flight to Alexandria, Louisiana. At 5:59 p.m.—after Suri had landed in Alexandria, Louisiana, but before he was booked into the Alexandria detention facility— his habeas petition was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Suri’s petition claimed that Secretary Rubio’s determination and Suri’s “targeting, arrest, transfer, and ongoing detention” violated the First Amendment and his Fifth Amendment right to due process. J.A. 21–24. As to his detention specifically, Suri alleged 9 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1560 Doc: 133 Filed: 07/23/2026 Pg: 10 of 86 that he was detained “not to facilitate deportation, or to protect against risk of flight or dangerousness,” but instead solely to retaliate against him for his speech. J.A. 23. And his detention, he further alleged, was an “attempt to chill” his future speech and that of others “who express support for Palestinian rights.” J.A. 22. Suri requested that the district court, inter alia, enjoin his transfer to another jurisdiction, order his immediate release, and “[d]eclare that [the Government’s] actions to arrest and detain [him] violate the First Amendment and Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” J.A. 25. Moreover, in an amended petition filed after he was detained for multiple weeks, Suri claimed that he was being held in “degrading and harmful conditions” in which he was “forced to sleep on the floor of an overcrowded TV room, deprived of all but a few hours of sleep,” “denied clean undergarments and adequate nutrition,” and “subjected, with no valid basis whatsoever, to more severe restrictions and treatment than other detained individuals despite posing no danger to others.” J.A. 125–26. On March 19, two days after Suri was taken and moved without explanation through four detention centers, his name finally appeared in ICE’s online detainee locator. It showed that he was being held at the Alexandria Staging Facility in Louisiana. Suri’s counsel then filed a motion requesting the district court to direct the Government to return him to the Eastern District of Virginia and to bar Suri’s removal from the United States while his petition was pending. 10 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1560 Doc: 133 Filed: 07/23/2026 Pg: 11 of 86 II. Procedural History On March 20—the same day the Government notified Suri that he would be transferred to New York for deportation and the same day Suri’s counsel filed the motion to bar his removal—the district court entered an order prohibiting the Government from removing Suri from the United States “unless and until the [c]ourt issues a contrary order.” Suri v. Trump (Suri I), 2025 WL 914757, at *1 (E.D. Va. Mar. 20, 2025). The district court issued its order pursuant to its authority to preserve its jurisdiction under the All Writs Act (“AWA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1651. Id. The Government moved to dismiss Suri’s habeas petition, or in the alternative, to transfer venue. The district court issued an opinion and order denying the Government’s motion. See Suri v. Trump (Suri II), 785 F. Supp. 3d 128, 133–49 (E.D. Va. 2025). The district court explained that although habeas jurisdiction is usually conferred where a petition is filed in the district of confinement and the respondent has custody over the petitioner, there are well-recognized exceptions. See Suri II, 785 F. Supp. 3d at 137–38. It found that the circumstances here fit within two exceptions to the default habeas jurisdiction rules: the unknown custodian exception, and the exception borne out of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). See id. at 140–48. The district court found that the unknown custodian exception applied because Suri was “held in an undisclosed location by an unknown custodian.” Id. at 141 (quoting Padilla, 542 U.S. at 450 n.18). It stated that no “diligent attorney could have known that 11 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1560 Doc: 133 Filed: 07/23/2026 Pg: 12 of 86 [Suri] was in Louisiana at the time he filed the petition.” Id. at 142. The district court noted that Suri’s NTA did not reference Louisiana, the ICE online detainee locator had no information on him, and Suri was not permitted to contact his wife until the evening of March 19, after his petition was already filed. See id. at 142, 144. Further, “even if it were possible for [Suri’s] counsel to have discovered he was in Louisiana at 5:59 p.m., [his] counsel would not have known who to identify as [Suri’s] immediate custodian.” Id. at 142. Suri was not booked at the Alexandria Staging Facility until 6:42 p.m.—“almost an hour after the petition was filed.” Id. The district court specifically noted that even the Government could not identify Suri’s immediate custodian. Id. The district court also found that the exception borne out of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Padilla applied. Id. at 144–48. Justice Kennedy wrote that there should be an exception “if there is an indication that the Government’s purpose in removing a prisoner were to make it difficult for his lawyer to know where the habeas petition should be filed” or “if the Government did inform the lawyer where a prisoner was being taken but kept moving him so filing could not catch up to the prisoner.” Id. at 144–45 (citing Padilla, 542 U.S. at 454 (Kennedy, J. concurring)). “In these situations, Justice Kennedy believed that ‘habeas jurisdiction would lie in the district or districts from which [the petitioner] had been removed.’ ” Id. at 145 (quoting Padilla, 542 U.S. at 454 (Kennedy, J. concurring)). The district court found that the Government’s NTA was “design[ed] to forum shop and spirit [Suri] away from this [d]istrict before his counsel could file a petition,” as the Government was “fully aware that listing [Suri’s] current residence . . . would determine which immigration court would have jurisdiction over his 12 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1560 Doc: 133 Filed: 07/23/2026 Pg: 13 of 86 proceedings.” Id. at 146. And the Government’s “myriad contradictory explanations combined with the inability for [Suri’s] exceptionally diligent counsel to keep up with [Suri’s] abnormal and rapid movement across state lines demands more flexible jurisdictional rules.” Id. at 148. Lastly, the district court declined to exercise its discretion to transfer Suri’s petition to Louisiana or Texas. Id. It stated that doing so would ratify the Government’s “attempt at forum shopping,” and would force Suri to litigate his case “many states away from his lawyers and family,” which would “meaningfully deprive him of their ability to aid in his representation for the duration of these habeas proceedings.” Id. Suri’s counsel filed a motion for release on bail. The district court held a bail hearing and subsequently ordered for Suri “to be immediately released.” Suri v. Trump (Suri III), 2025 WL 1392143, at *1 (E.D. Va. May 14, 2025). The district court conditioned his release, expressly requiring Suri to “participate in his removal proceedings.” Id. The Government appealed the district court’s order not to remove Suri and the bail release order. It also petitioned for a stay of the release order pending appeal and for mandamus. 6 6 While not relevant to the Government’s appeal here, it requested this court to issue a writ of mandamus “because the district court’s order amounts to judicial usurpation of the Executive’s exclusive statutory powers and preeminent constitutional powers over immigration.” Suri v. Trump (Suri IV), 2025 WL 1806692, at *9 (4th Cir. July 1, 2025). This court denied the request, as the Government’s “only substantive argument is that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Suri’s habeas petition,” and it already concluded that “the district court did possess habeas jurisdiction.” Id. 13 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1560 Doc: 133 Filed: 07/23/2026 Pg: 14 of 86 This court issued an opinion denying the Government’s requests for stay and mandamus. See Suri v. Trump (Suri IV), 2025 WL 1806692, at *1 (4th Cir. July 1, 2025). The court held that “the equities lie firmly in Suri’s favor,” as it agreed with the district court that “the unknown-custodian exception squarely applies.” Id. at *4, *6; see also id. at *6 n.6 (adopting Justice Kennedy’s reasoning from his Padilla concurrence as an alternative basis for holding that the district court had habeas jurisdiction). The court also held that the Government’s argument that certain provisions of the immigration code deprived the district court of jurisdiction over Suri’s habeas petition were unlikely to succeed. See id. at *7. The Government now appeals, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter its order to bar removal and its order granting release on bail. Appellant’s Br. (ECF No. 36) at 10 7 (hereinafter “Opening Br.”). The Government raises four main arguments. First, it asserts that Suri failed to satisfy the default habeas requirements of naming an immediate custodian and filing his petition in the district of confinement. Id. at 8. It further doubts whether any exception to the normal habeas rules exists. Id. at 8–9. Second, the Government argues that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to transfer Suri’s habeas petition to Texas or Louisiana. Id. at 37–41. Third, even if the district court had habeas jurisdiction, the Government believes three provisions of the INA stripped the district court of authority to address Suri’s claims regarding his detention. Those 7 Page numbers for citations to ECF documents utilize the page numbers in the red header on each document. 14 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1560 Doc: 133 Filed: 07/23/2026 Pg: 15 of 86 provisions, the Government says, preclude district court review of the Executive’s authority to initiate removal proceedings, and that decision is inextricably intertwined with the decision to detain. Id. at 9; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(5), (b)(9), (g). Finally, the Government contends that the district court erred in invoking the AWA because it “was not at risk of losing jurisdiction (assuming it had any to begin with).” Opening Br. at 9–10. As discussed below, we hold that none of these arguments withstand scrutiny. We address each in turn. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). III. Analysis This case is one of several that have arisen over the past year and a half presenting the same basic fact pattern: A student or scholar, in the United States on a valid student or exchange visa, is detained by DHS on the stated basis of his or her political speech, beliefs, or associations; shuttled across jurisdictions rapidly and often in secret; and detained for allegedly unconstitutional reasons and under allegedly unconstitutional conditions pending removal. And in each case, the Government insists that judicial review of the allegedly unconstitutional detention can come only after removal proceedings that can last for months or years. Until then, according to the Government, a detained noncitizen has no judicial recourse. We disagree. For the reasons explained below, Congress’ habeas jurisdiction statutes and Supreme Court case law permitted Suri to file a habeas petition in the district from which he was removed. And no provision of the INA deprived the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Suri’s challenges to his allegedly unconstitutional 15 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1560 Doc: 133 Filed: 07/23/2026 Pg: 16 of 86 detention. Our holding today aligns with this court’s ruling on the Government’s stay motion, see Suri IV, 2025 WL 1806692, as well as the Second Circuit’s rulings on stay motions in two similar cases, see Öztürk v. Hyde, 136 F.4th 382 (2d Cir. 2025); Mahdawi v. Trump, 136 F.4th 443 (2d Cir. 2025). We recognize that it diverges from the Third Circuit’s determination in Khalil v. President, United States, 164 F.4th 259 (3d Cir. 2026). But in our view, denying judicial review of detention claims like Suri’s misreads Congress’ statutes and undermines the protections guaranteed all persons on American soil by the writ of habeas corpus. See Lochnar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 324 (1996) (identifying writ of habeas corpus as the Constitution’s “best and only sufficient defen[s]e of personal freedom” (internal quotation marks omitted)). A. Habeas Jurisdiction 8 We review “the district court’s factual findings with respect to jurisdiction for clear error and the legal conclusion that flows therefrom de novo.” Velasco v. Gov’t of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2004). 1. The Default Habeas Rules For centuries, the writ of habeas corpus has been understood as a vital instrument to secure “freedom from unlawful restraint as a fundamental precept of liberty.” Boumediene 8 The questions before us dually concern whether the district court had personal and subject-matter jurisdiction over Suri’s habeas petition. See Kanai v. McHugh, 638 F.3d 251, 258 (4th Cir. 2011) (recognizing habeas jurisdiction as a matter of personal or venue jurisdiction); see also Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (AADC), 525 U.S. 471, 482, 492 (1999) (describing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) as a “narrow” jurisdictional bar that may deprive a federal court of jurisdiction over a respondent’s claims). Because there is (Continued) 16 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1560 Doc: 133 Filed: 07/23/2026 Pg: 17 of 86 v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739 (2008). The writ’s protections are at their peak where a petition challenges “ ‘the legality of Executive detention,’ ” rather than incarceration following criminal conviction. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 474 (2004) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001), superseded by statute as recognized in Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 580–81 (2020)). And “[t]he very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected.” Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 291 (1969). 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) provides district courts with the authority to grant writs of habeas corpus “within their respective jurisdictions.” In Rumsfeld v. Padilla, the Supreme Court explained the contours of habeas jurisdiction. 542 U.S. 426, 434–36 (2004). Generally, a habeas petition seeking to challenge present physical custody should be filed “in the district of confinement” and “the proper respondent to a habeas petition is ‘the person who has custody over [the petitioner].’ ” Id. at 434, 447 (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2242). Petitioners are generally required to name “some person who has the immediate custody of the party detained” 9 rather than “the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory official.” Id. at 435. When applying these rules, we generally look to where the petitioner no mandatory “sequencing of jurisdictional issues,” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999), we begin with whether the district court had habeas jurisdiction. 9 The Supreme Court has described an immediate custodian as a person that has “the ability to produce the prisoner’s body before the habeas court.” Padilla, 542 U.S. at 435; see also Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885). 17 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1560 Doc: 133 Filed: 07/23/2026 Pg: 18 of 86 was confined when their petition was filed. See United States v. Little, 392 F.3d 671, 680 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that because petitioner was confined in Texas when his petition was filed, the Western District of North Carolina was an improper venue). Even where these default habeas rules appear to be unsatisfied, those rules are not absolute. Two exceptions to the default habeas rules apply in this case: the unknown custodian exception and the exception borne out of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Padilla. 542 U.S. at 454 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Below, we discuss and apply each in turn. 2. The Unknown Custodian Exception 10 When a detainee is held in a secret location, their attorneys “cannot be expected to file in the jurisdiction where [they are] held” as it “is impracticable to require the attorneys to file in every jurisdiction.” Demjanjuk v. Meese, 784 F.2d 1114, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J., in chambers) (allowing suspected war criminal held in confidential location to file a habeas petition in the D.C. Circuit). Thus, “it is essential that [the] petitioner not be denied the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus” because they are in an unidentifiable location. Id. The Government wrongly asserts that this “so-called unknown custodian exception” in Demjanjuk was “never actually recognized by the Supreme Court.” Opening Br. at 25. The Supreme Court in Padilla expressly recognized the unknown custodian exception, 10 While the exception is commonly known as the “unknown custodian exception,” it also encompasses the exception to the default “district of confinement” rule. See Suri IV, 2025 WL 1806692, at *4. 18 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1560 Doc: 133 Filed: 07/23/2026 Pg: 19 of 86 stating that when “a prisoner is held in an undisclosed location by an unknown custodian, it is impossible to apply the immediate custodian and district of confinement rules.” 542 U.S. at 45 n.18. It seems the Supreme Court took the exception as a given, explaining that there, the “identity of the immediate custodian” was not “shrouded . . . in secrecy.” Id. at 449 n.17. Additionally, this court has previously applied the unknown custodian exception in United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 465 (4th Cir. 2004). There, the court held that because the petitioner’s immediate custodian was unknown, it was proper to name “Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld” as the ultimate custodian. Id. at 465. The Government ignores Moussaoui—binding circuit precedent—underscoring the weakness of its position. We refuse to indulge the Government’s invitation to disregard both the Supreme Court’s express recognition of the unknown custodian exception and our precedent applying it. It is firmly established, and “[t]his case is a prime example for why the unknown-custodian exception exists.” Suri IV, 2025 WL 1806692, at *5.