Grant County v. R. P. S.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Wisconsin
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket2026AP001796
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
November 19, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.
Appeal No. 2026AP1796 Cir. Ct. No. 2003ME181
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL COMMITMENT OF R.P.S.:
GRANT COUNTY,
PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,
V.
R.P.S.,
RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Grant County: LISA A.
RINIKER, Judge. Reversed.
No. 2026AP1796
¶1 KLOPPENBURG, J.1 R.P.S. appeals orders extending his
commitment under WIS. STAT. ch. 51 and authorizing his involuntary treatment.
R.P.S. argues that Grant County did not meet its evidentiary burden to show that
he is dangerous, as that term is used in WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2. Because the
County did not adduce evidence showing that R.P.S. is dangerous, I reverse.
BACKGROUND
¶2 R.P.S. was initially committed in this case in December 2003, and
his commitment has been extended ever since. This appeal is from proceedings
that commenced in January 2026, when the County filed a petition for extension
along with a report from a psychiatrist. The report opined that R.P.S. is dangerous
under the standard established by WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.d. This standard is
met where, due to mental illness, a person is “unable to satisfy basic needs for
nourishment, medical care, shelter or safety without prompt and adequate
treatment so that a substantial probability exists that death, serious physical injury,
serious physical debilitation, or serious physical disease will imminently ensue
unless the individual receives prompt and adequate treatment for this mental
illness.” Here, the report asserted that R.P.S. would become a proper subject for
commitment under this standard if treatment were withdrawn.
¶3 At the hearing on its petition, the County called the psychiatrist as its
sole witness and introduced her report as its sole exhibit. Between the testimony
and the report, the County introduced evidence that R.P.S. has been committed
1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(d) (2023-24).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
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No. 2026AP1796
and psychiatrically hospitalized on many occasions from the 1970s to the present,
that he has schizoaffective disorder, and that this condition is treatable.
¶4 Regarding dangerousness, the report noted that R.P.S. has been
continuously treated “for the past number of years, and has had no episodes of
dangerousness during this time.” However, the report also stated that R.P.S. does
not believe he has a mental illness and that it “seems clear” that he would stop
taking his medications if not committed. According to the report, R.P.S.
“[s]topping his medications could lead to psychiatric decompensation, and
psychiatric decompensation has been associated in the past with dangerous
behavior.”2 The report explained more specifically that the
link between psychiatric decompensation and
dangerousness in the recent past is difficult to establish. It
is clear that years ago, psychiatric decompensation led to
police contacts, involuntary commitment and
hospitalization. If forced to choose, my opinion now is that
treatment withdrawal is more likely than not to lead to
some type of dangerousness, but uncertainty remains in my
mind about exactly what that dangerousness would be and
when it would occur.
¶5 In addition to referring to the “police contacts, involuntary
commitment and hospitalization” from “years ago,” the report made the following
assertions about behavior by R.P.S. that could be regarded as dangerous: that he
had a suicide attempt at some unspecified time in the past; and that he had “a
history of aggression” including allegations that he had threatened a County
employee in 2020 and, again at some unspecified “remote” time, had “stalk[ed]” a
2
In psychology, “decompensation” means “a breakdown in an individual’s defense
mechanisms, resulting in progressive loss of normal functioning or worsening of psychiatric
symptoms.” Decompensation, APA DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY, https://dictionary.apa.org/
decompensation (last visited Nov. 13, 2026).
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No. 2026AP1796
social services worker, “apparently driving near the staff member’s house.” The
report also noted that R.P.S. sometimes has “verbal outbursts,” though he has had
“no episodes whatsoever of physically dangerous or self-harming behavior” for
some years. The report noted that R.P.S. currently lives alone with a dog and has
occasional contact with his children and grandchildren.
¶6 At the hearing, asked to explain “in layman’s terms” why she
believed R.P.S. satisfied the WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.d. standard, the psychiatrist
testified that R.P.S. receives “a lot of services” from the County in addition to
medication, and that if he did not receive such services—if the County did not
have staff communicating with and “looking in on” him—“there would be more
concern about his … well-being….” The County asked if the psychiatrist agreed
that “it’s a closer case as far as whether he should be off the commitment than
others. The fear, though, would be that he would likely then run into some
problems if he were not on the medication, and he stated he won’t take the
medication because of all the side effects?” The psychiatrist agreed. R.P.S. also
testified.
¶7 At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court stated that it was
clear that R.P.S. has a mental illness and is treatable, and that “[t]he problem here
is dangerousness.” The court concluded:
This is not a black and white case, but the evidence that I
have in front of me is from a doctor who recognizes that
there is not an overt act that would indicate [R.P.S.] is
dangerous, yet she still checks the box which would
indicate that he is a proper subject for commitment. There
is no other doctor’s testimony or evaluation to rely upon
that would not be consistent with [the psychiatrist’s]
opinion.
….
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No. 2026AP1796
So I’m going to rely upon her report. I will continue the
commitment for another year, and then see if [the
psychiatrist] has a different opinion in a year or some other
doctor might that I guess I can hang my hat on. So I’ll
continue it for another year with the involuntary medication
order as well.
¶8 R.P.S. appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. General principles and standard of review
¶9 As with an initial commitment order, to secure an order
recommitting a person under WIS. STAT. ch. 51, a petitioner must demonstrate that
the person meets three criteria. First, the person must be mentally ill. WIS. STAT.
§ 51.20(1)(a)1. Second, the person’s condition must be treatable. § 51.20(1)(a)1.
Third, the person must be dangerous. § 51.20(1)(a)2.; Langlade County v.
D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶31, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277. A person is
“dangerous” under ch. 51 if the person meets one or more of the five statutory
standards laid out in § 51.20(1)(a)2.a.-e.
¶10 As noted, in this case the County sought to prove R.P.S. dangerous
under the fourth statutory standard, WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.d. A person is
dangerous under this standard if, due to mental illness, the person is “unable to
satisfy basic needs for nourishment, medical care, shelter or safety” unless
promptly and adequately treated, and this inability creates “a substantial
probability … that death, serious physical injury, serious physical debilitation, or
serious physical disease will imminently ensue” without prompt and adequate
treatment. Because this proceeding concerns the extension of an existing
commitment, the County was not obligated to prove this standard by “recent acts
or omissions,” but could instead show a “substantial likelihood, based on
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No. 2026AP1796
[R.P.S.’s] treatment record, that [R.P.S.] would be a proper subject for
commitment if treatment were withdrawn.” § 51.20(1)(am).
¶11 “Substantial likelihood” in this context means the petitioner must
show that the outcome is “much more likely than not.” Marathon County v. D.K.,
2020 WI 8, ¶¶35, 61, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901 (R. Bradley, J.,
concurring). The petitioner must make this showing by “clear and convincing
evidence.” WIS. STAT. § 51.20(13)(e).
¶12 In a WIS. STAT. ch. 51 proceeding, “[a] determination of
dangerousness is not a factual determination, but a legal one based on underlying
facts.” D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶47. Accordingly, appellate courts review a
ch. 51 commitment using a mixed standard, upholding the circuit court’s factual
findings unless they are clearly erroneous, but independently deciding whether
those facts satisfy the legal standard. Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57,
¶15, 375 Wis. 2d 542, 895 N.W.2d 783.
II. The evidence that R.P.S. is dangerous was insufficient.
¶13 The issue on appeal is whether the circuit court had before it
evidence tending to show a substantial probability that, if treatment were
withdrawn, R.P.S. would become “unable to satisfy basic needs for nourishment,
medical care, shelter or safety” and that this would in turn create a substantial
likelihood of imminent death or serious physical harm.
¶14 R.P.S. argues that the psychiatrist’s ambivalent opinions about
dangerousness mean that the County did not carry its burden. As noted, her report
stated that it was “difficult to establish” a link between decompensation and
dangerousness for R.P.S. because his dangerous behavior had occurred years
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No. 2026AP1796
prior; offered an opinion on dangerousness only “[i]f [the psychiatrist was] forced
to choose”; and described dangerousness as “more likely than not” to occur, rather
than “much more likely than not” as the standard requires. D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50,
¶¶35, 61 (R. Bradley, J., concurring). But the circuit court, as factfinder, is not
bound by an expert’s opinion. Hughes v. Hughes, 223 Wis. 2d 111, 128, 588
N.W.2d 346 (Ct. App. 1998). Accordingly, even if an expert through a report or
testimony arguably opines that a person’s likelihood of dangerousness is lower
than what WIS. STAT. § ch. 51 requires for commitment, this opinion does not
prevent a circuit court from reaching an independent conclusion that the likelihood
is higher.
¶15 However, such an independent conclusion would have to be justified
by the available evidence. Moreover, this evidence would have to justify not
merely a conclusion that a person is “dangerous” in a general or colloquial sense,
but in accord with one or more of the five definitions provided by WIS. STAT.
§ 51.20(1)(a)2. (as modified, or not, by the § 51.20(1)(am) mode of proof).
D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶¶30-34.
¶16 The County contends that it presented such evidence here. It argues
that it submitted proof in a form typical for recommitment cases: first, a showing
of particular dangerous behaviors linked to a person’s mental condition in the past;
second, a showing that the person’s treatment under commitment is what has
prevented or ameliorated the recurrence of such behavior; and third, a showing
that absent commitment, the person is unlikely to continue treatment.
¶17 The County adduced evidence for the last two of these three
propositions: that R.P.S. has a “documented history of decompensation upon loss
of treatment”; and that R.P.S. will not continue to take psychiatric medication if he
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No. 2026AP1796
is not under a commitment order. From these two findings, a factfinder could
reasonably conclude that R.P.S. faces a substantial likelihood of decompensation
in the absence of commitment.
¶18 The failure of evidence relates to the first step in the logical chain
described above: evidence about prior dangerous behaviors by R.P.S. tied to his
mental condition. Such evidence is necessary because the statutes permit
commitment only upon a finding of dangerousness, not decompensation. That is,
it is not enough to show that the end of R.P.S.’s commitment would likely lead to
his decompensation; the County also had to show that this predicted
decompensation would likely bring about one (or more) of the five forms of
dangerousness established in the statute. See Trempealeau County v. S.K.,
No. 2025AP645, unpublished slip op., ¶¶15-16 (WI App Nov. 4, 2025) (evidence
insufficient for commitment where subject was likely to decompensate but no
showing of what dangerousness might result); Clark County v. R.D.S.,
No. 2022AP229, unpublished slip op., ¶14 (WI App Aug. 18, 2022) (petitioner
obligated to adduce evidence as to “whether, and how” decompensation would
create risk to self or others). The necessary link from decompensation to
dangerousness is evidence that the person, when untreated, has a history of
dangerous behavior. Outagamie County v. C.J.A., 2022 WI App 36, ¶17, 404
Wis. 2d 1, 978 N.W.2d 493
¶19 In support of its contention that a likelihood of R.P.S.’s
decompensation would create a likelihood of dangerousness, the County cites one
statement each from the psychiatrist’s testimony and her report: that
decompensation “has been associated in the past with dangerous behavior”; and
that “treatment withdrawal is more likely than not to lead to some type of
dangerousness.”
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No. 2026AP1796
¶20 These opinions, expressed by the psychiatrist, are insufficient to
show that R.P.S. is dangerous under any of the five statutory standards, including
that of WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.d. One of the ways WIS. STAT. ch. 51 guards
against the unjustified deprivation of a person’s liberty is that it does not permit
commitment based on a vague or amorphous conclusion that a person is
“dangerous.” Winnebago County v. S.H., 2020 WI App 46, ¶17, 393 Wis. 2d
511, 947 N.W.2d 761 (“conclusory opinions parroting the statutory language
without actually discussing dangerousness [] are insufficient to prove
dangerousness in an extension hearing”). The evidence must meet one of the five
standards.
¶21 What is missing from this case is any evidence that R.P.S. is likely
to be dangerous in the manner specified by WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.d.: that he is
likely to be “unable to satisfy basic needs for nourishment, medical care, shelter or
safety” and that this, in turn, creates a substantial probability of death or serious
injury, debilitation or disease. As noted, in a recommitment case, this type of
showing is generally made by presenting evidence that the person has, in the past,
demonstrated such an inability to provide for basic needs. See S.H., 393 Wis. 2d
511, ¶13 and n.6 (“Dangerousness in an extension proceeding can and often must
be based on the individual’s precommitment behavior, coupled with an expert’s
informed opinions and predictions ….”). For example, in Sauk County v. S.A.M.,
2022 WI 46, 402 Wis. 2d 379, 975 N.W.2d 162 (on which the County relies), our
supreme court upheld a commitment based on a different statutory standard of
dangerousness: that of § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. That standard requires a showing that,
due to impaired judgment, the person has a “substantial probability of physical
impairment or injury to one’s self or others.” S.A.M., 402 Wis. 2d 379, ¶4. The
supreme court observed that S.A.M., before his commitment, had been homeless,
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No. 2026AP1796
displayed signs of malnourishment, and suffered from trench foot due to a failure
to change shoes for long periods of time. Id., ¶7. When combined with evidence
that S.A.M. would not continue treatment absent commitment, the court found that
this was a sufficient showing of dangerousness under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. S.A.M.,
402 Wis. 2d 379, ¶34.
¶22 Despite the County’s reliance on S.A.M., it makes no argument that
it presented the circuit court here with evidence analogous to the evidence in that
case: evidence that R.P.S. has a history, due to mental illness, of an inability to
provide for his own “nourishment, medical care, shelter or safety.” There was no
evidence presented that R.P.S. has ever had difficulty feeding himself, obtaining
medical care, or maintaining shelter. Regarding the final listed item, “safety,”
although the County does not mention it in its brief, there was a statement in the
psychiatrist’s report that R.P.S. had, at some time in the past, attempted suicide.
Although intentional harm to oneself is more directly addressed in another of the
statutory dangerousness definitions, WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a., such history
might arguably also evidence a risk to a person’s “safety” as that term is used in
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.d. But even allowing for this interpretation, a bare reference to a
past suicide attempt is insufficient to carry the burden in a WIS. STAT. ch. 51 case.
In this case, neither the report nor the testimony gave any further information
about this alleged attempt, including, importantly, when it is said to have occurred.
Given that R.P.S. has been committed multiple times beginning in the 1970s, this
incident may have occurred 50 years ago or more. The total absence of
information about this alleged event renders it “old enough, weak enough, [and]
otherwise insufficient” to sustain a commitment under any dangerousness
standard. See S.H., 393 Wis. 2d 511, ¶13 n.6.
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No. 2026AP1796
¶23 The County argues that the psychiatrist’s “inability to specify the
exact form or timing of the harm is not a defect in the proof.” It cites a statement
from S.H. that “neither the statute nor the applicable case law requires an expert or
circuit court to speculate on the precise course of an individual’s impending
decompensation by identifying specific future dangerous acts or omissions the
individual might theoretically undertake without treatment.” Id., ¶13. This is true,
but in the same paragraph, S.H. also says that “a medical expert in a WIS. STAT.
ch. 51 proceeding must ‘link’ [the expert’s] testimony ‘back to the standards in the
statute,’ such that the expert’s misstatement of that standard, or the lack of any
evidence supporting a legal conclusion, will render the testimony insufficient.” Id.
(quoted source omitted); see also C.J.A., 404 Wis. 2d 1, ¶17 (Wisconsin statutes
protect constitutional right to freedom from unjustified commitment by “narrowly
assess[ing] current dangerousness based on recent acts or specific instances of past
dangerous behavior”).
¶24 The problem in this case is not that the psychiatrist could not specify
precisely when R.P.S. might behave dangerously, or exactly what form that
behavior might take. Rather, the problem is that the County presented no evidence
by the psychiatrist or another witness about R.P.S.’s prior conduct in sufficient
detail from which the circuit court could reasonably find that it is much more
likely than not that R.P.S. is currently dangerous. Here, the psychiatrist—who
was the only witness the County presented—did not give any evidence, in her
report or her testimony, that would support the legal conclusion that R.P.S. is
dangerous under the applicable statutory standard, WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.d. If
the psychiatrist here was unable to provide such evidence in admissible form,
evidence from other sources—family members, County social services workers,
law enforcement officers, or anyone with sufficient knowledge—might have
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No. 2026AP1796
provided concrete examples of R.P.S.’s prior conduct that would have
underpinned a finding of dangerousness under the statute. In the absence of such
evidence, I am obligated to reverse R.P.S.’s commitment.
CONCLUSION
¶25 The orders extending R.P.S.’s commitment and ordering his
involuntary medication are reversed.
By the Court.—Orders reversed.
This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.
12