Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON In the Matter of the Detention of No. 88451-4-I V.S., DIVISION ONE UNPUBLISHED OPINION CHUNG, J. — V.S. appeals an order committing her to 14 days of involuntary treatment. Specifically, V.S. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s determinations that she was gravely disabled under RCW 71.05.020(25)(a) and that she had not volunteered in good faith for appropriate treatment. Because substantial evidence supports the findings, which in turn support the court’s conclusions, we affirm. BACKGROUND In July 2024, V.S. separated from her husband of 30 years after reporting that he had choked her, resulting in his arrest. After the separation, V.S. lived alone and received $1,300 per month in Supplemental Security Income. Beginning in December 2024, V.S. repeatedly contacted emergency services “daily” but sometimes declined to disclose her location or open her door when emergency responders arrived. She testified that she made the calls because she was struggling to live alone, feared that her husband might be approaching her apartment, and wanted to talk to someone. She avoided the emergency responders when they arrived because she was afraid they were going to take her to a behavioral health No. 88451-4-I/2 facility. As a result of her many calls to 911, V.S. was referred to Seattle Fire Department Case Manager Julie Coffin in December 2024, who is assigned to help people in crisis who “are high utilizers of the 911 system who don’t necessarily need the full Fire outreach.” In her apartment on December 24, 2024, V.S. slipped on a plastic bag and fractured her elbow and subsequently sought treatment, recovered and could exercise. Then on June 2, 2025, she fractured her wrist after slipping in her bathtub. Due to that injury, V.S. had difficulty opening pill bottles, and she testified that the injury contributed to the recent disorder in her apartment. However, V.S. testified that she remained able to climb the stairs to her apartment, exercise, shop, and take her medications. Later in June 2025, V.S. received a pay-or-vacate notice and experienced several personal stressors, including the dismissal of the prosecution against her husband. She testified that several therapists cancelled her appointments and that an inpatient facility turned her away when she sought admission. During a home visit in June 2025, V.S. reported to Coffin that she could not drink bottled water because “she couldn’t figure out how to open her water bottles” and she could not drink the tap water “because the water [was] brown.” Despite this report, Coffin turned on the faucet and found clear water. Coffin also observed “rotting food on the counters . . . food on the floor . . .[and the] food in the fridge was expired.” Further, Coffin saw extensive clutter such as prescription bottles and pills “scattered” on a table and the floor, “a lot of trip hazards,” and standing dirty water in a clogged bathtub. Coffin described V.S. as “weak,” “a little unsteady on her feet,” and “her feet and ankles were 2 No. 88451-4-I/3 swollen.” V.S. told Coffin that “she hadn’t been eating or drinking” and “she felt like she couldn’t take care of herself alone.” On June 16, 2025, V.S. called 911 and reported that she had attempted suicide by taking pills. After she did not answer her door, the property manager unlocked her apartment to let in the responding police officers and paramedics. V.S. came out of her bedroom and told Seattle Police Department Officer Douglas Jorgensen that she had taken 10 pills but did not know what they were. Jorgensen described her as “frail,” “walking very slowly,” and looking as if she was “a little dirty, like she had been wearing the same clothing for several days” and appeared she “had trouble taking care of herself or was unable to care for herself.” He also observed the apartment “was messy” with “things all over the floor, clothing, pieces of paper . . . the entire apartment had stuff all over the floor. You had to kind of watch where you stepped so you didn’t step on the stuff.” V.S. permitted the paramedics to examine her but opposed being taken to a hospital. Subsequently, that same day, V.S. was admitted to Swedish Hospital. V.S. told professionals that “she has never been suicidal and ‘I lied so that I can get help. It’s the only way I can get help.’ ” She also reported that “she does not eat or sleep and has no support.” When asked about her plan if she were evicted, she said she would buy a car, get a job, and live in her car with her cat. Testing revealed no “presence of medications that would corroborate her claim of having ingested ten pills the night [or day] before,” her blood-alcohol level was .04, and the Swedish records contained no documented weight loss or other indication of 3 No. 88451-4-I/4 malnutrition. V.S. also acknowledged she had a dependence on Valium and described herself as experiencing withdrawal. A designated crisis responder detained V.S. at Swedish and transferred her to “Valley Cities Recovery Place Kent, an evaluation and treatment facility and secure withdrawal management and stabilization program” on June 17, 2025. A clinician who evaluated her at the Valley Cities identified working diagnoses of generalized anxiety disorder, major depressive disorder, borderline personality disorder, and benzodiazepine dependence. While at Valley Cities, V.S. took her prescribed medications, attended group sessions, ate during her stay, and slept without identified concerns. She agreed to a gradual benzodiazepine taper and, although she repeatedly asked for clarification about the schedule, she followed it. Valley Cities evaluator David Cornell testified that V.S.’s behavioral health disorder impaired her ability to provide for her essential health and safety needs. He explained that Coffin and law enforcement’s account of the condition of her apartment showed a “risk of fall hazards of the clutter” and “[t]here’s rotten food, indicating that [V.S.] is not eating well.” Further, he noted that V.S.’s account that the “tap water is not potable” and the “plugged-up bathtub” indicate that “taking care of her hygiene is an issue.” Cornell testified that V.S. had “a need for a benzodiazepine taper,” and, as she was 74 years old, “being in that age range provides additional considerations for that type of taper,” including that tapering outside a controlled hospital setting “would provide some concerning risks for her health.” Cornell also opined “I am concerned that . . . she doesn’t have insight or judgment into . . . what the abuse of alcohol and 4 No. 88451-4-I/5 benzodiazepines, particularly one that she has a dependence to, the Valium, the risks that can provide to her.” Further, when considering whether V.S. could be a “good faith voluntary patient” for a less restrictive treatment setting, Cornell explained “[s]he’s not demonstrated she can manage and keep herself emotionally regulated and safe without the use of the benzodiazepine which, at the risk of being cumulative, is dangerous for her to continue at this time due to physical, emotional, and mental dependence on it.” V.S. testified that she understood she needed treatment, preferred outpatient care and was willing to enter a hospital voluntarily if necessary. She preferred a facility closer to her apartment and expressed concern about her belongings and cat. On June 23, 2025, Cornell filed a petition seeking up to 14 days of involuntary treatment. The superior court conducted a probable cause hearing the following day. Before the hearing, her attorney notified the State by e-mail that V.S. was “raising the defense of good faith voluntary patient . . . that places the burden on the [State] by a preponderance of the evidence that [V.S.] has not in good faith volunteered for appropriate treatment.” The trial court rejected the email as insufficient notice of the good faith defense and further concluded that “if the good faith defense was timely asserted . . . the Court is not persuaded [V.S.] qualifies for the good faith defense.” The court found that V.S. suffered from behavioral health disorders, “including general anxiety disorder, major depressive disorder, borderline personality disorder, and valium dependency.” The court also noted her potential eviction, recent falls, dirty apartment conditions, reported failure to eat or drink, mismanagement of her medications, benzodiazepine dependence, and false report of a suicide attempt. The court concluded 5 No. 88451-4-I/6 it “[wa]s not persuaded that [V.S.] is a danger to herself at this time.” However, it concluded that her behavioral health disorder rendered her unable to provide for her essential health and safety needs and therefore was gravely disabled under RCW 71.05.020(25)(a). Further, although V.S. expressed a willingness to receive care, the court found that her testimony contained internal inconsistencies and was not “totally credible.” The court was not persuaded that she was a good-faith voluntary patient because she “did not want to go to the hospital,” she did “not want to stay in the hospital, and any expressed intention to follow the prescribed procedures and treatment has been equivocal at best. [V.S.]’s track record of requesting help and then not accepting or obtaining help demonstrates a significant lack of cooperation” and not a voluntary request for treatment. The court ordered V.S. be committed to Valley Cities for up to 14 days of involuntary treatment. V.S. appeals. DISCUSSION V.S. raises two challenges to her involuntary commitment order. First, she argues that the evidence did not establish that her behavioral health disorders rendered her unable to meet her essential needs that placed her in danger of serious physical harm under RCW 71.05.020(25)(a). Second, she argues that petitioner Valley Cities failed to prove that she had not volunteered in good faith for appropriate treatment. We address each challenge in turn. On appeal, we review whether substantial evidence supports the challenged findings and whether those findings support the legal conclusions. In re Det. of A.F., 20 Wn.App.2d 115, 125, 498 P.3d 1006 (2021). “ ‘Substantial evidence is the quantum of 6 No. 88451-4-I/7 evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Det. of H.N., 188 Wn. App. 744, 762, 355 P.3d 294 (2015)). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner and do not reassess witness credibility or the persuasiveness of the evidence. Id. Additionally, unchallenged findings are verities on appeal. In re Det. of K.P., 32 Wn. App. 2d 214, 221, 555 P.3d 480 (2024). I. Gravely Disabled under RCW 71.05.020(25)(a) At a 14-day commitment hearing, Valley Cities must establish grave disability “by a preponderance of the evidence.” RCW 71.05.240(4)(a). A person is gravely disabled under RCW 71.05.020(25)(a) when, as a result of a behavioral health disorder, the person “[i]s in danger of serious physical harm resulting from a failure to provide for his or her essential human needs of health or safety.” RCW 71.05.020(25)(a). The petitioner must present “recent, tangible evidence of failure or inability to provide for such essential human needs as food, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment.” In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 204-05, 728 P.2d 138 (1986). That deficiency must present a “high probability of serious physical harm within the near future unless adequate treatment is afforded.” Id. at 205. The inability to meet essential needs must result from the behavioral health disorder, rather than an unrelated circumstance. Id. V.S. challenges the court’s determination that she was gravely disabled on several grounds. 1 She claims neither her “financial inability to pay rent” nor her “age- 1 Although V.S. does not separately assign error to particular findings of fact, the commitment order does not contain individually numbered findings. As her briefing sufficiently identifies the factual determinations she challenges, the grounds for those challenges, and that Valley Cities had an opportunity to respond, we exercise our discretion to address V.S.’s challenges to certain factual findings as well as legal conclusions. See State v. Olson, 126 Wn.2d 315, 323, 893 P.2d 629 (1995) (when nature of appeal is clear, relevant issues argued in brief are supported by citation, and court and respondent are not prejudiced, “there is no compelling reason for the appellate court not to exercise its discretion to consider the merits of the case or issue”). 7 No. 88451-4-I/8 related danger of injury from falls” were valid bases for involuntary commitment. She also claims there was “no evidence [she] was at risk of serious physical harm due to neglect of her nutritional or medical needs.” Finally, she argues that her drug dependence also did not render her gravely disabled. First, as to V.S.’s housing instability, the trial court found that V.S. could be evicted and that, “[g]iven her current condition, it [was] highly probabl[e] that she would be unable to navigate the housing system on her own to obtain adequate shelter.” V.S. argues that she “was not gravely disabled merely because she struggled to pay her rent after fleeing her abusive husband.” Uncertainty about future housing and a lack of financial resources do not alone justify involuntary commitment. LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 210. 2 The petitioner must establish that the patient’s behavioral health disorder prevents the person from meeting their “essential needs as food, clothing and shelter” and “the likelihood of serious harm to a person from [their] failure to provide for such essential needs.” Id. For example, in K.P., there was a documented pattern of rapid deterioration after discharge, including failure to take medication and loss of temporary housing within three or four days. 32 Wn. App. 2d at 222-23. Those circumstances supported the court’s determination that K.P. was gravely disabled under prong (a) because the patient’s mental illness prevented them from meeting essential needs and, as a result, she was “in danger of serious physical harm.” Id. at 223-24. 2 Although the discussion in LaBelle addressed “prong (b),” it still requires a connection between the behavioral health disorder, an inability to meet essential needs, and the resulting physical danger. 107 Wn.2d at 205; see also In re Det. of A.M., 17 Wn. App. 2d 321, 334-35, 487 P.3d 531 (2021) (applying LaBelle’s “prong (b)” analysis to “prong (a)” to show that “there needs to be evidence … that this deficiency was or could be harmful”). 8 No. 88451-4-I/9 Here, it was undisputed that V.S. had fallen behind on rent and received a pay- or-vacate notice. She testified that if she lost the apartment, she planned to obtain a job and buy a car and live in it with her cat. But here, unlike in K.P., there was no evidence of the serious danger V.S. would encounter if she lost her housing. Although V.S.’s plan upon eviction is neither “cogent” nor “realistic,” Valley Cities did not identify a particular physical danger likely to result from the possible eviction, such as “a documented pattern of rapid deterioration after discharge,” exposure, inability to obtain food or water, or inability to obtain necessary medical care. See 32 Wn. App. 2d at 222-23. Thus, while the anticipated eviction and V.S.’s alternative plan may not seem “realistic,” this evidence does not independently support the requisite resulting physical harm to support a grave disability finding. V.S. also contends that she was not gravely disabled merely because she injured herself in two recent falls, pointing to the trial court’s finding that she “fell twice in her apartment, injuring her hand and elbow.” V.S. explained that she was having difficulty opening pill and water bottles due to a wrist injury. V.S. is correct that to the extent these injuries prevented her from caring for herself, they do not establish “grave disability”; rather, RCW 71.05.020(25)(a) requires that a danger of serious physical harm must be the result of behavioral health problems, not physical ailments. But the court did not rely on these injuries alone in reaching its conclusion that V.S. was gravely disabled. Indeed, the court noted these injuries “additionally” after finding that V.S. “told her case manager that she had not been eating or drinking . . . and that she could not take care of herself alone.” 9 No. 88451-4-I/10 V.S. further claims that there was insufficient evidence that she “was at risk of serious physical harm due to neglect of her nutritional or medical needs.” “[T]o establish grave disability under prong (a) there needs to be evidence not only of a failure to provide for nutritional needs but also that this deficiency was or could be harmful to the appellant.” In re Det. of A.M., 17 Wn. App. 2d 321, 335, 487 P.3d 531 (2021). An existing injury is unnecessary, but “the risk of physical harm from [a patient]’s tendency to neglect [their] health [cannot be] too speculative and insubstantial to justify continue commitment.” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 214. For example, in A.M., the court held that evidence that the patient was not adequately eating because of a delusional belief about his intestines was insufficient to establish grave disability because the record did not establish that his limited nutritional intake endangered his health. 17 Wn. App. 2d at 335. The court reasoned that evidence of a nutritional deficiency must show that “this deficiency was or could be harmful to the appellant,” noting that there, “[t]he only evidence in the record of potential harm [was a doctor’s] conclusory statements that [the patient] could not meet his basic health and safety needs or conduct his [activities of daily living] outside of a secured environment.” Id. at 334-35. Similarly, in LaBelle, a patient “indicated that he was not eating well before he was hospitalized but was unwilling to consider possible consequences of that or to seek medical help.” 107 Wn.2d at 214. Our Supreme Court found that “there was no evidence that he was in any danger” as “a result of his tendency to not eat well” and the evidence could not support a finding of grave disability. Id. Valley Cities distinguishes A.M. because it involved a 180-day involuntary commitment proceeding, “which is decided by a clear, cogent, and convincing evidence 10 No. 88451-4-I/11 standard reviewed on appeal under a more demanding standard than the one at work here.” However, even under the preponderance of evidence standard that applies to the 14-day involuntary commitment in this case, the statute still requires a connection between the unmet essential need and serious physical harm, such as evidence of actual injury, weight loss, or other possible articulated health consequences. A.M., 17 Wn. App. 2d at 335. V.S. also argues that, as in A.M. and LaBelle, there was no evidence that she lost weight or that her diet affected her health. Valley Cities counters that V.S.’s situation differs from that in A.M. because there, the patient was only “reluctant” to eat as opposed to having “an inability to” eat. Reluctance and inability to eat both relate to the failure to meet nutritional needs, but neither alone establishes that there was or could be resulting physical harm. A.M., 17 Wn. App. 2d at 335. Here, V.S. herself “told her case manager [Coffin] that she had not been eating or drinking.” Coffin observed that V.S. “appeared frail and disheveled,” but the hospital record disclosed no weight loss or other indication of malnutrition. However, in addition to noting the general disarray in V.S.’s apartment, which V.S. attributed to her “limited mobility due to fall-related injuries,” Cornell also specifically testified that V.S. refused to drink her tap water based on the mistaken belief that it was brown. Cornell connected V.S.’s depression to helplessness, hopelessness, requests for assistance, and difficulty following through with offered help. The fact that she ate at least part of each meal while at Valley Cities does not speak to whether, without receiving inpatient care, she could provide for her own essential needs. 11 No. 88451-4-I/12 Significantly, the trial court also found that V.S.’s Valium dependency, together with her other diagnoses, substantially impaired her cognitive or volitional functioning. A generalized concern about health and safety would not suffice here. A.M., 17 Wn. App. 2d at 334-35. However, a substance use disorder is a behavioral health disorder. RCW 71.05.020(8). A substance use disorder “means a cluster of cognitive, behavioral, and physiological symptoms indicating that an individual continues using the substance despite significant substance-related problems.” RCW 71.05.020(56). RCW 71.05.040 expressly permits commitment when a substance use disorder causes grave disability, although it precludes commitment solely because the person has a substance use disorder. Thus, while V.S.’s dependence on Valium alone does not establish grave disability, medical treatment for her substance use disorder is an essential human need under RCW 71.05.020(25)(a). Labelle, 107 Wn.2d at 204-05. Thus, an inability to obtain necessary medical care because of a behavioral health disorder may support a finding of grave disability even without proof that the person is unable to meet every other essential need. See A.F., 20 Wn. App. 2d at 126-27. In A.F., the patient’s Parkinson’s disease created physical limitations requiring extensive support, but his bipolar disorder, including resulting delusional thought, prevented him from recognizing those limitations and obtaining care. Id. at 127. The court held that this evidence supported a grave disability finding. Id. By contrast, in In re Treatment of Mays, 3 the court noted that the patient’s “alcoholism had some detrimental 3 In Mays, the trial court found that petitioner did not establish grave disability but ordered commitment under an alternative statutory ground permitting detention after repeated detoxification admissions and a demonstrated need for sustained treatment. 116 Wn. App. at 867. The appellate court held that the alternative ground was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. Id. at 874-75. Although the court did not review a finding of grave disability, its constitutional analysis applied LaBelle’s requirements to substance-related commitment and explained that “involuntary commitment is justified only upon a showing that the risk of danger in the near future is substantial and the potential physical injury is 12 No. 88451-4-I/13 effects on his health and safety due to his falls and failure to take medication regularly, but there was no showing of substantial recent harm or substantial risk of harm in the near future.” 116 Wn. App. 864, 874, 68 P.3d 1114 (2003). The court further stressed that the physician who examined the patient testified that they “could not say whether Mays was likely to suffer a serious injury or illness in the near future.” Id. Here, unlike the physician in Mays, Cornell identified a specific health consequence that showed a substantial risk of harm in the near future. Cornell described V.S. as having a “physical, emotional, and mental dependence to the Valium.” He testified that Valium was her “go-to” response to anxiety and depression and that V.S. had been “mixing Valium, benzodiazepine, with alcohol, which is very dangerous.” He further explained that combining a sedative, hypnotic drug like benzodiazepine with alcohol, a depressant, raised a “concern about toxicity.” Cornell testified that V.S. exhibited confusion about her prescriptions and taper schedule and that, outside a structured setting, “she would not be able to do this taper” and that conducting the taper outside a controlled hospital environment “would provide some concerning risks for her health.” Cornell predicted that V.S. would return to continued benzodiazepine and alcohol use if discharged. The court found it “more likely than not [that] she ha[d] been dangerously mixing [Valium] with alcohol.” Here, the essential need was the medical care necessary to manage V.S.’s dependence safely through the prescribed taper. Cornell’s testimony concerning her confusion about her prescriptions and inability to complete the taper outside a structured setting made a causal connection between her impaired functioning and her serious.” Id. at 870. Thus, the court’s discussion remains relevant in that it confirms the degree of danger necessary to justify involuntary commitment based on a substance use disorder. 13 No. 88451-4-I/14 inability to manage that essential treatment independently. His prediction that she would resume benzodiazepine and alcohol use once discharged connected that inability to the danger of toxicity he identified from combining those substances. Viewed in the light most favorable to Valley Cities, the evidence supports the finding that this disorder-related inability to manage her treatment presented a high probability of serious physical harm in the near future. This finding supports the trial court’s conclusion that V.S.’s was gravely disabled. II. Good Faith Volunteer Defense V.S. also challenges the trial court’s conclusion that she was not a good-faith voluntary patient. Specifically, she claims that the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof to her and, in the alternative, that Valley Cities did not meet its burden of proof. “If the person or his or her attorney alleges, prior to the commencement of the hearing, that the person has in good faith volunteered for treatment, the petitioner must show, by preponderance of the evidence, that the person has not in good faith volunteered for appropriate treatment.” RCW 71.05.240(3). To “qualify as a good faith volunteer, the person must abide by procedures and a treatment plan as prescribed by a treatment facility and professional staff.” Id. Before the probable cause hearing, V.S.’s counsel emailed the prosecutor and expressly asserted that V.S. had pursued treatment as a good-faith voluntary patient. The trial court rejected the email as insufficient notice of the good faith defense and further concluded that “if the good faith defense was timely asserted . . . the Court is not 14 No. 88451-4-I/15 persuaded [V.S.] qualifies for the good faith defense.” We assume without deciding that counsel’s prehearing e-mail sufficiently raised the issue and address the merits. Again, on appeal, we review whether the challenged findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. A.F., 20 Wn. App. 2d at 125. We assess the sufficiency of that evidence under the petitioner’s preponderance burden. RCW 71.05.240(3). Good faith requires an expressed willingness to follow the prescribed treatment and a history of conduct consistent with that willingness. In re Det. of Chorney, 64 Wn. App 469, 479, 825 P.2d 330 (1992). As we explained in Chorney, “[t]he critical factor is the [patient]’s recent history of actual compliance with prescribed procedures and treatment.” Id. “It is immaterial that the [patient] may not be able to cooperate or . . . that [their] fragile mental state was exacerbated as a result of being involuntarily detained after [being] initially admitted as a voluntary patient.” Id. Thus, in Chorney, even though the patient had initially voluntarily presented himself for admission to the hospital, the record supported the conclusion that he was not a good faith voluntary patient when he later objected to his prescribed treatment, became so agitated he had to be placed in restraints, and testified that he wished to leave the hospital immediately and resume outpatient treatment. Id. By contrast, in In re Det. of Kirby, the State’s evidence that Kirby was not a good faith voluntary patient included: “conclusory statements” in its petition that Kirby was “too impulsive” and her judgment and impulse control were “too impaired” for a less restrictive alternative, her statements “vacillat[ing] about taking her medication and coming to the hospital,” and her mother’s statements that her daughter had not been taking her medications. 65 Wn. App. 862, 870, 829 P.2d 1139 (1992). We held that this 15 No. 88451-4-I/16 evidence supported the conclusion that she was a good faith voluntary patient, emphasizing that Kirby initially sought out treatment voluntarily, and the record from the probable cause hearing included her “repeated lucid and rational assurances” that if released, she would follow treatment recommendations, her preference for maintaining control over her own treatment, and her statement that she understood if she did not abide by voluntary treatment, she would return to Western State Hospital, which “terrified” her and to which she “would object strenuously.” Id. at 870. Here, the trial court found that V.S. was not a good faith patient because she did not want to remain hospitalized and, regarding V.S.’s credibility, “any expressed intention to follow the prescribed procedures and treatments has been equivocal at best.” Moreover, V.S.’s history of requesting help and then not accepting or obtaining it demonstrated “a significant lack of cooperation.” Prior to June 2025, V.S. displayed a history of voluntarily seeking help related to her behavioral health but then refusing to accept treatment. V.S. did seek outpatient assistance but reported that the therapists canceled. She also testified that she had attempted to obtain inpatient treatment but was turned away. However, while V.S. repeatedly called emergency services, she then sometimes declined to answer her door because she feared being taken to a behavioral health hospital. During an occasion where she did accept treatment from paramedics, she was “adamant” that she did not want to go to the hospital. Once hospitalized, she took her prescribed medications, participated in group treatment, and ate at least part of every meal. She agreed to the benzodiazepine taper so long as it occurred gradually and followed the taper schedule. Cornell acknowledged 16 No. 88451-4-I/17 that V.S. was “asking appropriate questions” and consulting the nurses about the taper. V.S. also testified that she understood she needed treatment and, although she preferred outpatient therapy, was willing to enter a hospital if necessary. However, progress notes dated June 23, 2025, report that V.S. “explained that she wants to leave and she regrets ever seeking help, that last month had been very stressful for her” and she “denied any problems with housing.” Further, Cornell testified that V.S. could not complete the prescribed benzodiazepine taper outside a structured setting. He also testified that she lacked the capacity to be a good-faith voluntary patient because of her continued reliance on benzodiazepines to regulate her mood, anxiety and depression, life stressors, and her inconsistent statements concerning her requests for assistance. The “critical factor” is V.S.’s “recent history of actual compliance with prescribed procedures and treatment.” See Chorney, 64 Wn. App. 479. Here, the court considered V.S.’s history of inconsistent statements regarding her requests for assistance, as well as her inpatient conduct and Cornell’s testimony that V.S. did not have the capacity to complete her treatment outside a structured setting and expressly found her willingness to receive treatment equivocal. We do not reassess witness credibility or the persuasiveness of the evidence. A.F., 20 Wn.App.2d at 125. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Valley Cities, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings that V.S.’s willingness to accept the prescribed treatment was equivocal and inconsistent with her recent resistance to accepting care. Those findings support the determination that Valley Cities proved, by a preponderance of the 17 No. 88451-4-I/18 evidence, that V.S. had not volunteered in good faith for appropriate treatment. 4 We therefore uphold the trial court’s good-faith determination. CONCLUSION We affirm. WE CONCUR: 4 Contrary to V.S.’s contention, the trial court’s statement that it was “not persuaded” does not, read in context, establish that it shifted the burden of proof. The court affirmatively found a lack of good- faith voluntary status and identified the conduct supporting that finding. 18