Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON In the Matter of the Detention of No. 88811-1-I M.P. DIVISION ONE UNPUBLISHED OPINION DÍAZ, J. — A trial court committed M.P. to 14 days of involuntary detention pursuant to the involuntary treatment act (ITA), ch. 71.05 RCW. M.P. primarily argues that the involuntary commitment order was in error because he was a good faith voluntary patient. Disagreeing, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND M.P. is diagnosed with bipolar disorder, which he successfully managed with medication for many years. He worked for 35 years as a train engineer for BNSF railway. M.P. was injured in 2022 when a semi-truck collided with his train. In April 2025, doctors prescribed M.P. painkillers following surgery. After taking the new medication, M.P. began to show manic behaviors such as extreme sociability, resulting in frequent arrests, and giving away large sums of money. Sometime in mid-July 2025, M.P.’s friend, Chad Osborn, took M.P. to a No. 88811-1-I/2 voluntary inpatient treatment facility in Spokane Valley called We Level Up. M.P. left the facility after about 36 hours. The facility staff told Osborn that M.P. left against their advice. After leaving We Level Up, M.P. went directly to his mother’s house. On July 23, 2025, his mother called the police and said that M.P. assaulted her. Police entered the home and arrested him. At the jail, a designated crisis responder spoke with M.P. and then filed a petition for initial detention. M.P. was admitted to Fairfax Behavioral Hospital (Fairfax) on July 26. On July 31, 2025, Fairfax petitioned for a 14-day involuntary treatment. At a hearing on August 11, M.P. claimed that involuntary commitment was unnecessary because he was seeking treatment voluntarily. The commissioner informed the State that it had the burden to prove that M.P. was not in fact a good faith voluntary patient. A court evaluator testified that M.P. was still showing symptoms of mania and recommended involuntary inpatient treatment. The commissioner granted the petition. The commissioner also ordered a less restrictive treatment option as soon as possible. 1 On August 21, the court entered a less restrictive order for M.P. to return to We Level Up in Spokane Valley. M.P. filed a motion for revision of the commitment order, which the superior court denied. M.P. timely appeals. II. ANALYSIS M.P. claims that the court erred when it concluded that he was not a good 1 M.P. argues for the first time in his reply brief that ordering a less restrictive treatment is inconsistent with the finding that M.P. was not a good faith voluntary patient. “An issue raised and argued for the first time in a reply brief is too late to warrant consideration.” Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992). We therefore do not address this argument. 2 No. 88811-1-I/3 faith voluntary patient. We hold that substantial evidence supports the court’s finding. As a preliminary note, when the superior court denied revision of the commissioner’s order, it “adopt[ed] the commissioner’s findings, conclusions, and rulings as its own.” Grieco v. Wilson, 144 Wn. App. 865, 877, 184 P.3d 668 (2008). We then review whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact, and whether the findings then support the conclusions of law. In re Det. of A.S., 91 Wn. App. 146, 162, 955 P.2d 836 (1998). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner and defer to the trial court’s findings on “witness credibility and persuasiveness of the evidence.” In re Det. of A.F., 20 Wn. App. 2d 115, 125, 498 P.3d 1006 (2021) (citation omitted). M.P. does not dispute the court’s finding that he was gravely disabled. He only assigns error to the finding that he was not a good faith voluntary patient. At the hearing, because M.P. claimed to have “volunteered in good faith for appropriate treatment, the State was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence” that M.P. was not a good faith volunteer. In re Det. of Chorney, 64 Wn. App. 469, 478-79, 825 P.2d 330 (1992). The commissioner found that the State had met its burden. We hold that there is substantial evidence supporting the court’s finding that M.P. was not a good faith voluntary patient. A good faith volunteer must both “express a willingness to abide by the procedures and treatment plan” and “have a ‘track record’ which does not belie this stated intent.” Chorney, 64 Wn. App. at 479. 3 No. 88811-1-I/4 Here, just a few weeks before the hearing, M.P. was admitted to We Level Up as a good faith voluntary patient, but he left against the staff’s advice after 36 hours. Two days before the hearing, M.P. told Katherine Giesel, the court evaluator, that he wanted to return to We Level Up because he liked that “he could just leave if he wanted to.” M.P. explained that he left We Level Up because he was manic. This evidence plainly provides an inculpatory “‘track record’” which belies his “stated intent.” Chorney, 64 Wn. App. at 479. M.P. attempts to discount the fact that he left We Level Up by arguing that the court should determine voluntariness based on the patient’s “present status at the time of the probable cause hearing.” (Citing Chorney, 64 Wn. App. at 478-79.) But even if that were the actual standard—which it is not—it is undisputed that M.P. was still showing signs of mania while in treatment at Fairfax. When Giesel met with him, he was “still very hyperverbal and loud.” He told her that he had stopped taking medications for his bipolar disorder because he could not afford them. And, when she asked how he would afford them upon release, he yelled that he “has cash stored all over the place.” Further, Giesel testified that, because M.P. was not yet “at baseline” and because he admitted his mania would cause him to leave voluntary treatment, that he was not a good faith voluntary patient. The entirety of this evidence is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the court’s finding that M.P.’s track record did not support his stated intent to continue treatment voluntarily. See A.F., 20 Wn. App. 2d at 125. M.P. argues we should hold, as we did in In re Det. of Kirby, 65 Wn. App. 4 No. 88811-1-I/5 862, 872, 829 P.2d 1139 (1992), that the State produced insufficient evidence to show that M.P. was “unfit for voluntary treatment.” The record in Kirby showed that she “understood she had an incentive to abide by voluntary treatment guidelines.” Id. at 870. M.P. argues that like Kirby, he had been medication compliant, cooperative, and demonstrated a willingness to get better while at Fairfax. But in Kirby, the State’s argument that she was not a voluntary patient relied on a conclusory statement that she was “too impulsive,” and on testimony that she was not taking her medication and had experienced thoughts of harming others. Kirby, 65 Wn. App. at 870. We held that the State’s evidence was not relevant “to the question of whether she could be considered a good faith voluntary patient.” Id. As we addressed above, the record in this case shows that M.P. was still experiencing mania, and that mania had recently caused him to leave voluntary treatment early. This evidence distinguishes this case from Kirby, in which the State did not present any evidence that went to the patient’s voluntariness. 65 Wn. App. at 870. Since the State did present relevant evidence in this case, we defer to the court’s findings on the persuasiveness of the evidence. A.F., 20 Wn. App. 2d at 125. In summary, we hold there is substantial evidence to support the court’s conclusion that M.P.’s track record contradicted his stated intention to receive voluntary treatment, justifying the 14-day commitment order. 2 2 M.P. also assigns error to the court’s revocation of his right to possess a firearm 5 No. 88811-1-I/6 III. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s order. WE CONCUR: under RCW 71.05.182. Because this assignment of error relies on the argument that M.P. was a good faith voluntary patient, which we addressed above, we do not reach this issue. 6