Texas Right to Life and John Seago v. Allison Van Stean; Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Services; Planned Parenthood South Texas Surgical Center; Planned Parenthood Center for Choice; Bhavik Kumar, M.d; North Texas Equal Access Fund; Lilith Fund for Reproductive Equity, Inc.; The Afiya Center; Fund Texas Choice; West Fund; Frontera Fund; Clinic Access Support Network; The Bridge Collective; Monica Faulkner; Michelle Tuegel; Ghazaleh Moayedi, D.O.; And Jane Doe
CourtTexas Supreme Court
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket26-0099
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 26-0099
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Texas Right to Life and John Seago,
Petitioners,
v.
Allison Van Stean; Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas
Surgical Health Services; Planned Parenthood South Texas
Surgical Center; Planned Parenthood Center for Choice;
Bhavik Kumar, M.D.; North Texas Equal Access Fund;
Lilith Fund for Reproductive Equity, Inc.; The Afiya Center;
Fund Texas Choice; West Fund; Frontera Fund; Clinic Access
Support Network; The Bridge Collective; Monica Faulkner;
Michelle Tuegel; Ghazaleh Moayedi, D.O.; and Jane Doe,
Respondents
═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════
PER CURIAM
In this interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss,
the plaintiffs concede that their affirmative claims are now moot and the
case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The defendants
respond that the plaintiffs’ claims cannot be moot because they never
had standing to begin with. We hold that, either way, there is no
justiciable controversy before us, so we dismiss the case.
I
In 2021, the Legislature enacted the Texas Heartbeat Act.
Among other things, the Act prohibits a physician from knowingly
performing or inducing an abortion if the unborn child has a detectable
heartbeat. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 171.204(a). But the Act
provides that it “shall be enforced exclusively through . . . private civil
actions.” Id. § 171.207(a). Under the Act, “[a]ny person” may bring a
civil action against anyone who performs or induces an abortion in
violation of the Act, knowingly aids or abets the performance or
inducement of an abortion in violation of the Act, or intends to engage
in such conduct. Id. § 171.208(a). The Act further provides that a
prevailing claimant is entitled to injunctive relief, statutory damages of
no less than $10,000 for each violation, and costs and attorney’s fees. Id.
§ 171.208(b).
Shortly after the Act took effect, fourteen separate lawsuits1 were
filed against Texas Right to Life; its director, John Seago; and others.
1 The underlying lawsuits are:
• Allison Van Stean v. State of Texas et al., No. D-1-GN-21-004179
(98th Dist. Ct., Travis Cnty., Tex.)
• Monica Faulkner v. State of Texas et al., No. D-1-GN-21-004189
(250th Dist. Ct., Travis Cnty., Tex.)
• Jane Doe v. State of Texas et al., No. D-1-GN-21-004193 (53d Dist.
Ct., Travis Cnty., Tex.)
• The Bridge Collective v. State of Texas et al., No. D-1-GN-21-004303
(126th Dist. Ct., Travis Cnty., Tex.)
• Michelle Tuegel v. State of Texas et al., No. D-1-GN-21-004316
(261st Dist. Ct., Travis Cnty., Tex.)
2
The lawsuits named TRTL and Seago as defendants because, according
to plaintiffs’ petitions, they had previously announced their intention to
bring lawsuits under the Act. Plaintiffs sought a declaration under the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§§ 37.001-.011, that portions of the Heartbeat Act are unconstitutional
and an anti-suit injunction to prevent defendants from suing under the
Act. These fourteen suits were consolidated into a multi-district
litigation proceeding.
TRTL and Seago filed a plea to the jurisdiction and moved to
dismiss plaintiffs’ claims in each case under the Texas Citizens
Participation Act, id. §§ 27.001-.011. Among other things, they insisted
that plaintiffs lacked standing because “every Texas abortion provider
is complying with [the Act]—and they have been complying with [the
• Dr. Ghazaleh Moayedi v. State of Texas et al., No. D-1-GN-21-
004489 (98th Dist. Ct., Travis Cnty., Tex.)
• The N. Tex. Equal Access Fund v. State of Texas et al., No. D-1-GN-
21-004503 (455th Dist. Ct., Travis Cnty., Tex.)
• Lilith Fund for Reprod. Equity, Inc. v. State of Texas et al., No. D-1-
GN-21-004504 (53d Dist. Ct., Travis Cnty., Tex.)
• Clinic Access Support Network v. State of Texas et al., No. D-1-GN-
21-004544 (201st Dist. Ct., Travis Cnty., Tex.)
• The Afiya Ctr. v. State of Texas et al., No. D-1-GN-21-004605 (455th
Dist. Ct., Travis Cnty., Tex.)
• Fund Tex. Choice v. State of Texas et al., No. D-1-GN-21-004606
(98th Dist. Ct., Travis Cnty., Tex.)
• Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. et al. v.
Tex. Right to Life et al., No. D-1-GN-21-004632 (53d Dist. Ct., Travis
Cnty., Tex.)
• The West Fund v. State of Texas et al., No. D-1-GN-21-004648 (261st
Dist. Ct., Travis Cnty., Tex.)
• Frontera Fund v. State of Texas et al., No. D-1-GN-21-004846 (53d
Dist. Ct., Travis Cnty., Tex.)
3
Act] since the moment it took effect on September 1, 2021.” Following a
combined hearing, the trial court denied the jurisdictional plea and the
TCPA motion to dismiss and granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment in part, awarding declaratory and injunctive relief.
TRTL and Seago appealed the denial of their TCPA motion, which
automatically stayed the underlying litigation. See id. § 51.014(a)(12)
(providing for an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a TCPA motion
to dismiss), (b) (stating that an appeal of a TCPA motion to dismiss stays
the trial and “all other proceedings in the trial court pending resolution
of that appeal”). While that appeal was pending in the court of appeals,
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
Organization, which held that the U.S. Constitution does not confer a
right to abortion. 597 U.S. 215, 231 (2022) (overruling Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), and Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992)). The significance of Dobbs for this case is that it triggered
the effective date of a separate Texas statute regulating abortion. See
Human Life Protection Act of 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., ch. 800, § 3, 2021
Tex. Gen. Laws 1886, 1887 (stating that the Act takes effect “on the 30th
day after . . . the issuance of a United States Supreme Court judgment
in a decision overruling, wholly or partly, Roe v. Wade”). That statute,
with certain exceptions, prohibits persons from “knowingly
perform[ing], induc[ing], or attempt[ing] an abortion,” TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 170A.002(a), and it imposes both criminal punishment
and civil penalties enforceable by the Attorney General for a violation,
id. §§ 170A.004, .005.
4
Meanwhile, in this case, the court of appeals initially affirmed the
trial court’s order and concluded that the TCPA does not apply to
plaintiffs’ claims, but this Court vacated and remanded the case to the
court of appeals with instructions to first address whether plaintiffs had
standing. Tex. Right to Life v. Van Stean, 702 S.W.3d 348, 351 (Tex.
2024). On remand, the court of appeals held that plaintiffs had
standing, that their claims were both ripe and not moot, and that the
TCPA does not apply. 729 S.W.3d 896, 905-16, 917-21 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2026). TRTL and Seago again petitioned for review, asserting
that (1) all plaintiffs lack standing or their claims are otherwise moot
because plaintiffs have stopped performing or assisting abortions in
Texas and (2) the court of appeals erred in holding that the TCPA does
not apply to plaintiffs’ claims. The Court ordered plaintiffs to respond
to the petition.
II
After initially seeking and obtaining two extensions of time to file
their response, plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the case as moot.
They argue that their claims are moot because TRTL and Seago are now
barred by limitations from suing them. According to plaintiffs—and
consistent with the position TRTL and Seago previously embraced—no
Texas physician has performed a prohibited abortion since the Human
Life Protection Act took effect in August 2022. Because a civil action
under the Heartbeat Act must be brought within four years of the
violation, see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 171.208(d), plaintiffs now
concede that they do not face any threat of a civil lawsuit under that Act,
meaning they have no concrete injury that would be remedied by the
5
relief they request in their suit. See Grassroots Leadership, Inc. v. Tex.
Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 646 S.W.3d 815, 820 (Tex. 2022) (“To
satisfy standing’s requirements, the alleged injury must be concrete.”);
cf. State v. Zurawski, 690 S.W.3d 644, 658-59 (Tex. 2024) (holding that
standing to challenge a statute’s constitutionality requires a credible
threat of enforcement against arguably constitutionally protected
activity).
While still insisting that plaintiffs never had standing, TRTL and
Seago respond that plaintiffs’ affidavits are insufficient to prove that
they did not violate the Act in the previous four years or that they will
not violate the Act going forward. But even if TRTL and Seago are
correct, the case must still be dismissed because, according to them,
plaintiffs lacked standing when suit was filed. Whether there was never
a justiciable controversy at all or there used to be one that has since
evaporated, nothing remains in this case for the judiciary to resolve.
TRTL and Seago also argue that, even if the case were otherwise
moot, we must still resolve the issue of attorney’s fees. They primarily
contend that plaintiffs’ UDJA claims include a request for attorney’s
fees, which, according to TRTL and Seago, precludes a finding that those
claims are moot. They rely on this Court’s decision in State ex rel. Best
v. Harper, in which we stated that a claim for attorney’s fees sometimes
“breathes life” into an otherwise moot appeal when a statute authorizes
a fee award “based on equitable principles regardless of who prevails.”
562 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. 2018). In that situation, we explained that the
case may not be rendered moot because the trial court must consider the
relative merits of the parties’ positions when exercising its discretion
6
whether to award fees. Id. But here, all plaintiffs have affirmatively
withdrawn any claim for attorney’s fees.2 Thus, unlike in Harper, the
trial court would have no need or reason to consider the relative merits
of plaintiffs’ UDJA claims on remand.
TRTL and Seago further argue that plaintiffs’ lawsuits are not
moot because the UDJA allows either party to recover attorney’s fees.
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.009 (“In any proceeding under this
chapter, the court may award costs and reasonable and necessary
attorney’s fees as are equitable and just.”). TRTL and Seago recently
filed in at least one of the underlying lawsuits a request seeking, for the
first time, attorney’s fees under the UDJA. But they did so only after
plaintiffs asserted that the underlying claims were moot and withdrew
their pending UDJA fee claims. And TRTL and Seago have consistently
taken the position that the courts never had jurisdiction over plaintiffs’
claims. TRTL and Seago’s belated claim for attorney’s fees under the
UDJA cannot revive an already moot case.3
2 TRTL and Seago argue that plaintiffs’ withdrawal of their attorney’s
fee claims has no legal effect because they filed a “nonsuit” of their claims for
attorney’s fees and Rule 162 only permits a party to nonsuit the entire case,
not individual claims. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 162 (stating the circumstances under
which a plaintiff “may dismiss a case, or take a non-suit”). We need not decide
whether this reading of Rule 162 is correct because we interpret the substance
of plaintiffs’ pleading to be the affirmative withdrawal of their claims for
attorney’s fees. See In re J.Z.P., 484 S.W.3d 924, 925 (Tex. 2016) (“[C]ourts
should acknowledge the substance of the relief sought despite the formal
styling of the pleading.” (quoting Ryland Enter., Inc. v. Weatherspoon, 355
S.W.3d 664, 666 (Tex. 2011))).
3 This case thus differs from Weldon v. Lilith Fund for Reproductive
Equity, in which a request for attorney’s fees under the UDJA was pending
when the case became moot. See 735 S.W.3d 702, 706 n.6 (Tex. 2026).
7
Finally, TRTL and Seago argue that they may seek attorney’s fees
under other law—the TCPA and the Heartbeat Act. See id.
§ 27.009(a)(1) (providing that a successful TCPA movant shall recover
reasonable attorney’s fees); id. § 30.022(a) (providing that a person
seeking declaratory or injunctive relief against a statute that regulates
or restricts abortion is liable to pay the attorney’s fees of the prevailing
party). But both statutes authorize fees only if TRTL and Seago
prevailed in the underlying suit. Because they did not prevail under the
TCPA or the Heartbeat Act before plaintiffs asserted that the
substantive claims became moot, any claim for attorney’s fees under
those statutes does not “breathe[] life” into the underlying suit to
prevent it from becoming moot. See Harper, 562 S.W.3d at 7-8.4
III
We hold that there is no justiciable controversy before us, and we
must therefore dismiss the case. That raises the question of whether to
vacate the court of appeals’ opinion along with its judgment. See, e.g.,
Morath v. Lewis, 601 S.W.3d 785, 790 (Tex. 2020). Plaintiffs prevailed
in the court of appeals, and they are the parties now asking us to dismiss
4 TRTL and Seago contend that the dismissal of this case, even for
mootness, makes them a “prevailing party” under the Heartbeat Act and thus
entitles them to an award of attorney’s fees. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 30.022(b) (“For purposes of this section, a party is considered a prevailing
party if a state or federal court . . . dismisses any claim or cause of action
brought against the party that seeks the declaratory or injunctive relief
described by Subsection (a), regardless of the reason for the dismissal . . . .”).
Even under defendants’ theory, they would not become a prevailing party until
after the Court dismisses the case. The Act expressly contemplates that a
party may bring a separate civil action to recover attorney’s fees. Id.
§ 30.022(c). We express no opinion regarding the merits of such a claim.
8
the case as moot. And this case involves questions of public importance.
Accordingly, we vacate the court of appeals’ opinion. See id. at 791-92.
IV
Without hearing oral argument or considering the merits of the
appeal, we vacate the judgment and opinion of the court of appeals and
the trial court’s order and dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 56.2, 59.1.
OPINION DELIVERED: November 20, 2026
9