Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-26-00393-CV ___________________________ IN THE MATTER OF T.M. On Appeal from the County Court Wichita County, Texas Trial Court No. CC-MH2026-0272 Before Birdwell, Wallach, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant T.M. (Taylor)1 appeals from an order authorizing the forced administration of psychoactive medications. See Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 574.106, .1065. In a single issue, Taylor complains that the evidence is insufficient to show that she received written notice of her rights under Section 574.105, Subsections (3) and (4), thereby violating that section and her constitutional right to due process. See id. § 574.105(3), (4). Because this issue was not preserved, we will affirm. I. BACKGROUND A Cooke County district court found Taylor incompetent to stand trial and ordered her commitment to a mental health facility for treatment on April 1, 2026. Exactly one month later, Dr. Umamaheswara Velama applied for an order from the Wichita County trial court to authorize the administration of psychoactive medication to Taylor, regardless of her refusal.2 The trial court then signed an order on 1 We use an alias for T.M. to protect her privacy. 2 We note that the file stamp indicates that the application was filed on March 4, 2026, but Appellant’s brief submits—and we agree—that the file stamp appears to have been improperly set to “March” instead of “May.” The application was signed by Dr. Velama May 1, 2026, and states that Taylor was “subject to an order, dated April 1, 2026, for court-ordered mental health services.” Additionally, the trial court’s “Order Appointing Attorney for Inspection, Setting Hearings, and for Notice to Proposed Patient” was signed on May 4, 2026, yet the file stamp indicates it was filed March 4, 2026. Considering that all three dates are after the purported March 4, 2026 filing date, we presume that it is a scrivener’s error. “Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘scrivener’s error’ as a synonym for ‘clerical error.’” Odom v. Coleman, 615 S.W.3d 613, 628 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.). A “clerical error” is one “resulting from a minor mistake or inadvertence, esp. in writing or copying something on the record, and 2 May 4, 2026, that appointed an attorney to represent Taylor, permitted the attorney access to all necessary records, set a hearing date and place, and instructed the clerk of the court to “issue a notice of hearing to the proposed patient, who shall be personally served within a reasonable time prior to the time of the hearing on probable cause.” The probable cause hearing occurred on May 20, 2026. During the hearing, the trial court received a “Statement of Desire Not to Attend Proposed Final Commitment Hearing” for Taylor. The State referred to this as waiver of appearance. Taylor’s appointed counsel indicated that she had received the waiver and had no objections. The statement indicated that Taylor was “[u]nwilling to sign, in spite of expressing the desire not to attend the hearing.” Two staff members witnessed the handwritten statement3 that read: “[Taylor] stated she did not want to attend her hearing and was not signing any papers.” Following the hearing, the trial court signed an order authorizing psychoactive medication (Order). II. PRESERVATION On appeal, Taylor complains that, although the trial court’s Order contains a finding that “[a]ll necessary parties were served with a copy of the application and not from judicial reasoning or determination.” Black’s Law Dictionary 563 (7th ed. 1999). Thus, we accept Appellant’s explanation of the error and agree that it is immaterial to the disposition of this appeal. 3 The statement appears to have been written down by a third staff member, who also signed the statement. 3 written notice of time and place of this hearing,” there is no proof of this written notice in the record. However, no objection was raised to the trial court about written notice under Section 574.105(3), or about her patient’s rights under Section 574.105(4). There was likewise no objection raised on constitutional due process grounds. Rule 33.1 requires a party to preserve the issue presented on appeal by raising a timely and specific objection in the trial court. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). Even constitutional errors like due process complaints may be waived if not properly presented in the trial court. Magnuson v. Mullen, 65 S.W.3d 815, 829 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied) (citing Cannon v. Lemon, 843 S.W.2d 178, 183 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied)); cf. In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707, 711 (Tex. 2003) (holding that “allowing appellate review of unpreserved error would undermine the Legislature’s intent that cases terminating parental rights be expeditiously resolved”); In re R.A., 417 S.W.3d 569, 581 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.) (“This preservation requirement applies to a complaint that the appellant did not have adequate notice of a hearing as required by Rules 21 and 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.”). Because Taylor did not raise her constitutional due process challenge or her challenges under Section 574.105 in the trial court, and she was required to, she has waived her right to assert these complaints on appeal. See In re. J.B., 605 S.W.3d 650, 656 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (holding in an appeal from a forced administration psychoactive medication order, that to preserve error—even that related 4 to constitutional rights—the complaining party must make a timely objection in the trial court). We overrule Taylor’s sole issue. III. CONCLUSION Having overruled Taylor’s sole issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a). /s/ Brian Walker Brian Walker Justice Delivered: August 27, 2026 5