Full Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0450n.06 Case No. 25-3840 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT LODESTAR ENERGY, INC.; KENTUCKY ) FILED ) EMPLOYERS’ MUTUAL INSURANCE, Nov 12, 2026 ) Petitioners, KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) ) v. ) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A ) DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ ) DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, U.S. ) BENEFITS REVIEW BOARD DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; BONNIE ) OWENS, OBO AND WIDOW OF JOHN A. ) OWENS, OPINION ) Respondents. ) ) Before: GRIFFIN, READLER, and RITZ, Circuit Judges. RITZ, Circuit Judge. An administrative law judge (ALJ) denied benefits requested by coal miner John Owens and his spouse, Bonnie Owens, under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U.S.C. § 901, et seq. The Benefits Review Board (Board) vacated the decision and remanded. On remand, the ALJ changed course and granted benefits. Now, the employer and insurer responsible for payment petition for review of the Board’s decision affirming that grant. For the reasons set forth below, we deny the petition for review. BACKGROUND I. Statutory and legal framework The BLBA provides benefits for coal miners with pneumoconiosis, or “black lung” disease, a dust disease of the lung resulting from coal mine employment. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901, 902(b); 20 No. 25-3840, Lodestar Energy, Inc., et al. v. Dir., OWCP, et al. C.F.R. § 718.204(a); Brandywine Explosives & Supply v. Dir., OWCP, 790 F.3d 657, 661 (6th Cir. 2015). A claimant may receive benefits if he or she is “(1) a coal miner (2) who suffers from pneumoconiosis (3) arising out of [his or her] coal employment and (4) causing (5) [his or her] total disability.” Big Branch Res., Inc. v. Ogle, 737 F.3d 1063, 1069 (6th Cir. 2013); see 20 C.F.R. § 725.202(d). A survivor of a deceased miner can also claim benefits, either if the miner was eligible before death, or by proving that the miner had coal-mine related pneumoconiosis that caused the miner’s death. See 30 U.S.C. § 932(l); 20 C.F.R. § 718.205(a). A claimant must prove the elements of a benefits claim by a preponderance of the evidence, unless “aided by a presumption.” Peabody Coal Co. v. Hill, 123 F.3d 412, 416 (6th Cir. 1997). We apply a presumption of total disability from pneumoconiosis if the miner was “employed for at least fifteen years in underground coal mines” and is “totally disabled due to a respiratory or pulmonary impairment.” Big Branch Res., 737 F.3d at 1069 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4)). A claimant may establish total disability based on qualifying pulmonary function tests (PFTs), qualifying arterial blood-gas tests, medical opinions, and other specified evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(b)(2)(i)-(iv). The opposing party can rebut the presumption of total disability by showing either that the miner does not or did not have pneumoconiosis, or that the respiratory or pulmonary impairment was unrelated to coal mine employment. 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4). A district director under the United States Department of Labor’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) first determines benefits entitlement. 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.350-51, 725.418. An opposing party can then request a hearing before an ALJ. Id. §§ 725.418(c), 725.421. The ALJ’s decision can be appealed to the Board, whose ruling is subject to review by the court of appeals for the circuit where the miner’s injury took place. Id. § 725.481-82. -2- No. 25-3840, Lodestar Energy, Inc., et al. v. Dir., OWCP, et al. II. Factual and procedural background This case arises from a consolidated benefits proceeding combining the claim of miner John Owens, filed on December 22, 2014, and a survivor’s claim from his wife, Bonnie Owens, filed on October 30, 2017. We refer to John by his last name and Bonnie by her first name. Owens was born in 1951 and employed as a coal miner in Kentucky for 26 years. On September 29, 2016, the OWCP director awarded Owens benefits in a proposed decision and order. The director designated Owens’s former employer Lodestar Energy Inc., which was insured by Kentucky Employers Mutual Insurance (KEMN), as the party responsible for the payment of benefits. Lodestar then requested a hearing in front of an ALJ. After Owens passed away on September 15, 2017, the district director substituted Bonnie as the claimant. A. The ALJ’s May 2022 decision In May 2022, the ALJ reversed the director’s decision and denied benefits. Although he credited Owens with 26 years of coal mine employment, the ALJ found that there was no showing of total disability, and thus Bonnie could not invoke the rebuttable presumption to show an entitlement to benefits. The ALJ examined five PFTs, which, under 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(b)(2)(i), could establish total disability if the ALJ determined they produced qualifying values. The following chart summarizes the PFT evidence, with the ALJ’s qualifying determination in the righthand-most column: -3- No. 25-3840, Lodestar Energy, Inc., et al. v. Dir., OWCP, et al. Ex. Age/Height FEV1 FVC Ratio MVV Qualify? Pre-/Post1 Pre-/Post2 Pre-/Post3 DX A-13 63 1.54 2.84 54 71.95 Yes 3/9/2015 69" 1.74 3.01 58 92.97 No DX A-22 64 1.64 3.07 53 76 Yes 10/15/2015 69.25" 1.94 3.62 54 104 No CX M-4 65 1.45 2.48 58 58.24 Yes 11/21/2016 69" -- -- -- -- -- EX 4 65 1.77 3.10 57.2 74.5 Invalid MVV 12/9/2016 68.5" 1.79 3.16 56.5 -- No CX M-3 66 1.74 3.08 57 90.01 No 8/30/2017 69" -- -- -- -- -- Noting that none of the post-bronchodilator PFTs yielded qualifying values, and finding that the use of a bronchodilator does not adequately assess disability, the ALJ credited “the pre- bronchodilator studies over the post-bronchodilator studies.” Appx. 54, May 2022 ALJ Decision. He then stated that “[c]onsidering the improvement from qualifying to non-qualifying on the more recent PFTs . . . the preponderant weight of the PFT evidence [was] insufficient to prove that the [m]iner was totally disabled.” Id. The ALJ also determined that total disability could not be determined based on the expert medical opinions offered by the parties. In particular, the ALJ assigned no weight to the opinion of Dr. Esther Ajjarapu, who was retained by the Department of Labor, because her opinion 1 FEV1 is a PFT that determines “forced expiratory volume in one second.” Cent. Ohio Coal Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 762 F.3d 483, 491 n.3 (6th Cir. 2014). The pre- and post- values refer to the value of the test before and after the administration of a bronchodilator, “a medicine that helps with breathing.” Island Creek Coal Co. v. Wilkerson, 910 F.3d 254, 258 (6th Cir. 2018). 2 FVC is a PFT that “measure[s] the volume of air that can be blown out of the lungs after taking a full breath.” Cent. Ohio Coal Co., 762 F.3d at 491 n.3. 3 MVV refers to “maximum voluntary ventilation,” or the “total volume of air, in liters, that an individual expels over a period of one minute during maximum repetitive respiratory effort.” Peabody Coal Co. v. Dalrymple, 9 F.3d 109, 1993 WL 428793, at *2 (6th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision) (quoting Peabody Coal Co. v. Lowis, 708 F.2d 266, 270 (7th Cir. 1983)). -4- No. 25-3840, Lodestar Energy, Inc., et al. v. Dir., OWCP, et al. “fail[ed] to consider the most recent PFT evidence,” which was contrary to the ALJ’s assessment of the “weight of the PFT evidence.” Id. at 59. B. The Board’s August 2023 decision A benefits counselor, acting on behalf of Bonnie, asked the Board to review the ALJ’s decision. The Board affirmed in part and vacated in part, noting our case law holding that “it [is] irrational to credit evidence solely on the basis of recency where it shows the miner’s condition has improved.” Appx. 6, Aug. 2023 Board Decision (citing Woodward v. Dir., OWCP, 991 F.2d 314, 319-20 (6th Cir. 1993)). Here, according to the Board, the ALJ had erred in finding a lack of total disability based on the two most recent non-qualifying studies, when he had also found that the December 2016 study had invalid MVV values. The ALJ also “failed to rationally explain how” the December 2016 study could “dispute or outweigh” the three previous studies with qualifying pre-bronchodilator values. Id. As a result, the Board remanded and instructed the ALJ to (1) reconsider the pulmonary function study evidence and determine whether it supports a finding of total disability, and (2) reconsider Dr. Ajjarapu’s opinion regarding total disability because it was dependent on that pulmonary evidence. C. The ALJ’s July 2024 decision On remand, the ALJ issued a new decision awarding benefits. First, the ALJ reconsidered the PFT evidence, concluding that “[w]ithout reference to or consideration of the chronological order of the valid pre-bronchodilator PFTs in these cases, the 3 valid, qualifying pre-bronchodilator PFTs outweigh” the two most recent pre-bronchodilator PFTs. AR 65, July 2024 ALJ Decision. Additionally, the ALJ found that the three qualifying PFTs outweighed the non-qualifying August 2017 PFT with a valid MVV measurement. Thus, a “preponderance of the PFT evidence support[ed] a finding of total pulmonary or respiratory disability.” Id. -5- No. 25-3840, Lodestar Energy, Inc., et al. v. Dir., OWCP, et al. Second, the ALJ reevaluated the medical opinions. He gave Dr. Ajjarapu’s opinion “some probative weight,” as her finding of total disability was now “consistent with the preponderant weight of the PFT evidence.” Id. at 68. Thus, the medical opinion evidence also supported total disability. Owens was entitled to the presumption of total disability, which the ALJ found the employer had failed to rebut, and so survivor benefits could be awarded to Bonnie. Notably, while the ALJ reversed his previous denial, he wrote in a footnote that “were [he] not prohibited from considering the chronology of the PFTs, [he] would find that the PFT evidence does not support a finding of total respiratory or pulmonary disability” because a “more recent non-qualifying PFT is a better indicator” of the miner’s condition. Id. at 66 n.14. He also wrote in another footnote that, if he “were . . . not prohibited from considering the chronology of the PFTs,” he would “not give Dr. Ajjarapu’s opinion regarding disability any weight.” Id. at 71 n.21. D. The Board’s September 2025 decision The Board affirmed the ALJ’s second decision. In its decision, the Board reiterated that it had instructed the ALJ to explain his rationale for weighing the pulmonary function studies not because newer evidence of improvement could never be credited, but because recency could not be the sole evidentiary factor considered when a miner’s condition had improved. This timely petition for review followed. ANALYSIS I. Standard of review We review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo. See Paducah Marine Ways v. Thompson, 82 F.3d 130, 133 (6th Cir. 1996). “While we must affirm the Board’s decision unless the Board has committed legal error or exceeded its scope of review, our review actually focuses on whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Island Creek Ky. Mining v. -6- No. 25-3840, Lodestar Energy, Inc., et al. v. Dir., OWCP, et al. Ramage, 737 F.3d 1050, 1056 (6th Cir. 2013). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Kolesar v. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co., 760 F.2d 728, 729 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (citation modified). To meet this standard, an ALJ must have “adequately explained the reasons for crediting certain testimony and documentary evidence.” Huscoal, Inc. v. Dir., OWCP, 48 F.4th 480, 489 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). “We do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ.” Tenn. Consol. Coal Co. v. Kirk, 264 F.3d 602, 606 (6th Cir. 2001). Also, “we may affirm an ALJ’s decision even though ‘we would have taken a different view of the evidence were we the trier of facts.’” Big Branch Res., 737 F.3d at 1069 (quoting Ramey v. Kentland Elkhorn Coal Corp., 755 F.2d 485, 486 (6th Cir. 1985)). “A remand or reversal is only appropriate when the ALJ fails to consider all of the evidence under the proper legal standard or there is insufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s finding.” Id. (quoting McCain v. Dir., OWCP, 58 F. App’x. 184, 201 (6th Cir. 2003)). II. Discussion As a threshold matter, Lodestar asserts that the Board’s remand of the ALJ’s initial decision was procedurally improper because the appeal of that decision was untimely. But Lodestar fails to point to any evidence in the record that demonstrates that the appeal to the Board was late. We therefore turn to the merits. Lodestar argues that (1) the Board exceeded its authority when remanding the ALJ’s 2022 decision; and (2) the Board improperly applied this court’s decision in Woodward to pulmonary evidence. We address each argument before examining whether the Board otherwise properly affirmed the ALJ’s 2024 decision. -7- No. 25-3840, Lodestar Energy, Inc., et al. v. Dir., OWCP, et al. A. The Board’s initial remand First, Lodestar claims that the Board’s initial remand was improper because “the Board usurped the ALJ’s ability to consider the chronology of the pulmonary function evidence, requiring a finding of disability.” CA6 R. 18, Pet. Br., at 22. But the Board did not prohibit the ALJ from considering chronology. Rather, it asked the ALJ to explain his rationale in light of Woodward, which the Board construed as holding that it “is irrational to credit evidence solely on the basis of recency where [the evidence] shows the miner’s condition has improved.” Appx. 6, Aug. 2023 Board Decision. The Board accurately characterized Woodward. In that case, we rejected an ALJ’s denial of benefits when he declined to find disability solely based on the results of the claimant’s five most recent X-rays. Woodward, 991 F.2d at 319-20. But we did not rebuke chronology altogether. Rather, we reasoned that providing later evidence more weight—under the so-called “later evidence” rule—was helpful when the evidence facially demonstrated that “a miner’s condition has worsened.” Id. (quoting Adkins v. Dir., OWCP, 958 F.2d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 1992)). In such cases, an ALJ could “reconcile the pieces of proof” because “pneumoconiosis is a progressive disease.” Id. at 319 (citation modified). But when the evidence showed improvement, “it [was] just as likely that the later evidence [was] faulty as the earlier,” which counseled evaluating the “irreconcilable items of evidence . . . without reference to their chronological relationship.” Id. (citation modified). The ALJ in Woodward had “misapplied the later evidence rule” by relying only on recency for his denial, despite X-ray evidence showing “an improvement in the [miner’s] physical condition” that was “inconsistent with the normal course” of pneumoconiosis. Id. at 320. In this case, the Board correctly concluded that the ALJ’s initial decision was inadequate because he had failed to reconcile the conflicting PFTs “without reference to . . . chronological -8- No. 25-3840, Lodestar Energy, Inc., et al. v. Dir., OWCP, et al. order.” Appx. 6, Aug. 2023 Board Decision. Beyond recency, the ALJ did not explain why the two most recent PFTs, one of which had an invalid MVV value, outweighed the three previous qualifying PFTs with valid measurements. An ALJ must consider “all of the relevant evidence on the disability issue . . . [and] explain his consideration of it,” or otherwise “viol[ate] . . . controlling law and regulations.” Morrison v. Tenn. Consol. Coal Co., 644 F.3d 473, 480 (6th Cir. 2011). So here, the Board properly ordered the ALJ to provide a more thorough explanation that reconciled the evidence of the miner’s improvement. That is different from requiring the ALJ to find disability. See Tenn. Consol. Coal Co., 264 F.3d at 606. Lodestar’s argument to the contrary is unavailing. B. Woodward’s application to pulmonary tests Lodestar next argues that Woodward must be limited to X-rays, because such evidence concerns a diagnostic issue, which is different from a PFT’s measurement of the extent of impairment and disability. But there is no legal basis to limit Woodward in such a categorical manner. Woodward referenced the usage of the “later evidence rule” as an evidentiary principle regarding “test[s] or exam[s],” not just X-rays. 991 F.2d at 319-20. And although this court refrained, in one published opinion, from expressly deciding whether Woodward applies beyond the X-ray context, see Sunny Ridge Mining Co. v. Keathley, 773 F.3d 734, 740 (6th Cir. 2014), we have applied Woodward to a broad array of medical evidence in several unpublished decisions, see, e.g., Cumberland River Coal Co. v. Dir., OWCP, No. 25-3080, 2025 WL 2917014, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 14, 2025) (arterial blood-gas tests); Lance Coal Corp./Golden Oak Mining Co. v. Caudill, 636 F. App’x 355, 367 (6th Cir. 2016) (PFTs and arterial blood-gas studies); Worley, 1996 WL 180175, at *2 (PFTs and medical opinions). Likewise, the Fourth Circuit, whose reasoning Woodward relied upon, see 991 F.2d at 320, also applies limitations on the later evidence rule -9- No. 25-3840, Lodestar Energy, Inc., et al. v. Dir., OWCP, et al. beyond the X-ray context, see, e.g., Thorn v. Itmann Coal Co., 3 F.3d 713, 718-19 (4th Cir. 1993) (rejecting “[a] bare appeal to ‘recency’” in medical opinions); Adkins, 958 F.2d at 51 (rejecting “the [later is better] approach as applied to evidence that cannot be reconciled by reference to its sequence”); Gray v. Dir., OWCP, 943 F.2d 513, 520-21 (4th Cir. 1991) (involving arterial blood-gas studies). Given this case law, we see no error in the Board’s interpretation and application of Woodward here. Lodestar invokes Miller v. National Mines Corp., a Board decision stating that “a later non-qualifying pulmonary function study and an earlier qualifying pulmonary function study may accurately represent the miner’s respiratory condition at the time each study was taken.” CA6 R. 18, Pet. Br., at 31 (quoting BRB No. 15-0474 BLA, at 9 n.16 (BRB Aug. 15, 2016)). But Lodestar’s quotation of that decision is selective. Rather than find recency alone dispositive, the Board went on to say that “recency may be a relevant consideration, along with other factors, . . . in a qualitative analysis of the pulmonary function study evidence.” Miller, BRB No. 15-0474 BLA, at 9 n.16; see also Worley, 1996 WL 180175, at *2 (holding that “recency alone is insufficient to reconcile conflicting evidence where the most recent evidence shows that the miner has ‘improved’”). That rebuts, rather than aids, Lodestar’s argument. In any event, the Board properly applied Woodward to the PFT context.4 4 Lodestar also argues that Woodward imported its discussion of the later evidence rule from Mullins Coal Co. of Virginia v. Director, OWCP, 484 U.S. 135 (1987), which in turn was “guided by the agency-deference rule” overruled by Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024). CA6 R. 18, Pet. Br., at 32-33. But there is no indication that Mullins’s discussion of the later evidence rule stemmed from deference to the agency’s interpretation of a regulation or statute. See Mullins, 484 U.S. at 146, 151-52. - 10 - No. 25-3840, Lodestar Energy, Inc., et al. v. Dir., OWCP, et al. C. The ALJ’s decision upon remand We conclude by addressing whether the Board’s 2025 decision otherwise properly affirmed the ALJ’s decision upon remand. Again, “[a]bsent an error of law, findings of facts and conclusions flowing therefrom must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence.” Consolidation Coal Co. v. Worrell, 27 F.3d 227, 230-31 (6th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (citation modified). On remand, the ALJ evaluated the PFT evidence anew. He weighed the five PFTs again, finding that the two most recent tests did not outweigh the three qualifying older tests. And because of that finding, he shifted his opinion on Dr. Ajjarapu, giving her opinion “some probative weight.” AR 68, July 2024 ALJ Decision. That led to finding total disability based on both the PFTs and medical opinions, which in turn triggered the presumption of total disability for the miner. Substantial evidence supported that conclusion. A “reasonable mind” could accept that the qualifying pulmonary function results from March 9, 2015, October 15, 2015, and November 21, 2016 outweighed the more recent studies from December 9, 2016 and August 30, 2017, one of which had an invalid MVV value. Incoal, Inc. v. Dir., OWCP, 123 F.4th 808, 820 (6th Cir. 2024) (citation modified). And a reasonable mind could find Dr. Ajjarapu’s opinion offered some probative weight, given that it followed the tenor of the PFTs. Because the ALJ’s decision upon remand had a rational basis supported by the record, the Board was properly within its authority to affirm it. That said, the ALJ’s analysis contained two footnotes that we must address. In one footnote, he stated that “[w]ere [he] not constrained by the Board’s holding,” he would afford the most weight to the most recent tests and not make a finding of total disability. AR 65 n.14, July - 11 - No. 25-3840, Lodestar Energy, Inc., et al. v. Dir., OWCP, et al. 2024 ALJ Decision. Alternatively, he would give “equal weight” to the “recency of the valid, non-qualifying pre-bronchodilator PFT with a valid MVV measurement” and the “numerical superiority” of the three older, valid qualifying PFTs, finding that the evidence was in equipoise. Id. In another footnote, the ALJ stated that if not for the Board’s “prohibit[ion],” he would similarly decline to “give Dr. Ajjarapu’s opinion regarding disability any weight” and would not find that the medical opinion evidence established total disability. Id. at 71 n.21. These footnotes do not constitute reversible legal error. The ALJ’s overall analysis demonstrated that he understood and applied the correct legal standard. After all, the ALJ prefaced his analysis with an accurate description of Woodward: that the case “prohibit[ed] against crediting later objective testing[] over earlier objective testing, because the later testing is more recent,” specifically “when the later testing demonstrates an improvement in the miner’s condition.” Id. at 65. Faithful to that directive, the ALJ evaluated the irreconcilable PFTs “[w]ithout reference to . . . [their] chronological order” to reach his conclusion. Id.; see Woodward, 991 F.2d at 319. Any resulting error was also harmless. The “balance of the . . . decision and the record in this case” indicate that the ALJ’s decision “did not depend on [an] initial, inaccurate statement of the applicable law.” Belt v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 163 F. App’x 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Lodestar claims that the so-called prohibition on chronology tainted the ALJ’s analysis, leading him to consider quantity alone in weighing the PFT evidence, contrary to precedent. See, e.g., Woodward, 991 F.2d at 321. Yet the ALJ found total disability “based on the quality of all the PFT evidence and the numerical superiority of the valid, qualifying pre-bronchodilator PFTs.” AR 65, July 2024 ALJ Decision (emphasis added). Indeed, he considered quality both in his “discussion of the validity of the studies and the greater weight afforded to pre-bronchodilator studies over post-bronchodilator studies.” Id. - 12 - No. 25-3840, Lodestar Energy, Inc., et al. v. Dir., OWCP, et al. In sum, there is no material legal error that the Board overlooked when it affirmed the ALJ’s 2024 decision, which was supported by substantial evidence. CONCLUSION For these reasons, we deny the petition for review. - 13 -