State v. J. G. O.

No. 1024 October 21, 2026 117 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of J. G. O., a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. J. G. O., Appellant. Linn County Circuit Court 25CC02876; A187753 Michael B. Wynhausen, Judge. Argued and submitted September 22, 2026. Christopher J. O’Connor argued the cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Multnomah Defenders, Inc. Ryan Kahn, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and Pagán, Judge. PAGÁN, J. Affirmed. 118 State v. J. G. O. PAGÁN, J. Appellant challenges an order of the circuit court hospitalizing him due to mental illness under ORS 426.005(1)(f) (2023) (Dangerous to Others), amended by Or Laws 2025, ch 559, § 5. He raises one assignment of error: that he was deprived of a fair trial because his appointed attorney’s performance was constitutionally inadequate under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. For the following reasons, we affirm. Appellant was cited in May 2025 for hospitaliza- tion based upon allegations that he posed a threat to others pursuant to ORS 426.005(1)(f) (2023). Specifically, the cita- tion alleged that appellant made threats to family members with makeshift weapons due to psychosis and delusions. The trial court appointed an attorney for appellant and an investigator to conduct the pre-hearing investigation. After holding the hearing, the trial court found appellant posed a danger to others and ordered appellant hospitalized. He now appeals, arguing that counsel’s perfor- mance during the hearing was inadequate such that he was deprived of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Analysis We review a civil commitment proceeding for whether it comported with the applicable statutes and due process for legal error. See State v. C. C. N., 334 Or App 224, 226, 555 P3d 346 (2024) (reviewing for legal error whether the trial court complied with the pre-commitment statutes and whether any non-compliance with the statutes violated due process). At the outset, appellant acknowledges that no court, let alone the Oregon Supreme Court, has held that a per- son may challenge the adequacy of the performance of an attorney who is appointed to represent the person in a civil commitment matter. In support of the assignment of error, appellant makes two arguments: first, that Oregon courts should adopt the ineffective assistance of counsel standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 104 S Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 117 (2026) 119 Ct 2052, 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984), that is applied to attorneys appointed in criminal matters; and second, in the alterna- tive, that we should extend the holding of State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Geist, 310 Or 176 (1990), that respondents in termi- nation of parental rights proceedings are entitled to “funda- mentally fair” representation. In opposition, the state points out—accurately— that appellant’s arguments are undeveloped, particularly in light of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319, 96 S Ct 893, 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976), which requires a court to engage in a three- step analysis to determine whether someone has a constitu- tional right to challenge counsel’s performance.1 Appellant did not present the trial court or our court with any argu- ment or briefing about the Mathews factors. We therefore reject appellant’s due process claim of error as inadequately developed. See Cunningham v. Thompson, 188 Or App 289, 297, 71 P3d 110, 114 (2003) (“Ordinarily, the appellate courts of this state will decline to address an undeveloped argu- ment. “). Regarding appellant’s alternative argument, we must reject it for similar reasons. That is, in Geist, to the extent the Oregon Supreme Court established any rights to effective counsel, the analysis included discussing the Mathews factors in supporting the conclusion. Geist, 310 Or at 189-90. Without having arguments below regarding the factors, or substantial briefing in this court about how either of appellant’s arguments meet the factors set for in Mathews, we conclude that appellant’s arguments fail to establish a due process violation in this particular case, and affirm. Affirmed. 1 1 Those three factors are: (1) the private interest at issue; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) the state’s interest, including “the function involved and the fiscal and adminis- trative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. “ Id. at 335.