Obu v. State Med. Bd.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 13, 2026
DocketL-26-00037
JudgeMayle
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as Obu v. State Med. Bd., 2026-Ohio-4514.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
Fidelis I. Obu Court of Appeals No. {48}L-26-00037
Appellant Trial Court No. CI0202404636
v.
State Medical Board of Ohio DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellee Decided: November 13, 2026
*****
Jon D. Richardson, for appellant.
Andy Wilson, State of Ohio Attorney General,
D. Grant Wilson and Katherin Bockbrader,
Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
*****
MAYLE, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Dr. Fidelis Obu, appeals the February 11, 2026, Opinion
and Judgment Entry of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, which affirmed the
State Medical Board of Ohio’s (“the Board”) decision to permanently revoke his medical
license and fine him $20,000.00. On appeal, Obu argues that his punishment was “overly
harsh and unfair” and asks this court “to right this wrong and modify this penalty.” For
the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the Lucas County Court of Common
Pleas.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} As will be explained further below, after the Board notified Obu that it
intended to take disciplinary action against him, the matter proceeded to hearing.
Ultimately, a hearing examiner issued the following findings of fact, which were
subsequently adopted by the trial court. Neither the findings themselves nor the trial
court’s adoption of these findings is at issue on appeal.
1. Between 2014 and 2017, Dr. Obu successfully completed an internal
medicine residency. During part of his residency program, Dr. Obu
worked with Patient 1[1], a medical assistant.
2. On November 4, 2015, Patient 1 was hospitalized following the birth of
her child. Dr. Obu, then a resident, consulted on Patient l’s high blood
pressure prior to her discharge. This was the only time Dr. Obu treated
Patient 1 as a patient. Upon reviewing Dr. Obu’s consult note and
examining the patient, the attending physician noted that Patient 1 could
be discharged and should follow up with her primary care physician.
3. Dr. Obu and Patient 1 fell out of contact after he completed his
residency program. In late August 2019, Dr. Obu and Patient 1 became
friends on Facebook.
4. Patient 1 and Dr. Obu agreed to have Patient 1 come to Dr. Obu’ s new
home on the evening of October 2, 2019.
5. While Patient 1 was in his home, Dr. Obu attempted to force Patient 1 to
drink an alcoholic beverage. He then tried to remove her shirt, touching
her breasts over her bra.
6. Dr. Obu forced Patient 1 down onto a mattress in his living room, held
her down by her throat, and attempted to remove her pants. Patient 1
tried to push Dr. Obu off of her with one hand while using the other to
prevent him from removing her pants. Patient 1 felt Dr. Obu’s erect
penis on her leg.
7. Dr. Obu let Patient 1 up from the mattress, and Patient 1 moved towards
the front door of Dr. Obu’ s home. Dr. Obu got in front of Patient 1,
locked the front door, and would not move out of Patient l’s way until
Patient 1 called her daughter.
1
Throughout these proceedings, the Board, the trial court, and the parties have referred to
the victim as “Patient 1.” For consistency, we do the same.
2.
8. After Patient 1 exited his home, Dr. Obu followed her to her car and
prevented her from closing her car door for a short time. He eventually
released the car door, and Patient 1 was able to drive away.
***
A. Criminal Charges and Plea
{¶ 3} Patient 1 reported the incident and a criminal investigation began. Nearly
four years later, on September 12, 2023, a Lucas County grand jury indicted Obu on one
count of Gross Sexual Imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05, a felony of the fourth
degree, and one count of Abduction in violation of R.C. 2905.02, a felony of the third
degree. State v. Obu, Lucas C.P. No. G-4801-CR-202302404-000.
{¶ 4} On April 5, 2024, Obu pled guilty to unlawful restraint in violation of R.C.
2905.03(A) and (C), a misdemeanor of the third degree. In exchange, the original
charges were dismissed.
B. The Board’s Charges, Investigation, and Decision
{¶ 5} While Obu’s criminal investigation was ongoing, Obu was also the subject
of an investigation with the State Medical Board of Ohio.
{¶ 6} On August 9, 2023, the Board notified Obu that it intended to determine
whether to take disciplinary action against his license to practice medicine and surgery in
Ohio. In this notice, the Board stated four violations against Obu: three charges under
R.C. 4731.22(B)(10), for acts constituting a felony (specifically, Gross Sexual
Imposition, Kidnapping and Abduction), and one charge under R.C. 4731.22(B)(20), for
a violation of the Board’s sexual-misconduct rule, Adm.Code 4731-26-02, which
prohibits sexual conduct with a patient.
3.
{¶ 7} Obu requested a hearing on the charges against him. In May 2024, a three-
day hearing was held before a hearing examiner. At the hearing, Obu testified and denied
any sexual advances towards Patient 1. He claimed that they met at his home, had a short
conversation, and Patient 1 left without any issues.
{¶ 8} On October 22, 2024, the hearing examiner issued a Report and
Recommendation concluding that (1) Obu did not commit a violation of the Board’s
sexual misconduct rule because Patient 1 was no longer a patient of his, but (2) Obu
committed acts constituting the felonies of Gross Sexual Imposition (R.C. 2907.05),
Kidnapping (R.C. 2905.01), and Abduction (R.C. 2905.02), and therefore violated R.C.
4731.22(B)(10), which provides that the Board may “limit, revoke, or suspend” the
medical license of a licensed professional for “[c]ommission of an act that constitutes a
felony in this state, regardless of the jurisdiction in which the act was committed.” The
hearing examiner found that Obu’s actions were “unconscionable” and that “[d]octors are
trusted by society, and that trust has to be preserved. Someone who has committed acts
such as these is not someone who is worthy of such trust.” Accordingly, the hearing
examiner recommended a permanent revocation of Obu’s license to practice medicine,
and a monetary fine of $20,000.
{¶ 9} The Board considered the Report and Recommendation at its November 13,
2024, public meeting. After discussion, the Board voted unanimously (with two
members abstaining) to adopt the proposed order and the proposed sanction of a $20,000
fine and permanent revocation of Obu’s medical license. The Board issued an
Adjudication Order adopting the recommendations the same day.
4.
C. Obu’s Appeal to the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas
{¶ 10} After the Board issued its order adopting the recommendations of the
Hearing Officer, Dr. Obu filed an administrative appeal in the Lucas County Court of
Common Pleas. In his appeal, Dr. Obu argued that “the Order of the Board is not
supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence and is not in accordance with
the law.”
{¶ 11} On February 11, 2026, the trial court issued an Opinion and Judgment
Entry finding that the Board’s order was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence and is in accordance with law, and subsequently affirmed the Board’s order. To
support this conclusion, the trial court stated that it carefully reviewed all the evidence
and found that:
The testimony of Patient 1 is clear that even though she and Appellant were
having drinks that night, once Appellant began to get physical with her she
wanted to leave and felt uncomfortable, however, Appellant continued to
force himself upon her in a sexual way until Patient 1 was able to get her
daughter on her phone and leave Appellant’s home. However, Appellant
followed Patient 1 to her car and again refused to let go of Patient 1’s car
door to allow her to leave.
Dr. Obu appealed the trial court’s decision, and assigned the following error for our
review:
Fidelis I. Obu appeals from the Order issued by the Ohio State Medical
Board and upheld by the Honorable Kenneth Walz of the Lucas County
Court of Common Pleas on February 11, 2026, revoking his license to
practice medicine in the state of Ohio.
5.
II. Analysis
{¶ 12} Notably, although Obu previously denied all allegations of sexual
wrongdoing before the Board and the trial court, he now expressly concedes that “the
Agency’s findings were correct.” In his brief to this court, Obu admits that he lied “to
save the life he had built, his marriage, his career, his family and the future he had
planned for them, not to mention all those years of study.” He explains that “[i]t was all
on the block. … For what? A fling? A modicum of excitement while he was living alone,
a distraction until he could bring his family down from Windsor and begin their life in
Toledo?” At the hearing, “[i]n a kind of frozen panic, he determined that he had to deny
it all, everything but the flirting… [i]n retrospect, for many reasons, he should have told
the truth.” He admits that he was “slow to adhere” to the rule that “no means no.”
{¶ 13} While Obu admits the alleged misconduct, he nonetheless argues that the
Board’s sanction—i.e., the permanent revocation of his medical license—was too severe.
He claims that “the hearing officer turned a blind eye to evidence that could and should
have affected the punishment she meted out to Dr. Obu.” He acknowledges that “his
behavior cannot be countenanced,” but maintains “it should have been more fairly
weighted.” In other words, Obu contends that, despite the correctness of the Board’s
factual findings of misconduct, the trial court should have tailored the sanction to the
circumstances and imposed a less severe penalty. He argues that “[t]he law affords this
Court the power to right this wrong and modify this penalty.”
{¶ 14} Contrary to Obu’s arguments, the scope of judicial review in an
administrative appeal is quite limited: neither the common pleas court nor this Court may
6.
substitute its judgment for that of the agency on matters committed to the agency’s
discretion. Pons v. Ohio St. Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 (1993) (“[w]hen reviewing
a medical board’s order, courts must accord due deference to the board’s interpretation of
the technical and ethical requirements of its profession.”).
{¶ 15} Under R.C. 119.12(N), the common pleas court may uphold the order if it
is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence, and is in accordance with
the law. During the court’s review, “‘an agency’s findings of fact are presumed to be
correct and must be deferred to by a reviewing court unless that court determines that the
agency’s findings are internally inconsistent, impeached by evidence of a prior
inconsistent statement, rest upon improper inferences, or are otherwise unsupportable.’”
Bartchy v. State Bd. of Edn., 2008-Ohio-4826, ¶ 37, quoting Ohio Historical Soc. v. State
Emp. Relations Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 466, 471 (1993). But, while the trial court must defer
to the agency’s findings of fact, “‘it must construe the law on its own.’” Id. at ¶ 38,
quoting Ohio Historical Soc. at 471. Importantly, in Henry’s Cafe, Inc. v. Bd. of Liquor
Control, 170 Ohio St. 233 (1959), paragraph two of the syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court
clarified that a trial court has the power to “modify” an agency’s order under R.C.
119.12(N) only in “the absence of a finding that the order is supported by reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence.” In other words, if the trial court finds that sufficient
evidence and the law support an agency’s decision, the trial court “lacks authority to
review the agency’s exercise of discretion, even if its decision is ‘admittedly harsh.’”
Capital Care Network of Toledo v. Ohio Dept. of Health, 2018-Ohio-440, ¶ 25.
7.
{¶ 16} The role of an appellate court is even “‘more limited than that of a trial
court reviewing the same order.’” Rossford Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State
Bd. of Edn., 63 Ohio St. 3d 705, 707 (1992), quoting Lorain City School Dist. Bd. of Edn.
v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 40 Ohio St.3d 257, 261 (1998). Our sole function is to
determine if the Court of Common Pleas abused its discretion in its review of an agency’s
decision. Pons, 66 Ohio St.3d at 621. An abuse of discretion connotes that the trial
court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5
Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). An unreasonable decision is one that lacks sound reasoning
to support the decision. Hageman v. Bryan City Schools, 2019-Ohio-223, ¶ 13 (10th
Dist.). “An arbitrary decision is one that lacks adequate determining principle and is not
governed by any fixed rules or standard.” Id., citing Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, LLP
v. Frutta del Mondo, Ltd., 2008-Ohio-3567, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.). And an unconscionable
decision is one “that affronts the sense of justice, decency, or reasonableness.” Id.
“Absent an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, a court of appeals may not
substitute its judgment for those of the medical board or a trial court. Instead, the
appellate court must affirm the trial court’s judgment.” Pons at 621, citing Lorain City
School Dist. Bd. of Edn. at 260-261.
{¶ 17} Here, while Obu may believe his punishment is disproportionate to his
actions, we lack any authority to “modify” the Board’s order based on nothing more than
Obu’s disagreement with the severity of his sanction. Indeed, under Henry’s Café, the
trial court also lacked authority to modify the Board’s sanction once it concluded that the
“November 13, 2024 Adjudication Order is supported by reliable, probative, and
8.
substantial evidence and is in accordance with the law” as required by R.C. 119.12(N).
Obu attempts to circumvent the controlling authority of Henry’s Cafe by arguing that it
does not apply because “this is not about abuse of discretion. It is about a failure of
proof.” However, this argument fails seeing that Obu admits in the same brief to
engaging in the behavior—i.e., the proof—that supported the Board’s decision.
{¶ 18} Based on the findings that he admits “were correct,” the Board had clear
legal authority under R.C. 4731.22(B)(10) to permanently revoke Obu’s medical license
because the admitted facts establish his “[c]ommission of an act that constitutes a felony
in this state….” While R.C. 4731.22 grants the Board authority to impose a range of
sanctions, including the permanent revocation of a physician’s license, “[t]he discretion
granted to the board in imposing a wide range of potential sanctions reflects the deference
due to the board’s expertise in carrying out its statutorily granted authority over the
medical profession.” Demint v. State Med. Bd., 2016-Ohio-3531, ¶ 63 (10th Dist.). For
this reason, “if the common pleas court concludes that the board’s order was supported by
reliable, probative, and substantial evidence, it is precluded from modifying the penalty
imposed if the penalty was authorized by law.” Angerbauer v. State Med. Bd., 2017-Ohio-
7420, ¶ 46 (10th Dist.), citing Demint at ¶ 63.
{¶ 19} We therefore affirm the trial court’s decision because the Board’s penalty
was authorized by R.C. 4731.22, and Obu does not dispute that the underlying factual
findings of misconduct were “correct,” i.e., supported by reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence. Our limited scope of review does not permit us to substitute our
judgment for the Board’s as to the appropriate sanction for Obu’s conduct.
9.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 20} Based on our review of the record and the applicable law, we find Obu’s
sole assignment of error not well-taken.
{¶ 21} Accordingly, we affirm the February 11, 2026, Opinion and Judgment
Entry of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas. Obu is ordered to pay any costs of
this appeal under App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Christine E. Mayle, J. ____________________________
JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
CONCUR. ____________________________
JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, J.
CONCURS AND WRITES ____________________________
SEPARATELY. JUDGE
DUHART, J., concurring,
{¶ 22} I concur with the majority opinion because I believe I am confined by our
standard of review to do so.
{¶ 23} I write separately to express my concern with the punishment and the
procedure that permits an Administrative Board to make independent findings of felony-
10.
level conduct after the criminal system previously resolved the matter through a plea
agreement resulting in a finding of guilty to misdemeanor-level conduct.
{¶ 24} I believe the Administrative Board’s procedure, which relies on the same
underlying conduct for which Obu was criminally adjudicated to misdemeanor-level
conduct, has the hallmarks of a due process violation by exposing Obu to the most severe
consequence (license revocation) for felony-level conduct never criminally adjudicated.
{¶ 25} Also, I believe the Administrative Board’s punishment in reliance on the
same underlying conduct for which Obu was criminally adjudicated to misdemeanor-level
conduct, not felony-level conduct, constitutes a form of punitive overreach.
{¶ 26} However despite my concerns, ultimately Obu admitted to the
Administrative Board’s factual findings, and the sanction imposed is permitted by R.C.
4731.22(B), therefore I concur in the majority’s opinion.
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
11.