Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT LORENZETTA WHITFIELD, No. 25-11 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:24-cv-04136-JPR v. MEMORANDUM* FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Jean Rosenbluth, Magistrate Judge, Presiding Submitted June 10, 2026 ** Pasadena, California Before: BYBEE, COLLINS, and BRESS, Circuit Judges. Claimant Lorenzetta Whitfield appeals the district court’s decision affirming an administrative law judge’s (ALJ) denial of her application for disability insurance benefits. In June 2014, Whitfield applied for benefits on the basis of a * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). disability she alleged commenced in November 2013. As part of the requisite five- step evaluation to determine if an individual is disabled, 20 C.F.R § 404.1520(a)(4), the ALJ determined that she was not disabled because she retained the residual functional capacity to perform her past work as a telephone dispatcher. On appeal, Whitfield argues that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinions of two examining physicians whose assessments of Whitfield’s impairments were contradicted by more recent medical opinions. Pointing to the testimony of a vocational expert witness, Whitfield also claims that the ALJ’s determination that she could still perform her past work, with a limitation to frequent handling and fingering, is not supported by substantial evidence. We review the district court’s judgment de novo, Farlow v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 485, 487 (9th Cir. 2022), and review the Social Security Administration’s factual findings for substantial evidence, Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 99 (2019). 1. The ALJ stated specific and legitimate reasons for discounting the opinions of two physicians who concluded that Whitfield had more significant limitations. In assessing whether a person is disabled, the ALJ must “always consider the medical opinions in [the claimant’s] case record together with the rest of the relevant evidence [the agency] receive[s].” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b). The ALJ 2 25-11 must provide “specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record” for rejecting contradicted medical opinions from a treating doctor. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 1 The ALJ properly accorded “less weight” to the opinion of a physician who examined Whitfield in January 2012, nearly two years before the alleged onset of her disability. That physician diagnosed Whitfield with carpal tunnel syndrome. The ALJ discounted this opinion “because it was from an examination performed well prior to the alleged onset date and the diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome was not confirmed by others or by objective testing in a number of situations.” The ALJ articulated a specific and legitimate reason for giving less weight to this opinion. The results of an evaluation conducted almost two years before the alleged onset date of Whitfield’s disability are not more authoritative than the contradicting opinions of more recent treating physicians. Batson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (disregarding the opinion of a treating physician because it “was contradicted by other statements and assessments of [the claimant’s] medical condition”). And here, other examining doctors found “no evidence of carpal tunnel disease” and concluded that Whitfield 1 The newer regulations in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c do not apply because Whitfield filed her original claim before March 27, 2017. See Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2022). 3 25-11 could “return to work [at a] sedentary job.” Whitfield additionally did not complain of any musculoskeletal pain or swelling during numerous primary care physician visits between April 2016 and July 2018. Moreover, Whitfield’s extensive duties as the primary caregiver for her disabled sister militate against the alleged severity of her impairments. In sum, the ALJ’s dismissal of the physician’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence in the record. The ALJ also did not err in giving “little weight” to the opinion of another physician who determined in January 2014 that she was “incapacitated” for a “probable duration” of less than six months. The ALJ discounted this opinion on the grounds that a finding of “‘incapacity’ . . . is an issue reserved for the Commissioner.” Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1), “[a] statement by a medical source that [the claimant is] ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that [the agency] will determine that [the claimant is] disabled.” And in any event, as the district court noted, the opinion could not support a finding that Whitfield was disabled because the projected six-month duration did not meet the twelve-month duration requirement in the Social Security regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509. 2. The ALJ properly relied on vocational witness testimony to find that Whitfield, even when limited to “frequent” bilateral fingering and handling, had the residual functional capacity to perform her past work. According to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), “frequent” activity occurs from “1/3 to 4 25-11 2/3 of the time,” while constant activity occurs “2/3 or more of the time.” U.S. Dep’t of Labor, App. C, § IV, Dictionary of Occupational Titles (4th ed. 1991), 1991 WL 688702. At this stage of the inquiry, the claimant bears the burden to prove he or she lacks the capacity to perform past relevant work. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). For guidance, “ALJs often seek the views of ‘vocational experts,’” who “are professionals under contract with SSA to provide impartial testimony in agency proceedings.” Biestek, 587 U.S. at 100 (citation omitted). The testimony of vocational experts “may count as substantial evidence even when unaccompanied by supporting data.” Id. at 105. Whitfield claims that the “vocational witness conceded” that the ALJ’s limitation to “frequent” handling and fingering would preclude performance of her past work. As support, she notes that the witness answered in the negative when her counsel asked whether an individual with Whitfield’s limitations would be able to perform her past work if limited to using her “upper extremities reaching, handling, and fingering bilaterally in combination not more than 67% of the day.” Whitfield’s claims are unpersuasive. First, her counsel’s hypothetical referred to “reaching, handling, and fingering,” not handling and fingering alone. Second, the vocational expert testified that the DOT treats frequent activities as individually frequent, rather than frequent in combination with other activities. 5 25-11 There is no indication in the record that the ALJ intended for the modifier “frequent” to apply to handling and fingering in the aggregate. The vocational expert’s testimony is thus consistent with the ALJ’s limitation. See Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 775 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The ALJ was not bound to accept hypothetical questions that were more restrictive than those posed by him.”). AFFIRMED. 6 25-11