Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 18 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JILL T., No. 24-7344 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:23-cv-01065-WHO v. MEMORANDUM* CALIFORNIA PHYSICIANS' SERVICE, dba Blue Shield of California, Defendant - Appellee, and EAST WEST BANK, Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California William Horsley Orrick, District Judge, Presiding Submitted November 16, 2026** San Francisco, California Before: S.R. THOMAS, FRIEDLAND, and BRESS, Circuit Judges. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). In this Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) action, Plaintiff Jill T. appeals the district court’s judgment in favor of Defendant California Physicians’ Service (“Blue Shield”). After Blue Shield denied coverage for inpatient mental health treatment received by Plaintiff’s minor son, M.F., Plaintiff sued Blue Shield seeking benefits due under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), and equitable relief for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing de novo the “district court’s choice and application of the standard of review to decisions by fiduciaries” and reviewing for clear error the “underlying findings of fact,” Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc), we affirm. 1. Assuming Blue Shield breached its duty under ERISA to engage in a meaningful dialogue with Plaintiff before denying her claims, see id. at 974, the error was harmless. “Ordinarily, a claimant who suffers because of a fiduciary’s failure to comply with ERISA’s procedural requirements is entitled to no substantive remedy,” but rather is at most entitled to a remand for reconsideration under the proper procedures. Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1353 (9th Cir. 1984), abrogated on other grounds by Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989); see also Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds by Watkins v. 2 24-7344 Westinghouse Hanford Co., 12 F.3d 1517, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993). We “decline[] to remand” for reprocessing by the plan, however, “where it would be a ‘useless formality’ because the administrator’s alleged error did not prejudice the claimant or it was clear that the claimant was ineligible for benefits.” Wit v. United Behavioral Health, 79 F.4th 1068, 1084 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Ellenburg, 763 F.2d at 1096). Plaintiff has not shown that Blue Shield’s errors prejudiced her ability to present medical necessity evidence. During the external independent medical review (“IMR”), which addressed only the medical necessity issue, Plaintiff submitted thousands of pages of new evidence to the California Department of Managed Health Care (“DMHC”) that Blue Shield had not previously considered. Considering that evidence, the DMHC concluded that M.F.’s treatment at certain residential mental health treatment facilities was not medically necessary. Before the district court, Plaintiff relied on that same expanded record to argue that M.F.’s treatment was medically necessary. Plaintiff could have sought to supplement the record further but failed to do so. See Friedrich v. Intel Corp., 181 F.3d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting extrinsic medical evidence where the plan administrator had improperly “prevented” the submission of evidence and “limited [the claimant] to an administrative record” that was partial, “illegible[,] and disorganized”). 3 24-7344 Considering the record de novo, the district court agreed with the IMR that Plaintiff had not shown that M.F.’s treatment was medically necessary. Jill T. v. Cal. Physicians Serv., 755 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1243-46 (N.D. Cal. 2024). On appeal, Plaintiff’s Opening Brief expressly declined to challenge that factual finding. Her challenge to that finding is therefore forfeited. See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003). But even if we overlooked that forfeiture and reached the medical necessity arguments Plaintiff later raised in her Reply Brief, those arguments fail to show that the district court’s factual finding was clearly erroneous. Plaintiff does not offer any reason to believe that a different conclusion would be reached if Blue Shield reprocessed her claims. Because remanding would be a “useless formality,” Ellenburg, 763 F.2d at 1096, we affirm the judgment on Plaintiff’s benefits claim. 2. We also affirm the judgment on Plaintiff’s fiduciary duty claim. “Section 1132(a)(3) is a ‘catchall’ provision that allows appropriate equitable relief for injuries that [29 U.S.C.] § 1132 does not otherwise remedy.” Wit, 79 F.4th at 1086 (emphasis added) (quoting Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511- 12 (1996)). Plaintiff seeks two remedies: reimbursement and reprocessing. Reimbursement, which could be characterized as an equitable “surcharge,” requires a “showing of actual harm” caused by the fiduciary’s breach, which Plaintiff has not made here. CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 442, 444 4 24-7344 (2011). And Plaintiff has not “explain[ed] or refer[red] to precedent showing how reprocessing constitutes relief that was typically available in equity.” Wit, 79 F.4th at 1086. AFFIRMED. 5 24-7344