Gallagher v. Bisignano
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 10, 2026
Docket25-6801
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 10 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TIMOTHY GALLAGHER, No. 25-6801
D.C. No.
Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:24-cv-00040-KLD
v.
MEMORANDUM*
FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Kathleen Louise DeSoto, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 15, 2026**
Missoula, Montana
Before: TALLMAN, BRESS, and FORREST, Circuit Judges;
Dissent by Judge BRESS
Plaintiff-Appellant Timothy Gallagher suffered a traumatic brain injury that
causes seizures and other neurological complications. After his injury, he worked
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
semi-skilled jobs, including as a convenience store clerk from 2015 to 2021.
Gallagher appeals the district court’s affirmance of the administrative law judge’s
(ALJ) denial of his application for supplemental social security income and social
security disability insurance benefits. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and we affirm.
We review the agency’s denial of benefits de novo for substantial evidence.
Ahearn v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2020). In doing so, we consider the
“entire record.” Id. Substantial-evidence review is not a demanding standard; it
requires only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019). We must not
“reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ.” Ahearn, 988
F.3d at 1115.
Gallagher raises four arguments. He first challenges the ALJ’s failure to
discuss whether he is per se disabled based on epilepsy at step three of the agency’s
“five-step sequential evaluation process” for determining disability. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The rest of Gallagher’s arguments concern the
ALJ’s findings related to his residual functional capacity (RFC) at step four.
1. An ALJ need not directly discuss a claimant’s classification for a per se
disability under step three so long as the evidence relevant to determining whether
the claimant is disabled is discussed and evaluated. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503,
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512–14 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, the ALJ did not directly discuss Gallagher’s epilepsy
symptoms at step three, but the ALJ did discuss Gallagher’s seizure disorder in detail
in reaching its decision. And the record does not establish that Gallagher satisfies
the requirements for per se disability based on epilepsy. See 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404.
Subpt. P, App. 1 § 11.02.
2. Gallagher argues that the ALJ erred by discounting his subjective
testimony about the severity, intensity, and limiting effect of his physical and neuro-
cognitive conditions in assessing his RFC. Where objective medical evidence
supports the claimant’s asserted symptoms, the ALJ may discount the claimant’s
testimony concerning the severity or intensity of those symptoms only for clear and
convincing reasons. Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 497 (9th Cir. 2022). The ALJ
did so here.
The ALJ found inconsistency between Gallagher’s testimony about the extent
of his back problems and the objective medical findings, his conservative pain
management, and his work history and job duties as a store clerk. This finding is
supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ then acknowledged Gallagher’s history of seizures but rejected that
seizures prevent him from working. The ALJ noted that Gallagher suffered only four
seizures at work during his six years employed as a store clerk, even though
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Gallagher reported suffering “at least three to four [seizures] a year.”1 The ALJ also
concluded that the record indicated Gallagher’s “medications have generally been
good at controlling his seizures since the alleged onset date.” These findings are
supported by evidence that a “reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
[the] conclusion.” Biestek, 587 U.S. at 103. For example, while Gallagher reported
to a medical provider in December 2022 that he suffered “3 big seizures since
December 2021,” the medical record identifies only two events in that period, one
of which the treating provider indicated was likely “syncope and not a seizure”
because no seizure activity was observed and Gallagher “woke up right away after
being laid down to the floor.” Gallagher also reported during a routine medical
appointment in May 2022 that he had not had a seizure for nearly eight months. This
evidence reasonably supports the ALJ’s conclusion that the frequency of Gallagher’s
seizures had dissipated where the medical records documented three seizures in
2019. Additionally, Gallagher reported to his doctor in December 2022 that he was
taking his medications and that they were helping him.
Finally, the ALJ found no persuasive evidence that Gallagher’s
neurocognitive condition had deteriorated since he worked as a store clerk and
1
The ALJ noted that Gallagher was fired from his store clerk position because
of his seizures. However, the evidence in the record is Gallagher’s testimony that he
was fired from this position because he took too much time off and did not file the
correct paperwork related to a back injury.
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correctly noted that Gallagher had “not sought any additional treatment” for this
condition. The ALJ noted that Gallagher was not terminated from his store clerk job
due to his neurological condition and that his reported daily activities were
inconsistent with the claim that he cannot perform any work. Again, these
conclusions are supported by evidence in the record. Therefore, we do not disturb
the ALJ’s treatment of Gallagher’s symptom testimony.
3. Gallagher also challenges the ALJ’s rejection of three medical opinions
to the extent they concluded that Gallagher is limited to performing unskilled work.
In assessing the persuasiveness of a medical opinion, the agency must primarily
focus on how well the opinion is supported by objective medical findings and how
consistent the opinion is with the other medical and nonmedical evidence in the
record. Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 791–92 (9th Cir. 2022). The ALJ found
problems on both metrics because evidence showed that Gallagher was able to
perform semi-skilled work for many years despite his seizure disorder and related
neurological symptoms and the medical evidence did not indicate that Gallagher’s
condition had declined since he worked as a store clerk. Indeed, one of the relevant
medical sources reported that Gallagher did “surprising well” on cognitive testing
“in view of what he described” and noted that Gallagher’s “history would seem to
imply that he is capable of gainful activity.” Again, we find no basis to disrupt the
ALJ’s assessment of the evidence.
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4. Finally, Gallagher challenges the ALJ’s conclusion that he remains
capable of working as a store clerk. For reasons already discussed, this argument
fails. While Gallagher’s conditions warrant limiting his RFC in both exertion and
skill, substantial evidence, including his prior work history, supports the ALJ’s
conclusion that Gallagher remains capable of working as a store clerk.
AFFIRMED.
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FILED
Gallagher v. Bisignano, 25-6801 NOV 10 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
BRESS, Circuit Judge, dissenting: U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I would have remanded this matter to the ALJ because I cannot discern
sufficient support for the ALJ’s reasoning as to Gallagher’s seizures, which affects
the ALJ’s residual functional capacity (RFC) determination. I do not read the ALJ
to be discounting Gallagher’s self-reports about the frequency of his seizures.
Instead, the ALJ appeared to base his findings on the fact that (1) Gallagher’s
seizures have not regularly occurred at work, and (2) Gallagher’s “seizure
occurrence has decreased significantly since the alleged onset date.”
The first basis appears unsupported because the record does not establish the
trigger for Gallagher’s seizures. Absent a more verifiable cause for Gallagher’s
seizures, it is not clear that the place where the seizures occurred (at work versus
elsewhere) should have a bearing on Gallagher’s RFC. Adding to the confusion is
the ALJ’s unelaborated acknowledgment that, according to Gallagher, he was asked
to resign as a store clerk in part because of his seizures. The majority cites
Gallagher’s testimony that he was fired from the store clerk position because he did
not file correct paperwork. But it is not apparent the ALJ relied on this testimony
about paperwork, instead noting that Gallagher “was asked to resign due to his back
pain and seizure issues.” And if we are considering Gallagher’s testimony, he also
1
testified that he was asked to leave his prior job at a hair salon because of his seizures.
Gallagher’s testimony thus does not clear up issues.
As to the decrease in seizures, it is again unclear if this is supported in the
record. If the ALJ did not discount Gallagher’s self-report of three to five seizures
per year, it is not apparent they would be decreasing over time. Further, the record
provides examples of at least seven documented seizures (possibly eight since the
October 2022 incident was not ruled out as a seizure) spanning June 2019 to October
2022. With two (possibly three) seizures occurring after the alleged onset date (July
2021), this does not seem like a meaningful reduction in the frequency of seizures.
At the very least, I have difficulty seeing how the record reflects a “significant[]”
decrease in seizure occurrence, as the ALJ found. Although there is some evidence
that medication may help Gallagher’s seizures, it is not apparent that the medical
records support the ALJ’s finding that the “medications have generally been good at
controlling his seizures since the alleged onset date.”
Due to these uncertainties in the ALJ’s decision and my difficulty discerning
the basis for the ALJ’s reasoning, I would have remanded for further proceedings
before the ALJ, so that the RFC determination can be made based on a firmer
assessment of the nature and extent of Gallagher’s seizures.
2