In the Matter of: A.R.

10/06/2026 DA 24-0335 Case Number: DA 24-0335 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2026 MT 236 IN THE MATTER OF: A.R., Respondent and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, In and For the County of Gallatin, Cause No. DI-24-11B Honorable Rienne H. McElyea, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Tammy A. Hinderman, Appellate Defender Division Administrator, Kathryn Grear Hutchison, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Cori Losing, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Audrey Cromwell, Gallatin County Attorney, Abby Eskin, Deputy County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana Submitted on Briefs: July 29, 2026 Decided: October 6, 2026 Filed: __________________________________________ Clerk Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Appellant A.R. (A.R.) appeals from the April 2, 2024 Order for Commitment entered by the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, which committed her to the Montana State Hospital (MSH) in Warm Springs, Montana, for a period of 90 days. We address: Whether the District Court erred by relying on hearsay evidence referenced in the examining professional person’s testimony as the basis for involuntary commitment. ¶2 We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶3 A.R. attended and obtained a master’s degree at Oregon State University. Following her divorce in March of 2023, A.R. moved from Oregon back to West Yellowstone, her hometown. A.R. has intermittently received mental health treatment since 2019. Doctor Samone Franzese, MD, has been A.R.’s primary care physician since July 2023 and has prescribed A.R. antipsychotic medications. However, A.R. reportedly ceased taking her medication periodically due to the belief that they are “fake.” Prior to this action, A.R. was hospitalized on two occasions for mental health care, once in August of 2023 and again in December of 2023. ¶4 At an appointment on March 21, 2024, Dr. Franzese reported A.R. “exhibited brief delusional thoughts at times but appear[ed] to have recently decompensated,” and was “responding to internal stimuli during her visit.” Three days later, on March 24, 2024, A.R. allegedly got into her vehicle, backed down her parents’ driveway, and accelerated the car toward her parents, nearly colliding with them and their house before hitting the brakes. 2 Immediately, A.R.’s father called and reported the incident to the West Yellowstone Police Department, and Officer Leonel Sosa was dispatched to the scene. ¶5 At an appointment with Dr. Franzese shortly thereafter, A.R. presented as “distracted with her own thoughts,” which Dr. Franzese assessed as A.R. likely responding to internal stimuli. On March 26, 2024, A.R. admitted herself to the emergency room at Bozeman Health Deaconess Hospital where Samuel Nave, PMHNP, conducted a psychiatric evaluation of A.R. Nave reported A.R. as having delusional beliefs such as being in witness protection, having a device implanted in her brain, people having “messed with [her] reproductive system,” and being under a contract with her parents and law enforcement. Nave diagnosed A.R. with “unspecified schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorder” and opined that “[d]ue to the level of patient’s psychosis, she is not able to meet her basic needs, and her unwillingness to participate in treatment, it is recommended that patient be detained at [MSH].” ¶6 On March 26, 2024, the State filed a petition for the involuntary commitment of A.R., supported by Nave’s emergency room reports. That same day the District Court entered an order finding probable cause to temporarily detain A.R., appointing an attorney to A.R., and ordering A.R. be transferred to the MSH until her initial appearance. On March 28, 2024, A.R. appeared remotely from MSH for her initial appearance, at which the District Court ordered A.R. be examined by a certified mental health professional. ¶7 Mental health care professional Shannon Maroney (Maroney) conducted a remote evaluation of A.R. on April 2, 2024. A.R.’s counsel was also present remotely for the evaluation. Maroney’s report iterated A.R.’s symptoms, psychiatric history, social history, 3 and mental status. As additional sources of information for her report, Maroney listed: Nave’s medical reports from the Bozeman Health emergency room; a verbal report from A.R.’s parents; a verbal report from A.R.’s close friend; a verbal report from Officer Sosa; and a verbal report from Dr. Franzese. Maroney’s report summarized each of these verbal accounts and the events leading to the State’s petition. Ultimately, Maroney’s report concluded that A.R. “presents as an imminent risk to both herself and others, and unable to meet her basic needs due to her mental health conditions,” and recommended A.R. be committed to the MSH for no more than 90 days. ¶8 Later that day, on April 2, 2024, a hearing was held before the District Court. A.R. appeared in person with her attorney. At the hearing, the State called Maroney as its sole witness. Maroney began by testifying about the information she relied on in forming her opinion, including Nave’s emergency room reports, A.R.’s medical records from the MSH, and verbal accounts from A.R.’s parents, A.R.’s close friend, Officer Sosa, and Dr. Franzese. Maroney explained it was standard practice for a mental health professional to rely on such materials in forming a recommendation. When the State asked Maroney, “what specific statements [she relied] on from any of those people,” A.R.’s counsel objected on the grounds of hearsay. Citing to In re G.M., 2024 MT 49, 415 Mont. 399, 544 P.3d 893, the State responded by arguing that an expert is permitted to testify as to the basis of her opinion, even if otherwise inadmissible hearsay, and the factfinder may rely on those statements in assessing the credibility of the expert’s opinion. Agreeing with the State, the court overruled A.R.’s objection. 4 ¶9 Maroney went on to testify that she learned from the verbal accounts that A.R. had been hospitalized twice in eight months, had been inconsistent in accepting mental health treatment, and her mental condition had worsened over the past year. The State asked Maroney if she relied on any statements from A.R.’s parents, to which A.R.’s counsel renewed her earlier hearsay objection and the court overruled. Maroney answered that she learned A.R.’s parents did not feel safe around A.R. after the vehicle incident in their driveway. The State then asked what A.R.’s parents told Maroney about the driveway incident, eliciting testimony describing what allegedly took place. A.R.’s counsel raised another hearsay objection, but the District Court again overruled it. Maroney continued, stating that she had asked A.R. about the driveway incident during her evaluation and A.R. “admitted to me that she did drive the car toward them and stated that she was angry, but she hit the brakes. And again when I asked her what her intention was of doing that, she just stated ‘I hit the brakes.’” Later, during cross-examination, Maroney agreed with A.R.’s counsel that she specifically asked A.R., “[w]hat was going on when you were driving towards your parents,” and that A.R. had answered, “I knew that I shouldn’t do that and hit the brakes.” ¶10 Maroney next testified about her observations of A.R.’s mental condition during the evaluation. Maroney stated that A.R. “appeared very tangential” with “very delusional thinking” while speaking about having a medical device implanted in her brain, entering into a contract with the West Yellowstone Police Department and her parents that involved being in witness protection and Nobel Peace prizes, the possibility of having given birth without her consent, and how taking “fake” medications would prevent her from being in 5 the Air Force. When asked whether there were any indications that A.R. was suffering from psychosis or delusions, Maroney testified: Yes, there are many indications. Again, these very significant and severe delusional thoughts that are persecutory and paranoid in nature. She admitted herself that she went to the Bozeman ER a while back because she was hearing voices. And it sounds again like the voices are along the same lines as these persecutory delusions telling her to somehow try to get out of this contract. She told me that she is so hopeless and desperate to get out of this situation that she’s asked her parents to euthanize her, she has no purpose for living. So, that really speaks to I think the intensity of these delusional thoughts. ¶11 Based on Maroney’s testimony, the District Court determined that A.R. suffered from unspecified schizophrenia and other psychotic disorder to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, and because of that mental disorder, A.R. was at risk of harming others and herself and was unable to provide for her own need of safety. The District Court’s oral findings of fact and conclusions of law included: So, as a consequence of the admission from the Respondent that she, in fact, had driven toward her parents, and that she wanted her parents to euthanize her, and that she would not answer the question directly about suicidal thoughts, Ms. Maroney has a concern for the Respondent’s physical safety under 53-21-126(4)(a) as well as a concern that she is a threat to her own self injury under 53-21-126(4)(b). And for similar reasons is concerned about the driving incident that Respondent admitted to under 53-21-126(4)(c) that because of a mental disorder, there is an imminent threat of injury to the Respondent or to others because of Respondent’s acts or omissions, specifically, driving that the car toward her parents and the house. ¶12 On April 2, 2024, the District Court entered a written Order for Commitment, ordering A.R. be committed to the MSH for a period not to exceed 90 days. A.R. appeals. 6  STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶13 We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. In re O.L.K., 2024 MT 202, ¶ 9, 418 Mont. 90, 555 P.3d 767. To the extent that the district court’s ruling interprets an evidentiary rule or statute, we review de novo. In re O.L.K., ¶ 9. ¶14 “‘We review the sufficiency of the evidence in civil commitment proceedings in a light most favorable to the prevailing party and do not disturb a district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.’” In re A.S.B., 2008 MT 82, ¶ 16, 342 Mont. 169, 180 P.3d 625 (quoting Matter of D.S., 2005 MT 152, ¶ 12, 327 Mont. 391, 114 P.3d 264). “‘A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only if not supported by substantial credible evidence, the district court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or we have a definite and firm conviction upon review of the record that the court otherwise erred.’” In re G.M., 2024 MT 49, ¶ 8, 415 Mont. 399, 544 P.3d 893 (quoting In re C.K., 2017 MT 69, ¶ 10, 387 Mont. 127, 391 P.3d 735). DISCUSSION ¶15 Whether the District Court erred by relying on hearsay evidence referenced in the examining professional person’s testimony as the basis for involuntary commitment. ¶16 “Involuntary mental health commitment proceedings are civil matters which implicate fundamental liberty interests in a manner similar to criminal proceedings.” In re C.K., ¶ 12. “To safeguard against the ‘calamitous effect’ of an erroneous deprivation of liberty and damage to a person’s reputation, courts must strictly adhere to the statutory standards of proof, procedural requirements, and substantive criteria specified by 7 §§ 53-21-126 and -127, MCA.” In re C.K., ¶ 12 (citing In re B.D., 2015 MT 339, ¶ 7, 381 Mont. 505, 362 P.3d 636). ¶17 Upon the State’s filing of an involuntary commitment petition, the respondent must undergo a professional mental health evaluation. Section 53-21-123(1), MCA. The examining professional must submit a written evaluation report to the court for a preliminary determination of whether cause exists to proceed further. See § 53-21-123(1), MCA. If the proceedings continue, the examining professional must attend the commitment hearing and be subject to cross-examination by the respondent. Section 53-21-126(3), MCA. ¶18 At the commitment hearing, the district court first considers whether the respondent suffers from a mental disorder and secondly determines whether the respondent requires commitment based on several potential grounds including: (a) whether the respondent, because of a mental disorder, is substantially unable to provide for the respondent’s own basic needs of food, clothing, shelter, health, or safety; [and] . . . (c) whether, because of a mental disorder, there is an imminent danger of injury to the respondent or to others because of the respondent’s acts or omissions[.] Section 53-21-126(1)(a) and (1)(c), MCA; see also In re O.L.K., ¶ 12. ¶19 “The State has the burden of proving: (1) the existence and nature of the alleged mental disorder to a reasonable degree of medical certainty; (2) all pertinent ‘physical facts’ beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) all other matters by clear and convincing evidence.” In re G.M., ¶ 11 (quoting § 53-21-126(1)-(2), MCA). “Subject to generally applicable rules 8 of evidence as pertinent in each case, the professional person . . . ‘may testify as to the ultimate issue of whether the respondent is suffering from a mental disorder and requires commitment,’” but such testimony alone is insufficient to warrant an involuntary commitment. In re G.M., ¶ 11 (quoting § 53-21-126(4)(a), MCA); In re C.K., ¶ 14 (citing § 53-21-126(4), MCA). “Involuntary commitment is permissible only on sufficient proof of a mental disorder and additional ‘evidence from the professional person or others’ proving one of the specified statutory commitment criteria.” In re C.K., ¶ 14 (quoting § 53-21-126(4), MCA) (emphasis in original). The State may prove the substantive requirements of § 53-21-126(1)(a) and (1)(c), MCA, based solely on the testimony of the professional person, provided that the testimony is admissible under the rules of evidence. In re G.M., ¶ 13; see In re O.L.K., ¶ 17 (holding a professional person may testify in their expert capacity, as well as in a lay witness capacity, based on their personal knowledge of the matter). ¶20 A.R. argues that Maroney’s testimony reiterating her parents’ account of what occurred in the driveway incident is inadmissible hearsay, and the District Court erred in relying on the truth of such statements when making its determination. Further, A.R. contends that even if the statements are admissible under M. R. Evid. 703, the District Court erred when it considered them as substantive proof, and that A.R. was unfairly prejudiced by them pursuant to M. R. Evid. 403. A.R. asserts that, without the statements, the State failed its burden of presenting sufficient evidence to support the District Court’s conclusions under both § 53-21-126(1)(a) and (1)(c), MCA. 9 ¶21 In response, the State concedes A.R.’s parents’ verbal report is hearsay. Instead, the State argues A.R.’s own statements made to Maroney are admissible as non-hearsay, and such statements alone can support the District Court’s findings. We agree. ¶22 Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted[,]” and is generally inadmissible unless otherwise provided by statute or the Montana Rules of Evidence. M. R. Evid. 801(c), 802. A hearsay statement is not admissible merely because it is contained in a professional person’s report. Section 53-21-126(3), MCA. ¶23 As an initial matter, Rule 703 permits an expert to base his or her opinion on otherwise inadmissible evidence if the evidence is of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the field at issue. In re O.L.K., ¶ 23; In re G.M., ¶ 14. An expert may thus refer to otherwise inadmissible hearsay for the limited purpose of aiding the factfinder in assessing the relative credibility, veracity, and probative value of the expert’s opinion. In re G.M., ¶ 14 (citing In re C.K., ¶¶ 18-21). In other words, Rule 703 does not permit the factfinder to consider hearsay evidence relied upon by an expert for purposes of substantively proving the facts stated therein. In re O.L.K., ¶ 23 (citing In re C.K., ¶ 21). Then, Rule 403 acts as a “critical safeguard that protects against such improper or unfair use or effect” of hearsay evidence admitted under Rule 703. In re G.M., ¶ 14; In re C.K., ¶ 22. ¶24 A.R. contends she was unfairly prejudiced because “Maroney’s testimony about her conversations with A.R.’s parents unfairly colored the court’s interpretation of what A.R. told Maroney happened that day.” However, we need not reach the issue of whether A.R.’s parents’ statements are admissible under Rule 703 or conduct a balancing test under 10 Rule 403, because the District Court did not rely on A.R.’s parents’ statements testified to by Maroney in making its decision to commit A.R. Rather, the District Court based its findings supporting the statutory grounds for commitment entirely on A.R.’s own statements to Maroney during the evaluation. ¶25 Under M. R. Evid. 801(d)(2), a statement is not hearsay if the statement is offered against a party and is the party’s own statement. When Maroney asked A.R. “[w]hat was going on when you were driving towards your parents,” A.R. responded, “I knew that I shouldn’t do that and hit the brakes.” By stating that she “hit the brakes,” A.R., at the very least, acknowledged she was behind the wheel of a vehicle that was driving toward her parents. A.R. did not take issue with the factual premise of Maroney’s question, but rather stated she knew she should not do that, acknowledging the truth of Maroney’s question. A.R. thus acknowledged she had driven towards her parents and applied the brakes before colliding with them. Therefore, A.R.’s statement was a party-opponent admission under Rule 801(d)(2), and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in considering it for its truth. ¶26 The same can be said about the other statements A.R. made to Maroney that the District Court relied on. A.R. told Maroney that she is “hopeless,” that she wished her parents would “euthanize her,” and that she had “no purpose for living.” Having held A.R.’s statements to Maroney are admissible for the District Court to consider as substantive evidence, we next address whether there was sufficient evidence to support the District Court’s findings pursuant to § 53-21-126(1)(c) and (1)(a), MCA. 11 ¶27 Under § 53-21-126(1)(c), MCA, the State must prove “because of a mental disorder, there is an imminent danger of injury to the respondent or to others because of the respondent’s acts or omissions.” Section 53-21-126(1)(c), MCA. The State is required to show an imminent threat of injury to self or others by “overt acts or omissions, sufficiently recent in time as to be material and relevant as to the respondent’s present condition.” Section 53-21-126(2), MCA. The overt act must be proven by evidence “separate from the professional person’s testimony.” In re O.L.K., ¶ 13. ¶28 To support its finding under § 53-21-126(1)(c), MCA, the District Court relied solely on A.R.’s admission to the driveway incident. A.R. attempts to minimize her admission, contending it was “too vague, shifting, and lacking in adequate detail to glean reliable information about what actually happened or to support a finding A.R.’s driving caused an imminent threat of harm to herself or others.” However, more specific details about the incident are not necessary to demonstrate that A.R. committed an overt act. We have explained that “evidence of actual violence or physical harm is not required to satisfy the provision imminent threat of injury” and “an overt act need not be a completed act; an attempt or threat, or even a failure to act, may suffice.” In re E.A.L., 2015 MT 203, ¶ 13, 380 Mont. 129, 353 P.3d 1186 (internal quotations and citation omitted). In In re O.L.K. we found that, while O.L.K.’s homicidal statements were vague, they satisfied the overt act requirement. In re O.L.K., ¶ 25. Likewise, though A.R.’s response to Maroney’s question did not provide precise details of what occurred in her parents’ driveway, she nonetheless admitted that she drove toward her parents, placing them and perhaps herself 12 in imminent danger of injury, before braking. Therefore, the District Court’s findings were supported by sufficient evidence. ¶29 While the ground stated in § 53-21-126(1)(a), MCA, does not require evidence of an overt act or omission, the State must nonetheless present sufficient evidence that, due to a mental disorder, the respondent “is substantially unable to provide for respondent’s own basic needs of food, clothing, shelter, health, or safety.” Section 53-21-126(1)(a), MCA. A.R. argues that there is not sufficient evidence to support the District Court’s finding under § 53-21-126(1)(a), MCA, because “Maroney testified that A.R.’s mental disorder was not impacting her ability to care for her own housing, food, physical health or other basic needs[,]” and therefore her “delusions themselves were not impacting her daily function severely enough to warrant commitment.” In its findings pursuant to § 53-21-126(1)(a), MCA, the District Court relied on A.R.’s statement that voices were telling her to get out of a contract, and that she was “so hopeless and desperate to get out of this situation that she’s asked her parents to euthanize her.” The District Court found that A.R.’s suicidal thoughts coupled with her admission that she drove a car toward her parents was evidence that her delusions impacted her ability to provide for her own basic need of safety. Section 53-21-126(1)(a), MCA, does not require the State to prove a deficiency in all five basic needs; the statute clearly indicates “food, clothing, shelter, health, or safety.” (Emphasis added.) We conclude the District Court’s findings pursuant to § 53-21-126(1)(a), MCA, are supported by sufficient evidence. 13  CONCLUSION ¶30 The professional person’s testimony regarding statements made by A.R. were admissible under M. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) and the District Court’s findings under § 53-21-126(1)(a) and (1)(c), MCA, are sufficiently supported by A.R.’s own statements made to the professional person. Therefore, the District Court’s April 2, 2024 Order of Commitment is affirmed. /S/ JIM RICE We Concur: /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON 14