Full Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS NORTHLAND FAMILY PLANNING CENTER, FOR PUBLICATION NORTHLAND FAMILY PLANNING CENTER November 17, 2026 INC. EAST, NORTHLAND FAMILY PLANNING 1:28 PM CENTER INC. WEST, and MEDICAL STUDENTS FOR CHOICE, Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, v No. 375785 Court of Claims ATTORNEY GENERAL, DIRECTOR OF THE LC No. 24-000011-MM DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, and DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendants-Appellees/Cross- Appellees, and PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Intervening Defendant- Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and BAZZI and LIEVENSE, JJ. BORRELLO, P.J. This appeal requires us to determine whether certain statutory provisions—specifically, MCL 333.17015 and MCL 333.17015a—violate the recently adopted amendment to the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 28, establishing a fundamental right to reproductive freedom. -1- Intervening defendant, the People of the State of Michigan,1 appeals as of right from the opinion and order of the Court of Claims, which declared certain challenged provisions unconstitutional and permanently enjoined their enforcement. Plaintiffs cross-appeal by leave granted, challenging the Court of Claims’s determination that other statutory provisions at issue are not unconstitutional. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the Court of Claims in part but vacate any ruling pertaining to whether the statutory coercion-to-abort screening mandate constitutes discrimination under Const 1963, art 1, § 28(2) and remand to the Court of Claims for further proceedings consistent with this opinion solely on that issue. I. BACKGROUND In 2022, Michigan voters approved Proposal 3 to amend the Michigan Constitution and establish an individual constitutional right to reproductive freedom. This constitutional right is located in Const 1963, art 1, § 28, which provides as follows: (1) Every individual has a fundamental right to reproductive freedom, which entails the right to make and effectuate decisions about all matters relating to pregnancy, including but not limited to prenatal care, childbirth, postpartum care, contraception, sterilization, abortion care, miscarriage management, and infertility care. An individual’s right to reproductive freedom shall not be denied, burdened, nor infringed upon unless justified by a compelling state interest achieved by the least restrictive means. Notwithstanding the above, the state may regulate the provision of abortion care after fetal viability, provided that in no circumstance shall the state prohibit an abortion that, in the professional judgment of an attending health care professional, is medically indicated to protect the life or physical or mental health of the pregnant individual. (2) The state shall not discriminate in the protection or enforcement of this fundamental right. (3) The state shall not penalize, prosecute, or otherwise take adverse action against an individual based on their actual, potential, perceived, or alleged pregnancy outcomes, including but not limited to miscarriage, stillbirth, or abortion. Nor shall the state penalize, prosecute, or otherwise take adverse action against someone for aiding or assisting a pregnant individual in exercising their right to reproductive freedom with their voluntary consent. 1 The People moved to intervene on the basis that the named defendants declined to defend the constitutionality of the challenged laws. Concurrently, the Department of Attorney General established a conflict wall to establish an independent set of Assistant Attorneys General to defend the statutes at issue. The court granted the motion to intervene after the parties did not oppose it. -2- (4) For the purposes of this section: A state interest is “compelling” only if it is for the limited purpose of protecting the health of an individual seeking care, consistent with accepted clinical standards of practice and evidence-based medicine, and does not infringe on that individual’s autonomous decision-making. “Fetal viability” means: the point in pregnancy when, in the professional judgment of an attending health care professional and based on the particular facts of the case, there is a significant likelihood of the fetus’s sustained survival outside the uterus without the application of extraordinary medical measures. (5) This section shall be self-executing. Any provision of this section held invalid shall be severable from the remaining portions of this section. Plaintiffs, identifying themselves as abortion providers and advocates, commenced this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs contend that MCL 333.17015 and MCL 333.17015a contravene the recently established state constitutional right to reproductive freedom, rendering these statutes unconstitutional.2 The constitutional challenges presented are predicated on four specific mandates imposed on abortion procedures as articulated in the statutory language: (1) a 24-hour mandatory waiting period, (2) uniform informed consent requirements, (3) a physician participation mandate, and (4) mandatory screening for coercion. The 24-hour waiting period prohibits a physician from performing an abortion until at least 24 hours have passed after obtaining the patient’s informed written consent, unless a “medical emergency” exists. MCL 333.17015(1), (3), and (10). Under MCL 333.17015(1) and (3), “a physician shall not perform an abortion otherwise permitted by law without the patient’s informed written consent,” which must be obtained “not less than 24 hours before that physician performs an abortion . . . .” The medical emergency exception is found in MCL 333.17015(10). Next, various provisions within the challenged statutes impose strict requirements for obtaining statutorily sufficient informed consent from the patient. Under MCL 333.17015(3), “not less than 24 hours before” a physician performs an abortion, the physician or a qualified assistant must “[c]onfirm that, according to the best medical judgment of a physician, the patient is pregnant, and determine the probable gestational age of the fetus”; orally provide the patient with information about the probable gestational age of the fetus, “what to do and whom to contact should medical complications arise from the abortion,” and “how to obtain pregnancy prevention information through the department of health and human services”; “[p]rovide the patient with a physical copy of the written standardized summary”3 regarding accepted medical procedures for performing abortions, the complications that may arise from those procedures, the complications that may arise from live birth, the potential for an individual to experience “depression, feelings 2 The pertinent provisions of these statutes have been reproduced in the appendix at the conclusion of this opinion. 3 The contents of the standardized summary are described in MCL 333.17015(11)(b). -3- of guilt, sleep disturbance, loss of interest in work or sex, or anger” as a “result of an abortion,” available services to assist with adoption or foster care placement, and available counseling services should the patient experience adverse psychological effects from the abortion; “[p]rovide the patient with a physical copy of a medically accurate depiction, illustration, or photograph and description of a fetus supplied by the department of health and human services pursuant to subsection (11)(a) at the gestational age nearest the probable gestational age of the patient’s fetus”; “[p]rovide the patient with a physical copy of the prenatal care and parenting information pamphlet distributed by the department of health and human services . . .”; and “[p]rovide the patient with a physical copy of the prescreening summary on prevention of coercion to abort described in subsection (11)(i).” The physician must also, “personally and in the presence of the patient,” orally inform the patient of specific risks to the patient of any complications associated with the procedure to be performed based on the patient’s particular medical condition and history, as well as any specific risks to the patient in light of that same medical condition and history if the patient chooses to continue the pregnancy. MCL 333.17015(6)(b). Furthermore, pursuant to MCL 333.17015(2)(j), “provide the patient with a physical copy” means “confirming that the patient accessed the internet website described in subsection (5) and received a printed valid confirmation form from the website and including that form in the patient’s medical record or giving a patient a copy of a required document by 1 or more of the following means: (i) In person[;] (ii) By registered mail, return receipt requested[;] (iii) By parcel delivery service that requires the recipient to provide a signature in order to receive delivery of a parcel[;] (iv) By facsimile transmission.” The third of the challenged mandates is the physician mandate. Because MCL 333.17015(1) states that “a physician shall not perform an abortion otherwise permitted by law” (emphasis added), only licensed physicians may perform abortions. This means that other medical clinicians, such as nurse practitioners, certified nurse midwives, and physician assistants, may not provide abortions. Finally, abortion providers must also “orally screen the patient for coercion to abort using the screening tools developed by the department under section 17015(11).” MCL 333.17015a(1). This oral screening may occur before the requirements of MCL 333.17015(3) have been satisfied and before or after the expiration of the 24-hour waiting period. MCL 333.17015a(1). Abortion facilities must “post in a conspicuous place in an area of its facility that is accessible to patients, employees, and visitors the notice described in section 17015(11)(i),” which states, among other things, that it is illegal to coerce an individual to have an abortion and provides information about resources where help is available for domestic violence and sexual assault. MCL 333.17015a(5); MCL 333.17015(11)(i). In their cross-appeal, plaintiffs alleged that these provisions unconstitutionally burdened the right to abortion without serving the limited compelling purpose of protecting the health of an individual seeking care, that each provision was inconsistent with accepted clinical standards of practice and evidence-based medicine, that the provisions imposed requirements that intruded on the autonomous decision making of patients, and that the provisions discriminated in the protection and enforcement of the right to reproductive freedom. -4- The Court of Claims held a bench trial, where it heard the testimony of the parties’ experts. Following trial, the Court of Claims issued an extensive, thorough, and well-reasoned written opinion and order holding that the provisions creating the mandatory 24-hour waiting period, the uniform mandatory consent requirement, and the physician mandate, along with other provisions in the statute that were inextricably linked with these provisions, were unconstitutional. The court issued a permanent injunction enjoining enforcement of those provisions, which were MCL 333.17015(1), (2)(d)-(g) and (i)-(j), (3)-(10), (11)(a)-(h), (13)-(14), and (18)-(20). The court found the remaining challenged statutory provisions constitutional and preserved under the severability provision in MCL 333.17015(17). This appeal followed. II. JURISDICTION At the outset, this Court must address the fundamental question of appellate jurisdiction, as asserted by intervening defendant. Intervening defendant contends that this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain the present appeal as of right on the ground that the Court of Claims did not render a final order resolving all claims asserted in that court. Specifically, intervening defendant maintains that the Court of Claims failed to adjudicate the plaintiffs’ cause of action alleging discrimination under Const 1963, art 1, § 28(2), insofar as that claim challenges the statutory coercion-to-abort screening mandate embodied in MCL 333.17015a. Accordingly, intervening defendant posits that the order under review is not a final order and, as such, is not appealable as of right within the meaning of the Michigan Court Rules. It is axiomatic that this Court may not reach the substantive merits of any appeal unless and until it has first satisfied itself of its jurisdiction to proceed. Chen v Wayne State Univ, 284 Mich App 172, 191; 771 NW2d 820 (2009). The existence of subject-matter jurisdiction constitutes a pure question of law, subject to de novo review by this Court. Id. The contours of this Court’s appellate jurisdiction as of right are governed by MCR 7.203(A)(1), which authorizes an appeal of right from a final judgment or final order of the circuit court or Court of Claims, as that term is precisely defined by MCR 7.202(6). Under MCR 7.202(6)(a)(i), a “final order” in a civil action, for purposes of appellate review, is defined as “the first judgment or order that disposes of all the claims and adjudicates the rights and liabilities of all the parties.” Save for exceptions not relevant to the present dispute, MCR 7.203(A)(1) thus confers upon this Court jurisdiction as of right to review any such final order issued by the Court of Claims or a circuit court. The constitutional provisions implicated herein are found at Const 1963, art 1, § 28. Subsection (1) establishes that “[e]very individual has a fundamental right to reproductive freedom, which entails the right to make and effectuate decisions about all matters relating to pregnancy, including abortion care,” while subsection (2) mandates that “[t]he state shall not discriminate in the protection or enforcement of this fundamental right.” The dispositive jurisdictional question is therefore whether the May 13, 2025 opinion and order of the Court of Claims finally disposed of plaintiffs’ claim that the statutory coercion screening provisions contravene the nondiscrimination mandate of Const 1963, art 1, § 28(2). In the section of its opinion addressing the constitutionality of the coercion screening provisions, the Court of Claims opined as follows: -5- Plaintiffs have not met their burden of establishing that the coercion screening requirements burden or infringe upon a patient’s access to abortion care. The witnesses agree that coercion screening is a necessary step in abortion care. Informational posters warning patients about the illegality of abortion coercion and providing resources to patients facing such coercion protect patient rights to reproductive care of all kinds. Contrary to the position of some witnesses, nothing in the statutes requires providers to ask specific or direct questions during a coercion screening. The statutes permit provides to tailor their questions and interact with patients in an organic way. The Court of Claims determined that plaintiffs failed to sustain their burden of demonstrating that the coercion screening requirements imposed by statute either burdened or infringed upon a patient’s access to abortion care. The Court found the evidentiary record to reflect consensus among witnesses that coercion screening constitutes an integral and necessary component of abortion care. The Court further noted that the statutory regime’s requirements for informational posters—alerting patients to the illegality of abortion coercion and directing them to available resources—operate to safeguard patient rights in the reproductive healthcare context. Importantly, the Court rejected the argument that the statutes require providers to ask predetermined or overly specific questions, concluding instead that the statutory framework permits providers to conduct screening in a flexible, individualized, and organic manner, tailored to the patient’s circumstances. Accordingly, the Court of Claims’s finding that the statutory coercion screening requirements neither burden nor infringe the right of access to abortion care—a central facet of the “fundamental right to reproductive freedom” guaranteed by the Michigan Constitution— necessarily operates as a rejection of plaintiffs’ discrimination claim under Const 1963, art 1, § 28(2). The Court of Claims, in its conclusion, expressly held that “MCL 333.17015a and MCL 333.17015(11)(i) [the coercion screening provisions] are not unconstitutional,” thereby rejecting both Count I and Count II of plaintiffs’ complaint as to the constitutionality of the coercion screening provisions. Contrary to intervening defendant’s assertions, the final order issued by the Court of Claims disposed of all rights and liabilities of the parties, including any arising under Const 1963, art 1, § 28(2), with respect to the facial challenge to the statutory coercion-to-abort screening requirement. Nothing in the record suggests that any claim was left unadjudicated by the lower court. For these reasons, the finality requirement of MCR 7.202(6) is satisfied, and this Court is vested with appellate jurisdiction of right under MCR 7.203(A)(1).4 III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MCL 333.17015 AND MCL 333.17015a 4 Additionally, the Court of Claims explicitly designated its order as final, manifesting its intent to resolve all outstanding issues between the parties. While an explicit declaration of finality is not dispositive, it remains a significant factor in the determination of whether an order is final for appellate purposes. See McCoy v Berrien Co Clerk, 348 Mich App 602, 611; 19 NW3d 897 (2023). -6- On appeal, intervening defendant contends that the Court of Claims committed reversible error in concluding that the mandatory 24-hour waiting period, the mandatory uniform informed consent requirements, and the physician mandate provisions are facially unconstitutional. Intervening defendant asserts that, under established precedent, a statute is only facially unconstitutional if the challengers can demonstrate that “no set of circumstances exists under which the [statutory provisions] would be valid.” United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 745; 107 S Ct 2095; 95 L Ed 2d 697 (1987). Accordingly, intervening defendant maintains that plaintiffs failed to meet this exacting standard, and thus, the Court of Claims erred in declaring the provisions facially invalid. On cross-appeal, plaintiffs contend that the Court of Claims erred in upholding the constitutionality of the statutory provision requiring a screening for coercion prior to an abortion. Plaintiffs assert that this requirement imposes an undue burden on the exercise of the constitutional right to abortion and is not justified by “a compelling state interest.” As such, plaintiffs contend that this provision should also have been found unconstitutional. A. LEGAL FRAMEWORK Whether a statute is constitutional presents a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. League of Women Voters of Mich v Secretary of State, 508 Mich 520, 534; 975 NW2d 840 (2022). We also review de novo matters of constitutional and statutory interpretation. Coalition of State Employee Unions v State, 498 Mich 312, 322; 870 NW2d 275 (2015). “This Court reviews a trial court’s findings of fact following a bench trial for clear error and reviews de novo the trial court’s conclusions of law.” Trader v Comerica Bank, 293 Mich App 210, 215; 809 NW2d 429 (2011). “Our primary goal in construing a constitutional provision is to give effect to the intent of the people of the state of Michigan who ratified the Constitution, by applying the rule of ‘common understanding.’ ” Coalition of State Employee Unions, 498 Mich at 323 (citation omitted). “The interpretation that should be given it is that which reasonable minds, the great mass of the people themselves, would give it.” Citizens Protecting Michigan’s Constitution v Secretary of State, 503 Mich 42, 61; 921 NW2d 247 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, the common understanding of constitutional language is found by determining “the text’s original meaning to the ratifiers, the people, at the time of ratification.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). We must also “consider the circumstances leading to the adoption of the provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished.” Mothering Justice v Attorney General, 515 Mich 328, 346; 29 NW3d 346 (2024), opinion clarified 515 Mich 920 (2024) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “Our Constitution is clear that ‘[a]ll political power is inherent in the people.’ ” Citizens, 503 Mich at 59, quoting Const 1963, art 1, § 1 (alteration in original). “The people have chosen to retain for themselves, in Const 1963, art 12, § 2, the power to initiate proposed constitutional amendments that, if various requirements are met, will be placed on the ballot and voted on at election time.” Id. “[T]here is no more constitutionally significant event than when the wielders of ‘[a]ll political power’ under that document, Const 1963, art 1, § 1, choose to exercise their extraordinary authority to directly approve or disapprove of an amendment thereto.” Id. (some quotation marks and citation omitted). -7- This case involves a facial challenge to the statutory provisions at issue. Statutes are presumed to be constitutional. League of Women Voters, 508 Mich at 534. A statute that may have been constitutional when it was passed may become invalid as the result of a subsequent constitutional amendment. See Const 1963, art 3, § 7 (“The common law and the statute laws now in force, not repugnant to this constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by their own limitations, or are changed, amended or repealed.”). Generally, the “party challenging the facial constitutionality of an act must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [a]ct would be valid. The fact that the . . . [a]ct might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient . . . .” League of Women Voters, 508 Mich at 534- 535 (quotation marks and citations omitted; ellipses and alterations in original). The question is whether the challenged statutory provisions are “unconstitutional in the abstract” rather than “as applied” to the particular case. Id. at 535. However, constitutionally protected fundamental rights receive heightened protection from governmental interference. Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 720; 117 S Ct 2258; 138 L Ed 2d 772 (1997). Some fundamental rights are specifically enumerated in constitutional text. Id. The present case involves a right that is specifically designated as “fundamental” by our state constitution. Const 1963, art 1, § 28 expressly designates the “right to reproductive freedom,” which includes the right to make decisions about “all matters relating to . . . abortion care,” as a “fundamental right.” Furthermore, this constitutional provision specifically provides that an “individual’s right to reproductive freedom shall not be denied, burdened, nor infringed upon unless justified by a compelling state interest achieved by the least restrictive means.” Const 1963, art 1, § 28. The reproductive freedom amendment thereby expressly incorporates the most demanding test used by courts for analyzing the constitutionality of alleged governmental interference with fundamental rights: strict scrutiny. “The most heightened review, strict scrutiny, applies when the provision interferes with a fundamental right . . . [u]nder a strict scrutiny analysis, the government may not infringe upon a fundamental liberty interest unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Barrow v City of Detroit Election Comm, 301 Mich App 404, 420; 836 NW2d 498 (2013). Strict scrutiny “requires that a law be the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest.” Free Speech Coalition, Inc v Paxton, 606 US 461, 471; 145 S Ct 2291; 222 L Ed 2d 643 (2025) (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374, 388; 98 S Ct 673; 54 L Ed 2d 618 (1978) (“When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.”). “Strict scrutiny—which requires a restriction to be the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest—is the most demanding test known to constitutional law.” Free Speech Coalition, 606 US at 484 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Importantly, it is the government’s burden under strict scrutiny to prove that the challenged laws “are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.” Johnson v California, 543 US 499, 505; 125 S Ct 1141; 160 L Ed 2d 949 (2005). Turning to the language of the constitutional provision at issue, an “individual’s right to reproductive freedom,” which includes “the right to make and effectuate decisions about all -8- matters relating to . . . abortion care,” “shall not be denied, burdened, nor infringed upon unless justified by a compelling state interest achieved by the least restrictive means.” Const 1963, art 1, § 28(1) (emphasis added). For purposes of this constitutional provision, a “state interest is ‘compelling’ only if it is for the limited purpose of protecting the health of an individual seeking care, consistent with accepted clinical standards of practice and evidence-based medicine, and does not infringe on that individual’s autonomous decision-making.” Const 1963, art 1, § 28(4) (emphasis added). This section of our state Constitution protecting the fundamental right to reproductive freedom is “self-executing.” Const 1963, art 1, § 28(5). “When the language of the Constitution is self-executing, [o]bligations other than those so imposed may not be added.” League of Women Voters, 508 Mich at 541 (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). Accordingly, the statutory provisions challenged in the present case may only stand if they are both “justified by a compelling state interest” and achieve that compelling interest “by the least restrictive means.” In addressing the issues presented in this appeal, we first undertake an analysis of whether the statutory provisions at issue “deny, burden, or infringe” upon the constitutional “right to make and effectuate decisions about all matters relating to . . . abortion care” as articulated in Const 1963, art 1, § 28. Should we determine that a particular statutory provision does not deny, burden, or infringe upon that right, it necessarily follows that such a provision does not violate the Michigan Constitution. If, however, we find that the statutory provision implicates the protected right, we must then proceed to examine the governmental interest purportedly advanced by the provision. To withstand constitutional scrutiny, the challenged statutory provisions must “protect the health of an individual seeking care, consistent with accepted clinical standards of practice and evidence-based medicine,” and must not infringe upon that individual’s autonomous decision- making. Assuming that a sufficient state interest is identified, we then evaluate whether the intervening defendant, as the party defending the challenged statutes, has established that the asserted interest cannot be achieved by less restrictive means. Only if the statutory provision is the least restrictive means of achieving the articulated interest can it survive constitutional challenge. With this framework in mind, we proceed to address each of the challenged statutory provisions in turn. B. MANDATORY 24-HOUR WAITING PERIOD The 24-hour waiting period prohibits a physician from performing an abortion until at least 24 hours have passed after obtaining the patient’s informed written consent, unless a “medical emergency” exists. MCL 333.17015(1), (3), and (10). At trial, the Court of Claims heard testimony from witnesses with practical and research experience in the fields of abortion care and medical ethics. These witnesses included doctors, administrators, a certified nurse midwife and nurse practitioner, and university professors. The Court of Claims found: Based on the testimony presented at trial, and after weighing the relative credibility of the witnesses and examining the evidence presented, the Court finds that the mandatory 24-hour waiting period burdens and infringes upon patients’ rights to reproductive freedom. The mandatory delay exacerbates the burdens that patients experience seeking abortion care, including by increasing costs, prolonging -9- wait times, increasing the risk that a patient will have to disclose their decision to others, and potentially forcing the patient to forgo a medication abortion for a more invasive procedure. Having found that the mandatory 24-hour waiting period burdened and infringed the right to reproductive freedom, the Court of Claims acknowledged that the “ostensible goal” of the challenged provision was to protect patient health. However, the Court of Claims found that the mandatory 24-hour waiting period did not achieve that goal by the least restrictive means, consistent with accepted clinical standards of practice and evidence-based medicine. The Court of Claims reasoned, Against the mountain of expert opinions and citation of accepted clinical standards and medical literature submitted by plaintiffs establishing that the challenged laws do not protect patient health and are contrary to accepted clinical standards of practice and evidence-based medicine (set forth in extensive detail in preceding sections), intervening defendant has produced two witnesses deeply entrenched in the national anti-abortion movement who have frequently and widely testified in favor of complete abortion bans. These witnesses believe abortion is murder and an offense to God. Dr. Wubbenhurst’s testimony was based on theologically skewed studies from journals known to support anti-abortion views. Dr. Wubbenhurst’s testimony also made clear that she interpreted the findings of studies in ways the studies’ authors cautioned against. Intervening defendant has not attacked the qualifications or credibility of plaintiffs’ experts. The plain language of [Const 1963, art 1, § 28] unambiguously requires that the challenged laws achieve the goal of protecting patient health and be consistent with established clinical standards and evidence-based medicine. The only way for the Court to inquire into this element is to rely on the expert evidence submitted by the parties. The defense experts’ evidence is too impeached to assist their position. Plaintiffs’ experts have opined that the 24-hour waiting period does not protect the health of a patient seeking care and, in fact, hinders patient care by delaying care by an arbitrary 24-hours. Clinical research has shown that there is no correlation between having a patient wait 24 hours and the patient achieving better physical and psychological outcomes. Contrary to Dr. Wubbenhurst’s testimony, there is no evidence that the delay is used by providers to review a patient’s medical history to ensure the safety of the procedure for the patient. Rather, the delay is used solely to force the patient to further consider their choice, i.e., to dissuade the patient from securing an abortion. The Turnaway Study supports that the vast majority of patients seeking an abortion have high decisional certainty and low levels of regret following the procedure. The mandatory 24-hour waiting period also is not consistent with the accepted standard of care and evidence-based medicine. Again, the Turnaway Study demonstrated that patients seeking an abortion do not universally need additional time to reflect on their decision. No other reproductive care available to men or women is governed by the Legislature in this manner. -10- Moreover, the mandatory 24-hour waiting period infringes upon autonomous decision-making. The waiting period forces needless delay on patients after they are able to consent to a procedure, thus burdening and infringing upon a patient’s access to abortion care. On appeal, intervening defendant asserts that the Court of Claims erred in declaring the mandatory 24-hour waiting period provision facially invalid. Intervening defendant relies on record evidence, including admissions by plaintiffs’ witnesses—that some patients independently elect to wait before making an abortion decision after receiving the required information. On this basis, intervening defendant contends that the statutory waiting period is not inherently coercive, as it does not burden the rights of those patients who would choose to wait. Intervening defendant further argues that the statute is not unconstitutional in all its applications and that the Court of Claims failed to apply the correct standard for facial invalidity, which requires a showing that no set of circumstances exists under which the law would be valid. See Salerno, 481 US at 745. However, this argument fails to account for the heightened protection afforded to fundamental rights under the Michigan Constitution. When a challenged statute implicates a fundamental right, the state must demonstrate that the law is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means available, a standard that supersedes the general Salerno framework. See Const 1963, art 1, § 28(1). We note that the absence of a mandatory waiting period does not inhibit any patient from deliberating or reconsidering an abortion decision at her own pace. Indeed, the evidentiary record before this Court demonstrates that patients approach the decision to terminate a pregnancy with varying degrees of contemplation, and that the time required for a considered decision is highly individualized. The imposition of a categorical 24-hour waiting period, therefore, is not only untethered from patient autonomy but also operates as a blanket restriction that fails to accommodate the spectrum of patient circumstances. Under Michigan constitutional law, when a statute burdens a fundamental right, it must satisfy strict scrutiny by being narrowly tailored and the least restrictive means to advance a compelling state interest. See Const 1963, art 1, § 28(1); Free Speech Coalition, 606 US at 471. Here, intervening defendant has failed to identify any compelling empirical support—either in the record or by reference to legislative findings—that the rigid 24-hour waiting period furthers patient health, safety, or informed consent in a manner less restrictive alternatives could not achieve. The Court of Claims correctly found no evidence of a nexus between the statutory waiting period and any measurable improvement in patient physical or psychological outcomes. Moreover, the arbitrary and inflexible nature of the waiting period undermines any contention that it is narrowly drawn or necessary to achieve the state’s asserted aims. Notably, intervening defendant does not contest the Court of Claims’s factual finding that no causal relationship exists between the statutory waiting period and improved patient outcomes. Instead, intervening defendant posits that because some patients elect not to proceed with an abortion after an initial clinic visit, the 24-hour waiting period must be constitutional in at least some applications, thereby precluding facial invalidity. This contention fundamentally misconstrues the strict scrutiny standard and the burden-shifting framework applicable to statutes that infringe on fundamental rights under the Michigan Constitution. See Johnson, 543 US at 505. Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a statutory provision burdens a fundamental right, the burden -11- shifts squarely to the state to establish that the provision is the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling state interest. Here, intervening defendant failed to make such a showing both in the Court of Claims and on appeal, offering neither evidentiary support nor cogent argument that the 24-hour waiting period is, in fact, the least restrictive means to serve its asserted purpose. The absence of such justification is fatal to the statute’s survival under constitutional scrutiny. Accordingly, the provision cannot withstand review under Const 1963, art 1, § 28, and must be invalidated as an impermissible infringement on the right to reproductive autonomy. C. INFORMED CONSENT Next, multiple provisions of the statutes at issue establish rigorous requirements for securing legally adequate informed consent from patients. These statutory mandates obligate providers to disclose information regarding pregnancy prevention, the potential psychological sequelae of abortion—including depression, guilt, sleep disturbances, diminished interest in work or sexual activity, and anger—along with information about adoption or foster care resources, prenatal care, and parenting options. In its written opinion and order following trial, the Court of Claims found as follows on this issue: The Court finds that many provisions in MCL 333.17015 burden and infringe upon a patient’s right to make and effectuate decisions about abortion care. The entirety of Subsection (3) fails strict-scrutiny review. As already noted, the mandatory 24-hour waiting period of MCL 333.17015(3) burdens and infringes upon access to abortion care. Subsection (3)(a) require