Placeholder name
CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket375785
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
NORTHLAND FAMILY PLANNING CENTER, FOR PUBLICATION
NORTHLAND FAMILY PLANNING CENTER November 17, 2026
INC. EAST, NORTHLAND FAMILY PLANNING 1:28 PM
CENTER INC. WEST, and MEDICAL STUDENTS
FOR CHOICE,
Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants,
v No. 375785
Court of Claims
ATTORNEY GENERAL, DIRECTOR OF THE LC No. 24-000011-MM
DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING AND
REGULATORY AFFAIRS, and DIRECTOR OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES,
Defendants-Appellees/Cross-
Appellees,
and
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Intervening Defendant-
Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and BAZZI and LIEVENSE, JJ.
BORRELLO, P.J.
This appeal requires us to determine whether certain statutory provisions—specifically,
MCL 333.17015 and MCL 333.17015a—violate the recently adopted amendment to the Michigan
Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 28, establishing a fundamental right to reproductive freedom.
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Intervening defendant, the People of the State of Michigan,1 appeals as of right from the opinion
and order of the Court of Claims, which declared certain challenged provisions unconstitutional
and permanently enjoined their enforcement. Plaintiffs cross-appeal by leave granted, challenging
the Court of Claims’s determination that other statutory provisions at issue are not
unconstitutional. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the Court of Claims in part
but vacate any ruling pertaining to whether the statutory coercion-to-abort screening mandate
constitutes discrimination under Const 1963, art 1, § 28(2) and remand to the Court of Claims for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion solely on that issue.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2022, Michigan voters approved Proposal 3 to amend the Michigan Constitution and
establish an individual constitutional right to reproductive freedom. This constitutional right is
located in Const 1963, art 1, § 28, which provides as follows:
(1) Every individual has a fundamental right to reproductive freedom,
which entails the right to make and effectuate decisions about all matters relating
to pregnancy, including but not limited to prenatal care, childbirth, postpartum care,
contraception, sterilization, abortion care, miscarriage management, and infertility
care.
An individual’s right to reproductive freedom shall not be denied, burdened,
nor infringed upon unless justified by a compelling state interest achieved by the
least restrictive means.
Notwithstanding the above, the state may regulate the provision of abortion
care after fetal viability, provided that in no circumstance shall the state prohibit an
abortion that, in the professional judgment of an attending health care professional,
is medically indicated to protect the life or physical or mental health of the pregnant
individual.
(2) The state shall not discriminate in the protection or enforcement of this
fundamental right.
(3) The state shall not penalize, prosecute, or otherwise take adverse action
against an individual based on their actual, potential, perceived, or alleged
pregnancy outcomes, including but not limited to miscarriage, stillbirth, or
abortion. Nor shall the state penalize, prosecute, or otherwise take adverse action
against someone for aiding or assisting a pregnant individual in exercising their
right to reproductive freedom with their voluntary consent.
1
The People moved to intervene on the basis that the named defendants declined to defend the
constitutionality of the challenged laws. Concurrently, the Department of Attorney General
established a conflict wall to establish an independent set of Assistant Attorneys General to defend
the statutes at issue. The court granted the motion to intervene after the parties did not oppose it.
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(4) For the purposes of this section:
A state interest is “compelling” only if it is for the limited purpose of
protecting the health of an individual seeking care, consistent with accepted clinical
standards of practice and evidence-based medicine, and does not infringe on that
individual’s autonomous decision-making.
“Fetal viability” means: the point in pregnancy when, in the professional
judgment of an attending health care professional and based on the particular facts
of the case, there is a significant likelihood of the fetus’s sustained survival outside
the uterus without the application of extraordinary medical measures.
(5) This section shall be self-executing. Any provision of this section held
invalid shall be severable from the remaining portions of this section.
Plaintiffs, identifying themselves as abortion providers and advocates, commenced this
action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs contend that MCL 333.17015 and MCL
333.17015a contravene the recently established state constitutional right to reproductive freedom,
rendering these statutes unconstitutional.2 The constitutional challenges presented are predicated
on four specific mandates imposed on abortion procedures as articulated in the statutory language:
(1) a 24-hour mandatory waiting period, (2) uniform informed consent requirements, (3) a
physician participation mandate, and (4) mandatory screening for coercion.
The 24-hour waiting period prohibits a physician from performing an abortion until at least
24 hours have passed after obtaining the patient’s informed written consent, unless a “medical
emergency” exists. MCL 333.17015(1), (3), and (10). Under MCL 333.17015(1) and (3), “a
physician shall not perform an abortion otherwise permitted by law without the patient’s informed
written consent,” which must be obtained “not less than 24 hours before that physician performs
an abortion . . . .” The medical emergency exception is found in MCL 333.17015(10).
Next, various provisions within the challenged statutes impose strict requirements for
obtaining statutorily sufficient informed consent from the patient. Under MCL 333.17015(3), “not
less than 24 hours before” a physician performs an abortion, the physician or a qualified assistant
must “[c]onfirm that, according to the best medical judgment of a physician, the patient is pregnant,
and determine the probable gestational age of the fetus”; orally provide the patient with
information about the probable gestational age of the fetus, “what to do and whom to contact
should medical complications arise from the abortion,” and “how to obtain pregnancy prevention
information through the department of health and human services”; “[p]rovide the patient with a
physical copy of the written standardized summary”3 regarding accepted medical procedures for
performing abortions, the complications that may arise from those procedures, the complications
that may arise from live birth, the potential for an individual to experience “depression, feelings
2
The pertinent provisions of these statutes have been reproduced in the appendix at the conclusion
of this opinion.
3
The contents of the standardized summary are described in MCL 333.17015(11)(b).
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of guilt, sleep disturbance, loss of interest in work or sex, or anger” as a “result of an abortion,”
available services to assist with adoption or foster care placement, and available counseling
services should the patient experience adverse psychological effects from the abortion; “[p]rovide
the patient with a physical copy of a medically accurate depiction, illustration, or photograph and
description of a fetus supplied by the department of health and human services pursuant to
subsection (11)(a) at the gestational age nearest the probable gestational age of the patient’s fetus”;
“[p]rovide the patient with a physical copy of the prenatal care and parenting information pamphlet
distributed by the department of health and human services . . .”; and “[p]rovide the patient with a
physical copy of the prescreening summary on prevention of coercion to abort described in
subsection (11)(i).”
The physician must also, “personally and in the presence of the patient,” orally inform the
patient of specific risks to the patient of any complications associated with the procedure to be
performed based on the patient’s particular medical condition and history, as well as any specific
risks to the patient in light of that same medical condition and history if the patient chooses to
continue the pregnancy. MCL 333.17015(6)(b).
Furthermore, pursuant to MCL 333.17015(2)(j), “provide the patient with a physical copy”
means “confirming that the patient accessed the internet website described in subsection (5) and
received a printed valid confirmation form from the website and including that form in the patient’s
medical record or giving a patient a copy of a required document by 1 or more of the following
means: (i) In person[;] (ii) By registered mail, return receipt requested[;] (iii) By parcel delivery
service that requires the recipient to provide a signature in order to receive delivery of a parcel[;]
(iv) By facsimile transmission.”
The third of the challenged mandates is the physician mandate. Because MCL
333.17015(1) states that “a physician shall not perform an abortion otherwise permitted by law”
(emphasis added), only licensed physicians may perform abortions. This means that other medical
clinicians, such as nurse practitioners, certified nurse midwives, and physician assistants, may not
provide abortions.
Finally, abortion providers must also “orally screen the patient for coercion to abort using
the screening tools developed by the department under section 17015(11).” MCL 333.17015a(1).
This oral screening may occur before the requirements of MCL 333.17015(3) have been satisfied
and before or after the expiration of the 24-hour waiting period. MCL 333.17015a(1). Abortion
facilities must “post in a conspicuous place in an area of its facility that is accessible to patients,
employees, and visitors the notice described in section 17015(11)(i),” which states, among other
things, that it is illegal to coerce an individual to have an abortion and provides information about
resources where help is available for domestic violence and sexual assault. MCL 333.17015a(5);
MCL 333.17015(11)(i).
In their cross-appeal, plaintiffs alleged that these provisions unconstitutionally burdened
the right to abortion without serving the limited compelling purpose of protecting the health of an
individual seeking care, that each provision was inconsistent with accepted clinical standards of
practice and evidence-based medicine, that the provisions imposed requirements that intruded on
the autonomous decision making of patients, and that the provisions discriminated in the protection
and enforcement of the right to reproductive freedom.
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The Court of Claims held a bench trial, where it heard the testimony of the parties’ experts.
Following trial, the Court of Claims issued an extensive, thorough, and well-reasoned written
opinion and order holding that the provisions creating the mandatory 24-hour waiting period, the
uniform mandatory consent requirement, and the physician mandate, along with other provisions
in the statute that were inextricably linked with these provisions, were unconstitutional. The court
issued a permanent injunction enjoining enforcement of those provisions, which were MCL
333.17015(1), (2)(d)-(g) and (i)-(j), (3)-(10), (11)(a)-(h), (13)-(14), and (18)-(20). The court found
the remaining challenged statutory provisions constitutional and preserved under the severability
provision in MCL 333.17015(17).
This appeal followed.
II. JURISDICTION
At the outset, this Court must address the fundamental question of appellate jurisdiction,
as asserted by intervening defendant. Intervening defendant contends that this Court is without
jurisdiction to entertain the present appeal as of right on the ground that the Court of Claims did
not render a final order resolving all claims asserted in that court. Specifically, intervening
defendant maintains that the Court of Claims failed to adjudicate the plaintiffs’ cause of action
alleging discrimination under Const 1963, art 1, § 28(2), insofar as that claim challenges the
statutory coercion-to-abort screening mandate embodied in MCL 333.17015a. Accordingly,
intervening defendant posits that the order under review is not a final order and, as such, is not
appealable as of right within the meaning of the Michigan Court Rules.
It is axiomatic that this Court may not reach the substantive merits of any appeal unless
and until it has first satisfied itself of its jurisdiction to proceed. Chen v Wayne State Univ, 284
Mich App 172, 191; 771 NW2d 820 (2009). The existence of subject-matter jurisdiction
constitutes a pure question of law, subject to de novo review by this Court. Id.
The contours of this Court’s appellate jurisdiction as of right are governed by MCR
7.203(A)(1), which authorizes an appeal of right from a final judgment or final order of the circuit
court or Court of Claims, as that term is precisely defined by MCR 7.202(6). Under MCR
7.202(6)(a)(i), a “final order” in a civil action, for purposes of appellate review, is defined as “the
first judgment or order that disposes of all the claims and adjudicates the rights and liabilities of
all the parties.” Save for exceptions not relevant to the present dispute, MCR 7.203(A)(1) thus
confers upon this Court jurisdiction as of right to review any such final order issued by the Court
of Claims or a circuit court. The constitutional provisions implicated herein are found at Const
1963, art 1, § 28. Subsection (1) establishes that “[e]very individual has a fundamental right to
reproductive freedom, which entails the right to make and effectuate decisions about all matters
relating to pregnancy, including abortion care,” while subsection (2) mandates that “[t]he state
shall not discriminate in the protection or enforcement of this fundamental right.” The dispositive
jurisdictional question is therefore whether the May 13, 2025 opinion and order of the Court of
Claims finally disposed of plaintiffs’ claim that the statutory coercion screening provisions
contravene the nondiscrimination mandate of Const 1963, art 1, § 28(2). In the section of its
opinion addressing the constitutionality of the coercion screening provisions, the Court of Claims
opined as follows:
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Plaintiffs have not met their burden of establishing that the coercion
screening requirements burden or infringe upon a patient’s access to abortion care.
The witnesses agree that coercion screening is a necessary step in abortion care.
Informational posters warning patients about the illegality of abortion coercion and
providing resources to patients facing such coercion protect patient rights to
reproductive care of all kinds. Contrary to the position of some witnesses, nothing
in the statutes requires providers to ask specific or direct questions during a
coercion screening. The statutes permit provides to tailor their questions and
interact with patients in an organic way.
The Court of Claims determined that plaintiffs failed to sustain their burden of
demonstrating that the coercion screening requirements imposed by statute either burdened or
infringed upon a patient’s access to abortion care. The Court found the evidentiary record to reflect
consensus among witnesses that coercion screening constitutes an integral and necessary
component of abortion care. The Court further noted that the statutory regime’s requirements for
informational posters—alerting patients to the illegality of abortion coercion and directing them
to available resources—operate to safeguard patient rights in the reproductive healthcare context.
Importantly, the Court rejected the argument that the statutes require providers to ask
predetermined or overly specific questions, concluding instead that the statutory framework
permits providers to conduct screening in a flexible, individualized, and organic manner, tailored
to the patient’s circumstances.
Accordingly, the Court of Claims’s finding that the statutory coercion screening
requirements neither burden nor infringe the right of access to abortion care—a central facet of the
“fundamental right to reproductive freedom” guaranteed by the Michigan Constitution—
necessarily operates as a rejection of plaintiffs’ discrimination claim under Const 1963, art 1, §
28(2). The Court of Claims, in its conclusion, expressly held that “MCL 333.17015a and MCL
333.17015(11)(i) [the coercion screening provisions] are not unconstitutional,” thereby rejecting
both Count I and Count II of plaintiffs’ complaint as to the constitutionality of the coercion
screening provisions. Contrary to intervening defendant’s assertions, the final order issued by the
Court of Claims disposed of all rights and liabilities of the parties, including any arising under
Const 1963, art 1, § 28(2), with respect to the facial challenge to the statutory coercion-to-abort
screening requirement. Nothing in the record suggests that any claim was left unadjudicated by
the lower court. For these reasons, the finality requirement of MCR 7.202(6) is satisfied, and this
Court is vested with appellate jurisdiction of right under MCR 7.203(A)(1).4
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MCL 333.17015 AND MCL 333.17015a
4
Additionally, the Court of Claims explicitly designated its order as final, manifesting its intent to
resolve all outstanding issues between the parties. While an explicit declaration of finality is not
dispositive, it remains a significant factor in the determination of whether an order is final for
appellate purposes. See McCoy v Berrien Co Clerk, 348 Mich App 602, 611; 19 NW3d 897 (2023).
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On appeal, intervening defendant contends that the Court of Claims committed reversible
error in concluding that the mandatory 24-hour waiting period, the mandatory uniform informed
consent requirements, and the physician mandate provisions are facially unconstitutional.
Intervening defendant asserts that, under established precedent, a statute is only facially
unconstitutional if the challengers can demonstrate that “no set of circumstances exists under
which the [statutory provisions] would be valid.” United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 745; 107
S Ct 2095; 95 L Ed 2d 697 (1987). Accordingly, intervening defendant maintains that plaintiffs
failed to meet this exacting standard, and thus, the Court of Claims erred in declaring the provisions
facially invalid.
On cross-appeal, plaintiffs contend that the Court of Claims erred in upholding the
constitutionality of the statutory provision requiring a screening for coercion prior to an abortion.
Plaintiffs assert that this requirement imposes an undue burden on the exercise of the constitutional
right to abortion and is not justified by “a compelling state interest.” As such, plaintiffs contend
that this provision should also have been found unconstitutional.
A. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Whether a statute is constitutional presents a question of law that this Court reviews de
novo. League of Women Voters of Mich v Secretary of State, 508 Mich 520, 534; 975 NW2d 840
(2022). We also review de novo matters of constitutional and statutory interpretation. Coalition
of State Employee Unions v State, 498 Mich 312, 322; 870 NW2d 275 (2015). “This Court reviews
a trial court’s findings of fact following a bench trial for clear error and reviews de novo the trial
court’s conclusions of law.” Trader v Comerica Bank, 293 Mich App 210, 215; 809 NW2d 429
(2011).
“Our primary goal in construing a constitutional provision is to give effect to the intent of
the people of the state of Michigan who ratified the Constitution, by applying the rule of ‘common
understanding.’ ” Coalition of State Employee Unions, 498 Mich at 323 (citation omitted). “The
interpretation that should be given it is that which reasonable minds, the great mass of the people
themselves, would give it.” Citizens Protecting Michigan’s Constitution v Secretary of State, 503
Mich 42, 61; 921 NW2d 247 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, the
common understanding of constitutional language is found by determining “the text’s original
meaning to the ratifiers, the people, at the time of ratification.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). We must also “consider the circumstances leading to the adoption of the provision and
the purpose sought to be accomplished.” Mothering Justice v Attorney General, 515 Mich 328,
346; 29 NW3d 346 (2024), opinion clarified 515 Mich 920 (2024) (quotation marks and citations
omitted).
“Our Constitution is clear that ‘[a]ll political power is inherent in the people.’ ” Citizens,
503 Mich at 59, quoting Const 1963, art 1, § 1 (alteration in original). “The people have chosen
to retain for themselves, in Const 1963, art 12, § 2, the power to initiate proposed constitutional
amendments that, if various requirements are met, will be placed on the ballot and voted on at
election time.” Id. “[T]here is no more constitutionally significant event than when the wielders
of ‘[a]ll political power’ under that document, Const 1963, art 1, § 1, choose to exercise their
extraordinary authority to directly approve or disapprove of an amendment thereto.” Id. (some
quotation marks and citation omitted).
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This case involves a facial challenge to the statutory provisions at issue. Statutes are
presumed to be constitutional. League of Women Voters, 508 Mich at 534. A statute that may
have been constitutional when it was passed may become invalid as the result of a subsequent
constitutional amendment. See Const 1963, art 3, § 7 (“The common law and the statute laws now
in force, not repugnant to this constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by their own
limitations, or are changed, amended or repealed.”). Generally, the “party challenging the facial
constitutionality of an act must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [a]ct
would be valid. The fact that the . . . [a]ct might operate unconstitutionally under some
conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient . . . .” League of Women Voters, 508 Mich at 534-
535 (quotation marks and citations omitted; ellipses and alterations in original). The question is
whether the challenged statutory provisions are “unconstitutional in the abstract” rather than “as
applied” to the particular case. Id. at 535.
However, constitutionally protected fundamental rights receive heightened protection from
governmental interference. Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 720; 117 S Ct 2258; 138 L Ed
2d 772 (1997). Some fundamental rights are specifically enumerated in constitutional text. Id.
The present case involves a right that is specifically designated as “fundamental” by our state
constitution. Const 1963, art 1, § 28 expressly designates the “right to reproductive freedom,”
which includes the right to make decisions about “all matters relating to . . . abortion care,” as a
“fundamental right.”
Furthermore, this constitutional provision specifically provides that an “individual’s right
to reproductive freedom shall not be denied, burdened, nor infringed upon unless justified by a
compelling state interest achieved by the least restrictive means.” Const 1963, art 1, § 28. The
reproductive freedom amendment thereby expressly incorporates the most demanding test used by
courts for analyzing the constitutionality of alleged governmental interference with fundamental
rights: strict scrutiny. “The most heightened review, strict scrutiny, applies when the provision
interferes with a fundamental right . . . [u]nder a strict scrutiny analysis, the government may not
infringe upon a fundamental liberty interest unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.” Barrow v City of Detroit Election Comm, 301 Mich App 404, 420; 836
NW2d 498 (2013). Strict scrutiny “requires that a law be the least restrictive means of achieving
a compelling state interest.” Free Speech Coalition, Inc v Paxton, 606 US 461, 471; 145 S Ct
2291; 222 L Ed 2d 643 (2025) (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Zablocki v Redhail,
434 US 374, 388; 98 S Ct 673; 54 L Ed 2d 618 (1978) (“When a statutory classification
significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is
supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those
interests.”).
“Strict scrutiny—which requires a restriction to be the least restrictive means of achieving
a compelling governmental interest—is the most demanding test known to constitutional law.”
Free Speech Coalition, 606 US at 484 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Importantly, it is
the government’s burden under strict scrutiny to prove that the challenged laws “are narrowly
tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.” Johnson v California, 543 US
499, 505; 125 S Ct 1141; 160 L Ed 2d 949 (2005).
Turning to the language of the constitutional provision at issue, an “individual’s right to
reproductive freedom,” which includes “the right to make and effectuate decisions about all
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matters relating to . . . abortion care,” “shall not be denied, burdened, nor infringed upon unless
justified by a compelling state interest achieved by the least restrictive means.” Const 1963, art 1,
§ 28(1) (emphasis added). For purposes of this constitutional provision, a “state interest is
‘compelling’ only if it is for the limited purpose of protecting the health of an individual seeking
care, consistent with accepted clinical standards of practice and evidence-based medicine, and
does not infringe on that individual’s autonomous decision-making.” Const 1963, art 1, § 28(4)
(emphasis added). This section of our state Constitution protecting the fundamental right to
reproductive freedom is “self-executing.” Const 1963, art 1, § 28(5). “When the language of the
Constitution is self-executing, [o]bligations other than those so imposed may not be added.”
League of Women Voters, 508 Mich at 541 (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in
original). Accordingly, the statutory provisions challenged in the present case may only stand if
they are both “justified by a compelling state interest” and achieve that compelling interest “by
the least restrictive means.”
In addressing the issues presented in this appeal, we first undertake an analysis of whether
the statutory provisions at issue “deny, burden, or infringe” upon the constitutional “right to make
and effectuate decisions about all matters relating to . . . abortion care” as articulated in Const
1963, art 1, § 28. Should we determine that a particular statutory provision does not deny, burden,
or infringe upon that right, it necessarily follows that such a provision does not violate the
Michigan Constitution. If, however, we find that the statutory provision implicates the protected
right, we must then proceed to examine the governmental interest purportedly advanced by the
provision. To withstand constitutional scrutiny, the challenged statutory provisions must “protect
the health of an individual seeking care, consistent with accepted clinical standards of practice and
evidence-based medicine,” and must not infringe upon that individual’s autonomous decision-
making. Assuming that a sufficient state interest is identified, we then evaluate whether the
intervening defendant, as the party defending the challenged statutes, has established that the
asserted interest cannot be achieved by less restrictive means. Only if the statutory provision is
the least restrictive means of achieving the articulated interest can it survive constitutional
challenge. With this framework in mind, we proceed to address each of the challenged statutory
provisions in turn.
B. MANDATORY 24-HOUR WAITING PERIOD
The 24-hour waiting period prohibits a physician from performing an abortion until at least
24 hours have passed after obtaining the patient’s informed written consent, unless a “medical
emergency” exists. MCL 333.17015(1), (3), and (10).
At trial, the Court of Claims heard testimony from witnesses with practical and research
experience in the fields of abortion care and medical ethics. These witnesses included doctors,
administrators, a certified nurse midwife and nurse practitioner, and university professors. The
Court of Claims found:
Based on the testimony presented at trial, and after weighing the relative
credibility of the witnesses and examining the evidence presented, the Court finds
that the mandatory 24-hour waiting period burdens and infringes upon patients’
rights to reproductive freedom. The mandatory delay exacerbates the burdens that
patients experience seeking abortion care, including by increasing costs, prolonging
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wait times, increasing the risk that a patient will have to disclose their decision to
others, and potentially forcing the patient to forgo a medication abortion for a more
invasive procedure.
Having found that the mandatory 24-hour waiting period burdened and infringed the right
to reproductive freedom, the Court of Claims acknowledged that the “ostensible goal” of the
challenged provision was to protect patient health. However, the Court of Claims found that the
mandatory 24-hour waiting period did not achieve that goal by the least restrictive means,
consistent with accepted clinical standards of practice and evidence-based medicine. The Court
of Claims reasoned,
Against the mountain of expert opinions and citation of accepted clinical
standards and medical literature submitted by plaintiffs establishing that the
challenged laws do not protect patient health and are contrary to accepted clinical
standards of practice and evidence-based medicine (set forth in extensive detail in
preceding sections), intervening defendant has produced two witnesses deeply
entrenched in the national anti-abortion movement who have frequently and widely
testified in favor of complete abortion bans. These witnesses believe abortion is
murder and an offense to God. Dr. Wubbenhurst’s testimony was based on
theologically skewed studies from journals known to support anti-abortion views.
Dr. Wubbenhurst’s testimony also made clear that she interpreted the findings of
studies in ways the studies’ authors cautioned against. Intervening defendant has
not attacked the qualifications or credibility of plaintiffs’ experts.
The plain language of [Const 1963, art 1, § 28] unambiguously requires that
the challenged laws achieve the goal of protecting patient health and be consistent
with established clinical standards and evidence-based medicine. The only way for
the Court to inquire into this element is to rely on the expert evidence submitted by
the parties. The defense experts’ evidence is too impeached to assist their position.
Plaintiffs’ experts have opined that the 24-hour waiting period does not
protect the health of a patient seeking care and, in fact, hinders patient care by
delaying care by an arbitrary 24-hours. Clinical research has shown that there is no
correlation between having a patient wait 24 hours and the patient achieving better
physical and psychological outcomes. Contrary to Dr. Wubbenhurst’s testimony,
there is no evidence that the delay is used by providers to review a patient’s medical
history to ensure the safety of the procedure for the patient. Rather, the delay is
used solely to force the patient to further consider their choice, i.e., to dissuade the
patient from securing an abortion. The Turnaway Study supports that the vast
majority of patients seeking an abortion have high decisional certainty and low
levels of regret following the procedure.
The mandatory 24-hour waiting period also is not consistent with the
accepted standard of care and evidence-based medicine. Again, the Turnaway
Study demonstrated that patients seeking an abortion do not universally need
additional time to reflect on their decision. No other reproductive care available to
men or women is governed by the Legislature in this manner.
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Moreover, the mandatory 24-hour waiting period infringes upon
autonomous decision-making. The waiting period forces needless delay on patients
after they are able to consent to a procedure, thus burdening and infringing upon a
patient’s access to abortion care.
On appeal, intervening defendant asserts that the Court of Claims erred in declaring the
mandatory 24-hour waiting period provision facially invalid. Intervening defendant relies on
record evidence, including admissions by plaintiffs’ witnesses—that some patients independently
elect to wait before making an abortion decision after receiving the required information. On this
basis, intervening defendant contends that the statutory waiting period is not inherently coercive,
as it does not burden the rights of those patients who would choose to wait. Intervening defendant
further argues that the statute is not unconstitutional in all its applications and that the Court of
Claims failed to apply the correct standard for facial invalidity, which requires a showing that no
set of circumstances exists under which the law would be valid. See Salerno, 481 US at 745.
However, this argument fails to account for the heightened protection afforded to fundamental
rights under the Michigan Constitution. When a challenged statute implicates a fundamental right,
the state must demonstrate that the law is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental
interest and is the least restrictive means available, a standard that supersedes the general Salerno
framework. See Const 1963, art 1, § 28(1).
We note that the absence of a mandatory waiting period does not inhibit any patient from
deliberating or reconsidering an abortion decision at her own pace. Indeed, the evidentiary record
before this Court demonstrates that patients approach the decision to terminate a pregnancy with
varying degrees of contemplation, and that the time required for a considered decision is highly
individualized. The imposition of a categorical 24-hour waiting period, therefore, is not only
untethered from patient autonomy but also operates as a blanket restriction that fails to
accommodate the spectrum of patient circumstances. Under Michigan constitutional law, when a
statute burdens a fundamental right, it must satisfy strict scrutiny by being narrowly tailored and
the least restrictive means to advance a compelling state interest. See Const 1963, art 1, § 28(1);
Free Speech Coalition, 606 US at 471. Here, intervening defendant has failed to identify any
compelling empirical support—either in the record or by reference to legislative findings—that
the rigid 24-hour waiting period furthers patient health, safety, or informed consent in a manner
less restrictive alternatives could not achieve. The Court of Claims correctly found no evidence
of a nexus between the statutory waiting period and any measurable improvement in patient
physical or psychological outcomes. Moreover, the arbitrary and inflexible nature of the waiting
period undermines any contention that it is narrowly drawn or necessary to achieve the state’s
asserted aims.
Notably, intervening defendant does not contest the Court of Claims’s factual finding that
no causal relationship exists between the statutory waiting period and improved patient outcomes.
Instead, intervening defendant posits that because some patients elect not to proceed with an
abortion after an initial clinic visit, the 24-hour waiting period must be constitutional in at least
some applications, thereby precluding facial invalidity. This contention fundamentally
misconstrues the strict scrutiny standard and the burden-shifting framework applicable to statutes
that infringe on fundamental rights under the Michigan Constitution. See Johnson, 543 US at 505.
Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a statutory provision burdens a fundamental right, the burden
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shifts squarely to the state to establish that the provision is the least restrictive means to achieve a
compelling state interest. Here, intervening defendant failed to make such a showing both in the
Court of Claims and on appeal, offering neither evidentiary support nor cogent argument that the
24-hour waiting period is, in fact, the least restrictive means to serve its asserted purpose. The
absence of such justification is fatal to the statute’s survival under constitutional scrutiny.
Accordingly, the provision cannot withstand review under Const 1963, art 1, § 28, and must be
invalidated as an impermissible infringement on the right to reproductive autonomy.
C. INFORMED CONSENT
Next, multiple provisions of the statutes at issue establish rigorous requirements for
securing legally adequate informed consent from patients. These statutory mandates obligate
providers to disclose information regarding pregnancy prevention, the potential psychological
sequelae of abortion—including depression, guilt, sleep disturbances, diminished interest in work
or sexual activity, and anger—along with information about adoption or foster care resources,
prenatal care, and parenting options.
In its written opinion and order following trial, the Court of Claims found as follows on
this issue:
The Court finds that many provisions in MCL 333.17015 burden and
infringe upon a patient’s right to make and effectuate decisions about abortion care.
The entirety of Subsection (3) fails strict-scrutiny review. As already noted, the
mandatory 24-hour waiting period of MCL 333.17015(3) burdens and infringes
upon access to abortion care.
Subsection (3)(a) require