Muhammad v. Riverside Healthcare

2026 IL App (3d) 240274 Opinion filed June 15, 2026 ____________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS THIRD DISTRICT 2026 KERMIT S. MUHAMMAD, M.D., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 21st Judicial Circuit, Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Kankakee County, Illinois. ) v. ) Appeal No. 3-24-0274 ) Circuit No. 21-CH-70 RIVERSIDE HEALTHCARE and ) PHILIP KAMBIC, ) Honorable ) Lindsay Parkhurst, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding. ) ____________________________________________________________________________ PRESIDING JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Peterson and Bertani concurred in the judgment and opinion. ____________________________________________________________________________ OPINION ¶1 Plaintiff, Dr. Kermit S. Muhammad, appeals from the circuit court of Kankakee County’s dismissal, with prejudice, of his third amended complaint. On appeal, plaintiff challenges the circuit court’s findings, culminating in the dismissal, that defendants, Riverside Healthcare (Riverside) and Philip Kambic, were immune from civil liability under section 10.2 of the Hospital Licensing Act (Act) (210 ILCS 85/10.2 (West 2020)), that a portion of the controversy was moot, and that plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. ¶2 I. BACKGROUND ¶3 A. Factual Allegations ¶4 Plaintiff alleged the following facts in his third amended complaint. Plaintiff is a registered member of the Nation of Islam and holds the “sincere religious belief that vaccinations are in direct contradiction to the Will and Commandments of God.” He is also an orthopedic surgeon employed by Orthopedic Associates of Kankakee/Illinois Bone and Joint Institute, LLC, and has clinical privileges at Riverside. Plaintiff alleged that, throughout the 17 years that he has been a member of the staff at Riverside, he has conscientiously objected to and been exempted from receiving all vaccinations, on account of his religious beliefs. ¶5 1. Riverside’s COVID-19 Vaccination Policy ¶6 Relevant to this dispute, section 12.1 of Riverside’s Medical Staff Bylaws (Bylaws) states that “[t]he Medical Executive Committee shall review, develop and adopt policies, which shall be binding upon the medical staff, its members, and those otherwise granted permission to practice or holding clinical privileges” and that “[o]nly policies adopted by the Medical Executive Committee are binding upon the medical staff.” Section 13.2 of the Bylaws separately states that “all policies of the Medical Staff may be adopted and amended by a majority vote of the Medical Executive Committee” and that changes to “Medical Staff policies will become effective only when approved by the Board [of Directors].” ¶7 On August 26, 2021, Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker issued an executive order that required healthcare workers to be vaccinated against COVID-19, but further provided that an individual would be exempt from the requirement if the vaccination were to require the individual to “violate or forgo a sincerely held religious belief” (August 26 executive order). (Internal quotation omitted.) The following day, Kambic, the president and chief executive officer of Riverside, 2  circulated a memorandum stating that all staff would need to be vaccinated against COVID-19 by October 31, 2021 (August 27 memorandum). The August 27 memorandum explained that Riverside was imposing the vaccination requirement because of the August 26 executive order, the fact that the Food and Drug Administration had fully approved the Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine, the “resurgence of infections,” and Riverside’s “commitment to provide the highest quality patient care in the safest environment for [its] staff.” ¶8 Also in August 2021, Riverside issued a policy, effective August 27, 2021, that required its medical staff to receive the COVID-19 vaccination by October 31, 2021, unless exempt because of “[r]eligious [c]onviction” (vaccination policy). The vaccination policy further required any staff member who declined to receive the vaccination on account of “sincerely held religious beliefs” to submit a request for a religious exemption and to wear an N95 mask throughout his or her shift. Additionally, the vaccination policy stated that “[e]ven in circumstances where a religious belief may otherwise qualify for an exemption, Riverside reserve[d] the right to deny the request where safety risks and legal liability created an undue hardship and increased risk for transmission of the Covid virus among patients, staff and community members.” ¶9 Plaintiff alleged that, during a September 9, 2021, speech, former President Joe Biden had “announced a COVID-19 plan that would include an Emergency Temporary Standard *** from the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration *** related to vaccine requirements.” In a subsequent memorandum, dated September 10, 2021, Riverside stated that, until it received and could review the contents of the Emergency Temporary Standard that former President Biden had referenced in his September 9, 2021, speech, it would “be temporarily suspending the decisions on pending religious *** exemption requests.” On September 12, 2021, plaintiff submitted a religious exemption request, pursuant to the vaccination policy. 3 ¶ 10 Five days after plaintiff submitted his religious exemption request, Kambic circulated a memorandum stating that the vaccination policy was to remain in effect, with “[o]ne important modification,” which was that, “[w]here a religious belief [might have] otherwise qualified for an exemption, Riverside [would] deny such request for all patient-facing positions where safety risks and legal liability create[d] an undue hardship and increase[d] risk for transmission of the COVID- 19 virus among [the] patients and staff” (September 17 memorandum). In October 2021, the Board of Directors (Board) approved the vaccination policy as issued in August 2021. ¶ 11 On October 8, 2021, Riverside posted a video on YouTube that featured Kambic and was directed at Riverside employees “ ‘to answer questions,’ and ‘to explain the why of why [Riverside was] doing some things’ ” (YouTube video). Plaintiff alleged that, in the YouTube video, Kambic had stated that, “for employees to choose to refuse to be vaccinated [was] to say, ‘I’m going to have to leave’ Riverside.” ¶ 12 2. Notification of Adverse Action ¶ 13 In an October 27, 2021, letter authored by Kambic, Riverside notified plaintiff that the Medical Executive Committee (Executive Committee) had recommended to the Board that the clinical privileges of medical staff who had not yet complied with the vaccination policy be terminated (October 27 letter). The letter stated that, because the loss of clinical privileges constituted an adverse action under the Bylaws, plaintiff was allowed to request a hearing, the scope of which would be limited to his compliance with the vaccination policy. The letter further stated that if plaintiff did not request a hearing, then his membership on the medical staff would be terminated effective 11:59 p.m. on November 30, 2021. Attached to the letter was a copy of the vaccination policy. 4 ¶ 14 3. Hearing on Adverse Action ¶ 15 Section 11.3-1 of the Bylaws provides that a “hearing is a forum for the resolution of issues involving professional conduct and competence on an intraprofessional basis.” Section 11.3-3 of the Bylaws also mandates that, in the event of a hearing, the president of the medical staff and chief executive officer must appoint a hearing committee that is comprised of at least three medical staff members “with no prior involvement in the matter” and that “[t]he affected [p]hysician has the right to inspect pertinent information with regard to the basis on which adverse decision was made.” Under sections 11.3-6 and 11.3-7 of the Bylaws, after a hearing concludes, the hearing committee must issue a written report that contains its findings and recommendations to the Board as to whether to accept, reject, or modify the prior corrective action recommendation, and the Board must later issue a final written decision. ¶ 16 On November 23, 2021, pursuant to the Bylaws, plaintiff requested a hearing regarding the denial of his religious exemption request and the potential termination of his clinical privileges. Plaintiff also requested “the right to inspect any and all pertinent information with regard to the basis on which the adverse decision was made at an agreeable time reasonably in advance of the hearing.” ¶ 17 The hearing requested by plaintiff ultimately commenced on January 18, 2022. The hearing committee comprised Dr. Jason Serpe, Dr. Scott Smithgall, and Dr. Ryan Meiners. Also present at the hearing were Kambic; counsel for plaintiff, attorney Troy Lundquist; and counsel for Riverside and advisor to the hearing committee, attorney Michael Phillips. At the outset of the proceedings, the hearing committee clarified, in response to a request by Lundquist, that the “operative policy” with which plaintiff was said not to have complied was the vaccination policy, as issued in August 5  2021 and approved by the Board in October 2021. Later during the hearing, the following exchange took place: “[PLAINTIFF]: *** So the policy that we have here, which is the policy that, you know, I based [my application for a religious exemption] on, it doesn’t say anything about denying exemption for front-facing activities with patients. And so my question is, you know, why is that different? Is there a different policy, or why is that? *** [PLAINTIFF]: I mean, the policy here, so this policy, which was approved in October, it allows for religious exemptions. But apparently, there’s some additional policy someplace which says that you can’t have a religious exemption because all of them were denied. So I’m saying, where is that policy? Yeah, it’s not in here. [MR. KAMBIC]: That policy doesn’t exist and that’s not the point of the hearing. But the policy doesn’t exist. We never said that we were going to deny every religious exemption. [PLAINTIFF]: Okay. Well, specifically in that case, why was mine denied? [MR. PHILLIPS]: Because you’re patient-facing, and you will endanger ***.” ¶ 18 Also during the hearing, Lundquist asked for plaintiff to be provided with any “medical evidence, articles, guidelines, [and] things of that nature” that were relied upon in the decision to take adverse action against plaintiff. Kambic stated that Lundquist’s request would be taken “under advisement.” Later during the hearing, plaintiff asked whether there was “any specific medical 6  literature” that was relied upon in the development of the vaccination policy, to which Phillips responded: “I think that’s something your attorney asked, and we’re taking that under advisement.” ¶ 19 Following the hearing, the hearing committee issued a report in which it found that plaintiff was “sincere in his religious convictions,” but that the COVID-19 pandemic had “created a situation that supersede[d] individual preference” (report). The hearing committee further found that Riverside’s “decision to institute a vaccination mandate was made for the safety and protection of patients and the staff who cared for them” and that plaintiff had not been discriminated against, “given the provisions of the [vaccination policy] were uniformly applied to all medical staff providers seeking religious exemptions.” The hearing committee thus recommended that the Board uphold the Executive Committee’s recommendation to terminate plaintiff’s medical staff membership and clinical privileges, which the Board subsequently did. ¶ 20 In a letter dated February 18, 2022, Riverside informed plaintiff that, in response to his request at the January 18, 2022, hearing for the “ ‘specific medical literature’ ” that Riverside had relied upon to develop the vaccination policy, said policy was “not based upon a specific piece of medical literature but rather the medical judgment of Dr. Moss and selected members of Riverside’s medical staff.” Riverside also stated, however, that reports published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) regarding the efficacy of COVID-19 vaccination had informed the medical knowledge and judgment of Riverside’s staff and that those reports were available to the public through the CDC’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. ¶ 21 B. Procedural History ¶ 22 On November 23, 2021, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants in the circuit court of Kankakee County that alleged, in sum, that the vaccination policy violated the Health Care Right of Conscience Act (745 ILCS 70/1 et seq. (West 2020)) and that Riverside had violated the 7  Bylaws by denying his religious exemption request. On that same day, plaintiff also filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction that would, in part, prohibit defendants from “terminating, transferring, suspending, placing on paid or unpaid leave, revoking or suspending any medical staff privileges or hospital credentials, or otherwise retaliat[ing] against [plaintiff]” for filing a religious exemption request. ¶ 23 On March 29, 2022, the circuit court granted plaintiff a temporary restraining order that enjoined defendants from taking any adverse action against plaintiff’s clinical privileges based on his COVID-19 vaccination status. The temporary restraining order remained in effect until August 26, 2022, around which time Riverside amended the vaccination policy to allow religious exemptions for patient-facing staff in light of the decline in COVID-19 infections and mortality rates in the local community and nationwide. Plaintiff alleged that the temporary restraining order prevented Riverside from “officially” terminating his clinical privileges. ¶ 24 On May 30, 2023, plaintiff filed his third amended complaint, which contained four counts. Starting with count I, for breach of contract, plaintiff alleged that Riverside had violated the Bylaws and the Act by taking adverse action against his clinical privileges for a “sham purpose,” rather than to promote the quality of patient care. Plaintiff also alleged that all physicians must participate in a managed care, government, or private insurance program (collectively, “insurance programs”) to practice and that the insurance programs “re-credential” participating physicians every two years. According to plaintiff, Riverside must disclose its adverse action against his clinical privileges as part of the re-credentialing process, and the insurance programs are unlikely to re-credential and are likely to increase rates and government scrutiny in light of the adverse action. Plaintiff alleged that, because of Riverside’s adverse action against his clinical privileges, 8  he must now pay increased rates for the rest of his career, and his ability to practice medicine has been “significantly curtailed.” ¶ 25 As to count II, for tortious interference with existing and prospective business relations, plaintiff alleged that defendants knew that he had both existing and prospective relations with patients whom he was currently treating and who would return to him for ongoing cases, as well as with physicians unaffiliated with Riverside who would refer cases to him. Plaintiff further alleged that Riverside had directed his patients to a physician employed by Riverside Medical Group, an affiliate of Riverside, and had instructed the unaffiliated physicians to refer patients to this same physician employed by Riverside Medical Group rather than to plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that defendants’ actions had been motivated by his “unvaccinated status” and had caused him to lose a substantial portion of his medical practice. ¶ 26 Under count IV, 1 for intentional interference with employment contract, plaintiff alleged that Kambic had induced Riverside to breach the provisions of the Bylaws through conduct that included authoring, distributing, and enforcing the policy of denying religious exemptions to staff in patient-facing positions; refusing to provide plaintiff with the literature upon which he relied in determining that plaintiff was a danger to patients or staff; and posting YouTube videos in which he stated that “all staff in patient-facing positions would be terminated.” Plaintiff alleged that, in so inducing Riverside, Kambic had acted with self-interest, a desire to harm plaintiff, and a desire to promote religious discrimination at Riverside. ¶ 27 In count V, for intentional infliction of emotional distress, plaintiff alleged that Kambic and other Riverside representatives had engaged in a pattern of discriminatory and harassing conduct to retaliate against him for requesting an exemption to the vaccination policy. According to 1 The third amended complaint does not contain a count “III.” 9  plaintiff, this conduct was extreme and outrageous and included “knowingly and intentionally” violating the Bylaws during the course of revoking his clinical privileges; preventing him from presenting a full defense during the January 18, 2022, hearing; disregarding the evidence presented during the hearing; subjecting his work performance to stricter scrutiny compared to the work performance of other similarly situated unvaccinated staff with medical exemptions; subjecting him to demeaning and humiliating comments and behavior regarding his religious beliefs and unvaccinated status; subjecting him to “repeated baseless” peer review processes so as to interfere with his ability to practice; and influencing the peer review process to lead to the termination of his clinical privileges. Plaintiff alleged that, because of defendants’ conduct, he suffered severe emotional distress that resulted in guilt, shame, embarrassment, hopelessness, anguish, fury, humiliation, loss of sleep, decrease in appetite, and “other physical manifestations of emotional distress.” ¶ 28 On July 5, 2023, defendants filed a combined motion to dismiss the third amended complaint under section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2020)). In their motion, defendants requested that the circuit court dismiss all four counts of the complaint, pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code (id. § 2-619), because they were immune from liability under section 10.2 of the Act (210 ILCS 85/10.2 (West 2020)). Defendants also requested that, in the alternative, the court dismiss count I of the third amended complaint, pursuant to section 2-619, because it became moot after Riverside amended its vaccination policy, and that the court dismiss counts II, IV, and V of the third amended complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2020)) for failure to state a claim for relief. ¶ 29 Following a hearing on defendants’ combined motion to dismiss, the court found that defendants were immune from liability under section 10.2 of the Act, that count I was moot, and 10  that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under counts II, IV, and V, respectively. Based on these findings, the court dismissed the entirety of the third amended complaint with prejudice. ¶ 30 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 31 On appeal, plaintiff challenges the circuit court’s grant of defendants’ combined motion to dismiss his third amended complaint, on multiple grounds. First, plaintiff argues that defendants were not immune from liability under section 10.2 of the Act because he had sufficiently alleged that they took adverse action against his clinical privileges for a sham purpose, which the Act does not protect. Second, plaintiff argues that count I of the third amended complaint was not moot because he had sufficiently alleged that he had incurred damages as a result of defendants’ adverse action against his clinical privileges, despite the fact that defendants later amended the vaccination policy. Third, plaintiff argues that he stated a claim for relief under counts II, IV, and V of the third amended complaint, respectively. ¶ 32 A. Legal Standards ¶ 33 Section 2-619.1 of the Code permits a litigant to file a combined motion to dismiss pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code. See 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2020). “A section 2-615 motion admits all well-pleaded facts and attacks the legal sufficiency of [a] complaint.” Floyd v. Rockford Park District, 355 Ill. App. 3d 695, 699-700 (2005). The question raised by a section 2- 615 motion is whether the allegations in the complaint, construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. Id.; Doe v. Chicago Board of Education, 339 Ill. App. 3d 848, 853 (2003). Dismissal pursuant to section 2- 615 is proper when it is apparent that no set of facts can be proven that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Ozuk v. River Grove Board of Education, 281 Ill. App. 3d 239, 244 (1996). 11 ¶ 34 In contrast, a section 2-619 motion admits the legal sufficiency of a complaint and all well- pleaded facts and reasonable inferences therefrom but raises an affirmative matter outside of the complaint that bars or defeats the cause of action. Reynolds v. Jimmy John’s Enterprises, LLC, 2013 IL App (4th) 120139, ¶ 31. As to any affirmative matter raised in a section 2-619 motion, there is no admission of truth or sufficiency. Buckner v. O’Brien, 287 Ill. App. 3d 173, 178 (1997). Statutory immunity is an affirmative matter properly raised in a section 2-619 motion. Wilson v. City of Decatur, 389 Ill. App. 3d 555, 558 (2009). ¶ 35 When considering a section 2-615 or 2-619 motion to dismiss, a court must accept all well- pleaded facts in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences from these facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Edelman, Combs & Latturner v. Hinshaw & Culbertson, 338 Ill. App. 3d 156, 164 (2003). We apply de novo review to dismissals made pursuant to either section 2-615 or 2-619 of the Code. Id. Furthermore, we may affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of a complaint on any basis in the record, regardless of the court’s reasoning. Kucinsky v. Pfister, 2020 IL App (3d) 170719, ¶ 34. ¶ 36 B. Section 2-619 Dismissal ¶ 37 1. Mootness ¶ 38 We start by analyzing whether count I of the third amended complaint in this case is moot. It is well settled that the subject matter jurisdiction of the appellate court extends only to cases that present an actual controversy. See, e.g., Lo v. Provena Covenant Medical Center, 356 Ill. App. 3d 538, 540 (2005). Accordingly, this court will not consider moot or abstract questions or render an advisory decision. Fisch v. Loews Cineplex Theatres, Inc., 365 Ill. App. 3d 537, 540 (2005). “An issue is moot if no actual controversy exists or events happen that make it impossible for the court 12  to grant effectual relief.” Baker v. Forest Preserve District of Cook County, 2015 IL App (1st) 141157, ¶ 35. ¶ 39 Plaintiff in this case cites Gates v. Holy Cross Hospital, 175 Ill. App. 3d 439 (1988), to support his argument that count I is not moot. The plaintiff in Gates was a surgeon whose clinical privileges at a hospital were summarily suspended. Id. at 441. The plaintiff later sued the hospital, along with three other defendants, and alleged in his complaint that the hospital had violated numerous procedural requirements that its medical staff bylaws set forth regarding the suspension of clinical privileges. Id. at 441, 443. In his complaint, the plaintiff sought the removal of the summary suspension from his record and compensation for damages in the amount of $250,000. Id. at 444. ¶ 40 On appeal following the dismissal of the complaint with prejudice, the defendants argued that the issue was moot because the plaintiff’s suspension had been terminated and his full clinical privileges had been restored prior to the filing of his complaint. Id. at 448. The appellate court noted, however, that there remained a question of whether the hospital had substantially complied with its medical staff bylaws relative to the summary suspension of the plaintiff’s clinical privileges. Id. The court further noted that, if the plaintiff were to prevail on the merits of the case, then he would be entitled to an expungement of the summary suspension from his record. Id. The court thus concluded that an actual controversy still existed and that the issue was not moot, despite the fact that the plaintiff’s clinical privileges had since been restored. Id. ¶ 41 As was similarly so in Gates, plaintiff in this case alleged that a temporary restraining order prevented Riverside from “officially” terminating his clinical privileges and that, after it had taken adverse action against his clinical privileges, Riverside amended the vaccination policy to allow religious exemptions to patient-facing staff. Also like the plaintiff in Gates, plaintiff in this case 13  nevertheless alleged under count I of the third amended complaint that defendants violated Illinois law and the Bylaws in taking adverse action against his clinical privileges. Furthermore, although plaintiff did not specifically request the removal of the adverse action from his record in his prayer for relief, he did seek monetary relief to compensate for damages that he alleged had resulted from the fact that Riverside was obligated to report the adverse action to insurance programs in which he was required to participate, in turn causing him to have to pay increased rates “for the remainder of his career” and his ability to practice medicine to be “significantly curtailed.” ¶ 42 Despite the similarities to the facts in Gates, defendants in this case argue that count I of the third amended complaint is moot because they are immune from liability for the monetary damages sought by plaintiff, under section 10.2 of the Act. Although defendants contend that they are so immune, plaintiff contends the opposite, and it remains incumbent on this court to determine which of these contentions is correct and whether defendants are in fact immune under section 10.2 of the Act. Furthermore, if we were to determine that defendants are not so immune, then there would remain a question of whether defendants violated Illinois law and the Bylaws in taking adverse action against plaintiff’s clinical privileges, which, if answered in the affirmative, would in turn potentially entitle plaintiff to the monetary relief that he seeks. Accordingly, we find that there is an actual controversy under count I of the third amended complaint and that the count is not moot. See U-Haul Co. of Chicago Metroplex v. Town of Cicero, 87 Ill. App. 3d 915, 918-19 (1980) (concluding that a count of a complaint was not moot but nevertheless properly dismissed, after finding that the defendants were statutorily immune from liability for damages alleged under that count of the complaint). 14 ¶ 43 2. Immunity ¶ 44 Next, we analyze whether defendants are immune from liability for the monetary damages that plaintiff alleged under all four counts of his third amended complaint. Relevant to our analysis, section 10.2 of the Act provides the following, in relevant part: “[N]o hospital and no individual who is a member, agent, or employee of a hospital, hospital medical staff, hospital administrative staff, or hospital governing board shall be liable for civil damages as a result of the acts, omissions, decisions, or any other conduct, except those involving willful or wanton misconduct, of a medical utilization committee, medical review committee, patient care audit committee, medical care evaluation committee, quality review committee, credential committee, peer review committee, or any other committee or individual whose purpose, directly or indirectly, is internal quality control or medical study to reduce morbidity or mortality, or for improving patient care within a hospital, or the improving or benefiting of patient care and treatment, whether within a hospital or not, or for the purpose of professional discipline including institution of a summary suspension in accordance with Section 10.4 of this Act and the medical staff bylaws.” 210 ILCS 85/10.2 (West 2020). Illinois courts have interpreted section 10.2 to grant physicians, hospitals, and their staff immunity from civil damages for actions taken in the course of serving on a hospital peer review committee or other credential committee. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Rockford Memorial Hospital Ass’n, 183 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1077-78 (1989) (collecting cases). The supreme court has further interpreted this section to “indicate a general legislative intention that hospitals and medical staffs be free to exercise their professional judgment in the selection and retention of medical staff members.” Barrows v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 123 Ill. 2d 49, 58 (1988). 15 ¶ 45 The parties in this case do not seem to dispute that Riverside is a “hospital,” that Kambic is an “employee of a hospital” under section 10.2, or that, consequently, defendants are of the types of individuals whom the section protects. However, the parties do dispute the actual purpose of defendants’ alleged conduct and whether, in light of that purpose, immunity under section 10.2 applies. Specifically, defendants assert that immunity applies because the purpose of their alleged conduct was to protect patient and staff safety during the COVID-19 pandemic. To the contrary, plaintiff asserts that immunity does not apply because the purpose of defendants’ alleged conduct was not any of the grounds set forth under section 10.2 but was, instead, a “sham” and undertaken “to continue to usurp [his] call volume and preferrable cases at [Riverside],” to discriminate against him based on his religious beliefs, and “to retaliate against [him] for challenging [Kambic’s] unadopted Covid policy and based on [Kambic’s] personal animus for [him].” ¶ 46 Illinois reviewing courts have discussed the concept of a sham purpose for actions taken during a peer review process only once, in the decision of Valfer v. Evanston Northwestern Healthcare, 2016 IL 119220. The plaintiff in Valfer was a physician who sued a hospital for breach of contract to recover civil damages that had allegedly stemmed from the hospital’s decision not to reappoint him. Id. ¶¶ 3, 12. The hospital filed a motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, arguing, in part, that it was immune from liability for civil damages under section 10.2. Id. ¶ 13. The circuit court ultimately awarded summary judgment in favor of the hospital after determining that the plaintiff had provided insufficient evidence to support his allegation that the reasons for the hospital’s decision to discharge him were that one doctor had an economic conflict with him and another doctor morally objected to his practice. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. ¶ 47 On appeal, the supreme court in Valfer emphasized that section 10.2 confers immunity in the context of quality review “only if the review was undertaken based on the actual purpose 16  specified by the statute—i.e., to maintain or improve the quality of health care.” (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 34. Accordingly, the court warned that its decision “should not be interpreted as condoning sham peer review.” Id. Furthermore, the court stated that a plaintiff physician’s claim pertaining to a peer review decision may survive a motion to dismiss when the plaintiff “alleges well-pleaded facts—which are not based on mere speculation or unsupported conclusions—to indicate that the purpose of the discipline was not based on the grounds enunciated in the statute but was instead a sham.” Id. ¶ 36. In applying these principles to the facts of the case before it, the court noted that the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim had advanced beyond the pleading stages, “despite the conclusory nature of his allegations.” Id. ¶¶ 38. The supreme court also found that the circuit court had properly awarded summary judgment in favor of the hospital. Id. ¶¶ 39-40. ¶ 48 The Valfer court considered the decision of Levitin v. Northwestern Community Hospital, 64 F. Supp. 3d 1107 (N.D. Ill. 2014), to be instructive on the issue of whether to affirm the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment. Valfer, 2016 IL 119220 ¶ 39. One of the plaintiffs in Levitin, Yelena Levitin, was a female general surgeon whose clinical privileges at a hospital had been revoked during the period that she had practiced within the General Surgery Section of the hospital, which, in turn, oversaw the hospital’s Surgical Audit Committee. Levitin, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 1111- 12. The plaintiffs alleged that, prior to the revocation of Levitin’s clinical privileges, Daniel Conway, the chairman of the Surgical Audit Committee and chief of the General Surgery Section, had “engag[ed] in heightened scrutiny of [Levitin’s] surgeries” and had accessed her patients’ private medical records to find reasons to challenge her professional competence and abilities. Id. at 1115. The plaintiffs further alleged that Conway had also provided William Soper, his partner and the chief of the hospital’s Department of Surgery, a list of past surgical cases, which Soper in turn used to support a request that one of the hospital’s oversight committees review Levitin’s 17  activities and take corrective action against her. Id. at 1116. The plaintiffs asserted that Conway and Soper had falsely alleged that there were concerns and complaints regarding Levitin’s practice, “not out of a concern for patient safety, but rather as retaliation for [her earlier] complaints against Conway and in order to interfere with her practice, which competed with ASA’s, Soper’s, Loren’s, and Conway’s practices.” Id. at 1116. The plaintiffs alleged that Conway and Soper’s conduct had caused the revenue earned by Levitin’s practice to decrease by approximately 38%. Id. at 1119. ¶ 49 The plaintiffs in Levitin filed a lawsuit that pertained to the revocation of Levitin’s clinical privileges. Id. at 1110. The defendants later filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit and argued therein that the Act protected them from liability for the plaintiffs’ alleged damages because “Levitin’s peer review process ‘met all of the statutory requirements ***’ and served the purpose of internal quality control and improving patient care within the hospital.” Id. at 1120. In addressing the motion to dismiss, the court found that the plaintiffs’ allegations “provid