D.S. v. Agency for Persons With Disabilities
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledNovember 16, 2020
Docket1D19-3807
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D19-3807
_____________________________
D.S.,
Appellant,
v.
AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Department of Children and Families Office
of Appeal Hearings.
Ashanti Jones, Hearing Officer.
November 16, 2020
PER CURIAM.
D.S. is eligible for services under the provisions of the Home
and Community Based Medicaid Waiver Program for persons with
developmental disabilities. See §§ 393.0661 & 393.0662, Fla. Stat.
(2019). He was placed on a waiting list for services when he was
three years of age. When D.S. turned thirteen, his parents applied
on his behalf for crisis waiver enrollment—which would have
prioritized him for available waiver placements ahead of other
applicants—but their application was denied by the Agency for
Persons with Disabilities, which is charged with oversight of the
program. § 393.063(2), Fla. Stat. (2019). An appeal to the Office of
Appeal Hearings, Department of Children and Families, resulted
in an evidentiary hearing and a final order affirming the denial.
This appeal followed.
The hearing officer ultimately found that D.S. did not
establish the crisis waiver criteria in any of the three “priority”
categories set forth in Florida Administrative Code Rule 65G-
1.047(4), (5), and (6). But at the start, the hearing officer made an
especially critical finding of fact: D.S.’s “primary diagnosis is
Autism.” On the contrary, the record established that D.S. was
diagnosed with spastic quadriplegic cerebral palsy and
mitochondrial cytopathy, along with profound motor and
developmental delays. There is no record support whatsoever for a
finding that D.S. was diagnosed with autism. Yet, based on the
evidence presented, the consequence of that finding was
momentous. A diagnosis of autism was a gamechanger when it
came to services available to D.S. The family’s insurance plan
expressly excluded from coverage expenses for “Applied
Behavioral Analysis (ABA) therapy when [the] diagnosis is other
than autism.” (Emphasis added). On the other hand, a multitude
of services were available to the family under their plan if D.S. fell
within the autism spectrum of disorders. By finding that D.S was
autistic, the hearing officer was free to conclude that no evidence
had been presented showing any behavioral services had been
denied by the family’s insurer, only that they had not attempted to
access said services. With potential private support sources
available to him, D.S. would be ineligible for crisis waiver
enrollment under the rule.
As the hearing officer’s action depended on a finding of fact
not based on competent, substantial evidence, we must set aside
the final order and remand the case to the Office of Appeal
Hearings, Department of Children and Families, for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. See § 120.68(7)(b), Fla.
Stat. (2019); see also Kennedy v. Agency for Health Care Admin.,
954 So. 2d 710, 711 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (holding that this court
reviews an agency’s order “under the competent, substantial
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evidence standard” and may set aside the order “when it is based
on a fact not supported by competent, substantial evidence”). ∗
REVERSED and REMANDED.
RAY, C.J., and JAY and LONG, JJ., concur.
_____________________________
Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________
Rachel Siegel-McLaughlin of Disability Rights Florida,
Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Cecilie Dale Sykes of Agency for Persons with Disabilities,
Tallahassee, for Appellee.
∗
Our disposition on this point obviates the need to address the
first point raised in this appeal.
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