Jackson v. Ventavia Research Group

Case: 24-40564 Document: 120-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit ____________ FILED November 13, 2026 No. 24-40564 Thomas B. Plunkett, III ____________ Clerk United States of America, ex rel, Brook Jackson, Plaintiff—Appellant, versus United States of America, Intervenor Plaintiff—Appellee, Ventavia Research Group, L.L.C., Defendant—Appellee. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 1:21-CV-8 ______________________________ Before Elrod, Chief Judge, and Richman and Willett, Circuit Judges. Don R. Willett: The False Claims Act (FCA) 1 deputizes private citizens to litigate on the Government’s behalf, but the claims remain the Government’s to _____________________ 1 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33. 1 Case: 24-40564 Document: 120-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 No. 24-40564 control. A relator may bring the suit, but the Government retains the right to seek to end it. Here, after declining to intervene during the seal period, the Government moved to intervene and dismiss Brook Jackson’s lawsuit challenging the scientific integrity of Pfizer’s COVID-19 vaccine trials. It argued that her claims lacked merit, conflicted with federal public-health policy, and would impose heavy litigation and discovery burdens. Following the Supreme Court’s guidance in United States ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc., 2 we conclude that the district court acted well within its discretion in permitting intervention and dismissing Jackson’s FCA claims. The district court also properly dismissed Jackson’s separate retaliation claim 3 against Ventavia Research Group, LLC (Ventavia)—Jackson’s employer and a site operator for Pfizer’s clinical trials—for failure to state a claim. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s judgment in full. I. Background A. The False Claims Act The FCA “is the government’s primary litigation tool for recovering losses sustained as the result of fraud.” 4 The statute authorizes treble damages and civil penalties from persons who knowingly present, or cause to be presented, false or fraudulent claims for payment to the Government. 5 _____________________ 2 599 U.S. 419 (2023). 3 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). 4 United States ex rel. Marcy v. Rowan Cos., 520 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Avco Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 884 F.2d 621, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 5 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(B). 2 Case: 24-40564 Document: 120-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 No. 24-40564 Although the Government ordinarily litigates its own claims, the FCA contains a qui tam mechanism permitting private relators to file an action “for the person and for the United States Government.” 6 Such an action is filed under seal for 60 days—extendable for good cause—and served only on the Government so it may investigate the allegations and decide whether to intervene. 7 If the Government declines to intervene during the seal period, the relator “shall have the right to conduct the action” and proceed on the Government’s behalf. 8 Even so, the statute allows the Government “to intervene at a later date upon a showing of good cause.” 9 Once the Government intervenes—either initially or at a later date— it obtains “primary responsibility for prosecuting the action,” and the relator’s role becomes secondary. 10 Under § 3730(c)(2)(A), “[t]he Government may dismiss the action notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating the action if the person has been notified by the Government of the filing of the motion and the court has provided the person with an opportunity for a hearing on the motion.” This language gives the Government substantial flexibility. Even after declining to intervene during the seal period, the Government may later try to take over and dismiss the suit. 11 _____________________ 6 Id. § 3730(b)(1). 7 Id. § 3730(b)(2)–(4). 8 Id. § 3730(b)(4)(B). 9 Id. § 3730(c)(3). 10 Id. § 3730(c)(1). 11 Polansky, 599 U.S. at 434–38. 3 Case: 24-40564 Document: 120-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 No. 24-40564 The FCA also contains a retaliation provision that protects whistleblower employees from adverse employment actions for their lawful acts “in furtherance of” an FCA lawsuit or “other efforts to stop” FCA violations. 12 To state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) she engaged in protected activity, (2) her employer knew of that protected activity, and (3) her protected conduct was the cause of the adverse employment action. 13 B. Jackson’s Lawsuit Ventavia hired Jackson in September 2020 as a regional clinical-trial director responsible for vaccine-testing sites, patient recruitment, training, and quality assurance. Ventavia operated three clinical trial sites participating in Pfizer’s Phase III COVID-19 vaccine trial. As a contract investigator, Ventavia’s responsibilities included conducting clinical procedures, collecting data, maintaining records, and performing trial-site quality-control checks in accordance with Pfizer’s study protocols and FDA Good Clinical Practice guidelines. Pfizer also contracted with Icon PLC, a clinical research organization, to manage the vaccine trials. Jackson began working at Ventavia shortly after Pfizer agreed to deliver 100 million doses of an FDA-approved or -authorized COVID-19 vaccine to the Government. Her tenure lasted roughly two weeks. During that time, she developed concerns about protocol deviations and regulatory violations. These concerns prompted Jackson to recommend pausing trial enrollment while Ventavia addressed the issues and implemented safeguards. _____________________ 12 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). 13 United States ex rel. King v. Solvay Pharms., Inc., 871 F.3d 318, 332 (5th Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Hodge, 933 F.3d 468, 475 (5th Cir. 2019). 4 Case: 24-40564 Document: 120-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 No. 24-40564 Jackson repeatedly reported her concerns to her supervisors during her short tenure, and she eventually reported to the FDA her view that the trial sites were not operating according to regulatory expectations. The same day Jackson contacted the FDA, Ventavia terminated her for not being a “good fit.” Ventavia resumed trial enrollment the next day, and Pfizer announced favorable results two months later. Jackson filed her original complaint under seal in January 2021, alleging FCA claims on behalf of the Government against Pfizer, Ventavia, and Icon PLC. She also brought a retaliation claim against Ventavia. The Government elected not to intervene during the seal period but reserved its right to intervene later. After the Government declined intervention, the district court unsealed Jackson’s complaint, and she proceeded as a qui tam relator under § 3730(b)(4)(B). Jackson immediately filed her first amended complaint, and all three Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 9(b). Although the Government did not intervene, it still filed a statement of interest supporting dismissal. The district court held a hearing and promptly granted the motions. Following the dismissal of her claims, Jackson moved for reconsideration so that she could amend her complaint to include a fraud-in-the-inducement claim. The district court granted her motion. Building upon her previous accusations, Jackson’s Second Amended Complaint (SAC) alleged, among other things, that Pfizer’s submissions to the FDA contained fabricated or manipulated data and excluded reporting of serious adverse events. Had the FDA been aware of the alleged misconduct, Jackson claimed, the Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) would not have been granted for Pfizer’s vaccine. She further asserted that the Government’s subsequent decisions to purchase doses of Pfizer’s 5 Case: 24-40564 Document: 120-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 No. 24-40564 vaccine revealed the false claims “caused” by Defendants because the underlying data supporting the EUA were purportedly fraudulent. The SAC also reasserted a nearly identical retaliation claim against Ventavia that was previously dismissed. Defendants again moved to dismiss Jackson’s complaint. This time, the Government sought to intervene so that it could dismiss Jackson’s lawsuit under § 3730(c)(2)(A). In the Government’s view, the FCA claims lacked merit, were based on “misinformation,” and were inconsistent with public-health policy. The Government also anticipated that continued litigation would impose substantial discovery and oversight burdens on the FDA, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ). The district court granted the Government’s motion, dismissing the FCA claims with prejudice as to Jackson and without prejudice as to the Government. The district court separately dismissed with prejudice the FCA retaliation claim under § 3730(h) against Ventavia for failure to state a claim, concluding that Jackson did not sufficiently plead a protected activity or Ventavia’s knowledge of this activity. Having dismissed all federal claims, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law retaliation claim, and denied Jackson leave to amend her complaint a third time. II. The Government Properly Intervened The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the Government to intervene. 14 The FCA allows intervention after the seal _____________________ 14 See Newby v. Enron Corp., 443 F.3d 416, 423 (5th Cir. 2006). 6 Case: 24-40564 Document: 120-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 No. 24-40564 period “upon a showing of good cause.” 15 The Government explained that it sought dismissal of Jackson’s claims because it believed the suit was unlikely to succeed on the merits, would impose substantial discovery and litigation burdens, and conflicted with public-health policy. Those reasons readily satisfy the statute’s good-cause requirement. A. The Governing Standard At the outset, the parties disagree about what “good cause” standard applies. The Government argues that the district court correctly applied the more lenient standard: the articulation of a legally sufficient reason for intervention. Jackson, by contrast, argues that the Government was required to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)’s requirements for permissive intervention alongside the statute’s good-cause requirement. The district court properly held that Rule 24(b) is inapplicable here. Section 3730(c)(3) of the FCA does not define “good cause,” and the Supreme Court did not expressly evaluate it in Polanksy. 16 Even so, the Court favorably quoted the Third Circuit when affirming “across the board” and “in all respects”: A “showing [of] ‘good cause’ is neither a burdensome nor unfamiliar obligation” but instead “a uniquely flexible and capacious concept, meaning simply a legally sufficient reason.” 17 Based on this description, the Court indicated that “good cause” in § 3730(c)(3) functions _____________________ 15 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3). 16 See 599 U.S. at 429 n.2 (discussing with approval the Third Circuit’s good-cause analysis while noting that the issue was not challenged). 17 Id. at 429 & n.2, 439 (quoting Polansky v. Exec. Health Res. Inc., 17 F.4th 376, 387 (3d Cir. 2021)); accord United States ex rel. CIMZNHCA, LLC v. UCB, Inc., 970 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2020) (“‘Good cause’ is a uniquely flexible and capacious concept” or “‘[a] legally sufficient reason’” (quoting Good Cause, s.v. Cause, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 2011)). 7 Case: 24-40564 Document: 120-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 No. 24-40564 as a threshold requirement ensuring that intervention is grounded in an articulated governmental interest. Other circuits have similarly recognized the flexibility of this good-cause standard when the Government articulates a reason for dismissing FCA claims brought in its name. 18 By contrast, Rule 24(b)—which governs permissive intervention by nonparties seeking entry into ordinary litigation—imposes formal prerequisites and mandatory considerations that do not exist in “the FCA’s Government-centered purposes.” 19 Rule 24(b) requires the would-be intervenor to demonstrate a common question of law or fact and requires the district court to “consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” 20 These requirements are absent from § 3730(c)(3)’s text. 21 Because this provision applies only to the United States, 22 the Government is not situated like a typical intervenor—it owns the fraud claim. 23 This obviates any need to demonstrate a common question of law or fact because commonality _____________________ 18 E.g., United States ex rel. USN4U, LLC v. Wolf Creek Fed. Servs., Inc., No. 24- 3022, 2025 WL 1009012, at *7 (6th Cir. Mar. 31, 2025); Brutus Trading, LLC v. Standard Chartered Bank, No. 20-2578, 2023 WL 5344973, at *1–2 (2d Cir. Aug. 21, 2023); United States ex rel. Carver v. Physicians Pain Specialists of Ala., P.C., No. 22-13608, 2023 WL 4853328, at *4–7, *6 n.4 (11th Cir. July 31, 2023) (per curiam); CIMZNHCA, 970 F.3d at 846, 853–54; United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp., 151 F.3d 1139, 1145–46 (9th Cir. 1998). 19 Polansky, 599 U.S. at 434. 20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B), (b)(3). 21 Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). 22 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (authorizing only “the Government to intervene at a later date upon a showing of good cause” (emphasis added)). 23 See Eisenstein, 556 U.S. at 932 (recognizing that, upon intervention, “the United States acquires the ‘primary responsibility for prosecuting the action’” (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1)). 8 Case: 24-40564 Document: 120-1 Page: 9 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 No. 24-40564 will always be satisfied. Similarly, a relator is not situated like a typical plaintiff because the relator is only a partial assignee of a federal claim that remains subject to the Government’s superior rights. 24 Given these unique features, Rule 24(b)’s constraints make little sense in the qui tam context. Requiring the Government to satisfy these additional requirements before intervention undermines Congress’s express decision to give the Government a broader and more flexible entry mechanism than ordinary intervenors. Without this mechanism, the Government—the “real party in interest” 25—could be locked out of its own claims simply because it initially declined intervention during the seal period. Not only does Rule 24(b)’s architecture fail to map onto the FCA context, but Congress’s specialized standard in § 3730(c)(3) does not explicitly incorporate Rule 24(b) or implement analogous procedures. Presumably, this inapplicability of Rule 24(b) is why Polansky did not once mention Rule 24(b)’s requirements when discussing intervention. 26 To be sure, Polansky was clear that “[t]he Federal Rules are the default rules in civil litigation.” 27 But Polansky also emphasized that “Congress may override that command when it wishes.” 28 There is good reason to believe Congress did so here: the FCA expressly imbues the Government with broad authority to decide how and when to take over a qui tam action without importing additional procedural constraints. Rule 24(b)’s gatekeeping function— instructing courts to weigh good cause against prejudice—is thus _____________________ 24 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1). 25 Eisenstein, 556 U.S. at 930. 26 See generally 599 U.S. at 428–35 (omitting discussion of Rule 24(b)). 27 Id. at 436. 28 Id. 9 Case: 24-40564 Document: 120-1 Page: 10 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 No. 24-40564 inapplicable in qui tam cases, 29 and the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting its application. 30 B. Good Cause to Intervene Having determined that the more lenient good-cause standard applies instead of Rule 24(b)’s stricter framework, we next consider whether the Government satisfied that burden when it moved to intervene. 31 It did. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding good cause. After “investigat[ing] and evaluat[ing]” Jackson’s claims, the Government averred that it had “good cause to intervene because it s[ought] to dismiss” Jackson’s lawsuit for multiple reasons. The Government represented that further litigation would impose substantial discovery and monitoring burdens. Notably, the district court recognized this concern even _____________________ 29 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). 30 Jackson contends that “[t]he Government [forfeit]ed any argument against application of Rule 24, as it failed to address the argument.” Although Jackson is correct that the Government did not explicitly discuss Rule 24’s inapplicability, we disagree that this argument is forfeited. Rule 24’s inapplicability is implicit in the Government’s statement that “courts . . . have never looked beyond the flexible ‘good cause’ standard set forth in § 3730(c)(3).” In any event, forfeiture is discretionary. See United States v. Lincks, 82 F.4th 325, 330 (5th Cir. 2023). 31 Even under Rule 24’s stricter standard, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Government satisfied it. As the district court observed, Jackson “has always known that intervention was a possibility” and yet “chose to proceed anyway.” That knowledge minimized any resulting prejudice. Moreover, the district court’s repeated stays of discovery over Jackson’s objections further mitigated any prejudice by limiting Jackson’s financial investment. Compared to Polansky, where “the parties and the District Court invested considerable time and resources,” far less was invested occurred here because the Government’s motion was filed before any discovery took place, and roughly a year and a half before the scheduled trial date. See 17 F.4th at 381–82. Jackson’s prejudice arguments are unpersuasive and do not outweigh the Government’s predominant interest in controlling litigation brought in its name. 10 Case: 24-40564 Document: 120-1 Page: 11 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 No. 24-40564 before the Government intervened, staying discovery deadlines after Pfizer represented that “discovery in this case will be exceptionally burdensome . . . not only . . . on the parties” but would “fall on the United States as well.” The Government also expressed doubts about the merits of Jackson’s claims and a desire to avoid expending resources on litigation it viewed as inconsistent with public-health policy. Each of these reasons mirrors those that other circuits have recognized as sufficient to establish good cause. 32 Jackson’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. First, she contends that the district court “[i]mproperly [c]ollapsed the [i]ntervention and [d]ismissal [s]tandards.” But dismissal and intervention are frequently intertwined in FCA litigation. Indeed, courts after Polansky routinely construe motions to dismiss that are silent on intervention as containing intervention requests. 33 This undercuts Jackson’s portrayal of the Government’s motion as “threadbare.” The Government’s motion here exceeded the motion deemed acceptable in Polansky, where “the Government’s request to dismiss the suit . . . itself established good cause to intervene.” 34 _____________________ 32 See, e.g., Polansky, 17 F.4th at 392–93 (weighing discovery burdens against likelihood of success); Wolf Creek, 2025 WL 1009012, at *7 (discussing “significant monitoring costs” not justified by the strength of the claims); Carver, 2023 WL 4853328, at *6–7 (significant discovery burdens and failure to sufficiently prosecute the claims); Brutus Trading, 2023 WL 5344973, at *2 (desire to dismiss). 33 See, e.g., Polansky, 17 F.4th at 392 (“[W]e construe the Government’s motion to dismiss as including a motion to intervene.”); CIMZNHCA, 970 F.3d at 849 (treating the Government’s motion to dismiss as a motion to intervene); see also Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (assuming that, if intervention “were . . . a requirement, we could construe the government’s motion to dismiss as including a motion to intervene”). 34 Polansky, 599 U.S. at 429 n.2 (citing Polansky, 17 F.4th at 392–93). The Supreme Court approved the Third Circuit’s approach of treating the Government’s motion to 11 Case: 24-40564 Document: 120-1 Page: 12 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 No. 24-40564 Next, Jackson argues that the Government’s reasons for intervention lacked specific evidentiary support, such as “affidavits or some other submission to establish good cause.” She relies on § 3730(b)(3) for this argument, which governs sealing-period extensions. But that provision merely says that the Government may support its motion to extend the sealing period with evidence—not that it must establish good cause with such evidence. 35 Relatedly, Jackson emphasizes that the district court was required to make “specific factual findings” about the veracity of the Government’s reasons. Not only does Jackson point to no statutory language for support, but she fails to reconcile this higher standard with Polansky, which instructs that the Government need only provide a “legally sufficient reason” to establish good cause. 36 It did so here. Jackson next contends that the Government may intervene after the seal period only upon a showing of “changed circumstances.” Once again, this requirement finds no footing in the statute. Section 3730(c)(3) unambiguously permits late-stage intervention “upon a showing of good cause,” without specifying that changed circumstances are required. Although Polansky acknowledged that Congress “knew that circumstances _____________________ dismiss as “reasonably construed to include a motion to intervene,” even though the motion contained no explicit request for intervention. Polansky, 599 U.S. at 428–29; see also Polansky, 17 F.4th at 392–93 (“[B]y thoroughly examining the Government’s stated reasons for moving to dismiss and granting the motion, the District Court necessarily found the Government had shown the ‘legally sufficient reason’ for intervening that good cause requires.” (quoting CIMZNHCA, 970 F.3d at 846)). 35 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3) (“The Government may, for good cause shown, move the court for extensions of the time during which the complaint remains under seal under paragraph (2). Any such motions may be supported by affidavits or other submissions in camera.”). 36 599 U.S. at 429 n.2 (quoting Polansky, 17 F.4th at 387). 12 Case: 24-40564 Document: 120-1 Page: 13 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 No. 24-40564 could change and new information [could] come to light,” 37 this recognition simply identified the likely motivations for late-stage intervention without modifying the good-cause standard. 38 In any event, circumstances have changed since the Government declined to intervene. After the district court dismissed Jackson’s first complaint (shortly after the Government filed its statement in support of dismissal), Jackson filed another complaint with a new cause of action. Each litigation development forces the Government to spend extra resources monitoring the case while the claims remain alive. And those expenses only balloon once discovery begins. All the while, the Government continues to receive additional vaccine data that further enables its ongoing assessment of the merits of Jackson’s claims and their compatibility with public-health policy. So even if changed circumstances are needed to intervene after initially declining (they are not), that requirement was met here. Finally, Jackson argues that intervention by the Government undermines the purpose of the FCA. But this policy argument does not confer a license to ignore the scheme Congress created—even if that process is flawed or not ideal at times. 39 True, Congress strengthened the FCA to enable private enforcement when the Government lacks the resources or the _____________________ 37 Id. at 435. 38 The same is true for the DOJ’s Granston Memorandum. See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (Jan. 10, 2018). Supplying a non-binding, “general framework” for intervention, the Granston Memorandum likewise left the standard untouched and briefly identified situations that commonly give rise to late-stage intervention, three of which were asserted by the Government here. Id. at 2–6 (identifying the elimination of meritless cases, prevention of interference with agency policies and programs, and preservation of Government resources as factors historically relied upon in dismissing qui tam actions). 39 See Moosa v. I.N.S., 171 F.3d 994, 1009 (5th Cir. 1999) (declining to “second- guess . . . policy choices properly made by the legislative branch”). 13 Case: 24-40564 Document: 120-1 Page: 14 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 No. 24-40564 political will to pursue certain fraud claims. 40 But as Jackson herself recognizes, “[t]hese amendments empowered private citizens to prosecute fraud cases even when the government declined to act”—not when the Government chose to act contrary to the private citizen’s preferences. * * * Because the Government articulated well-established grounds for intervention under § 3730’s flexible good-cause standard, the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting intervention. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s ruling on intervention. III. The Government Properly Dismissed the FCA Claims After permitting intervention, the district court likewise acted within its discretion in granting the Government’s motion to dismiss. 41 Once the Government intervenes in a qui tam action, § 3730(c)(2)(A) authorizes dismissal notwithstanding the relator’s objections. 42 The Supreme Court clarified in Polansky that such a dismissal is governed by Rule 41—the standard applicable to voluntary dismissals. 43 Two principles follow from that framework. First, Rule 41 generally instructs courts to grant a voluntary dismissal before the filing of an answer or summary-judgment motion. Second, the FCA modifies that rule only by requiring notice and an opportunity for the relator to be heard. Neither limit on Rule 41 deference— _____________________ 40 S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 2 (1986). 41 See Hyde v. Hoffmann–La Roche, Inc., 511 F.3d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 2007). The district court did not determine whether dismissal of the FCA claims would also have been proper under Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b) given the Government’s voluntary dismissal. Because we affirm the voluntary dismissal, we need not reach those alternative merits grounds. 42 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A); see also Polansky, 599 U.S. at 426. 43 599 U.S. at 434–35, 439–40. 14 Case: 24-40564 Document: 120-1 Page: 15 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 No. 24-40564 lack of adequate process imposed by the FCA or violation of bedrock constitutional constraints—is present here. A. Rule 41 Governs Ordinarily, a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) dismissal is absolute and self- executing for the plaintiff 44 and does not allow an intervenor to terminate a similar dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims. 45 However, Rule 41(a) dismissals are “[s]ubject to . . . any applicable federal statute.” 46 Enter the FCA. Tracking Rule 41’s language, the FCA allows for a special type of voluntary dismissal by a particular intervenor: “[t]he Government may dismiss the action” without the relator’s consent so long as the relator receives notice and an opportunity to be heard. 47 This required process is the only deviation from Rule 41. Accordingly, when a voluntary dismissal motion is filed prior to an answer or summary judgment motion, “Rule 41 entitles _____________________ 44 Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i) (“[T]he plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by filing . . . a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.”); see Marques v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Chi., 286 F.3d 1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 2002) (“But one doesn’t need a good reason, or even a sane or any reason, to dismiss a suit voluntarily. The right is absolute, as Rule 41(a)(1) and the cases interpreting it make clear[.]” (collecting cases)); see also Vanderlan, 135 F.4th at 266 (citing favorably the district court’s observation that “a straight-up Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissal procedure would not satisfy § 3730(c)(2)(A)”). 45 See CIMZNHCA, 970 F.3d at 850 (“By itself, Rule 41(a) provides that ‘the plaintiff may dismiss an action,’ which obviously does not authorize an intervenor-plaintiff to effect involuntary dismissal of the original plaintiff’s claims.” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a))). 46 Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A). 47 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A); see Vanderlan, 135 F.4th at 267 (“The FCA permits the government to dismiss a qui tam action ‘notwithstanding the objections’ of the relator, so long as it provides notice and an opportunity for a hearing.” (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A)). 15 Case: 24-40564 Document: 120-1 Page: 16 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 No. 24-40564 the [Government] to a dismissal” of the qui tam action and “the district court has no adjudicatory role” beyond ensuring adequate notice and a hearing. 48 A voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) warrants “an even greater degree of deference” than Rule 41(a)(2) dismissals. 49 Because “the Government’s views are entitled to substantial deference,” the Supreme Court has warned that a court “should think several times over before denying a motion to dismiss” in the FCA context. 50 And as we recently put it, a district court has “no discretion to deny dismissal [of a qui tam action by the Government] absent a claim that the Constitution forbids it” 51 or “[a]bsent some extraordinary circumstance.” 52 This does not mean that the Government has unlimited power to dismiss—only that its decision is reviewed under Rule 41(a)(1)’s highly deferential framework. 53 Those requirements are easily satisfied here. _____________________ 48 Polansky, 599 U.S. at 436 n.4. But “where the government’s conduct does not bump up against the Rules, the statute, or the Constitution, the notice and hearing under § 3730(c)(2)(A) serve no great purpose.” CIMZNHCA, 970 F.3d at 853. 49 Vanderlan, 135 F.4th at 268 (discussing Polanksy’s dicta about pre-answer motions); see also United States ex rel. Doe v. Credit Suisse AG, 117 F.4th 155, 161 (4th Cir. 2024) (explaining that because Polansky required substantial deference to Rule 41(a)(2) motions, an even greater degree of deference applies to Rule 41(a)(1) motions). 50 Polansky, 599 U.S. at 437–38. 51 Vanderlan, 135 F.4th at 267. 52 Polansky, 599 U.S. at 437 n.4, 438; see also Polansky, 17 F.4th at 389–90. 53 See Polansky, 599 U.S. at 435–36 (“The Government thinks it has essentially unfettered discretion to dismiss; Polansky proposes a complicated form of arbitrary-and- capricious review, with a burden-shifting component. But again, the Third Circuit’s Goldilocks position is the legally right one. A district court should assess a [c](2)(A) motion to dismiss using Rule 41’s standards. And in most FCA cases, as the Court of Appeals suggested, those standards will be readily satisfied.”). 16 Case: 24-40564 Document: 120-1 Page: 17 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 No. 24-40564 In response, Jackson focuses on Polansky’s language that the Government must offer a “reasonable argument for why the burdens of continued litigation outweigh its benefits” to obtain dismissal. She contends that the Government has not done so. But this standard applies in the Rule 41(a)(2) context after a defendant files an answer or moves for summary judgment. 54 Here, the Government sought dismissal before the filing of any responsive pleading to the SAC. “In that context, Rule 41 entitles the [Government] to a dismissal” 55 if the limits on Rule 41 deference do not apply. 1. Notice and Hearing The first limit—notice and an opportunity to be heard—is satisfied. 56 To begin, there is no dispute that Jackson received notice of the Government’s intent to intervene and dismiss the action. The motion was docketed publicly, served on all parties, and briefed extensively. And the district court held a three-hour hearing that afforded Jackson an opportunity to press her objections. The parties’ dispute therefore centers on whether Jackson received an adequate hearing. _____________________ 54 Id. at 435–38. Even if Defendants had answered or moved for summary judgment, the governing standard would remain highly deferential to the Government’s determination that dismissal was warranted. Dismissal in such situations falls under Rule 41(a)(2), which authorizes dismissal “on terms that the court considers proper” without requiring evidentiary substantiation of the Government’s reasons. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). The Supreme Court indicated that this standard would easily be met so long as the Government “g[i]ve[s] good grounds for thinking that th[e] suit would not do what all qui tam actions are supposed to do: vindicate the Government’s interests.” Polansky, 599 U.S. at 438. 55 Polansky, 599 U.S. at 436 n.4. 56 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A). 17 Case: 24-40564 Document: 120-1 Page: 18 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 No. 24-40564 The FCA requires that a relator have “an opportunity for a hearing on the motion,” 57 but nothing in the statute requires the court to convene an evidentiary hearing. Recently, we interpreted the use of “hearing” in § 3730(c)(2)(A) as “only requir[ing] a hearing on the briefs” and rejecting a relator’s argument “that the FCA requires an evidentiary hearing when the Government seeks voluntary dismissal.” 58 When Congress wants to impose a stricter requirement, it knows how to do so. 59 Because Congress did not require an evidentiary hearing, a hearing on the briefs suffices. Even so, the district court afforded Jackson more process than the statute requires by conducting an in-person hearing. Jackson’s counsel argued at length and raised the same arguments that she now asserts on appeal. The court asked both sides multiple questions about their arguments, focusing heavily on the Government’s basis for intervention and dismissal and Jackson’s constitutional objections. Jackson even submitted affidavits. Overall, Jackson was able to contest the Government’s motion through _____________________ 57 Id. 58 Vanderlan, 135 F.4th at 265–66. Other circuits agree. See, e.g., USN4U, 2025 WL 1009012, at *8 (6th Cir.) (“[T]he district court’s consideration of the parties’ briefs . . . satisfied the § 3730(c)(2)(A) hearing requirement.”); Credit Suisse, 117 F.4th at 161 (4th Cir.) (“The district court satisfied the ‘hearing’ requirement by considering the parties’ written submissions[.]”); Brutus Trading, 2023 WL 5344973, at *2 (2d Cir.) (“Here, the district court met the hearing requirement by carefully considering the parties’ written submissions.”). 59 See, e.g., United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 234–38 (1973) (interpreting Congress’s use of “hearing” to require a hearing “on the record”). 18 Case: 24-40564 Document: 120-1 Page: 19 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 No. 24-40564 briefing and oral argument, which easily satisfied § 3730(c)(2)(A)’s hearing requirement 60 and provided more process than o