Full Opinion

Case: 25-2097 Document: 31 Page: 1 Filed: 11/13/2026 NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________ JOSEPH PAUL DODSON, Claimant-Appellant v. DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Respondent-Appellee ______________________ 2025-2097 ______________________ Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in No. 23-7457, Judge Scott Laurer. ______________________ Decided: November 13, 2026 ______________________ JOSEPH PAUL DODSON, Charlottesville, VA, pro se. SEAN KELLY GRIFFIN, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash- ington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by ERIC P. BRUSKIN, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, BRETT SHUMATE; BRIAN D. GRIFFIN, RICHARD STEPHEN HUBER, Office of Gen- eral Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Af- fairs, Washington, DC. ______________________ Case: 25-2097 Document: 31 Page: 2 Filed: 11/13/2026 2 DODSON v. COLLINS Before LOURIE and REYNA, Circuit Judges, and PENNELL, District Judge. 1 PER CURIAM. Joseph Paul Dodson appeals from a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Vet- erans Court”) that remanded one of Dodson’s claims to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“the Board”) for further con- sideration. Appx1–5 (“Veterans Court Decision”). 2 For the following reasons, we dismiss. BACKGROUND Dodson served on active duty in the United States Ma- rine Corps from May 2006 to October 2012. See Appx34. He is service-connected for several disabilities, including traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic mixed-type headaches. See Appx64–68. In December 2019, Dodson filed an application for in- creased compensation, arguing that his previous rating de- cisions failed to address special monthly compensation (“SMC”) at the “t” rate (“SMC(t)”). Appx50–52. SMC is a benefit paid in addition to basic disability compensation when a service-connected disability results in specific lev- els of impairment. See 38 U.S.C. § 1114(k)–(t). Subsec- tion (t) provides for certain benefits when a “veteran, as the result of service-connected disability, is in need of regular aid and attendance for the residuals of traumatic brain in- jury.” Id. § 1114(t). 1 Honorable Rebecca L. Pennell, District Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation. 2 “Appx” refers to the appendix attached at the end of Dodson’s Informal Opening Brief. Case: 25-2097 Document: 31 Page: 3 Filed: 11/13/2026 DODSON v. COLLINS 3 Dodson had also applied for Program of Comprehensive Assistance for Family Caregivers (“PCAFC”) benefits at the Veterans Affairs (“VA”) Medical Center, which provides assistance to support family caregivers of veterans. See 38 U.S.C. § 1720G. The Medical Center denied Dodson’s application in January 2020. SAppx66–67. 3 In August 2021, the Regional Office (“RO”) of the De- partment of Veterans Affairs denied Dodson’s application for increased SMC(t) compensation. SAppx45. Dodson ap- pealed to the Board, which remanded to the RO in July 2022 for additional development of the SMC(t) claim. SAppx81, 119–22. In August 2023, the RO issued a deci- sion continuing SMC at its current rate, and Dodson again appealed to the Board. SAppx133, 141. In November 2023, the Board issued a decision denying entitlement to SMC(t), and Dodson appealed to the Veter- ans Court. Appx34–42. While that appeal was pending, the RO granted Dodson entitlement to SMC(t) and as- signed the date of Dodson’s claim as the effective date. Appx56–59. The Secretary therefore moved to dismiss the Veterans Court appeal as moot. Dodson opposed dismissal, raising arguments about earlier effective dates and addi- tional entitlements, including entitlement to PCAFC. See Veterans Court Decision, Appx1–4. In July 2025, the Veterans Court set aside the Board’s denial of SMC(t) and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at Appx1–5. The Veterans Court determined that the case was not moot because under Barry v. McDonough, 101 F.4th 1348, 1358 (2024)––decided after the Board’s de- cision but before the Veterans Court’s decision––the Board on remand was required to consider whether Dodson was 3 “SAppx” refers to the Supplemental Appendix at- tached at the end of the government’s Informal Response Brief. Case: 25-2097 Document: 31 Page: 4 Filed: 11/13/2026 4 DODSON v. COLLINS entitled to other intermediate-rate SMC increases. Veter- ans Court Decision, Appx2–3. However, the Veterans Court explained that Dodson’s arguments concerning effec- tive dates and PCAFC “exceed[ed] the [Veterans] Court’s jurisdiction given the Board’s decision here.” Id. at Appx4. Dodson timely appealed. Our jurisdiction is governed by 38 U.S.C. § 7292. DISCUSSION Our jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans Court is limited. We may “review and decide any challenge to the validity of any statute or regulation or any interpre- tation thereof” and “interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, to the extent presented and necessary to a deci- sion.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c). But we generally “may not re- view (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). Furthermore, “we have . . . generally declined to review non-final orders of the Veterans Court,” Williams v. Prin- cipi, 275 F.3d 1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (internal quota- tions and citations omitted), because, as we have explained, finality is a jurisdictional requirement, Winter- bottom v. McDonough, 124 F.4th 933, 935 (Fed. Cir. 2024). That is, we “typically will not review remand orders by the [Veterans Court] because they are not final judgments.” Williams, 275 F.3d at 1364 (internal quotations and cita- tions omitted). We depart from this “strict rule of finality” only when the remand from the Veterans Court satisfies three so-called Williams conditions: (1) [T]here must have been a clear and final deci- sion of a legal issue that (a) is separate from the remand proceedings, (b) will directly govern the re- mand proceedings or, (c) if reversed by this court, would render the remand proceedings unneces- Case: 25-2097 Document: 31 Page: 5 Filed: 11/13/2026 DODSON v. COLLINS 5 sary; (2) the resolution of the legal issues must ad- versely affect the party seeking review; and, (3) there must be a substantial risk that the decision would not survive a remand, i.e., that the remand proceeding may moot the issue. Id. (footnotes omitted). Here, the Veterans Court issued a remand, so there is no final order, see Veterans Court Decision, Appx2, but Dod- son alleges that the Williams requirements are met. Be- cause we determine that the third Williams requirement is not met, we do not address the first two. See Donnellan v. Shinseki, 676 F.3d 1089, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“In this case, as in many others, the question whether we will re- view the remand order from the Veterans Court comes down to the third factor set forth in Williams.”). Dodson argues that the third Williams requirement is met because the Board will be bound by the Veterans Court’s purportedly erroneous legal determination that his arguments concerning “effective dates and [PCAFC] . . . ex- ceed the [Veterans] Court’s jurisdiction given the Board’s decision here,” Veterans Court Decision, Appx4, meaning that there is a substantial risk that the Veterans Court’s jurisdictional determination will not survive a remand. We disagree. Similar arguments were made, and rejected, in Limon v. Collins, 181 F.4th 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2026). In that case, the appellant argued that the third Williams requirement was satisfied because the Board would be bound by the Vet- erans Court’s purported misinterpretation of a regulation. Id. at 1215. But we explained that, even though the Board may be bound by the Veterans Court’s ruling, “that ruling will not, of course, in any way bind this court” such that a remand would moot the issue. Id. at 1216. That is the case here as well––as in Limon, “after completion of the remand proceedings and the entry of a final judgment by the Vet- Case: 25-2097 Document: 31 Page: 6 Filed: 11/13/2026 6 DODSON v. COLLINS erans Court, [Dodson] may raise any objections to the judg- ment that was entered, whether the errors arose from the original Veterans Court decision or the second and final de- cision.” See id. at 1216 (emphasis added) (internal quota- tions, citations, and alterations omitted). Dodson cites Chavez v. McDonough, 98 F.4th 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2024) for support that the third Williams re- quirement is met here, but that case is distinguishable. There, we explained that the third factor was met “because the legal issue [appellant] has raised—his right to a favor- able decision on the merits without a remand—would be mooted if a remand is ordered.” Id. at 1373. Here, there is no such concern. As in Limon, there is no indication that the Veterans Court’s purported legal determination will be mooted upon remand. Finally, Dodson offers a number of constitutional and statutory arguments. See Inf. Open. Br at 21–30. Dodson’s arguments do not change the fact that the Veterans Court issued a non-final order which we have no jurisdiction to review. See Williams, 275 F.3d at 1364. CONCLUSION We have considered Dodson’s remaining arguments but find them unpersuasive. We therefore dismiss. DISMISSED COSTS No costs.