In The Matter Of The Detention Of S.d.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket89237-1
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Detention of
No. 89237-1-I
S.D.
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HAZELRIGG, C.J. — S appeals from the trial court order that granted a
hospital’s petition to commit her to up to 14 days of involuntary mental health
evaluation and treatment. S contends that substantial evidence does not support
the court’s finding that she posed a substantial risk of harm to others and,
therefore, the court erred when it entered its order detaining her. We disagree and
affirm.
FACTS
On January 21, 2026, a designated crisis responder filed a petition in King
County Superior Court seeking to detain S for an initial period of evaluation and
treatment and specifically alleged that due to her diagnosed medical conditions of
psychosis, major depressive disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder, she
presented, among other things, an imminent likelihood of serious harm to others.
She was subsequently taken into emergency custody and hospitalized for inpatient
evaluation and treatment.
On January 26, hospital staff filed a petition to further detain S for up to 14
days. The hospital’s petition again alleged, among other things, that as a result of
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a behavioral health disorder, she presented a likelihood of serious harm to others.
In support of this allegation, a hospital employee stated,
The respondent suffers from a behavioral health disorder as
evidenced by disorganization, paranoia, delusions, suicidal ideation,
agitation, agression [sic], alcohol abuse, impulsivity, poor judgement
[sic] and impaired insight.
Prior to hospitalization the respondent decompensated and has been
calling 911 multiple times a day endorsing suicidal ideation. She is
paranoid and so has been carrying a knife. [R]arely leaves her
home. [H]as stopped going to work. [F]ixated on her property
manager becoming aggressive and lunged at her. In the emergency
department the respondent was nonsensical and disorganized. The
respondent is unable to take care of their essential needs of health
and safety in their decompensated state.
Petitioners state that respondent has been previously advised of the
need for voluntary treatment and respondent . . . has not accepted.
(Emphasis added.)
On January 28, a probable cause hearing was held at which the State
appeared on behalf of the petitioning hospital and called three witnesses to testify,
including the property manager for the apartment building where S resided. S also
appeared at the hearing and testified in opposition to the petition.
The trial court later issued a written order finding that the State proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that S, as a result of a behavioral health disorder,
presented a likelihood of serious harm to others and a less restrictive alternative
was not in her best interest. 1 The court therefore ordered that she remain in
inpatient treatment for up to the next 14 days.
11 The hospital also alleged that S presented a likelihood of serious harm to herself and
was gravely disabled. The court did not find that the hospital had proven those bases. The court’s
written order also incorporated its oral ruling issued at the probable cause hearing.
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S timely appealed. 2
ANALYSIS
S asserts that the trial court erred when it granted the hospital’s 14-day
involuntary treatment petition. This is so, S avers, because substantial evidence
does not support the court’s finding that she presents a substantial risk of harm to
others. We disagree.
We have set forth the relevant standard of review as follows:
Appellate review of the trial court’s ruling on involuntary commitment
is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the
findings and, if so, whether those findings support the conclusion of
law and judgment. In re Det. of A.S., 91 Wn. App. 146, 162, 955
P.2d 836 (1998), aff’d, 138 Wn.2d 898, 982 P.2d 1156 (1999).
“Substantial evidence is ‘evidence that is in sufficient quantum to
persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the declared premise.’”
Id. (quoting Holland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wn.2d 384, 390, 583 P.2d 621
(1978)). The burden is on the challenging party to demonstrate that
substantial evidence does not support a finding of fact. Id.
In re Det. of T.C., 11 Wn. App. 2d 51, 56, 450 P.3d 1230 (2019).
Notably, “[t]he substantial evidence standard is deferential and requires the
appellate court to view all evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party.” Lewis v. Dep’t of Licensing, 157 Wn.2d 446, 468, 139 P.3d
1078 (2006). Indeed, when reviewing for substantial evidence, “[w]e defer to the
trial court’s determinations of the weight and credibility of the evidence.” In re Est.
of Barnes, 185 Wn.2d 1, 9, 367 P.3d 580 (2016). We “‘need determine only
whether the evidence most favorable to the prevailing party supports the
challenged findings, even if the evidence is in conflict.’” Sherrell v. Selfors, 73 Wn.
2 After the notice of appeal was filed in this case, the hospital released S from her
hospitalization.
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App. 596, 601, 871 P.2d 168 (1994) (quoting Thomas v. Ruddell Lease-Sales, Inc.,
43 Wn. App. 208, 212, 716 P.2d 911 (1986)).
With regard to entry of a 14-day involuntary treatment order pursuant to the
involuntary treatment act, 3 we have stated,
A court may order a person held for 14 days of involuntary
treatment when the State has demonstrated by a preponderance of
the evidence that, as a result of a mental disorder, the person
presents a likelihood of serious harm or is gravely disabled. [Former]
RCW 71.05.240(3) [(2018)];[4] In re Det. of W.C.C., 193 Wn. App.
783, 785-86, 372 P. 3d 179[, aff’d, 185 Wn.2d 260, 370 P.3d 1289
(2016)]. A “mental disorder” is an organic, mental, or emotional
impairment that “has substantial adverse effects on a person’s
cognitive or volitional functions.” [Former] RCW 71.05.020(37)
[(2018)].[5] A “likelihood of serious harm” means “[a] substantial risk”
of physical harm to self, others, or property of others. [Former] RCW
71.05.020(35)(a).[6] For a finding of substantial risk of harm to others,
the State must demonstrate “behavior which has caused such harm
or which places another person or persons in reasonable fear of
sustaining such harm.” [Former] RCW 71.05.020(35)(a)(ii).
T.C., 11 Wn. App. 2d at 56-57 (emphasis added) (some alteration in original). We
also noted that our Supreme Court interpreted the statutory definition of “likelihood
of serious harm” “‘as requiring a showing of a substantial risk of physical harm as
evidenced by a recent overt act. This act may be one which has caused harm or
creates a reasonable apprehension of dangerousness.’” Id. at 57 (emphasis
added) (quoting In re Det. Harris, 98 Wn.2d 276, 284-85, 654 P.2d 109 (1982)).
Indeed, for proof of a likelihood of serious harm to others, “all that is required . . .
is that another person be placed in reasonable fear of sustaining such harm.” Id.
(emphasis added).
3 Chapter 71.05 RCW.
4 Currently codified at RCW 71.05.240(4)(a).
5 Currently codified at RCW 71.05.020(39).
6 Currently codified at RCW 71.05.020(37)(a).
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No. 89237-1-I/5
Here, during the hearing on the hospital’s 14-day commitment petition, the
State called Jessica Portch who testified that she was the property manager at the
apartment complex where S resided during the time in question. Portch testified
that S moved into one of the apartment units in the complex in July 2025 and,
between July and early January 2026, she would have at least weekly interactions
with S, who Portch described as “very nice, very kind,” with “a great sense of
humor.” During that time, Portch did not witness any strange behavior from S.
Portch further testified, however, that on a Tuesday in mid-January, an
incident occurred with S that “was the first time [Portch had] really experienced
anything where [she] would say that [S] was suffering from delusions.” She
testified regarding the previous Tuesday morning as follows:
[S] sat down in my office and—on Monday, I was off because of the
holiday. And when she sat in my chair, she said, We have a problem.
You have entered my apartment.
I was out sick the prior week. So I was like, I’m sorry, I – I’m
not sure what you’re saying. Yesterday was a holiday, and I was out
sick. She was like, You entered my home. You’ve been in my home.
And I said, I did not enter your home, [S]. I was off yesterday. I did
not go into your apartment.
She continued to accuse me of entering her home. I said that
the only person that was here on Monday was my leasing consultant,
. . . and he was off that week. And I could talk to him, but I could
confidently say that I did not enter her home and neither did my staff.
She then said that I’m lying and she would be calling the cops
on me. And she walked out of the office and, I’m assuming, called
the police because they did show up about an hour later.
Portch further testified that she heard S tell the police officers that Portch
had “entered her apartment and moved things meticulously,” including the shower
head in S’s bathroom. Portch then testified that she was four feet, nine inches tall,
“there’s not really settings” on the building’s shower heads, and she told S that she
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No. 89237-1-I/6
neither entered S’s home nor “mess[ed] with her shower head.” Portch testified
that the police officers completed their interviews and departed.
Portch then testified that S returned to Portch’s office later that evening,
repeated to one of Portch’s assistants her accusation that Portch had entered her
apartment unit, and asked for the apartment’s electronic door entry logs. Portch
testified,
I walked in there and I said that we were having issues and
that I was going to be calling [the lock system company] in the
morning. [S] said that she has done property management before
and door keying is very straightforward. And I said, Yes, door keying
is, but that is for our exterior and common areas and that [the lock
system company] is the lock system for our apartment front doors
and that I would be calling them in the morning to ask them how to
pull the log.
. . . And I told her that I – there was nothing that I can do that
night, it’s 5:00 [p.m.], they’re already closed and I will be calling them
in the morning.
That is when she got very, very angry and said that, So you’re
just going to be a Veronica about this. And I said, I’m sorry, I don’t
know what you mean by a Veronica. And that is when [S]’s entire
face, entire body language changed. She became very agitated.
And that is when she charged from one side of that office to in front
of me and stopped about—I braced myself because I’ve never been
charged like that before. And she stopped about three inches from
my face and said, Fuck you. And she did this right in front of my face.
And I closed my eyes and braced myself because I thought I was
going to get hit.
(Emphasis added.) While testifying to the foregoing, Portch made a physical
gesture, and when asked to describe it, Portch testified, “[S] kind of, like, lunged
towards me and was, like I said, about three inches from my face and screamed,
Fuck you, in it.” Then, when Portch was asked whether she was in “any fear for
[her] own physical safety at that point” she testified, “I have been, yes. I—I’ve been
scared since the day the incident happened.”
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No. 89237-1-I/7
Later on at the hearing, the State called Susan Surdez, a licensed mental
health counselor, to testify as to her evaluation of S. Surdez testified that in
evaluating S, she interviewed S, reviewed certain of her medical records, and
heard the testimony presented at the hearing. Surdez testified that S had a
working diagnosis of unspecified psychosis as a result of her exhibiting symptoms
of “paranoia, irritability, delusions, impaired sleep, impaired appetite, some
impulsivity, self-harm behavior, and tangential thought process, as well as
impaired insight and judgment.” She further testified that in her opinion, S
presented a substantial risk of physical harm to others because, among other
things, S “continue[d] to have paranoid delusions secondary to her apartment
complex.”
Surdez also testified that she relied, in part, on a psychiatry inpatient note
written by Dr. Bruce Larson, in which Larson reported,
On evaluation today, patient presents as cooperative, though
guarded, immediately stating that she is in the hospital, quote,
because of all the abuse, quote. Patient states that she has been
the victim of numerous physical and sexual assaults dating back to
young age and states that some of these assaults occurred within
the past week. She answers questions in a disorganized, at times
logical fashion. Patient denies auditory and visual hallucination,
though appears preoccupied, and at times answers questions as
though talking to another individual in the room.
....
Although she acknowledges experiencing, quote, homicidal, quote,
thoughts in the recent past, patient insists that she never intended to
harm any specific individuals; rather, that she has thoughts about
harming people that have abused her in the past. Quote, I am not
feeling that way right now, quote. Patient also denies any history of
assaultive violence [sic] behavior.
Surdez further testified that she relied on additional treatment notes during S’s
inpatient hospitalization in which S denied homicidal ideation by reporting “not right
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No. 89237-1-I/8
now” and reported paranoid and persecutory delusions, including about “her
belongings moving places in her apartment” and her belief that “someone was
entering it and taking and moving her things.”
On cross-examination, Surdez testified that other treatment notes during
S’s hospitalization reflected that she presented as calm, pleasant, polite, and
cooperative, with a normal mental status and no paranoid or delusional thought
content or homicidal ideation. On redirect, however, in response to a question as
to whether those other treatment notes changed her opinion, Surdez responded,
“No” and testified,
significant ongoing paranoia and delusions as part of her behavioral
health disorder. It’s—these are a—an altered reality and an
unrealistic distrust of other people. She is denying homicidal ideation
in the hospital, sometimes stating—not now, but continues to have
these persecutory delusions from her apartment complex, which is
where she would return.
After the hearing, the trial court entered a written order that found as follows:
In this case, the evidence does establish, by a preponderance
standard, that the respondent suffers from a behavioral health
disorder (BHD) of psychosis not otherwise specified, and that this
disorder does have a substantial adverse effect on the Respondent’s
cognitive and volitional functions. Additionally, the evidence
establishes that, as a result of this BHD, the Respondent presents a
substantial risk of physical harm to others. . . .
The evidence presented in this case included the testimony of the
property manager of the apartment complex where the Respondent
lives, Jessica Portch, as well as Seattle Police Department Crisis
Team member Michelle Kim, Swedish Hospital court evaluator
Susan Surdez, and the respondent herself.
This court specifically finds that Jessica Portch’s testimony is
credible, in that the Respondent charged at her, yelled at her, and
invaded her personal space, thus placing Ms. Portch in reasonable
fear for her own safety. This incident, combined with the evidence
from Susan Surdez (who this [c]ourt also found credible) showing
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that the Respondent remains paranoid and delusional, and has had
waxing and waning violent thoughts and thoughts of harming others,
establishes that she continues to present a substantial likelihood of
serious harm to others.
Taken in the light most favorable to the State, the record contains
substantial evidence in support of the trial court’s finding that S presented a
substantial likelihood of serious harm to others. As set forth supra, the record
contains evidence that Portch had at least weekly friendly interactions with S over
a period of six to seven months and then suddenly, over the course of one day,
Portch noticed that S was exhibiting delusional and paranoid thoughts about her.
This incident culminated in S confronting Portch by lunging at her, entering directly
into her personal space, and screaming at her, placing Portch in fear that she was
about to be harmed. Based on Portch’s observation of the significant change in
S’s mental state, Portch herself being the subject of S’s paranoid and delusional
thoughts, and S’s physically threatening behavior toward her, Portch’s belief of
forthcoming harm to her from S was reasonable. Thus, substantial evidence
supports that S’s behavior placed Portch in reasonable fear of sustaining harm
from S. See T.C., 11 Wn. App. 2d at 57.
S nevertheless asserts that Portch’s testimony was insufficient, as a matter
of law, to establish that she was placed in a reasonable fear of harm. This is so,
according to S, because the record contained treatment notes from medical
providers during her inpatient hospitalization that supported an absence of harmful
or homicidal thoughts and the trial court “failed to give the proper weight” to such
treatment notes. This assertion does not establish an entitlement to appellate
relief. As an initial matter, even if the foregoing evidence was in conflict with
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Portch’s testimony, identification of conflicting evidence is insufficient, by itself, to
prevail on a substantial evidence challenge. See Sherrell, 73 Wn. App. at 600-01.
Moreover, when facts have been found by a trial court, we do not reweigh the
evidence on appeal. Mueller, 185 Wn.2d at 9. Furthermore, as noted, the medical
record on which Surdez relied for her opinion reflected that S’s symptoms waxed
and waned during her inpatient hospitalization. Consequently, taken in the light
most favorable to the petitioner, such evidence was consistent with Portch’s
testimony and supported her narrative of S’s behavior changing from one of
friendliness and kindness to one of delusion and paranoia, with such a dramatic
change in behavior further underlying the reasonableness of Portch’s fear. 7 Thus,
substantial evidence supports the challenged trial court finding, and S does not
establish an entitlement to appellate relief.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
7 S also asserts that the trial court erred when, in its oral ruling, it indicated that it was
relying on our decision in T.C. This is so, S avers, because the facts of T.C. are significantly
different than the facts of the matter before us. We disagree. As analyzed herein and as set forth
in T.C., the trial court concluded that there was a substantial likelihood of harm in proper reliance
on credible testimony of an individual who the respondent, due to a behavioral health condition,
placed in a reasonable fear of sustaining harm. 11 Wn. App. 2d at 57. Thus, S’s assertion fails.
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