Rene v. Mustafa
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket24-936
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
24-936
Rene v. Mustafa, et al.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term 2024
(Argued: May 1, 2025 Decided: November 18, 2026)
No. 24-936
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
DIANA RENE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TANZIA MUSTAFA, M.D., PERSONALLY; EJIKE ONUOGU, M.D., PERSONALLY; TAHIRA
N. SIAL, M.D., PERSONALLY; AND BRUNSWICK HOSPITAL CENTER, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Before: MERRIAM and KAHN, Circuit Judges, and KOVNER, District Judge. *
Plaintiff-appellant Diana Rene arrived at the Stony Brook University
Hospital, a state-run facility, complaining about chest pain, weakness, nausea,
headaches, and pain in her jaw. Psychiatrist Tanzia Mustafa determined that
Rene posed a substantial suicide risk and arranged for her to be transported to a
private psychiatric hospital for involuntary commitment. Two staff psychiatrists
at the private hospital assessed Rene’s suicide risk and ordered her committed
there.
*
Judge Rachel P. Kovner of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York, sitting by designation.
Rene then brought this lawsuit, asserting a Fourth Amendment claim
against Dr. Mustafa, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the
doctors at the private psychiatric hospital, and state law violations. To support
her claim that she was subjected to an unreasonable seizure by the physician-
defendants, Rene submitted an affidavit stating that Dr. Mustafa had performed
only a cursory evaluation that “lasted less than ten minutes,” and that her
meetings with the doctors at the private hospital were similarly brief. Joint App’x
2962; 2963–67. She also submitted a supplemental expert report opining that the
cursory evaluations Rene described would fall substantially below applicable
professional standards.
The district court granted summary judgment to defendant-appellees on all
federal claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state ones. In
granting summary judgment to Dr. Mustafa on Rene’s Fourth Amendment claim,
the court declined to consider Rene’s affidavit and her supplemental expert
report—principally relying on the fact that Rene’s affidavit expanded on her
account in her deposition testimony. As to the psychiatrists at the private
hospital, the court held that Rene’s federal claims failed because a reasonable jury
could not conclude those doctors acted under color of state law. Because this
Court agrees with the district court’s conclusions as to the private doctors but not
with its disposition of Rene’s Fourth Amendment claims against Dr. Mustafa, the
district court’s order is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part.
Judge Kahn concurs in a separate opinion.
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: WILLIAM MICHAEL BROOKS, Center for
Justice, Civil Rights, and Liberties, Inc., Port
Washington, NY.
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: BARBARA D. GOLDBERG (Gregory J.
Radomisli, on the brief), Martin Clearwater &
Bell LLP, New York, NY, for Tanzia Mustafa,
M.D.
MICHAEL J. DEL PIANO (Amy E. Bedell, on the
brief), Lewis Johs Avallone Aviles, LLP,
Islandia, NY, for Ejike Onuogu, M.D., Tahira
Sial, M.D., and Brunswick Hospital Center.
2
RACHEL P. KOVNER, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff-appellant Diana Rene arrived at the Stony Brook University
Hospital, a state-run facility, complaining about chest pain, weakness, nausea,
headaches, and pain in her jaw. Psychiatrist Tanzia Mustafa determined that
Rene posed a substantial suicide risk and arranged for her to be transported to a
private psychiatric hospital for involuntary commitment. Two staff psychiatrists
at the private hospital assessed Rene’s suicide risk and ordered her committed
there.
Rene then brought this lawsuit, asserting a Fourth Amendment claim
against Dr. Mustafa, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the
doctors at the private psychiatric hospital, and state law violations. To support
her claim that she was subjected to an unreasonable seizure by the physician-
defendants, Rene submitted an affidavit stating that Dr. Mustafa had performed
only a cursory evaluation that “lasted less than ten minutes,” and that her
meetings with the doctors at the private hospital were similarly brief. Joint App’x
2962; 2963–67. She also submitted a supplemental expert report opining that the
cursory evaluations Rene described would fall substantially below applicable
professional standards.
3
The district court granted summary judgment to defendant-appellees on all
federal claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state ones. In
granting summary judgment to Dr. Mustafa on Rene’s Fourth Amendment claim,
the court declined to consider Rene’s affidavit and her supplemental expert
report—principally relying on the fact that Rene’s affidavit expanded on her
account in her deposition testimony. As to the psychiatrists at the private
hospital, the court held that Rene’s federal claims failed because a reasonable jury
could not conclude those doctors acted under color of state law. Because this
Court agrees with the district court’s conclusions as to the private doctors but not
with its disposition of Rene’s Fourth Amendment claims against Dr. Mustafa, the
district court’s order is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the summary judgment record and are
uncontested unless indicated otherwise. In or around March 2015, appellant
Diana Rene began experiencing an unpleasant taste in her mouth, tension
headaches, and pain on the right side of her jaw. Joint App’x 2535–36. Doctors
diagnosed her with a salivary gland disorder and performed surgery to address
her pain. Id. at 2482, 2537. The operation did not cure Rene’s symptoms, which
continued to worsen. Id. at 2483, 2536–39.
4
On July 24, 2015, Rene went to the Emergency Department of the Stony
Brook University Hospital, where she complained of “weakness, chest pain,
dizziness, nausea, and facial pain.” Id. at 2541. She reported that she was
“anxious about her medical condition,” that her chest pain worsened when she
“worried about her health,” and that she had “trouble falling asleep” and “woke
often at night in a sweat.” Id. at 2542. At one point, she stated, “I don’t know
how people live with such pain in their face.” Id. at 2543. An emergency
department physician wrote that Rene “[s]tate[d] that she wants to take her life as
a result of these symptoms,” and had an “anxious and depressed affect.” Id. at
2544. The physician requested that Rene undergo a consultation with the
hospital’s Comprehensive Psychiatric Emergency Program (“CPEP”). Id. at 2545.
A psychiatric nurse, a social-work intern, and a psychiatry resident then
evaluated Rene. Those providers’ notes each documented statements suggesting
depression or suicidal ideation, but Rene alleges that the notes do not accurately
reflect what she told the professionals. Nurse Thomas Fining wrote that Rene
“reported that her quality of life had gone down,” that she had “lost her zest for
life,” that she had thoughts “of wanting to leave this earth,” and that she did “not
want to be a burden to anyone.” Id. at 2545–46; see id. at 1455–56. He filled out
5
a suicide risk assessment form stating that, two to five times per week in the past
month, Rene had wished to be dead. Id. at 2547–48. He marked on the form that
Rene did not have spiritual or religious convictions. See id. at 1456.
Kristy Graziano, a social work student, recorded that Rene’s husband had
reported that Rene felt “down in the dumps . . . due to her medical issues” and
financial stressors, id. at 2550, but that he “denied that she had any history of
suicidal statements” or plans, id. at 2552. Graziano’s report also noted that Rene
had lost her fiancé, first husband, and her sister in various accidents. Id. at 2556.
Her notes report that Rene stated: “I know I said that I wanted to leave this earth,
but I do not want to kill myself.” Ibid. Graziano wrote that Rene said she was
“a Christian and love[d her] family too much to” commit suicide. Ibid.; see id. at
1527. Graziano also wrote that Rene had not “slept in two weeks” and “gets two
hours of sleep a night.” Id. at 2555. Rene told Graziano that she wanted to take
medication “to sleep and to calm . . . down so [she] can use [her] coping skills and
the supports that” she had, and also that she wanted “to speak with a therapist on
how to cope with this stress.” Id. at 2557.
Finally, psychiatry resident Sridhar Kadiyala evaluated Rene and diagnosed
her with “Depression, NOS,” id. at 1475, 2498, apparently meaning “not otherwise
6
specified.” He wrote that Rene slept two hours a night in the previous three
months, felt hopeless, and occasionally thought about hurting herself. Id. at
1475–76, 2561–63. He wrote that she had told her primary care provider that she
“had thoughts of jumping off a bridge.” Id. at 1476, 2564. The notes indicate
that Rene told Dr. Kadiyala that she “had not had an appetite for three weeks” and
“had lost six pounds in one week.” Id. at 2484–85. Dr. Kadiyala’s notes clarified
that Rene denied having an intent to hurt herself because she “can’t do that to her
family,” and because she is “Christian and go[es] to church.” Id. at 1476.
Rene submitted a lengthy affidavit in opposition to defendant-appellees’
summary judgment motions disputing that many of the notes accurately reflected
what she said. See id. at 2950–68. In her affidavit, she denied making the
suicidal statements those providers described—such as her alleged statements to
Graziano and Fining that she “want[ed] to leave this earth,” id. at 2954, 2958, and
the statements recorded by Dr. Kadiyala that she wanted to take her life, id. at 2954,
had thoughts of hurting herself, id. at 2959, and had told her primary care provider
that she had thoughts of jumping off a bridge, id. at 2960. She attributed some of
the statements in those notes to garbled recording. For instance, she wrote that
Fining must have misheard her statement that she “would never want to leave this
7
earth” because she was “a Christian woman.” Id. at 2954. And she wrote that
she “certainly never acknowledged” to Dr. Kadiyala that she had told her primary
care provider she wanted to jump off a bridge; rather, she believed that Dr.
Kadiyala may have mistakenly taken that note because another patient in the
emergency room that day had “attempted to jump off a bridge,” and Rene had
instructed Dr. Kadiyala to call her primary care physician. Id. at 2960.
Rene stated that if she had told Dr. Kadiyala or anyone else that she was
depressed—a proposition she describes as “doubtful”—it was because she “found
it depressing” that doctors had not solved her glandular problem, though she
“remained very upbeat about life in general.” Id. at 2958–59. She also wrote that
the clinicians misunderstood her remarks about sleep. She wrote that while she
had reported “difficulty sleeping,” she meant that she was “waking up every two
hours,” not sleeping only two hours a night. Id. at 2957. She denied stating that
she had not slept in two weeks. Ibid. She further claimed that Fining
misinterpreted her comment about “being a burden,” which she meant to convey
her frustration that her husband frequently had to drive her to doctor’s
appointments. Id. at 2956. The parties agree that Rene told Dr. Kadiyala and
8
Graziano that she could not commit suicide due to her religious beliefs. Id. at
2556, 2564.
Defendant-appellee Mustafa then evaluated Rene, after talking to
Dr. Kadiyala and reading portions of Rene’s chart. Id. at 546, 2503–04. While
appellees claim that Dr. Mustafa met with Rene at least four times that night, for a
total of about 60 to 80 minutes, see id. at 554–55, 2503–07, Rene attests in the
affidavit she submitted in opposition to summary judgment that the two met once
for “less than ten minutes,” some of which they spent discussing a prescription for
her glandular problem. Id. at 2961–62. At her deposition, Rene testified that her
only conversation with Dr. Mustafa lasted “probably 12 to 15 minutes” because
she “did ask her about the medication” for her olfactory nerve. Id. at 286. Dr.
Mustafa “found Rene to be moderately-to-severely depressed, even though she
denied suicidal ideation at the time.” Id. at 2504 (capitalization altered).
Dr. Mustafa concluded that Rene’s depression had become so severe that she “was
not able to use her coping skills”; “felt hopeless, worthless and helpless”; and
posed a substantial risk of harm to herself. Id. at 2506, 2509. After discussions
with staff, she determined that Rene’s condition warranted involuntary in-patient
9
treatment and applied to transfer her to Brunswick Hospital Center, a private
psychiatric hospital that provides such treatment. Id. at 574–75, 2509–10.
Rene was transported to Brunswick Hospital Center. Consistent with a
New York requirement that a physician at a hospital receiving a patient for
involuntary in-patient care “confirm[]” the “need for immediate hospitalization”
before admission, N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 9.37(a), Dr. Ejike Onuogu met with
Rene to evaluate her. Joint App’x 2573–74. The parties dispute whether
Dr. Onuogu looked at Rene’s Stony Brook records during this meeting and
whether this second meeting also lasted “less than ten minutes.” Id. at 2517–18,
2964. Dr. Onuogu concurred with Dr. Mustafa’s diagnoses and, over Rene’s
protestations, authorized her involuntary commitment at Brunswick. Id. at 2518–
19, 2575–82.
In accordance with a state requirement that continuing involuntary in-
patient treatment beyond 72 hours requires “another examining physician” to
certify the need for ongoing care, N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 9.37(a), physician
Tahira N. Sial re-evaluated Rene on July 26 and 27, 2015, Joint App’x 2585, 2594.
The parties dispute whether Rene told Dr. Sial that she “felt hopeless,” had
“suicidal thoughts,” or “had been depressed” for months. Id. at 2519–20. But
10
they agree that Dr. Sial ultimately found that Rene posed a “substantial risk of
danger to herself because she was suicidal” and certified her for continued
treatment. Id. at 2591, 2594, 2597. Several days later, Dr. Sial re-evaluated Rene,
determined that she posed a lower risk of suicide, and arranged for her discharge.
Id. at 2601–05.
Rene then filed this lawsuit, challenging her involuntary commitment under
Section 1983 and New York law. In the counts relevant to this appeal—the counts
that remain after settlement with some additional defendants and withdrawal of
certain counts—Rene presses claims against Dr. Onuogu and Dr. Sial (for
convenience, the “Brunswick doctors”), as well as Dr. Mustafa. She alleges that
Dr. Mustafa committed an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and Section 1983 by arranging for Rene to be detained so that she
could be transported to Brunswick for involuntary commitment (Count One). Id.
at 60–61; see Compl. ¶¶ 71–72, Joint App’x 108. She further alleges that all three
defendant-appellees violated Section 1983 through confinement that was not
privileged, in that Rene “did not meet the criteria for hospitalization under Mental
Hygiene Law § 9.37 and the defendants departed from accepted professional
standards when determining that Ms. Rene warranted involuntary
11
hospitalization” (Count Five). Compl. ¶¶ 77–78. In addition, she alleges that
the Brunswick doctors violated the Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment,
and Section 1983 through her involuntary commitment (Counts Four, Six, and
Seven). Id. ¶¶ 75–76, 79–82. Finally, she brings state-law claims against Dr.
Mustafa and the Brunswick doctors for false imprisonment (Counts Nine, Ten, and
Eleven) and medical malpractice (Counts Twelve and Thirteen). Id. ¶¶ 85–94.
The parties proceeded to discovery, during which Rene was deposed. See
Joint App’x 207. Rene stated at her deposition that she told Stony Brook staff she
“woke often at night in a sweat” and had “chest pain” when she worried about
her health. Id. at 364–66. She also recalled telling staff that she had “fe[lt]
depressed” about the persistence of her glandular problems and did not “know
how people live with such pain in their face.” Id. at 263–64, 294. However, Rene
testified that she did not say she “wanted to take [he]r life as a result of these
symptoms.” Id. at 264. Rene further recalled that after an evaluation by Stony
Brook staff and a 12-to-15-minute interview with Dr. Mustafa, she was transferred
to Brunswick. Id. at 286–87. After her transfer, Dr. Onuogu asked her a
“barrage of questions.” Id. at 411. Rene had difficulty recalling the contents of
the questions at the deposition, where she explained that during the interview she
12
was “in shock” and “still was not processing that they were not letting [her] go
home.” Id. at 411–12. Finally, Rene noted that she met Dr. Sial, told her she was
“doing everything [she] was supposed to do” to be released from Brunswick, and
was later discharged. Id. at 437, 450.
After discovery, defendant-appellees moved for summary judgment, with
all the doctors arguing, in part, that their conduct had not violated clearly
established Fourth Amendment law, and the Brunswick doctors also arguing that
no reasonable jury could find that they were state actors, as required for liability
under Section 1983.
Rene filed an affidavit that disputed many of the facts on which defendant-
appellees relied in their summary judgment motion. As relevant here, Rene
contended that Dr. Mustafa and the Brunswick doctors had each performed
cursory evaluations lasting no longer than ten minutes. She also disputed that
she had made many of the statements attributed to her in medical records,
asserting that the other medical staff who evaluated her at Stony Brook had
misheard, misinterpreted, or misrecorded what she had said. See id. at 2954–62.
Rene also filed a supplemental expert report by Dr. Peter Stastny, a
psychiatrist, who opined that if Rene’s account of events were taken as true, each
13
of the doctors who certified Rene for hospitalization deviated significantly from
professional standards.
Dr. Stastny opined that assessments of mental illness and dangerousness
each required “a face-to-face evaluation” during which the clinician would obtain
information from the patient about her mental state or dangerousness. Id. at
2972. While psychiatrists could rely on information from collateral sources, he
wrote, a psychiatrist must attempt to confirm with the patient any information the
doctor finds important to the assessment, and may not “simply rely on
information obtained from collateral sources without also speaking to the patient.”
Id. at 2972–73. In addition, he wrote, a psychiatrist diagnosing a mental health
condition such as depression must “gather information to determine” whether a
patient’s “thinking, behavior, or mood are[,] in fact, a symptom of mental illness,”
or are instead caused by something else. Id. at 2974. For example, he explained,
loss of appetite could be “a sign of depression, a symptom of anxiety, or
attributable to a physical disorder.” Ibid. As to risk of suicide, he wrote that a
psychiatrist assessing suicidality must “gather information about pertinent risk
and mitigating factors,” because those factors bear on the likelihood that a person
would harm herself. Id. at 2974–75.
14
Turning to Rene’s case, Dr. Stastny reasoned that Dr. Mustafa and the
Brunswick doctors “did not have any objectively reasonable basis to conclude that
Ms. Rene posed a substantial threat of harm to herself.” Id. at 2981. He wrote
that “by conducting a brief face-to-face evaluation, which did not last more than
ten minutes, these physicians could not have gathered enough information from
Ms. Rene, including attempting to corroborate any information in the chart that
these physicians believed was important, as to enable them [to] make an informed
decision pertaining to the level of risk that Ms. Rene posed.” Ibid.; see also id. at
2984 (“It would have been impossible to comport with the standards for a mental
status and assessment of dangerousness . . . based on an evaluation that lasted ten
minutes.”). He also reasoned that the rushed timeline of the evaluations would
not have permitted the doctors to learn of many risk-mitigating factors in Rene’s
case—such as her “supportive family, religious convictions that counseled against
suicide, and concrete plans for the future”—and prevented them from learning
that her physical symptoms such as loss of appetite and chest pain were better
explained by physical ailments than mental health considerations. See id. at 2979–
82, 2992.
15
The district court granted summary judgment to defendant-appellees on all
of Rene’s federal claims, and declined supplemental jurisdiction over her state
claims. It first rejected Rene’s constitutional claims against Mustafa after
declining to consider Rene’s affidavit and Dr. Stastny’s report. Id. at 25–26. The
court reasoned that Rene’s affidavit did not create a material dispute of fact
regarding the duration or substance of defendant-appellees’ evaluations because
it was a “sham affidavit” that contradicted her prior deposition testimony. Id. at
49–51. Then, taking as uncontroverted Dr. Mustafa’s account of her evaluation—
as including “at least three face-to-face interactions” with Rene ranging from 10
minutes to 45 minutes or more—the court held that no reasonable jury could find
that Dr. Mustafa violated the Fourth Amendment in arranging Rene’s transport
for commitment. Id. at 64–65. The court found that Dr. Stastny’s report did not
create a jury question principally because Dr. Stastny’s conclusion that Dr.
Mustafa fell below applicable professional standards was based on Rene’s version
of events, including Rene’s claim that Dr. Mustafa engaged in “only one[] 10-
minute in-person evaluation of Plaintiff.” Id. at 68–69; see id. at 70. It also
reasoned that there was “no per se rule that a 10-minute evaluation is insufficient
for a doctor to make a medical determination such as Mustafa’s.” Id. at 70. At
16
a minimum, the court reasoned, Dr. Mustafa was entitled to qualified immunity
because she did not violate clearly established law. Id. at 71.
The district court rejected Rene’s fifth cause of action, an additional Section
1983 claim, concluding that the claim “reads as being based upon a violation of”
Mental Hygiene Law § 9.37, and was therefore unsustainable because a
Section 1983 claim cannot be “based upon a violation of a state statute.” Id. at 71.
The court then rejected the remaining federal claims against the Brunswick
doctors, reasoning that those doctors were not state actors under Section 1983, and
that in any case qualified immunity shielded their clinical decisions. Id. at 87–92.
Having granted summary judgment on all of Rene’s federal claims, the district
court declined to exercise jurisdiction over her state-law claims. Id. at 95–97.
Rene appeals. She principally argues that the district court erred in
excluding her affidavit as a sham, Appellant Br. 31–48, and in excluding Dr.
Stastny’s opinion, and that the record, including the erroneously excluded
evidence, would permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Dr. Mustafa
violated her clearly established Fourth Amendment rights, id. at 48–56. Rene also
argues that a reasonable jury could conclude that Dr. Onuogu’s and Dr. Sial’s
17
conduct was attributable to the state, and that they violated her clearly established
rights under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 59–67.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An award of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Nambiar v. Cent.
Orthopedic Grp., LLP, 158 F.4th 349, 357 (2d Cir. 2025). Summary judgment is
appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A
genuine issue of fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Frost v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 980 F.3d
231, 242 (2d Cir. 2020) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “A fact is material
if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Ibid. (citation
and quotation marks omitted). In determining whether there is a genuine issue
of material fact, a court evaluates the whole record, resolving all ambiguities and
drawing all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-movant. See ibid.
“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find
for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial,” and summary
judgment should be granted. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
18
DISCUSSION
The district court erred in concluding that appellant presented no triable
issue of fact as to her Fourth Amendment claim against Dr. Mustafa, but correctly
disposed of appellant’s other federal claims. Accordingly, the grant of summary
judgment in favor of Dr. Mustafa is reversed, and the disposition of all federal
claims other than those against Dr. Mustafa is affirmed. Appellant’s state-law
claims are reinstated because the district court declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over appellant’s state-law claims on the ground that all federal claims
had been dismissed—a proposition that no longer holds true.
I. Appellant’s Fourth Amendment claim against Dr. Mustafa presents a
triable issue of fact.
Disputes of fact preclude summary judgment for Dr. Mustafa on appellant’s
Fourth Amendment claim. Appellant was entitled to rely on her affidavit
describing cursory interactions with Dr. Mustafa and others to generate a factual
dispute concerning the circumstances surrounding Dr. Mustafa’s commitment
decision. And her expert’s report—opining that the type of brief evaluation
appellant described fell well below the standard of care—was enough to generate
a jury question concerning whether Dr. Mustafa’s decision to confine appellant for
transport to a private hospital comported with Fourth Amendment standards.
19
A. Sham Affidavit Doctrine.
The district court erred in applying the “sham affidavit” doctrine to exclude
appellant’s affidavit and the expert report relying on it. District courts should
not displace the jury’s factfinding role by “weigh[ing] evidence or assess[ing] the
credibility of witnesses.” Hayes v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 619 (2d Cir.
1996). A party’s sworn statement may be adequate to counter summary
judgment and “must be weighed by a trier of fact,” even in the face of substantial
evidence on the other side. Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282, 291 (2d Cir. 2003); see
Danzer v. Norden Sys., Inc., 151 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 1998) (“To hold, as defendants
ask us to do, that the non-movant’s allegations of fact are (because ‘self-serving’)
insufficient to fend off summary judgment would be to thrust the courts—at an
inappropriate stage—into an adjudication of the merits.”).
The sham affidavit exception is a narrow exception: “[A] party’s factual
assertion in an affidavit opposing summary judgment, contradicting his prior
deposition testimony, may be disregarded as a sham attempt to create an issue of
fact.” Crawford v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp., 758 F.3d 473, 481 (2d Cir. 2014)
(emphasis added). By extension, a party also cannot create an issue of fact by
submitting an expert report that effectively smuggles in testimony that would
contradict the affiant’s past statements. See In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 707
20
F.3d 189, 193 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). But an affidavit warrants exclusion only
if it presents contradictions that are “real, unequivocal, and inescapable.” Id. at
194 & n.4 (quoting Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg’l Transp. Auth, 702 F.3d 685, 696
(2d Cir. 2012)). “If there is a plausible explanation for discrepancies in a party’s
testimony, the court considering a summary judgment motion should not
disregard the later testimony because of an earlier account that was ambiguous,
confusing, or simply incomplete.” Langman Fabrics v. Graff Californiawear, Inc.,
160 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1998). Evidence that “amplifies or explains, but does
not merely contradict” prior testimony may not be excluded at summary
judgment. Ibid. (citation omitted). For instance, an expert’s statement that he
“did not know that” a patient was on a drug unequivocally contradicted his prior
testimony that he did know she was on that drug. Fosamax, 707 F.3d at 194. But
if an affiant “does not allege the occurrence of something that he previously
described as not happening,” the affiant’s testimony does not create a “real,
unequivocal, and inescapable contradiction.” Rivera, 743 F.3d at 22–23 (2d Cir.
2014) (declining, at summary judgment, to discount plaintiff’s deposition
testimony that coworkers called him ethnic slurs even though prior filings stated
a different “number of times he was subjected to such slurs” (emphasis omitted));
21
see Langman, 160 F.3d at 112 (declining to exclude later account that offered
“additional factual details” coloring earlier account that witness “was uncertain”).
Under these principles, the district court erred in excluding Rene’s affidavit.
The court excluded Rene’s affidavit without finding it unequivocally contradicted
by her deposition testimony; the court instead observed that both Rene’s affidavit
and her deposition testimony discussed the same topic—“what [Rene] meant by
her responses to various Stony Brook and [Brunswick] Hospital [Center] personnel
evaluators”—and it reasoned that Rene’s opportunity to explain those statements
“was during her deposition when those issues were being explored” and not in a
“post-deposition affidavit.” Joint App’x 50. The purported “inconsistencies”
identified by the district court, see id. 49, 50 n.13, do not rise to the level of
unequivocal contradictions but instead attempt to offer “additional factual
details.” Langman, 160 F.3d at 112. A party is entitled to make factual
submissions that expand on her earlier testimony so long as the new statements
do not unequivocally or inescapably contradict the earlier ones.
While appellees now scour the record for contradictions that could support
exclusion, they identify at most discrepancies that could lead jurors to doubt
appellant’s affidavit, not fatal inconsistencies that warrant disregarding the
22
affidavit completely. Dr. Mustafa points to portions of Rene’s affidavit in which
she provides new context—for example, Rene’s explanation in her affidavit that
her statement to doctors that she “d[id]n’t know how people live with such pain
in their face,” Joint App’x 263–64, “was a statement of frustration,” not “an
expression of” suicidal thought, id. at 2954; see Mustafa Br. 37. But that
explanation is not a contradiction. Nor is Rene’s deposition testimony that she
told staff that she felt “depressed” because she worried that her health situation
was “not resolving,” Joint App’x 293–94, unequivocally contradicted by her later
explanation that she was not depressed generally, but found the inability to cure
her condition depressing. See Mustafa Br. 38. A witness does not
unequivocally contradict her prior testimony by providing context or
explanations, even if a jury would be free not to credit them.
For their part, although Drs. Onuogu and Sial offer five pages of quotations
from appellant’s deposition testimony that they allege to be inconsistent with
appellant’s affidavit, they provide arguments about only two supposed
contradictions. See Onuogo & Sial Br. 41–46. First, they compare appellant’s
testimony that Dr. Onuogu asked her a “barrage of questions” while she was “in
shock,” Joint App’x 411, against the claim in her affidavit that Dr. Onuogu asked
23
her “a few questions” that duplicated the ones asked of her at Stony Brook, id. at
2964. But that difference in degree does not amount to an insurmountable
contradiction. See, e.g., Rivera, 743 F.3d at 22–23 (finding variance in “the number
of times” affiant stated he was subjected to slurs insufficient to render statement
incredible as matter of law or to constitute a “real, unequivocal inescapable
contradiction”). And while appellees point to appellant’s shock as evidence that
she was “unable to process” the events of July 2015, Onuogu & Sial Br. 39, a
witness’s later account that adds “far more detail[]” to an “avowedly uncertain”
earlier account does not contradict prior testimony. Langman, 160 F.3d at 112
(permitting jury to consider an “expanded version” of testimony, even though it
could conclude the “later elaboration suggests fabrication”). For the same
reason, the Brunswick doctors cannot establish an unequivocal contradiction by
pointing to the affidavit’s statements that appellant “was sexually active with [her]
husband,” Joint App’x 2965, despite the caveat in her deposition that she
“c[ould]n’t remember” if she and her husband were “having intimate relations” at
the time, id. at 336.
Finally, appellees claim that Rene’s affidavit contradicts doctors’
“contemporaneous medical records,” Onuogu & Sial Br. 35; see also Mustafa Br. 41,
24
echoing the district court’s critique of the affidavit as speculative, Joint App’x 50.
But this does not compel a finding that Rene’s affidavit is a sham. The sham
affidavit doctrine wards against manufactured evidence contradicting an affiant’s
own testimony. Hayes, 84 F.3d at 619; Fosamax, 707 F.3d at 193–94. A plaintiff is
“entitled to rely on h[er] own testimony” at summary judgment, Rentas v. Ruffin,
816 F.3d 214, 221 (2d Cir. 2016), even if other parts of the record contradict it, Frost,
980 F.3d at 247–48 (rejecting argument to exclude declaration as sham “based on
its . . . lack of support in the record”). And while Dr. Mustafa observes that a
district court cannot consider evidence so “blatantly contradicted by the record”
that “no reasonable jury could believe it,” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007),
the rule does not permit a district court to discredit a patient’s affidavit solely “on
the basis of [its] disparity” with “medical records,” Coughlin, 344 F.3d at 289–90.
Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63, 76 (2d Cir. 1996), on which appellees
rely, is inapposite. There, this Court found that an expert report relying on “bare
denials of statements allegedly made by patients” did not create an issue of
material fact. Id. at 76–77. But the Kulak Court distinguished the bare denials
before it from a case in which a patient conceded that she had made “some of the
statements the doctors claimed to rely upon in confining her, but claimed that she
25
also made related statements ignored by the doctors ‘that would permit competing
inferences to be drawn as to the meanings of the undisputed events.’”. Id. at 76
(quoting Rodriguez v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1051, 1064 (2d Cir. 1995)). That is
precisely appellant’s situation. Rene does not “simply den[y] every allegation,”
but rather supplements her hospital records with context. Ibid.; see, e.g., Joint
App’x 2957–59 (acknowledging that she wept at the hospital, may have said that
she had not been sleeping, and may have expressed that she “felt hopeless at times
about [her] medical situation”); id. at 2956 (acknowledging that appellant may
have said she did “not like being a burden to [her] family” but explaining that she
did not mean the statement to express a desire to commit suicide).
For the foregoing reasons, the district court erroneously excluded
appellant’s affidavit. It therefore also erred in excluding Dr. Stastny’s report for
its “reliance upon” the affidavit. Id. at 70.
B. A genuine dispute of fact exists regarding whether Dr. Mustafa
violated Rene’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights.
With the record expanded, Rene established a jury question on her claim
that Dr. Mustafa violated her Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable seizures by authorizing her commitment at Brunswick. Although
“confinement of the mentally ill by state action is generally analyzed under the
26
due process clause,” this Circuit recognizes a Fourth Amendment right against
involuntary hospitalizations, which are “tantamount to the infringement of being
arrested.” Glass v. Mayas, 984 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). No
party disputes that appellant was involuntarily hospitalized without