American Academy of Pediatrics v. James Uthmeier
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date FiledJuly 8, 2026
Docket26-2238
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
July 8, 2026
By the Court:
No. 26-2238
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF Appeal from the United States District
PEDIATRICS, Court for the Northern District of
Plaintiff-Appellee, Illinois, Eastern Division.
v. No. 1:26-cv-02401
JAMES UTHMEIER, Attorney General Matthew F. Kennelly,
of the State of Florida, Judge.
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that appellant’s motion for en banc reconsideration is
GRANTED. The panel’s opinion issued June 22, 2026, is VACATED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the district court’s preliminary injunction
dated June 8, 2026, is STAYED pending the resolution of this appeal and the issuance of
this court’s mandate. Judges Hamilton, Jackson-Akiwumi, Lee, Pryor, and Maldonado
dissent from the stay of the district court’s preliminary injunction pending appeal for
the reasons explained in the panel majority opinion.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that this appeal will be heard initially en banc. Fed.
R. App. P. 40(g). The court will set a new briefing schedule and a date for oral argument
by separate order.
2 No. 26-2238
LEE, Circuit Judge, joined by JACKSON-AKIWUMI, PRYOR, and
MALDONADO, Circuit Judges, dissenting from the grant of ini-
tial hearing en banc. Today, we take the extraordinary step of
deciding sua sponte to take an appeal away from the hands of
the assigned panel and proceed initially en banc. Although
Fed. R. App. P. 40(g) permits us to do so, it cautions that “ini-
tial hearing en banc is not favored and ordinarily will not be
ordered.” And, I believe, wisely so.
Not only did Congress designate the three-judge panel as
the default method for federal appellate review, 28 U.S.C.
§ 46, but allowing an appeal to be addressed first by the as-
signed panel provides the full court with the benefit of a more
robust record and the panel’s reasoning on the contested is-
sues. See Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 211 F.3d
853, 854 (4th Cir. 2000) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring in the de-
nial of initial hearing en banc) (“Panel decisions refine, nar-
row, and focus issues before the court.”); Bristol Regional
Women’s Ctr., P.C., v. Slatery, 993 F.3d 489, 490–92 (6th Cir.
2021) (Moore, J., dissenting from the grant of initial hearing
en banc) (noting that, without a panel decision, there is a
greater risk that the en banc process will be unsatisfying, un-
productive, and inefficient).
Furthermore, I worry about the impact this use of Rule
40(g) will have on future proceedings and the court as a
whole. See Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Azar, 799 F.
App’x 193, 196 (4th Cir. 2020) (Richardson, J., dissenting from
grant of initial hearing en banc and denial of motion to stay)
(entrusting a panel to adjudicate an appeal prior to en banc
review “not only foster[s] collegiality but reflect[s] the value
of deciding even controversial matters with adherence to a
purposeful procedure”). And, to be clear, I express no views
No. 24-3250 3
on the merits of the appeal. Perhaps this is one of the exceed-
ingly rare cases that Rule 40(g) envisions and will prove to be
the extraordinary exception and not the rule. I certainly hope
so and respectfully dissent.