Havens v. US Department of Education
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketCivil Action No. 2026-0816
JudgeJudge Loren L. AliKhan
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
HEATHER HAVENS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Civil Action No. 26 - 816 (LLA)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
For decades, the federal government has provided direct loans to students pursuing
postsecondary and higher education. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087a. Loan repayment plans vary. As
relevant here, the federal government offers borrowers several income-contingent repayment
(“ICR”) plans, which tie borrowers’ monthly payments to their income. See id. §§ 1078(b)(9)(A),
1087e(d)(1)(D); see also 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a). In 2023, the U.S. Department of Education
amended an existing ICR plan, the Revised Pay As You Earn (“REPAYE”) plan, to create the
Saving on a Valuable Education (“SAVE”) plan. See Improving Income Driven Repayment for
the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program and the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL)
Program, 88 Fed. Reg. 43820, 43900 (July 10, 2023). In March 2026, the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri vacated the final rule creating SAVE, leaving SAVE enrollees in
administrative forbearance. See ECF No. 25-11. In July 2026, the Department began instructing
SAVE enrollees to choose new loan repayment plans within ninety days. See ECF No. 19-2, Ex. 4;
ECF No. 20 ¶ 10.
Plaintiffs Heather Havens, Elizabeth Robeson, Anna Grunseth, and William Boykin are
four borrowers who were enrolled in SAVE prior to the Eastern District of Missouri’s vacatur of
the SAVE rule. ECF No. 18 ¶¶ 21-26. Plaintiffs bring this action against the U.S. Department of
Education and Linda McMahon in her official capacity as Secretary of Education (collectively, the
“Department”), arguing that the Eastern District of Missouri’s vacatur of the SAVE rule
automatically reinstated the REPAYE rule, and that the Department’s failure to reinstate REPAYE
therefore violates the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. ECF No. 18
¶¶ 135-148. Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction or an administrative stay enjoining the
Department from “shadow repeal[ing]” REPAYE and requiring SAVE borrowers to enroll in a
different loan repayment plan. ECF No. 19, at 1. For the reasons explained below, the court denies
the motion.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Federal Student Loan Repayment Plans
In the Higher Education Act of 1965 (“HEA”), Congress authorized the Department of
Education “to provide financial assistance for students in postsecondary and higher education.”
Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (1965) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1070 et seq.). In 1993, Congress
enacted the Student Loan Reform Act which, as relevant here, amended the HEA and allowed the
federal government to issue direct loans to students pursuing postsecondary and higher education.
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993)
(codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087a to 1087h).
As amended, the HEA establishes several plan options for borrowers to repay their student
loans. See 20 U.S.C. § 1078(b)(9)(A). Borrowers may choose between fixed repayment plans and
income-driven repayment (“IDR”) plans. Id. §§ 1078(b)(9)(A), 1087e(d)(1)(A)-(E), (e). Fixed
2
repayment plans set borrowers’ monthly payments based on their loan balances and require
repayment of those balances in full by the end of a payment term. 34 C.F.R. § 685.208(a)-(b). In
contrast, IDR plans set borrowers’ monthly payments based on their income and typically provide
for loan forgiveness—also known as “loan cancellation” or “discharge”—after a certain period of
qualifying payments. See id. § 685.209(a), (k).
The HEA establishes two sets of IDR plans. First, in 20 U.S.C. § 1098e, Congress directly
established the Income-Based Repayment Plan (“IBR”). Second, in 20 U.S.C. § 1087e, Congress
authorized the Department to implement regulations to establish ICR plans. Pursuant to
Section 1087e, the Department created three ICR plans: (1) the Income Contingent Repayment
Plan (“Original ICR”), (2) Pay As You Earn (“PAYE”), and (3) REPAYE. 34 C.F.R.
§ 685.209(a). The diagram below sets forth how these programs are structured.
ECF No. 25-1, at 3.
When an enrollee in an IDR plan becomes eligible for loan forgiveness, the Department
discharges the enrollee’s remaining loan balance. Id. § 685.209(k). The Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”) will then tax the discharged balance as income. See 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(11) (defining
taxable gross income to include “[i]ncome from discharge of indebtedness”). However, under the
American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, any debt discharged under an IDR plan between January 1,
3
2021 and December 31, 2025 was excluded from taxation. Pub. L. No. 117-2, § 9675, 135 Stat.
4, 185 (previously codified at 26 U.S.C. § 108(f)(5) (2021)). That temporary tax exemption has
expired. See id.
1. The REPAYE Rule
In 2015, the Department issued a final rule creating the REPAYE plan. Student Assistance
General Provisions, Federal Family Education Loan Program, & William D. Ford Federal Direct
Loan Program, 80 Fed. Reg. 67204 (Oct. 30, 2015). “To establish a new, widely available [ICR]
plan targeted to the neediest borrowers,” id. at 67204, REPAYE set borrowers’ monthly payments
based on their income and family size and capped those monthly payments at 10% of borrowers’
monthly income, id. at 67205. For borrowers in negative amortization—that is, borrowers whose
monthly payments did not cover the accrued interest on their loans—the Department would not
charge any remaining interest on subsidized loans during the first three years of repayment, after
which the Department would charge only 50% of the remaining interest. Id. at 67227, 67239.1
REPAYE therefore “limit[ed] the rate at which loan balances increase[d] and the amount
[borrowers] ultimately owed.” Id. at 67227. Furthermore, REPAYE provided for loan forgiveness
after 240 monthly payments (or twenty years of qualifying payments) for borrowers with only
undergraduate loans, or 300 monthly payments (or twenty-five years of qualifying payments) for
borrowers with loans for graduate or professional study. Id. at 67205, 67241. Because borrowers
could enroll in REPAYE regardless of when they took out their loans, REPAYE was available to
more borrowers than other ICR plans. See id. at 67204.
1
For borrowers in negative amortization on unsubsidized loans, the Department would charge only
50% of the remaining interest from the start of the repayment period. 80 Fed. Reg. at 67239.
4
2. The SAVE Rule
In 2023, the Department issued a final rule amending and renaming REPAYE to “SAVE.”
88 Fed. Reg. at 43820. Among other changes, SAVE reduced the amount of borrowers’ income
used to calculate their monthly payments, eliminated any remaining accrued interest, and credited
certain periods of payment deferment or forbearance toward the time needed for borrowers to
receive loan forgiveness. Id. Under SAVE, borrowers still qualified for loan forgiveness after 240
or 300 monthly payments, or the equivalent of twenty or twenty-five years of qualifying payments.
Id. at 43902-03. But SAVE expedited that timeline by granting loan forgiveness after 120 monthly
payments, or the equivalent of ten years of qualifying payments, for any borrower whose “total
original principal balance on all loans . . . under the REPAYE plan was less than or equal to
$12,000.” Id. at 43903. For every $1,000 above the $12,000 original balance, borrowers could
receive loan forgiveness after an additional twelve months of payments, or the equivalent of one
year of qualifying payments. Id.; see Missouri v. Trump (“Missouri II”), 128 F.4th 979, 987
(8th Cir. 2025) (explaining that SAVE “expedited loan forgiveness for most borrowers”).
B. Missouri Litigation and the One Big Beautiful Bill Act
In April 2024, a group of seven states sued the Department alleging that SAVE violated
the APA. Missouri v. Biden (“Missouri I”), 738 F. Supp. 3d 1113, 1123, 1135 (E.D. Mo. 2024).
The Eastern District of Missouri initially issued a preliminary injunction enjoining only SAVE’s
loan-forgiveness provisions. Id. at 1156. The Department then implemented the remaining SAVE
provisions alongside the prior REPAYE loan-forgiveness provisions in what became known as the
“hybrid rule.” Missouri II, 128 F.4th at 998. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit instructed the Eastern
District of Missouri to modify and broaden its preliminary injunction to enjoin the entire SAVE
rule, as well as the hybrid rule. Id. The Eastern District of Missouri entered the modified
5
preliminary injunction in April 2025. Order, ECF No. 69, Missouri v. Trump (“Missouri III”),
No. 24-CV-520 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 14, 2025).
In July 2025, during the pendency of the Missouri litigation, Congress enacted the One Big
Beautiful Bill Act (“OBBBA”). Pub. L. No. 119-21, § 82001, 139 Stat. 72 (2025). Effective
July 1, 2028, the OBBBA repeals provisions of Section 1087e, stripping the Department of its
statutory authority to create ICR plans through regulations. Id. at 340-41. The OBBBA directs
the Department to “take such steps as may be necessary to ensure” that ICR plan enrollees select
new repayment plans before July 1, 2028. Id. at 337.
In December 2025, the plaintiff states and the Department reached a settlement agreement
in the Missouri litigation. ECF No. 19-2, Ex. 2. The Department agreed to (1) not forgive loans
under SAVE or REPAYE; (2) “not enforce the original REPAYE rule or otherwise enroll any
borrowers, including SAVE borrowers, into the original REPAYE Plan”; and (3) “pursue
negotiated rulemaking to effectuate this settlement,” including a “formal and complete repeal of
the SAVE Plan Final Rule,” as well as “sunsetting” the Original ICR and PAYE plans consistent
with the OBBBA. ECF No. 19-2, Ex. 2 ¶¶ 9, 11-12. In light of the settlement agreement, the
parties jointly requested the Eastern District of Missouri to enter final judgment and vacate the
entire SAVE rule. See id. ¶ 8.
Rather than entering final judgment, the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed the case as
moot. Missouri v. Trump (“Missouri IV”), No. 24-CV-520, 2026 WL 548660, at *2 (E.D. Mo.
Feb. 27, 2026). In reaching that conclusion, the Eastern District of Missouri noted “the apparent
lack of adversity between the parties,” which extinguished any live controversy and divested the
court of its Article III jurisdiction. Id. On March 9, 2026, the Eighth Circuit summarily reversed
and instructed the Eastern District of Missouri to enter final judgment. Missouri v. Trump
6
(“Missouri V”), No. 26-1394, 2026 WL 696770, at *1 (8th Cir. Mar. 9, 2026). The Eastern District
of Missouri did so the next day and vacated the entirety of the SAVE rule, with one exception.
Order, ECF No. 102, Missouri v. Trump (“Missouri VI”), No. 24-CV-520 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 10,
2026); see ECF No. 25-11.2 On March 13, 2026, Plaintiffs in this suit moved to intervene in the
Missouri litigation, asking the Eastern District of Missouri to reconsider its vacatur of the SAVE
rule. See ECF No. 29-10, at 1-2. The Eastern District of Missouri denied Plaintiffs’ intervention
request as untimely. Id. at 10.
On March 27, 2026, the Department publicly announced that, pursuant to the OBBBA, the
Department would begin issuing notices on July 1, 2026, instructing SAVE enrollees to enroll in
different loan repayment plans within ninety days. ECF No. 19-2, Ex. 4. According to the
announcement, SAVE enrollees could still enroll in other IDR plans, including, in some cases, the
ICR plans sunsetting in 2028. Id.3 Enrollees who did not select new plans within their ninety-day
period would be transferred to non-ICR plans. Id. SAVE enrollees would remain in administrative
forbearance until they enrolled in a new plan. See id.
2
The sole surviving provision of SAVE involves crediting certain payment deferments and
forbearances toward loan forgiveness. 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(k)(4)(iv). This provision was not
challenged by the plaintiffs in the Missouri litigation, see ECF No. 25-5, at 7 n.1, and it is not at
issue in this case, ECF No. 25-1, at 8.
3
On July 1, 2026, the Department began offering borrowers a new IDR plan created by the
OBBBA called the Repayment Assistance Plan (“RAP”). 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(d)(1)(F). RAP is
available to all qualifying borrowers, regardless of when borrowers took out their loans. See 34
C.F.R. § 685.209(d)(4). The Department continues to offer PAYE and Original ICR to qualifying
borrowers who have not taken out loans after July 1, 2026, but those plans will end on June 30,
2028. Id. § 685.209(d)(1), (3).
7
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Ms. Havens, Ms. Rosen, Ms. Grunseth, and Mr. Boykin are borrowers who were enrolled
in SAVE prior to the Eastern District of Missouri’s March 10, 2026 vacatur of the SAVE rule.
ECF No. 18 ¶¶ 21-24; see ECF No. 19-3 ¶ 4; ECF No. 19-4 ¶ 2; ECF No. 19-5 ¶ 4; ECF No. 19-6
¶ 2.
Ms. Havens has four federal student loans with a total outstanding balance of more than
$75,000. ECF No. 19-3 ¶¶ 2, 7. Ms. Havens alleges that she has made 303 qualifying payments—
more than the required 300 payments—on two of her loans, which are eligible for discharge and
have a combined balance of more than $64,000. ECF No. 18 ¶¶ 21, 109; ECF No. 19-3 ¶ 8.
According to Ms. Havens, the effective discharge date for those two loans was November or
December 2025. ECF No. 18 ¶¶ 21, 109; ECF No. 19-3 ¶ 8. Ms. Havens acknowledges that she
“may be eligible for loan cancellation under other [IDR] plans if [she] switch[es] plans,” but she
is “concerned about the possibility that [she] would have to pay taxes on that discharge.” ECF
No. 19-3 ¶ 9; see ECF No. 18 ¶ 110.
Ms. Havens called her loan servicer on March 6, 2026 regarding her eligibility for loan
discharge and was told that she “did not need to apply [for loan forgiveness]” because “if [she]
was eligible . . . the discharge would be processed automatically.” ECF No. 19-3 ¶ 10; see ECF
No. 18 ¶ 115. When Ms. Havens asked about loan discharge under SAVE, the loan service agent
told her that “the SAVE plan was no longer being offered and that [she] would have to apply for a
different [IDR] plan.” ECF No. 19-3 ¶ 10; see ECF No. 18 ¶ 116. As of June 23, 2026, none of
Ms. Havens’s loans had been discharged. ECF No. 19-3 ¶ 10. Ms. Havens alleges that if she were
to change repayment plans, the lowest IDR plan she would be eligible for would be $588 per
month, or $196 more per month than what she would pay under REPAYE. Id. ¶ 15. Ms. Havens
8
received a notice from the Department on July 14, 2026, stating that SAVE was “no longer
available to borrowers” and instructing her to enroll in a new loan repayment plan within ninety
days. ECF No. 29-8, at 2. On October 19, 2026, Ms. Havens received a final notice indicating
that she had thirty days to select a new plan. ECF No. 35, at 2.
Ms. Robeson has two federal student loans with a total outstanding balance of more than
$90,000. ECF No. 18 ¶ 118; ECF No. 19-5 ¶ 2. Ms. Robeson alleges that she has made 325
qualifying payments—more than the required 216 payments—on her loans, which are eligible for
discharge with an effective discharge date in April 2024. ECF No. 18 ¶ 118; see ECF No. 19-5
¶ 3.4 Like Ms. Havens, Ms. Robeson acknowledges that she “may be eligible for loan cancellation
under other [IDR] plans if [she] switch[es] plans,” but is “concerned about the possibility that [she]
would have to pay taxes on that discharge.” ECF No. 19-5 ¶ 3; see ECF No. 18 ¶ 119.
Ms. Robeson’s adjusted gross income for 2025 was approximately $8,000. ECF No. 18 ¶ 122;
ECF No. 19-5 ¶ 2.
Ms. Robeson called her loan servicer on March 4, 2026 regarding her eligibility for loan
discharge under SAVE and was told that “the only way to obtain a discharge would be to apply
for another [IDR] plan.” ECF No. 19-5 ¶ 5; see ECF No. 18 ¶ 125. As of June 23, 2026, none of
Ms. Robeson’s loans had been discharged. ECF No. 19-5 ¶ 5. On July 29, 2026, Ms. Robeson
4
Plaintiffs generally assert that Ms. Robeson would be entitled to loan forgiveness “[u]nder the
existing SAVE regulations or prior REPAYE regulations,” ECF No. 18 ¶ 118, but they do not
explain why Ms. Robeson had “216 required” payments on her outstanding loans, id.; see ECF
No. 19-5 ¶ 3, even though REPAYE only provided for loan forgiveness after a fixed threshold of
240 or 300 qualifying payments, see 80 Fed. Reg. at 67241. Furthermore, it is unclear from the
briefing whether Plaintiffs’ references to “SAVE or REPAYE,” see, e.g., ECF No. 18 ¶ 22, refer
to two distinct plans—the 2023 SAVE rule alongside the prior 2015 REPAYE rule—or instead
use “SAVE” to refer to the prior REPAYE rule that Plaintiffs contend should have been reinstated.
9
received a ninety-day notice to select a new loan repayment plan. ECF No. 35, at 3. On
October 29, 2026, Ms. Robeson received a final thirty-day notice to select a new plan. Id.
Ms. Grunseth has federal student loans with an unspecified outstanding balance. See ECF
No. 18 ¶ 23; ECF No. 19-4 ¶ 2. Ms. Grunseth alleges that she has made 105 eligible payments of
the required 120 monthly payments on her student loans “under SAVE.” ECF No. 18 ¶ 23; see
ECF No. 19-4 ¶ 8. “If given the opportunity, [she] would buy back . . . 15 months of forbearance
to qualify for loan discharge.” ECF No. 19-4 ¶ 8; see ECF No. 18 ¶ 23.5 Ms. Grunseth and her
spouse have a combined household income of approximately $62,000. ECF No. 19-4 ¶ 7.
Ms. Grunseth alleges that if she were to change repayment plans, the lowest plan she would be
eligible for is $76 per month, or $14 more per month than what she would pay under REPAYE.
Id. ¶¶ 6-7. On August 26, 2026, Ms. Grunseth received a ninety-day notice to select a new loan
repayment plan. ECF No. 35, at 3.
Mr. Boykin has federal student loans with an unspecified outstanding balance. See ECF
No. 18 ¶ 24; ECF No. 19-6 ¶ 2. Mr. Boykin was previously enrolled in SAVE but applied to a
different repayment plan in January 2025 after hearing news that SAVE had been preliminarily
enjoined. ECF No. 18 ¶ 105; ECF No. 19-6 ¶ 2. Mr. Boykin alleges that he had made 117 eligible
payments of the required 132 monthly payments on his student loans. ECF No. 18 ¶ 105; ECF
No. 19-6 ¶ 3.6 Like Ms. Grunseth, Mr. Boykin “would buy back . . . 15 months of forbearance to
5
Plaintiffs inconsistently describe this “buyback” program as being available under SAVE and
REPAYE. Compare ECF No. 19-4 ¶ 8 (describing buying back “months of forbearance to qualify
for loan discharge under SAVE”), with ECF No. 19-6 ¶ 3 (describing buying back “months of
forbearance to qualify for loan discharge under REPAYE”).
6
Although Plaintiffs allege in the amended complaint that Mr. Boykin had 132 required payments
to qualify for loan forgiveness “under the SAVE plan,” No. 18 ¶ 24, Mr. Boykin attests in a
(continued on next page)
10
qualify for loan discharge” if “given the opportunity.” ECF No. 19-6 ¶ 3; see ECF No. 18 ¶ 106.
In a June 2026 declaration, Mr. Boykin attested that, based on his household income and other
personal information at the time, the lowest IDR plan he was eligible for was $124 per month, or
$41 more per month than what he would pay under REPAYE. ECF No. 19-6 ¶ 6. In an
October 2026 declaration, Mr. Boykin attested that he has been enrolled in IBR since
January 2026. See ECF No. 35-4 ¶ 5. The IBR plan initially required monthly payments of $0 for
a twelve-month period. See id. Mr. Boykin contends that he improperly received a bill for a
monthly payment of $330.01 in September 2026, and that his actual monthly payment under IBR
should be $146 per month, or $49 more per month than what he would pay under REPAYE. See
id. ¶¶ 5-12.7
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs filed suit on March 9, 2026 against the Department, alleging that the Eastern
District of Missouri’s dismissal of the Missouri IV litigation as moot required the Department to
revive the SAVE rule, ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 7, 11, and the Department’s failure to do so violated the APA,
id. ¶¶ 115-133. After the Eastern District of Missouri issued a final judgment vacating almost the
entirety of the SAVE rule in Missouri VI, the Department moved to dismiss, arguing that this court
could not award Plaintiffs relief in light of that vacatur. ECF No. 17, at 6.
June 2026 declaration appended to the preliminary injunction motion that he was eligible for loan
discharge “under SAVE or REPAYE,” ECF No. 19-6 ¶ 3 (emphasis added). The Department
suggests that Plaintiffs made a typo in representing that Mr. Boykin was “eligible for discharge
under either SAVE or REPAYE ‘after making 132 payments.’” ECF No. 25-1, at 19 (quoting
ECF No. 19-6 ¶ 3). Plaintiffs offered no response to that contention. See generally ECF No. 29.
7
Whether the $330.01 bill was an administrative error is an issue that is not before this court.
Because Mr. Boykin represents that his monthly payment under IBR should be $146 per month,
see ECF No. 35-4 ¶ 11, the court will use that figure in assessing any potential harm to him.
11
Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on June 23, 2026. ECF No. 18. Although Plaintiffs
maintained some allegations from the original complaint concerning SAVE, see, e.g., id.
¶¶ 146-148, Plaintiffs primarily asserted new allegations about REPAYE, id. ¶¶ 135-142.
Specifically, Plaintiffs argued that the Eastern District of Missouri’s vacatur of the SAVE rule
automatically reinstated the prior REPAYE rule, and the Department’s failure to enforce REPAYE
was a “shadow repeal” of the rule that violated the APA. Id. ¶¶ 133-134, 144. That same day,
Plaintiffs also moved for a preliminary injunction or an administrative stay to require the
Department to implement REPAYE and postpone SAVE enrollees’ transitions to other loan
repayment plans. ECF No. 19-1, at 24.
The court issued a briefing schedule the next day. June 24, 2026 Minute Order. However,
upon the Department’s unopposed extension request, ECF No. 20, the court modified the schedule
to provide the parties additional time to complete briefing, June 30, 2026 Minute Order. In light
of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, ECF No. 18, the court also denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 17, as moot, June 30, 2026 Minute Order. The motion for
a preliminary injunction or an administrative stay is fully briefed. ECF Nos. 19, 25, 26, 27, 29,
31. Plaintiffs have additionally filed a notice of subsequent developments. ECF No. 35.
IV. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Preliminary Injunction
A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that should be granted only when the
party seeking the relief, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Chaplaincy of Full
Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Cobell v. Norton, 391
F.3d 251, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). To receive a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must show
(1) “that [s]he is likely to succeed on the merits,” (2) “that [s]he is likely to suffer irreparable harm
12
in the absence of preliminary relief,” (3) “that the balance of equities tips in h[er] favor,” and
(4) “that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S.
7, 20 (2008). Where, as here, the government is the opposing party, the third and fourth factors
merge. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).
B. Administrative Stay
The APA permits a court reviewing agency action to “issue all necessary and appropriate
process to postpone the effective date of an agency action or to preserve status or rights pending
conclusion of the review proceedings” if it is “necessary to prevent irreparable injury.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 705. The standard for an administrative stay is substantially the same as the standard for a
preliminary injunction. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 433-34. Because the public is “generally entitled
to the prompt execution” of final agency orders, a stay “is not a matter of right, even if irreparable
injury might otherwise result to the [plaintiff].” Id. at 427 (quoting Virginian Ry. Co. v. United
States, 272 U.S. 658, 672 (1926)).
V. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs argue that a preliminary injunction or an administrative stay is necessary because
they will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of court intervention. Plaintiffs allege four
“distinct” injuries caused by the Department’s “shadow repeal” of REPAYE and the forced
transfer of SAVE borrowers to other loan repayment plans: (1) taxable loan discharges, (2) higher
monthly payments, (3) lost interest subsidies, and (4) the inability to make payments toward loan
discharge. ECF No. 19-1, at 12; see id. at 12-23; ECF No. 19-1, at 20-22. Defendants counter that
Plaintiffs lack standing as it concerns the taxation of their future loan discharges and that they
otherwise cannot meet the standards for a preliminary injunction or an administrative stay. ECF
13
No. 25-1, at 14-30, 38-40. The court concludes that Plaintiffs lack standing concerning the
taxability of their loan discharges and that they fail to show irreparable harm based on their other
alleged injuries.
A. Standing
In the preliminary injunction context, the plaintiffs must “show a substantial likelihood of
standing under the heightened standard for evaluating a motion for summary judgment.” Elec.
Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Presidential Advisory Comm’n on Election Integrity, 878 F.3d 371, 377
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack,
808 F.3d 905, 912 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). Plaintiffs therefore “cannot rest on . . . mere allegations, but
must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts that, if taken to be true, demonstrate a
substantial likelihood of standing.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Defs.
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). “To establish standing, a party must demonstrate: ‘(1) an
injury in fact that is concrete and particularized as well as actual or imminent; (2) a causal
connection between the injury and the challenged conduct; and (3) a likelihood, as opposed to
mere speculation, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.’” Nat. Res. Def.
Council v. Wheeler, 955 F.3d 68, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Env’t
Prot. Agency, 755 F.3d 1010, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). Because “standing is not dispensed in
gross,” “plaintiffs must demonstrate standing for each claim that they press and for each form of
relief that they seek.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 592 U.S. 413, 431 (2021).
Plaintiffs contend that the Department’s “shadow repeal” of REPAYE, which is forcing
Ms. Havens and Ms. Robeson to transfer to a different loan repayment plan, under which each will
incur “significant tax burden[s]” due to a later effective loan-discharge date, is sufficient to give
Ms. Havens and Ms. Robeson standing. ECF No. 19-1, at 7; ECF No. 29, at 11-12. The
14
Department responds that these purported tax burdens are self-inflicted, such that Ms. Havens and
Ms. Robeson have failed to establish causation and redressability. See ECF No. 25-1, at 14-18.
The court agrees with the Department. See Food & Water Watch, Inc., 808 F.3d at 913 (“A party
who fails to show a substantial likelihood of standing is not entitled to a preliminary injunction.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
As it concerns Ms. Havens and Ms. Robeson, Plaintiffs’ theory of standing rests on the
incorrect assumption that, but for the Department’s unlawful conduct, Ms. Havens and
Ms. Robeson would otherwise be able to qualify for tax-free loan discharges under the American
Rescue Plan Act of 2021. See ECF No. 19-1, at 5-6, 20; ECF No. 29, at 11-12. Not so. As
explained, see supra Part I.A., the federal government typically taxes discharged student loans,
but the American Rescue Plan granted a temporary reprieve for discharges that occurred between
January 1, 2021 and December 31, 2025, see 26 U.S.C. § 108(f)(5) (2021); see also ECF No. 19-1,
at 9-10 (“[W]ith the expiration of the American Rescue Plan provision, any [loan] discharge on
January 1, 2026, or later is considered taxable income.”).
Nor can Ms. Havens or Ms. Robeson avail themselves of a limited extension to the
American Rescue Plan’s temporary reprieve from treating discharged student loan debt as taxable.
Specifically, in 2025, a group of borrowers sued to ensure that borrowers could still benefit from
the American Rescue Plan’s tax relief if their loans were eligible for discharge in 2025 but not
processed in time. Am. Compl., ECF No. 41 ¶¶ 8, 14, 24-29, 56, Am. Fed’n of Tchrs. v. U.S. Dep’t
of Educ., No. 25-CV-802 (D.D.C. Sep. 9, 2025). A court ordered the Department to backdate
SAVE enrollees’ discharges to the date they became eligible for discharge, but only if the enrollee
(1) had applied to transfer to a different IDR plan by December 31, 2025, and (2) the Department
approved the transfer application after January 1, 2026. ECF No. 19-2, Ex. 1.
15
Plaintiffs concede that Ms. Havens and Ms. Robeson did not apply to another IDR plan by
December 31, 2025, see ECF No. 19-1, at 6, 20, and they do not dispute that “the IRS would be
correct to require payment of taxes for the loan discharge[s]” for Ms. Havens and Ms. Robeson if
they do not fall within the limited exception carved out in American Federation of Teachers, ECF
No. 29, at 21. Instead, Plaintiffs appear to argue that, under American Federation of Teachers,
Ms. Havens’s and Ms. Robeson’s eligibility for loan forgiveness under REPAYE alone should
result in backdating their loans for tax-free discharges. See ECF No. 19-1, at 20 (asserting that
“student loan discharges are non-taxable events if they occurred prior to January 1, 2026”); id. at
21 (asserting that “merely honoring the existence of REPAYE will save plaintiffs thousands of
dollars in tax liability”). That proposition finds no purchase in the text of the court’s order in
American Federation of Teachers, ECF No. 19-2, Ex. 1, or in the REPAYE program more
generally. At bottom, Plaintiffs have not shown that Ms. Havens’s and Ms. Robeson’s purported
tax injuries were caused by the Department’s “shadow repeal” of REPAYE and the resulting need
for Ms. Havens and Ms. Robeson to transfer to other loan repayment plans. See Dep’t of Educ. v.
Brown, 600 U.S. 551, 565 (2023) (“Put differently, the Department’s decision to give other people
relief under a different statutory scheme did not cause respondents not to obtain the benefits they
want.”).
For the same reason Plaintiffs fail to establish causation with regard to Ms. Havens and
Ms. Robeson, they also fail to establish redressability. See Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002,
1012 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[C]ausation and redressability are closely related, and can be viewed
as ‘two facets’ of a single requirement.” (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984))).
That is because, even if the Department ultimately discharges Ms. Havens’s or Ms. Robeson’s
loans under REPAYE, Ms. Havens and Ms. Robeson would still owe taxes on those discharges,
16
which fall outside the American Rescue Plan’s tax exemption and the court order in American
Federation of Teachers backdating SAVE enrollees who applied to another loan repayment plan
by December 31, 2025.8 Plaintiffs therefore fail to establish that Ms. Havens and Ms. Robeson
have standing based on the future taxation of their loan discharges.9
B. Irreparable Harm
The D.C. Circuit has emphasized that “the basis of injunctive relief in the federal courts
has always been irreparable harm,” meaning that “[a] movant’s failure to show any irreparable
harm is therefore grounds for refusing to issue a preliminary injunction, even if the other three
factors entering the calculus merit such relief.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d
at 297 (quoting Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974)). In this way, the Circuit “has set a
high standard for irreparable injury.” Id. First, the injury “must be both certain and great,” “actual
and not theoretical,” and “of such imminence that there is a ‘clear and present’ need for equitable
relief.” Id. (quoting Wis. Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir.
8
Furthermore, the Department contends that the IRS—which is not a party to this litigation—
makes the ultimate determination regarding the tax implications of any loan discharge. See ECF
No. 25-1, at 17-18. In response, Plaintiffs fault the Department “for choosing to report discharges
as taxable income to the IRS.” ECF No. 29, at 20 (emphasis added). But, as the Department points
out, even if the court were to order the Department to discharge Plaintiffs’ loans under REPAYE
while prohibiting the Department from reporting any discharges to the IRS, the IRS would remain
“free to treat REPAYE discharges as taxable income.” ECF No. 25-1, at 17. Indeed, the parties
in American Federation of Teachers agreed that it was “the IRS and the U.S. Department of the
Treasury, and not [the Department of Education]” that had the “final say on whether . . . student
loan cancellations qualify as taxable income under . . . the American Rescue Plan Act.” ECF
No. 25-16 ¶ 10.
9
Because Ms. Robeson does not allege any other basis for standing beyond a tax injury, this
analysis is likely sufficient to warrant her dismissal from the case. The court will address the
Department’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 24, forthwith. See, e.g., Save Long Island Beach, Inc.
v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., No. 25-CV-02214, 2026 WL 2150375, at *2 (D.D.C. July 27, 2026) (first
denying a motion for preliminary injunction, then considering a defendant’s motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim).
17
1985) (per curiam)). Second, the injury “must be beyond remediation,” and “[t]he possibility [of]
adequate compensatory or other corrective relief . . . at a later date . . . weighs heavily against a
claim of irreparable harm.” Id. at 297-98 (quoting Wis. Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674).
To meet this high standard, Plaintiffs must “substantiate the claim that irreparable injury is
likely to occur” and show that “the alleged harm will directly result from the action which [they]
seek[] to enjoin.” Wis. Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore,
it is “well settled that economic loss does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm.” Id.
Indeed, “[c]ourts in this Circuit have recognized that economic loss can constitute irreparable
injury only in limited circumstances: where ‘monetary loss . . . threatens the very existence of the
movant’s business,’ or where the claimed economic loss is unrecoverable.” Dall. Safari Club v.
Bernhardt, 453 F. Supp. 3d 391, 401 (D.D.C. 2020) (second alteration in original) (quoting Wis.
Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674). Even where economic losses may be unrecoverable, Plaintiffs must
still meet their “considerable burden of proving that those losses are certain, great and actual.”
Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Jackson, 768 F. Supp. 2d 34, 52 (D.D.C. 2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Power Mobility Coal. v. Leavitt, 404 F. Supp. 2d 190, 204 (D.D.C. 2005)).
The court concludes that the remaining Plaintiffs have not carried their burden of showing
irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction or an administrative stay. That is a
sufficient basis to deny their motion. See Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 297;
Clevinger v. Advoc. Holdings, Inc., 134 F.4th 1230, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (concluding that when
a plaintiff failed to establish irreparable harm, “the district court did not err in declining to evaluate
the remaining preliminary injunction factors”); see, e.g., Jansen v. Trump, No. 25-CV-2961, 2026
WL 2481696, at *8 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2026) (denying a motion for a preliminary injunction after
18
considering only whether the plaintiff had shown irreparable harm); Corp. for Pub. Broad. v. Fed.
Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 792 F. Supp. 3d 67, 75 (D.D.C. 2025) (same).
First, Plaintiffs assert that Ms. Havens, Ms. Grunseth, and Mr. Boykin will be harmed by
increased monthly payments under a new loan repayment plan, and that Ms. Havens will lose
access to a 50% interest subsidy available under REPAYE. ECF No. 19-1, at 21-22; ECF No. 19-3
¶ 15; ECF No. 19-4 ¶¶ 6-7; ECF No. 19-6 ¶ 6. According to their declarations, under the most
affordable alternative plan, Ms. Havens will pay $196 more per month, and Ms. Grunseth will pay
$14 more per month. ECF No. 19-3 ¶ 15; ECF No. 19-4 ¶¶ 6-7. Mr. Boykin’s most recent
October 2026 declaration indicates that he would pay $49 more per month, ECF No. 3-4 ¶ 11,
whereas his prior declaration indicated that he would pay $41 more per month, ECF No. 19-6 ¶ 6.
In response, the Department offers a counter-declaration explaining that Ms. Havens miscalculated
her repayment liability and would, in fact, receive a “better deal” under IBR than REPAYE. ECF
No. 25-1, at 19; see ECF No. 25-3 ¶¶ 14-16. As to Ms. Grunseth and Mr. Boykin, the Department
argues that $1,320 in total additional costs over a two-year span, before ICR plans sunset in
July 2028, does not amount to irreparable harm. ECF No. 25-1, at 14-15, 19-21.10
As to the impact of shifting to a new loan repayment plan, Plaintiffs appear to concede that
Ms. Havens will not experience any increased monthly payments under a non-REPAYE plan. See
ECF No. 29, at 11-12. Plaintiffs simply state that “[the Department] agree[s] Plaintiffs face $1,320
in additional student loan repayment costs over the coming two years,” id. at 11, but that is the
amount that Ms. Grunseth and Mr. Boykin allege they will collectively have to pay and does not
10
The D