In The Matter Of The Detention Of K.c.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket88315-1
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
In the Matter of the Detention of No. 88315-1-I
K.C.,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
BOWMAN, A.C.J. — K.C. appeals the trial court’s 14-day involuntary
treatment order. K.C. argues the trial court erred by concluding that the
designated crisis responder (DCR) sufficiently documented his consultation with
an emergency room doctor. She also argues that substantial evidence does not
support the court’s conclusion that she was gravely disabled under RCW
71.05.020(25)(a) and (b). We affirm.
FACTS
K.C. is a 70-year-old woman living at a senior living facility. Fairfax
Behavioral Health hospital involuntarily committed K.C. for treatment for a
behavioral health disorder on March 23, 2025 and discharged her on April 9.
About a month later on May 21, K.C. voluntarily went to Harborview Medical
Center to report sexual assault. Harborview treated K.C. and discharged her the
same day.
Four days later on the evening of May 25, K.C. voluntarily went to the
Swedish First Hill Emergency Center. Staff observed that K.C. appeared
healthy, “well nourished,” and alert but delusional with “rambling and rapid
No. 88315-1-I/2
speech.” K.C. tested positive for methamphetamine, cocaine, and cannabinoids.
She became “visibly agitated” and was scared the hospital would “ ‘throw her out
back home to keep getting raped and injected with drugs.’ ” When medical staff
offered K.C. voluntary psychiatric hospitalization, she began screaming at them.
Hospital staff then referred K.C. to a DCR.
On May 26, the DCR petitioned for initial detention based on K.C.’s recent
history of hospitalization, substance use, behavioral presentation at Swedish,
and manifestation of an escalating loss of cognitive and volitional control. The
DCR checked the box on the petition to show he consulted “examining
emergency department professional Dr. Tilman who opined: .”1 But the
DCR left the line blank and did not document what Dr. Tilman specifically
“opined.” The superior court authorized the hospital to detain K.C. under RCW
71.05.153(1) and (2). Swedish transferred K.C. to Fairfax the same day.
On the morning of June 2, Fairfax filed a 14-day involuntary treatment
petition under the involuntary treatment act (ITA), chapter 71.05 RCW. K.C.
moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the DCR failed to adequately
document his consultation with the emergency room doctor under RCW
71.05.154. The court denied K.C.’s motion to dismiss and held a probable cause
hearing on Fairfax’s petition that afternoon.
Susan Surdez, the records custodian and court evaluator for Swedish,
testified that on May 25, K.C. told medical staff that several individuals had
repeatedly raped her, that her food was being stolen, and that her neighbors
1
Dr. Tilman’s first name is not in the appellate record.
2
No. 88315-1-I/3
were injecting her with drugs and stealing her groceries. K.C. could not recall the
last meal she ate. And she said she did not feel safe at home and had not slept
for several nights.
Anntonett Cherizard, K.C.’s daughter, testified that K.C.’s mental health
was in obvious decline. Cherizard described K.C. experiencing delusions of
bugs crawling on her, screaming, “crying uncontrollably,” and being “extremely
aggressive.” On March 23, Cherizard had Fairfax “come pick [K.C.] up” from
Cherizard’s home, and Fairfax involuntarily hospitalized K.C. While hospitalized,
K.C. stabilized on medication and agreed to a medical recovery plan. But when
Fairfax discharged her on April 9, she did not pick up her prescriptions, including
blood pressure medication, and she did not attend the planned outpatient
therapy. Cherizard said K.C. had drastically changed over the prior two years, as
K.C. had worked a full-time job, was a leader in the church, and regularly took
her prescribed medications.
Katherine Geisel, a court evaluator for Fairfax, testified that based on
K.C.’s history and current presentation at the hospital, K.C. has a behavioral
health disorder; specifically, a working diagnosis of unspecified schizophrenia.
Geisel believed K.C. was impaired and in danger of serious physical harm from
her failure or inability to provide for her essential needs of health and safety.
Geisel believed that K.C. was gravely disabled under “prong A”2 due to “her
delusions and behaviors where she does not feel safe in her apartment” and
receiving a 30-day eviction notice because of her behavior. Geisler also noted
2
See RCW 71.05.020(25)(a).
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No. 88315-1-I/4
K.C. was not following through with treatment or taking her medication, leading to
deteriorating conditions. Geisel believed K.C. was also gravely disabled under
“prong B”3 due to K.C.’s repeated hospitalizations in a short time frame, a
continuing loss of cognitive control, increased irritability, and delusions that
resulted in her loss of housing.
Geisel testified that she did not believe K.C. would get the care essential
to her health and safety if discharged because K.C. did not follow the treatment
plan after her last discharge. And no less-restrictive alternatives were possible
because K.C. was in denial about having a behavioral health disorder and very
reluctant to sign a treatment plan. Geisel also pointed out that by the time of the
hearing, any “illicit substances” had metabolized out of K.C.’s system, yet she
was still experiencing paranoia and delusions.
On June 6, the trial court ordered up to 14 days of involuntary treatment
under RCW 71.05.240(4)(a) and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that K.C. suffers from a
behavioral health disorder; specifically, unspecified schizophrenia spectrum
disorder. The court concluded K.C. was gravely disabled under prong A, given
the danger of serious physical harm from her failure or inability to provide for her
essential needs of health and safety. The court also concluded that K.C. was
gravely disabled under prong B because of a severe deterioration in her routine
functioning. Finally, the court found that a less-restrictive alternative to inpatient
3
See RCW 71.05.020(25)(b).
4
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treatment would not be in K.C.’s best interest because she would not otherwise
seek or comply with treatment.
K.C. appeals.
ANALYSIS
K.C. argues that the trial court erred by concluding that the DCR complied
with the statutory obligation to document his consultation with the emergency
room doctor. She also argues that substantial evidence does not support the
court’s conclusion that she was gravely disabled under RCW 71.05.020(25)(a)
and (b).4 We address each argument in turn.
1. Compliance with RCW 71.05.154
K.C. argues the DCR did not comply with the statutory obligations of RCW
71.05.154. We disagree.
Interpretation of the ITA is a question of law we review de novo. In re Det.
of C.A.C., 6 Wn. App. 2d 231, 234, 430 P.3d 276 (2018). We review whether a
trial court properly applied the law to the facts for abuse of discretion. In re Det.
of A.C., 1 Wn.3d 731, 739, 533 P.3d 81 (2023). A court abuses its discretion if,
among other things, it is exercised on untenable grounds, such as a
misunderstanding of the law. Id. at 740.
Our state legislature amended the ITA in 2015 to mandate that “the court
must focus on the merits of the petition, except where requirements have been
totally disregarded.” LAWS OF 2015, ch. 269, § 1; RCW 71.05.010(2). The ITA is
4
K.C. argues that her release from the hospital does not render her appeal moot.
Because involuntary commitment orders have potential collateral consequences, we
agree and address her arguments on their merits. See In re Det. of A.M., 17 Wn. App.
2d 321, 324 n.1, 487 P.3d 531 (2021).
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No. 88315-1-I/6
“totally disregarded” only if a “person is involuntarily detained without legal
authority under the act,” not necessarily for every violation of the ITA. A.C., 1
Wn.3d at 745. And there is a presumption in favor of deciding ITA issues on their
merits. In re Det. of G.V., 124 Wn.2d 288, 296, 877 P.2d 680 (1994).
Under RCW 71.05.154, the DCR
shall take serious consideration of observations and opinions by an
examining emergency room physician, . . . advanced registered
nurse practitioner, or physician assistant in determining whether
detention . . . is appropriate. The [DCR] must document his or her
consultation with this professional, if the professional is available, or
his or her review of the professional’s written observations or
opinions regarding whether detention . . . is appropriate.
Here, in the petition for initial detention, the DCR checked a box that stated he
“consulted with examining emergency department professional Dr. Tilman.”
Citing In re Detention of K.R., 195 Wn. App 843, 381 P.3d 158 (2016),
K.C. argues that the DCR “totally disregarded” RCW 71.05.154 by not
documenting what he discussed during his consultation with Dr. Tilman. But that
case is inapposite.
In K.R., Division Two held that under former RCW 71.05.154 (2016), the
DCR must document their consultation with the examining physician, including
the physician’s observations and opinions on the patient. 195 Wn. App at 848.
But the legislature significantly amended the statute after K.R., removing the
requirement to document the physician’s observations and opinions. See LAWS
OF 2017, ch. 14, § 12. The current statute—the statute in effect at the time of
K.C.’s initial detention—requires the DCR to “document his or her consultation
with this professional, if the professional is available, or his or her review of the
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No. 88315-1-I/7
professional’s written observations or opinions regarding whether detention of the
person is appropriate.” RCW 71.05.154. And in In re Detention of A.V., No.
85686-3-I, slip op. at 10-15 (Wash. Ct. App. July 15, 2024) (unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/856863.pdf,5 we concluded that under
the amended statute, the DCR need document only that a consultation with a
qualifying medical professional had occurred or that the DCR reviewed the
professional’s qualifying notes. Id. at 14. No further documentation is required.
Id.
Because the DCR documented that a consultation with the emergency
room physician occurred, the trial court did not err by concluding that the DCR
complied with RCW 71.05.154.
2. Substantial Evidence
K.C. argues that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s
conclusion that she was gravely disabled under RCW 71.05.020(25)(a) and (b).
We disagree.
Where, as here, the trial court has weighed the evidence before issuing an
involuntary commitment order, we review whether substantial evidence supports
the trial court’s findings of fact and whether those findings support the court’s
conclusions of law. In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 209, 728 P.2d 138
(1986). Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient “ ‘to persuade a fair-minded
5
“Washington appellate courts should not, unless necessary for a reasoned
decision, cite or discuss unpublished opinions in their opinions.” GR 14.1(c). “However,
unpublished opinions of the Court of Appeals filed on or after March 1, 2013, may be
cited as nonbinding authorities, if identified as such by the citing party, and may be
accorded such persuasive value as the court deems appropriate.” GR 14.1(a). A.V. has
such persuasive value.
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person of the truth of the declared premise.’ ” In re Det. of A.S., 91 Wn. App.
146, 162, 955 P.2d 836 (1998) (quoting Holland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wn.2d 384,
390-91, 583 P.2d 621 (1978)), aff’d, 138 Wn.2d 898, 982 P.2d 1156 (1999).
Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. In re Det. of L.S., 23 Wn.
App. 2d 672, 686, 517 P.3d 490 (2022).
Involuntary commitment for behavioral health disorders “is a significant
deprivation of liberty which the State cannot accomplish without due process of
law.” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 201. So, to involuntarily commit a person for 14
days, the court must find “by a preponderance of the evidence” that
[the] person detained for behavioral health treatment, as the result
of a behavioral health disorder, presents a likelihood of serious
harm, or is gravely disabled, and, after considering less restrictive
alternatives to involuntary detention and treatment, finds that no
such alternatives are in the best interests of such person or others.
RCW 71.05.240(4)(a).
Under the ITA, “gravely disabled” means:
[A] condition in which a person, as a result of a behavioral health
disorder: (a) Is in danger of serious physical harm resulting from a
failure to provide for his or her essential human needs of health or
safety; or (b) manifests severe deterioration in routine functioning
evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional
control over his or her actions and is not receiving such care as is
essential for his or her health or safety.
RCW 71.05.020(25). Prongs A and B of RCW 71.05.020(25) provide “two
alternative definitions of ‘gravely disabled,’ either of which provides a basis for
involuntary commitment.” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 202.6
6
LaBelle cites the definition of “gravely disabled” under former RCW 71.05.020(1)
(1979). The substantive definition of “gravely disabled” has not changed since LaBelle.
Compare former RCW 71.05.020(1), with RCW 71.05.020(25).
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No. 88315-1-I/9
A. RCW 71.05.020(25)(a)
To show grave disability under prong A, the petitioner must “present
recent, tangible evidence of failure or inability to provide for such essential
human needs as food, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment which presents a
high probability of serious physical harm within the near future.” LaBelle, 107
Wn.2d at 204-05; see RCW 71.05.020(25)(a). The failure to provide for one’s
needs must be because of a behavioral health disorder and not because of other
factors. LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 205. And while the risk of harm must be within
the near future, it need not be imminent. Id. at 203.
Here, Swedish court evaluator Surdez testified that K.C. reported her
neighbors were “continuously” stealing her groceries and food. Surdez also
testified that K.C. could not recall her last meal, was not sleeping, and had
ketones in her urine. Fairfax court evaluator Geisel testified that K.C. was at risk
of losing her long-term housing due to her behavior and had received an eviction
notice. K.C. also told medical staff that she did not “feel safe in her apartment.”
Cherizard, K.C.’s daughter, testified that K.C. had not picked up her prescribed
medications and was not attending outpatient therapy.
K.C.’s inability to provide for her essential human needs such as food,
shelter, and medical treatment is substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s
conclusion that K.C. was gravely disabled under prong A.
K.C. argues that the evidence shows she was able to provide for her
essential needs. She points to the testimony that she went to Swedish
voluntarily on May 25, that she appeared moderately healthy and well nourished,
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No. 88315-1-I/10
and that she was at times cooperative and calm. But despite K.C.’s well-
nourished appearance, the testimony showed that K.C. was taking illicit drugs,
not eating, at risk of losing her housing, and not taking her prescribed
medications. And alleviation of an individual’s inability to care for oneself while in
a hospital setting does not show the individual is necessarily able to function
outside of that controlled environment. See Labelle, 107 Wn.2d at 210 (finding
there was sufficient evidence that appellant was gravely disabled even though
his condition had “stabilized or improved slightly while in the hospital”).
Substantial evidence supports the court’s conclusion that K.C. was gravely
disabled under RCW 71.05.020(25)(a).
B. RCW 71.05.020(25)(b)
To show grave disability under prong B, the petitioner must show the
patient “manifests severe deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by
repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over his or her
actions.” RCW 71.05.020(25)(b). And the “significant loss of cognitive or
volitional control” must arise from a behavioral health disorder. See LaBelle, 107
Wn.2d at 208. Finally, the petitioner must show a factual basis to conclude that
the patient would not receive care that is “essential to [their] health or safety” if
released and that harmful consequences likely would result without further
hospitalization. Id.
Here, Cherizard testified that two years before her 2025 hospitalizations,
K.C. was a leader in her community, had a full-time job, and regularly took her
prescribed medications for physical ailments, including a heart murmur. But
10
No. 88315-1-I/11
since then, K.C. had deteriorated. K.C.’s condition had worsened such that in
March 2025, Cherizard called Fairfax to involuntarily take K.C. to the hospital
because she was screaming, crying uncontrollably, and believed bugs were
crawling all over her. Cherizard further testified that K.C. had stabilized on
medication while in the hospital. But after Fairfax discharged her in April, K.C.
did not follow a treatment plan and further deteriorated. Geisel testified that K.C.
was hospitalized several times in an increasingly shorter time frame. And Surdez
testified that when K.C. appeared at Swedish on May 25, she screamed at
hospital staff and believed they would rape and assault her.7 Finally, Geisel
testified that if Fairfax discharged K.C., she would likely suffer harmful
consequences, such as losing her housing, not obtaining necessary medical
care, and further deterioration.
K.C. argues that there was no significant deterioration from her “relevant
recent” baseline when Fairfax discharged her in April. K.C. further argues that
despite reporting delusional beliefs during her May hospitalization, she had no
“uncontrolled” actions. But Geisel testified that even if K.C.’s baseline was
evaluated from the April discharge, her multiple hospital visits within a two-month
period are evidence of deterioration. And the most recent evidence of K.C.
accusing her neighbors, apartment manager, and hospital staff of stealing from
her and assaulting her showed a repeated and escalating loss of cognitive
function. Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that K.C. was gravely
disabled under prong B.
7
Geisel testified that K.C. was still experiencing paranoia and delusions after any
“illicit substances” had metabolized out of her system.
11
No. 88315-1-I/12
Because the DCR properly documented that he consulted the emergency
room physician under RCW 71.05.154 and substantial evidence supports the
court’s conclusion that K.C was gravely disabled under RCW 71.05.020(25)(a)
and (b), we affirm the court’s order involuntarily committing K.C. for 14 days.
WE CONCUR:
12