Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE In the Matter of the Detention of No. 88315-1-I K.C., UNPUBLISHED OPINION Appellant. BOWMAN, A.C.J. — K.C. appeals the trial court’s 14-day involuntary treatment order. K.C. argues the trial court erred by concluding that the designated crisis responder (DCR) sufficiently documented his consultation with an emergency room doctor. She also argues that substantial evidence does not support the court’s conclusion that she was gravely disabled under RCW 71.05.020(25)(a) and (b). We affirm. FACTS K.C. is a 70-year-old woman living at a senior living facility. Fairfax Behavioral Health hospital involuntarily committed K.C. for treatment for a behavioral health disorder on March 23, 2025 and discharged her on April 9. About a month later on May 21, K.C. voluntarily went to Harborview Medical Center to report sexual assault. Harborview treated K.C. and discharged her the same day. Four days later on the evening of May 25, K.C. voluntarily went to the Swedish First Hill Emergency Center. Staff observed that K.C. appeared healthy, “well nourished,” and alert but delusional with “rambling and rapid No. 88315-1-I/2 speech.” K.C. tested positive for methamphetamine, cocaine, and cannabinoids. She became “visibly agitated” and was scared the hospital would “ ‘throw her out back home to keep getting raped and injected with drugs.’ ” When medical staff offered K.C. voluntary psychiatric hospitalization, she began screaming at them. Hospital staff then referred K.C. to a DCR. On May 26, the DCR petitioned for initial detention based on K.C.’s recent history of hospitalization, substance use, behavioral presentation at Swedish, and manifestation of an escalating loss of cognitive and volitional control. The DCR checked the box on the petition to show he consulted “examining emergency department professional Dr. Tilman who opined: .”1 But the DCR left the line blank and did not document what Dr. Tilman specifically “opined.” The superior court authorized the hospital to detain K.C. under RCW 71.05.153(1) and (2). Swedish transferred K.C. to Fairfax the same day. On the morning of June 2, Fairfax filed a 14-day involuntary treatment petition under the involuntary treatment act (ITA), chapter 71.05 RCW. K.C. moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the DCR failed to adequately document his consultation with the emergency room doctor under RCW 71.05.154. The court denied K.C.’s motion to dismiss and held a probable cause hearing on Fairfax’s petition that afternoon. Susan Surdez, the records custodian and court evaluator for Swedish, testified that on May 25, K.C. told medical staff that several individuals had repeatedly raped her, that her food was being stolen, and that her neighbors 1 Dr. Tilman’s first name is not in the appellate record. 2 No. 88315-1-I/3 were injecting her with drugs and stealing her groceries. K.C. could not recall the last meal she ate. And she said she did not feel safe at home and had not slept for several nights. Anntonett Cherizard, K.C.’s daughter, testified that K.C.’s mental health was in obvious decline. Cherizard described K.C. experiencing delusions of bugs crawling on her, screaming, “crying uncontrollably,” and being “extremely aggressive.” On March 23, Cherizard had Fairfax “come pick [K.C.] up” from Cherizard’s home, and Fairfax involuntarily hospitalized K.C. While hospitalized, K.C. stabilized on medication and agreed to a medical recovery plan. But when Fairfax discharged her on April 9, she did not pick up her prescriptions, including blood pressure medication, and she did not attend the planned outpatient therapy. Cherizard said K.C. had drastically changed over the prior two years, as K.C. had worked a full-time job, was a leader in the church, and regularly took her prescribed medications. Katherine Geisel, a court evaluator for Fairfax, testified that based on K.C.’s history and current presentation at the hospital, K.C. has a behavioral health disorder; specifically, a working diagnosis of unspecified schizophrenia. Geisel believed K.C. was impaired and in danger of serious physical harm from her failure or inability to provide for her essential needs of health and safety. Geisel believed that K.C. was gravely disabled under “prong A”2 due to “her delusions and behaviors where she does not feel safe in her apartment” and receiving a 30-day eviction notice because of her behavior. Geisler also noted 2 See RCW 71.05.020(25)(a). 3 No. 88315-1-I/4 K.C. was not following through with treatment or taking her medication, leading to deteriorating conditions. Geisel believed K.C. was also gravely disabled under “prong B”3 due to K.C.’s repeated hospitalizations in a short time frame, a continuing loss of cognitive control, increased irritability, and delusions that resulted in her loss of housing. Geisel testified that she did not believe K.C. would get the care essential to her health and safety if discharged because K.C. did not follow the treatment plan after her last discharge. And no less-restrictive alternatives were possible because K.C. was in denial about having a behavioral health disorder and very reluctant to sign a treatment plan. Geisel also pointed out that by the time of the hearing, any “illicit substances” had metabolized out of K.C.’s system, yet she was still experiencing paranoia and delusions. On June 6, the trial court ordered up to 14 days of involuntary treatment under RCW 71.05.240(4)(a) and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that K.C. suffers from a behavioral health disorder; specifically, unspecified schizophrenia spectrum disorder. The court concluded K.C. was gravely disabled under prong A, given the danger of serious physical harm from her failure or inability to provide for her essential needs of health and safety. The court also concluded that K.C. was gravely disabled under prong B because of a severe deterioration in her routine functioning. Finally, the court found that a less-restrictive alternative to inpatient 3 See RCW 71.05.020(25)(b). 4 No. 88315-1-I/5 treatment would not be in K.C.’s best interest because she would not otherwise seek or comply with treatment. K.C. appeals. ANALYSIS K.C. argues that the trial court erred by concluding that the DCR complied with the statutory obligation to document his consultation with the emergency room doctor. She also argues that substantial evidence does not support the court’s conclusion that she was gravely disabled under RCW 71.05.020(25)(a) and (b).4 We address each argument in turn. 1. Compliance with RCW 71.05.154 K.C. argues the DCR did not comply with the statutory obligations of RCW 71.05.154. We disagree. Interpretation of the ITA is a question of law we review de novo. In re Det. of C.A.C., 6 Wn. App. 2d 231, 234, 430 P.3d 276 (2018). We review whether a trial court properly applied the law to the facts for abuse of discretion. In re Det. of A.C., 1 Wn.3d 731, 739, 533 P.3d 81 (2023). A court abuses its discretion if, among other things, it is exercised on untenable grounds, such as a misunderstanding of the law. Id. at 740. Our state legislature amended the ITA in 2015 to mandate that “the court must focus on the merits of the petition, except where requirements have been totally disregarded.” LAWS OF 2015, ch. 269, § 1; RCW 71.05.010(2). The ITA is 4 K.C. argues that her release from the hospital does not render her appeal moot. Because involuntary commitment orders have potential collateral consequences, we agree and address her arguments on their merits. See In re Det. of A.M., 17 Wn. App. 2d 321, 324 n.1, 487 P.3d 531 (2021). 5 No. 88315-1-I/6 “totally disregarded” only if a “person is involuntarily detained without legal authority under the act,” not necessarily for every violation of the ITA. A.C., 1 Wn.3d at 745. And there is a presumption in favor of deciding ITA issues on their merits. In re Det. of G.V., 124 Wn.2d 288, 296, 877 P.2d 680 (1994). Under RCW 71.05.154, the DCR shall take serious consideration of observations and opinions by an examining emergency room physician, . . . advanced registered nurse practitioner, or physician assistant in determining whether detention . . . is appropriate. The [DCR] must document his or her consultation with this professional, if the professional is available, or his or her review of the professional’s written observations or opinions regarding whether detention . . . is appropriate. Here, in the petition for initial detention, the DCR checked a box that stated he “consulted with examining emergency department professional Dr. Tilman.” Citing In re Detention of K.R., 195 Wn. App 843, 381 P.3d 158 (2016), K.C. argues that the DCR “totally disregarded” RCW 71.05.154 by not documenting what he discussed during his consultation with Dr. Tilman. But that case is inapposite. In K.R., Division Two held that under former RCW 71.05.154 (2016), the DCR must document their consultation with the examining physician, including the physician’s observations and opinions on the patient. 195 Wn. App at 848. But the legislature significantly amended the statute after K.R., removing the requirement to document the physician’s observations and opinions. See LAWS OF 2017, ch. 14, § 12. The current statute—the statute in effect at the time of K.C.’s initial detention—requires the DCR to “document his or her consultation with this professional, if the professional is available, or his or her review of the 6 No. 88315-1-I/7 professional’s written observations or opinions regarding whether detention of the person is appropriate.” RCW 71.05.154. And in In re Detention of A.V., No. 85686-3-I, slip op. at 10-15 (Wash. Ct. App. July 15, 2024) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/856863.pdf,5 we concluded that under the amended statute, the DCR need document only that a consultation with a qualifying medical professional had occurred or that the DCR reviewed the professional’s qualifying notes. Id. at 14. No further documentation is required. Id. Because the DCR documented that a consultation with the emergency room physician occurred, the trial court did not err by concluding that the DCR complied with RCW 71.05.154. 2. Substantial Evidence K.C. argues that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusion that she was gravely disabled under RCW 71.05.020(25)(a) and (b). We disagree. Where, as here, the trial court has weighed the evidence before issuing an involuntary commitment order, we review whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether those findings support the court’s conclusions of law. In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 209, 728 P.2d 138 (1986). Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient “ ‘to persuade a fair-minded 5 “Washington appellate courts should not, unless necessary for a reasoned decision, cite or discuss unpublished opinions in their opinions.” GR 14.1(c). “However, unpublished opinions of the Court of Appeals filed on or after March 1, 2013, may be cited as nonbinding authorities, if identified as such by the citing party, and may be accorded such persuasive value as the court deems appropriate.” GR 14.1(a). A.V. has such persuasive value. 7 No. 88315-1-I/8 person of the truth of the declared premise.’ ” In re Det. of A.S., 91 Wn. App. 146, 162, 955 P.2d 836 (1998) (quoting Holland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wn.2d 384, 390-91, 583 P.2d 621 (1978)), aff’d, 138 Wn.2d 898, 982 P.2d 1156 (1999). Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. In re Det. of L.S., 23 Wn. App. 2d 672, 686, 517 P.3d 490 (2022). Involuntary commitment for behavioral health disorders “is a significant deprivation of liberty which the State cannot accomplish without due process of law.” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 201. So, to involuntarily commit a person for 14 days, the court must find “by a preponderance of the evidence” that [the] person detained for behavioral health treatment, as the result of a behavioral health disorder, presents a likelihood of serious harm, or is gravely disabled, and, after considering less restrictive alternatives to involuntary detention and treatment, finds that no such alternatives are in the best interests of such person or others. RCW 71.05.240(4)(a). Under the ITA, “gravely disabled” means: [A] condition in which a person, as a result of a behavioral health disorder: (a) Is in danger of serious physical harm resulting from a failure to provide for his or her essential human needs of health or safety; or (b) manifests severe deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over his or her actions and is not receiving such care as is essential for his or her health or safety. RCW 71.05.020(25). Prongs A and B of RCW 71.05.020(25) provide “two alternative definitions of ‘gravely disabled,’ either of which provides a basis for involuntary commitment.” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 202.6 6 LaBelle cites the definition of “gravely disabled” under former RCW 71.05.020(1) (1979). The substantive definition of “gravely disabled” has not changed since LaBelle. Compare former RCW 71.05.020(1), with RCW 71.05.020(25). 8 No. 88315-1-I/9 A. RCW 71.05.020(25)(a) To show grave disability under prong A, the petitioner must “present recent, tangible evidence of failure or inability to provide for such essential human needs as food, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment which presents a high probability of serious physical harm within the near future.” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 204-05; see RCW 71.05.020(25)(a). The failure to provide for one’s needs must be because of a behavioral health disorder and not because of other factors. LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 205. And while the risk of harm must be within the near future, it need not be imminent. Id. at 203. Here, Swedish court evaluator Surdez testified that K.C. reported her neighbors were “continuously” stealing her groceries and food. Surdez also testified that K.C. could not recall her last meal, was not sleeping, and had ketones in her urine. Fairfax court evaluator Geisel testified that K.C. was at risk of losing her long-term housing due to her behavior and had received an eviction notice. K.C. also told medical staff that she did not “feel safe in her apartment.” Cherizard, K.C.’s daughter, testified that K.C. had not picked up her prescribed medications and was not attending outpatient therapy. K.C.’s inability to provide for her essential human needs such as food, shelter, and medical treatment is substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that K.C. was gravely disabled under prong A. K.C. argues that the evidence shows she was able to provide for her essential needs. She points to the testimony that she went to Swedish voluntarily on May 25, that she appeared moderately healthy and well nourished, 9 No. 88315-1-I/10 and that she was at times cooperative and calm. But despite K.C.’s well- nourished appearance, the testimony showed that K.C. was taking illicit drugs, not eating, at risk of losing her housing, and not taking her prescribed medications. And alleviation of an individual’s inability to care for oneself while in a hospital setting does not show the individual is necessarily able to function outside of that controlled environment. See Labelle, 107 Wn.2d at 210 (finding there was sufficient evidence that appellant was gravely disabled even though his condition had “stabilized or improved slightly while in the hospital”). Substantial evidence supports the court’s conclusion that K.C. was gravely disabled under RCW 71.05.020(25)(a). B. RCW 71.05.020(25)(b) To show grave disability under prong B, the petitioner must show the patient “manifests severe deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over his or her actions.” RCW 71.05.020(25)(b). And the “significant loss of cognitive or volitional control” must arise from a behavioral health disorder. See LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 208. Finally, the petitioner must show a factual basis to conclude that the patient would not receive care that is “essential to [their] health or safety” if released and that harmful consequences likely would result without further hospitalization. Id. Here, Cherizard testified that two years before her 2025 hospitalizations, K.C. was a leader in her community, had a full-time job, and regularly took her prescribed medications for physical ailments, including a heart murmur. But 10 No. 88315-1-I/11 since then, K.C. had deteriorated. K.C.’s condition had worsened such that in March 2025, Cherizard called Fairfax to involuntarily take K.C. to the hospital because she was screaming, crying uncontrollably, and believed bugs were crawling all over her. Cherizard further testified that K.C. had stabilized on medication while in the hospital. But after Fairfax discharged her in April, K.C. did not follow a treatment plan and further deteriorated. Geisel testified that K.C. was hospitalized several times in an increasingly shorter time frame. And Surdez testified that when K.C. appeared at Swedish on May 25, she screamed at hospital staff and believed they would rape and assault her.7 Finally, Geisel testified that if Fairfax discharged K.C., she would likely suffer harmful consequences, such as losing her housing, not obtaining necessary medical care, and further deterioration. K.C. argues that there was no significant deterioration from her “relevant recent” baseline when Fairfax discharged her in April. K.C. further argues that despite reporting delusional beliefs during her May hospitalization, she had no “uncontrolled” actions. But Geisel testified that even if K.C.’s baseline was evaluated from the April discharge, her multiple hospital visits within a two-month period are evidence of deterioration. And the most recent evidence of K.C. accusing her neighbors, apartment manager, and hospital staff of stealing from her and assaulting her showed a repeated and escalating loss of cognitive function. Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that K.C. was gravely disabled under prong B. 7 Geisel testified that K.C. was still experiencing paranoia and delusions after any “illicit substances” had metabolized out of her system. 11 No. 88315-1-I/12 Because the DCR properly documented that he consulted the emergency room physician under RCW 71.05.154 and substantial evidence supports the court’s conclusion that K.C was gravely disabled under RCW 71.05.020(25)(a) and (b), we affirm the court’s order involuntarily committing K.C. for 14 days. WE CONCUR: 12