Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON In the Matter of the Detention of: No. 88869-2-I F.H. DIVISION ONE UNPUBLISHED OPINION BUI, J. — F.H. appeals the 14-day involuntary commitment order, arguing there was not substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding she was gravely disabled, and there were less restrictive alternatives other than involuntary detention. We disagree and affirm. 1 FACTS On September 9, 2025, F.H. was admitted to Harborview Medical Center (HMC) for an ankle fracture after being hit by a car. While at HMC, F.H. was evaluated for involuntary commitment, based on the observations by Dr. Stacey Wildermuth and designated crisis responder (DCR) Melinda Hasegawa, that F.H. had poor oral intake of food and medications, poor sleep, and F.H. could not recount details about being hit by a car. F.H.’s mother also told the DCR that prior to the incident, the mother observed F.H. “responding to internal stimuli, 1 Because an involuntary commitment order may have adverse collateral consequences on future involuntary commitment determinations, this case is not moot even though the commitment order has since expired. See In re Det. of M.K., 168 Wn. App. 621, 629, 279 P.3d 897 (2012); RCW 71.05.245(3). No. 88869-2-I/2 talking to herself, not eating/drinking, and standing/posturing for days.” On September 12, a petition for 14-day involuntary treatment was filed alleging F.H. was gravely disabled because as a result of a mental health disorder, F.H. was in danger of serious physical harm. After a good cause continuance of the hearing date, a hearing was held on September 22. The State called clinical social worker Gina Ferrari and psychiatrist Dr. Katherine Snyder as witnesses. Following the hearing, the trial court issued an oral decision and entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court found F.H. was in danger of serious physical harm due to a failure to provide for her essential needs. The court also found F.H. had a diagnosis of unspecified psychosis; was exhibiting symptoms of catatonia, delusions, and poor nutritional intake; was inconsistently engaged in evaluation and treatment; was selectively taking medications; denied having a mental illness; and denied needing psychiatric medications. The court further determined that it was not in F.H.’s best interest to be in a setting less restrictive than detention. Based on these findings, the court concluded F.H. was gravely disabled and ordered she be detained at HMC for 14 days of involuntary mental health treatment. F.H. appeals. ANALYSIS F.H. challenges the trial court’s determination she was gravely disabled and there was no less restrictive alternative other than hospitalization. 2 No. 88869-2-I/3 “Generally, where the trial court has weighed the evidence, appellate review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the findings and, if so, whether the findings in turn support the trial court’s conclusions of law and judgment.” In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 209, 728 P.2d 138 (1986). “ ‘Substantial evidence is the quantum of evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person.’ ” In re Det. of A.F., 20 Wn. App. 2d 115, 125, 498 P.3d 1006 (2021) (quoting In re Det. of H.N., 188 Wn. App. 744, 762, 355 P.3d 294 (2015)). In considering whether there was sufficient evidence, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner. In re Det. of A.M., 17 Wn. App. 2d 321, 330, 487 P.3d 531 (2021) (citing In re Det. of B.M., 7 Wn. App. 2d 70, 85, 432 P.3d 459 (2019)). “We do not review a trial court’s decision regarding witness credibility or the persuasiveness of the evidence.” A.F., 20 Wn. App. 2d at 125. “The burden is on the challenging party to demonstrate that substantial evidence does not support a finding of fact.” In re Det. of T.C., 11 Wn. App. 2d 51, 56, 450 P.3d 1230 (2019). Involuntary commitment for behavioral health disorders “is a significant deprivation of liberty” which requires “due process of law.” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 201. “In general, an individual may be involuntarily committed for mental health treatment if, as a result of a mental disorder, the individual either (1) poses a substantial risk of harm to him or herself, others, or the property of others, or (2) is gravely disabled.” In re Det. of M.K., 168 Wn. App. 621, 630, 279 P.3d 897 (2012). Here, the superior court ordered F.H.’s commitment after concluding she was gravely disabled. 3 No. 88869-2-I/4 RCW 71.05.020(25) provides two definitions of gravely disabled. The trial court relied only on subsection (a). RCW 71.05.020(25)(a) provides, “as a result of a behavioral health disorder . . . [i]s in danger of serious physical harm resulting from a failure to provide for his or her essential human needs of health or safety.” These strict requirements are designed to mitigate the “danger of imposing majoritarian values on a person’s chosen lifestyle which, although not sufficiently harmful to justify commitment, may be perceived by most of society as eccentric, substandard, or otherwise offensive.” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 204. “Although uncertainty of living arrangements or lack of financial resources will not alone justify continued confinement in a mental hospital,” evidence supported involuntary treatment where it indicated the person’s “plans to live on the streets are not the result of a choice of lifestyle but rather a result of his deteriorated condition which rendered him unable to make a rational choice with respect to his ability to care for his essential needs.” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 210. However, the risk of harm need not be imminent at the time of the 14-day probable cause hearing. LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 203. The trial court concluded F.H. was gravely disabled because due to a behavioral health disorder, F.H. was “in danger of serious physical harm resulting from a failure to provide for [her] essential human needs of health or safety.” RCW 71.05.020(25(a). Here, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding. F.H. was diagnosed with unspecified psychotic disorder, catatonia, and severe malnutrition. She had symptoms of catatonia, that included “withdrawal, [] not 4 No. 88869-2-I/5 eating, not drinking, staring for prolonged periods of times, mutism, not engaging or speaking, not moving frequently, not attending to her activities of daily living.” Ferrari and Dr. Snyder testified F.H.’s symptomology and diagnoses posed concerns that if F.H. were released into the community at the time of the hearing, she would be incapable of independently taking care of herself. For example, Dr. Snyder testified F.H.’s malnutrition was related to a mental health disorder, and if left untreated, “patients run the risk of having vitamin deficiencies, which can cause a whole host of issues on their own, including neurological deficits [and] organ failure.” And in F.H.’s case, malnutrition “delays wound healing, which can be difficult when we’re trying to repair a fracture, a bone fracture, a serious one at that. And so it delays both wound healing for bone and for skin.” Further, Ferrari and Dr. Snyder testified during F.H.’s hospitalization, F.H. was selective about the medications she would take, and although F.H. took her psychiatric mediations throughout her stay, it was not always voluntary. Dr. Snyder stated this was concerning because F.H. was on blood thinners to prevent blood clots following her ankle fracture. And, according to Dr. Snyder, blood clots “increase the risk of other complications and death.” F.H.’s inability to ambulate to use the restroom also put her at increased “risk of skin infections if she’s not being appropriately cleaned or monitored.” Although F.H. was compliant with her orthopedic surgery protocol and her psychiatric mediation for periods during her hospitalization, given F.H.’s symptomology and diagnoses, Dr. Snyder and Ferrari opined F.H. was gravely 5 No. 88869-2-I/6 disabled based on concerns about F.H. becoming catatonic again, discontinuation of medications, increasing risk of blood clots, infection to the surgical site, or re-injury, which would result in further impairment of F.H.’s ability to care for her basic needs of health, safety, and medical care. F.H. contends her predominant issue at the time of the hearing was her limited mobility due to her recovery from orthopedic surgery. “[T]he failure or inability to provide for [] essential needs must be shown to arise as a result of mental disorder and not because of other factors.” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 205. Here, the evidence is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person that F.H., as a result of her unspecified psychotic disorder with symptoms of catatonia, was in danger of serious physical harm due to her failure to provide for her essential needs. The main concern of Dr. Snyder and Ferrari was F.H.’s catatonia, which if left untreated, could result in F.H. not taking medications critical to her mental health and to prevent blood clots while she recovered from surgery. These findings support the trial court’s determination that F.H., as a result of a behavioral health disorder, was in danger of serious physical harm from a failure to provide for her essential human needs of health and safety under RCW 71.05.020(25)(a). F.H. contends even if substantial evidence supported she was gravely disabled, there were less restrictive alternatives other than involuntary detention. We disagree. 6 No. 88869-2-I/7 The State “ ‘cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends.’ ” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 201 (quoting O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 45 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1975)). F.H. testified if she were released into the community, she had a caregiver and family who could care for and support her. She testified she would agree to take doctors’ recommended medications but also stated “if it works for my body and if it works for me.” F.H. contends “there [was] no showing that F.H.’s mother would not be able to monitor F.H.’s caloric intake and make sure that she did not become malnourished again.” While F.H. had general insight she needed assistance from other people, Dr. Snyder testified the hospital was unable to verify “that support [was] available.” And because of the significant assistance F.H. required, help ambulating to the bathroom and inability to adhere to both mental and physical medications, caregiver support would be ineffective because it “is exceedingly limited and would not be able to provide 24-hour care [like] . . . the hospital.” Without extensive support, Dr. Snyder testified, F.H.’s catatonia symptoms could reemerge, she could develop blood clots, or re-injury. Substantial evidence supports the finding that less restrictive alternatives other than involuntary detention were not available, particularly when considered in the light most favorable to the petitioner. Affirmed. 7 No. 88869-2-I/8 WE CONCUR: 8