In The Matter Of The Detention Of F.h.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket88869-2
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Detention of:
No. 88869-2-I
F.H.
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
BUI, J. — F.H. appeals the 14-day involuntary commitment order, arguing
there was not substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding she was
gravely disabled, and there were less restrictive alternatives other than
involuntary detention. We disagree and affirm. 1
FACTS
On September 9, 2025, F.H. was admitted to Harborview Medical Center
(HMC) for an ankle fracture after being hit by a car. While at HMC, F.H. was
evaluated for involuntary commitment, based on the observations by Dr. Stacey
Wildermuth and designated crisis responder (DCR) Melinda Hasegawa, that F.H.
had poor oral intake of food and medications, poor sleep, and F.H. could not
recount details about being hit by a car. F.H.’s mother also told the DCR that
prior to the incident, the mother observed F.H. “responding to internal stimuli,
1 Because an involuntary commitment order may have adverse collateral consequences
on future involuntary commitment determinations, this case is not moot even though the
commitment order has since expired. See In re Det. of M.K., 168 Wn. App. 621, 629, 279 P.3d
897 (2012); RCW 71.05.245(3).
No. 88869-2-I/2
talking to herself, not eating/drinking, and standing/posturing for days.”
On September 12, a petition for 14-day involuntary treatment was filed
alleging F.H. was gravely disabled because as a result of a mental health
disorder, F.H. was in danger of serious physical harm.
After a good cause continuance of the hearing date, a hearing was held
on September 22. The State called clinical social worker Gina Ferrari and
psychiatrist Dr. Katherine Snyder as witnesses. Following the hearing, the trial
court issued an oral decision and entered written findings of fact and conclusions
of law. The court found F.H. was in danger of serious physical harm due to a
failure to provide for her essential needs. The court also found F.H. had a
diagnosis of unspecified psychosis; was exhibiting symptoms of catatonia,
delusions, and poor nutritional intake; was inconsistently engaged in evaluation
and treatment; was selectively taking medications; denied having a mental
illness; and denied needing psychiatric medications. The court further determined
that it was not in F.H.’s best interest to be in a setting less restrictive than
detention.
Based on these findings, the court concluded F.H. was gravely disabled
and ordered she be detained at HMC for 14 days of involuntary mental health
treatment. F.H. appeals.
ANALYSIS
F.H. challenges the trial court’s determination she was gravely disabled
and there was no less restrictive alternative other than hospitalization.
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“Generally, where the trial court has weighed the evidence, appellate
review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the
findings and, if so, whether the findings in turn support the trial court’s
conclusions of law and judgment.” In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 209, 728
P.2d 138 (1986). “ ‘Substantial evidence is the quantum of evidence sufficient to
persuade a fair-minded person.’ ” In re Det. of A.F., 20 Wn. App. 2d 115, 125,
498 P.3d 1006 (2021) (quoting In re Det. of H.N., 188 Wn. App. 744, 762, 355
P.3d 294 (2015)). In considering whether there was sufficient evidence, we
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner. In re Det. of
A.M., 17 Wn. App. 2d 321, 330, 487 P.3d 531 (2021) (citing In re Det. of B.M., 7
Wn. App. 2d 70, 85, 432 P.3d 459 (2019)). “We do not review a trial court’s
decision regarding witness credibility or the persuasiveness of the evidence.”
A.F., 20 Wn. App. 2d at 125. “The burden is on the challenging party to
demonstrate that substantial evidence does not support a finding of fact.” In re
Det. of T.C., 11 Wn. App. 2d 51, 56, 450 P.3d 1230 (2019).
Involuntary commitment for behavioral health disorders “is a significant
deprivation of liberty” which requires “due process of law.” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at
201. “In general, an individual may be involuntarily committed for mental health
treatment if, as a result of a mental disorder, the individual either (1) poses a
substantial risk of harm to him or herself, others, or the property of others, or (2)
is gravely disabled.” In re Det. of M.K., 168 Wn. App. 621, 630, 279 P.3d 897
(2012). Here, the superior court ordered F.H.’s commitment after concluding she
was gravely disabled.
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RCW 71.05.020(25) provides two definitions of gravely disabled. The trial
court relied only on subsection (a). RCW 71.05.020(25)(a) provides, “as a result
of a behavioral health disorder . . . [i]s in danger of serious physical harm
resulting from a failure to provide for his or her essential human needs of health
or safety.” These strict requirements are designed to mitigate the “danger of
imposing majoritarian values on a person’s chosen lifestyle which, although not
sufficiently harmful to justify commitment, may be perceived by most of society
as eccentric, substandard, or otherwise offensive.” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 204.
“Although uncertainty of living arrangements or lack of financial resources will not
alone justify continued confinement in a mental hospital,” evidence supported
involuntary treatment where it indicated the person’s “plans to live on the streets
are not the result of a choice of lifestyle but rather a result of his deteriorated
condition which rendered him unable to make a rational choice with respect to his
ability to care for his essential needs.” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 210. However, the
risk of harm need not be imminent at the time of the 14-day probable cause
hearing. LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 203.
The trial court concluded F.H. was gravely disabled because due to a
behavioral health disorder, F.H. was “in danger of serious physical harm resulting
from a failure to provide for [her] essential human needs of health or safety.”
RCW 71.05.020(25(a).
Here, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding. F.H. was
diagnosed with unspecified psychotic disorder, catatonia, and severe
malnutrition. She had symptoms of catatonia, that included “withdrawal, [] not
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eating, not drinking, staring for prolonged periods of times, mutism, not engaging
or speaking, not moving frequently, not attending to her activities of daily living.”
Ferrari and Dr. Snyder testified F.H.’s symptomology and diagnoses
posed concerns that if F.H. were released into the community at the time of the
hearing, she would be incapable of independently taking care of herself. For
example, Dr. Snyder testified F.H.’s malnutrition was related to a mental health
disorder, and if left untreated, “patients run the risk of having vitamin deficiencies,
which can cause a whole host of issues on their own, including neurological
deficits [and] organ failure.” And in F.H.’s case, malnutrition “delays wound
healing, which can be difficult when we’re trying to repair a fracture, a bone
fracture, a serious one at that. And so it delays both wound healing for bone and
for skin.”
Further, Ferrari and Dr. Snyder testified during F.H.’s hospitalization, F.H.
was selective about the medications she would take, and although F.H. took her
psychiatric mediations throughout her stay, it was not always voluntary. Dr.
Snyder stated this was concerning because F.H. was on blood thinners to
prevent blood clots following her ankle fracture. And, according to Dr. Snyder,
blood clots “increase the risk of other complications and death.” F.H.’s inability to
ambulate to use the restroom also put her at increased “risk of skin infections if
she’s not being appropriately cleaned or monitored.”
Although F.H. was compliant with her orthopedic surgery protocol and her
psychiatric mediation for periods during her hospitalization, given F.H.’s
symptomology and diagnoses, Dr. Snyder and Ferrari opined F.H. was gravely
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disabled based on concerns about F.H. becoming catatonic again,
discontinuation of medications, increasing risk of blood clots, infection to the
surgical site, or re-injury, which would result in further impairment of F.H.’s ability
to care for her basic needs of health, safety, and medical care.
F.H. contends her predominant issue at the time of the hearing was her
limited mobility due to her recovery from orthopedic surgery. “[T]he failure or
inability to provide for [] essential needs must be shown to arise as a result of
mental disorder and not because of other factors.” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 205.
Here, the evidence is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person that F.H., as a
result of her unspecified psychotic disorder with symptoms of catatonia, was in
danger of serious physical harm due to her failure to provide for her essential
needs.
The main concern of Dr. Snyder and Ferrari was F.H.’s catatonia, which if
left untreated, could result in F.H. not taking medications critical to her mental
health and to prevent blood clots while she recovered from surgery. These
findings support the trial court’s determination that F.H., as a result of a
behavioral health disorder, was in danger of serious physical harm from a failure
to provide for her essential human needs of health and safety under RCW
71.05.020(25)(a).
F.H. contends even if substantial evidence supported she was gravely
disabled, there were less restrictive alternatives other than involuntary detention.
We disagree.
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The State “ ‘cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous
individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the
help of willing and responsible family members or friends.’ ” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d
at 201 (quoting O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 45 L.
Ed. 2d 396 (1975)).
F.H. testified if she were released into the community, she had a caregiver
and family who could care for and support her. She testified she would agree to
take doctors’ recommended medications but also stated “if it works for my body
and if it works for me.” F.H. contends “there [was] no showing that F.H.’s mother
would not be able to monitor F.H.’s caloric intake and make sure that she did not
become malnourished again.” While F.H. had general insight she needed
assistance from other people, Dr. Snyder testified the hospital was unable to
verify “that support [was] available.” And because of the significant assistance
F.H. required, help ambulating to the bathroom and inability to adhere to both
mental and physical medications, caregiver support would be ineffective because
it “is exceedingly limited and would not be able to provide 24-hour care [like] . . .
the hospital.” Without extensive support, Dr. Snyder testified, F.H.’s catatonia
symptoms could reemerge, she could develop blood clots, or re-injury.
Substantial evidence supports the finding that less restrictive alternatives other
than involuntary detention were not available, particularly when considered in the
light most favorable to the petitioner.
Affirmed.
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WE CONCUR:
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