Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON AMANUEL REDDA as Personal Representative of THE ESTATE OF No. 88347-0-I TSEHAINESH GHEBREHIWET, deceased, Appellant, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION RENTON HEALTHCARE REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC, a limited liability company, DR. DARREN SWENSON, M.D., an individual, DR. NISHITA BHUMKAR, M.D., and individual, SWENSON HEALTHCARE, PLLC, a Washington limited liability company, US POST ACUTE CARE, LLC, a foreign limited liability company, PROVIDENCE HEALTH & SERVICES, a Washington corporation, and DOES 1-10, Respondents. CHUNG, J. — Amanuel Redda, personal representative of the Estate of Tsehainesh Ghebrehiwet (the Estate), filed suit against Renton Healthcare Rehabilitation Center (RHRC), Dr. Nishita Bhumkar, Dr. Darren Swenson and his corporate entities Swenson Healthcare, PLLC and US Post Acute Care, LLC, and Providence Health & Services (Providence). The Estate alleged that Dr. Bhumkar caused Ghebrehiwet to contract and ultimately die from COVID-19 and brought claims against defendants for wrongful death, lost chance of survival, and violation of the abuse of vulnerable adults act (AVAA), ch. 74.34 RCW. Dr. Swenson, his corporate No. 88347-0-I/2 entities, and Dr. Bhumkar (collectively “Swenson Defendants”) filed a motion for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion based on the Estate’s failure to establish proximate causation and dismissed the claims. The Estate appeals the dismissal of its claims. We hold that Dr. Bhumkar did not owe Ghebrehiwet a common law duty of care not to enter RHRC after testing positive for COVID-19. Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of the Estate’s claims against the Swenson Defendants. BACKGROUND Ghebrehiwet was admitted to RHRC in May 2019 as a hospice patient with Alzheimer’s disease. At that time, Dr. Swenson provided healthcare services at RHRC through his corporations and employees, including Dr. Bhumkar.1 On February 29, 2020, Washington State Governor Jay Inslee issued a declaration of a state of emergency in response to COVID-19. On March 9, 2020, 2 Dr. Bhumkar developed symptoms of a headache and body aches. On March 13, Dr. Bhumkar visited RHRC to care for patients but did not provide care for Ghebrehiwet that day. Before being allowed into RHRC on March 13, Dr. Bhumkar signed a visitor questionnaire indicating that she did not have any signs or symptoms of a respiratory infection and had not had contact with someone who had or was under investigation for having COVID-19. On March 16, Dr. Bhumkar took a COVID-19 test and on March 24, the results returned as positive. On March 20, the Washington State Department of Health (DOH) released return to work guidance for healthcare workers who had confirmed COVID-19 infections and 1 Dr. Bhumkar, Dr. Swenson, and Dr. Swenson’s corporate entities, Swenson Healthcare, PLLC and US Post Acute Care, LLC, are the Respondents in this appeal. 2 All relevant dates are in 2020 unless otherwise noted. 2 No. 88347-0-I/3 recommended that healthcare providers not return to work until “[a]t least 3 days (72 hours) have passed since recovery defined as resolution of fever without the use of fever-reducing medications and improvement in respiratory symptoms (e.g. cough, shortness of breath); and [a]t least 7 days have passed since symptoms first appeared.” Dr. Bhumkar kept Dr. Swenson apprised of her symptoms through text messages. Dr. Bhumkar did not develop a fever during her illness. By March 25, at least 72 hours had passed since her symptoms had improved, and seven days had passed since her symptoms first appeared. Because Dr. Bhumkar was symptom free by March 23, Dr. Swenson and Dr. Bhumkar jointly determined that Dr. Bhumkar met the criteria to return to work on March 25 per DOH’s March 20 guidance. When Dr. Bhumkar returned to RHRC on March 25, she evaluated patients including Ghebrehiwet. She attested that she wore full personal protective equipment (PPE) “at all times when [she] cared for patients.” Before being allowed into RHRC on March 25, Dr. Bhumkar signed a visitor questionnaire identical to the one she signed on March 13. At that time, neither Dr. Bhumkar nor Dr. Swenson disclosed to RHRC that Dr. Bhumkar’s March 16 test was positive for COVID-19. Dr. Bhumkar did not return to RHRC after March 25. On March 26, Dr. Bhumkar took another COVID-19 test, and on March 27, she received her results, which showed she was still positive for the virus. RHRC learned on March 27 that Dr. Bhumkar had tested positive for COVID-19. Dr. Bhumkar provided RHRC with a list of patients whom she had seen through March 25. According to RHRC, all such patients were placed in “droplet isolation,” along with their roommates, 3 No. 88347-0-I/4 and were tested for COVID-19. Of the 12 patients seen by Dr. Bhumkar on March 25 and their eight roommates (20 total), 14 eventually tested positive for COVID-19. Ghebrehiwet’s medical records show that starting March 29, she was placed in “contact isolation” pending the results of a COVID-19 test as a precaution to monitor for possible exposure to COVID-19. Ghebrehiwet’s medical chart notes from March 29 and March 30 state that she was asymptomatic with good vital signs. On March 30, in conjunction with the King County Health’s COVID-19 Communicable Disease Department, RHRC determined that Ghebrehiwet was no longer at risk of infection and discontinued isolation. Ghebrehiwet was tested for COVID-19 on March 28 and again on April 7; both tests were negative. Fassika Kassa, a registered nurse, saw patients at RHRC with Dr. Bhumkar on March 25. Kassa cared for Ghebrehiwet again on April 6 and tested positive for COVID- 19 on or about April 9. On April 25, Ghebrehiwet began to manifest symptoms, and she developed a fever on April 28. On April 29, Ghebrehiwet’s chart notes describe her as “actively dying.” On April 30, Ghebrehiwet received chest x-ray results consistent with pneumonia. On May 1, Ghebrehiwet received a COVID-19 test, which came back positive on May 4. Ghebrehiwet died on May 14, and her death certificate listed her causes of death as complications due to COVID-19, pneumonia, failure to thrive, and advanced Alzheimer’s dementia. The Estate filed suit on March 6, 2023, against the Swenson Defendants, RHRC, and Providence,3 alleging that Dr. Bhumkar’s visit to RHRC on March 13 or March 25, 3 The complaint alleged “Providence provides healthcare to multiple hospitals, clinics, and nursing homes, including RHRC.” 4 No. 88347-0-I/5 2020, caused Ghebrehiwet to contract and ultimately die from COVID-19. The Estate alleged claims for wrongful death, lost chance of survival, and violation of the AVAA. As to the wrongful death claim, the Estate alleged two theories of causation: (1) direct transmission, whereby Dr. Bhumkar directly infected Ghebrehiwet when she examined her on March 25 or (2) indirect transmission, whereby Dr. Bhumkar indirectly caused Ghebrehiwet to become infected through a “chain of transmission” by introducing COVID-19 into RHRC, which eventually reached Ghebrehiwet. In June 2023, the Swenson Defendants moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the Estate’s motion for a CR 56(f) continuance. In December 2024, the Swenson Defendants filed a renewed motion for summary judgment. The Swenson Defendants sought summary judgment on the wrongful death claim on the basis that the direct transmission theory was controlled by the medical malpractice statute, RCW 7.70. The Estate responded that this argument relied on the “faulty premise” that the wrongful death claim was based on health care provided by Dr. Bhumkar to Ghebrehiwet. Instead, the Estate clarified that its claim was based on the actions that Dr. Bhumkar “took outside the scope of her patient-physician relationship” with Ghebrehiwet, so RCW 7.70 did not apply. The Estate contended in the alternative that even if the claim was governed by RCW 7.70, it had submitted testimony from three experts sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. At the summary judgment hearing, the trial court concluded that the Estate “failed to satisfy its burden of production with competent, expert opinion regarding the question of causation by a preponderance [of evidence] to a reasonable degree of medical or scientific certainty.” It stated that “[a]lthough [the Estate’s] experts may have attributed 5 No. 88347-0-I/6 blame to Dr. Bhumkar . . . as to ways she or the other Swenson defendants may have breached a duty of care, [the Estate’s] experts . . . provided insufficient testimony to show that any act or omission by Dr. Bhumkar or the other defendants in March of 2020, caused Ms. Ghebrehiwet’s death in May 2020.” Furthermore, the trial court noted that even crediting the Estate’s expert opinion, “the jury would be left to speculate as to causation, and that is an improper basis to send something to the jury.” In its written order, the court held that “as a matter of law that [the Estate] has failed to establish the requisite element of proximate cause under any cause of action alleged against the moving defendants.” Further, because all of the Estate’s claims required proof of causation, the court dismissed all the claims without reaching the issues of whether RCW 7.70 was the exclusive remedy, whether the Swenson Defendants’ conduct “r[ose] to the level of abuse or neglect” under the AVAA and what was the scope of any duty. The court granted the Estate’s motion for default against RHRC but denied the motion for default judgment against RHRC.4 The court noted that the “issue of [the Estate]’s damages remains undetermined,” but nevertheless granted the Estate’s motion for final judgment with written findings that there was no just reason to delay appeal. The Estate then filed this appeal of the court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing its claims against the Swenson Defendants pursuant to RAP 2.2(d). 4 The Estate argued that “default judgment against RHRC would be futile because [the Estate] cannot collect on it.” The court agreed and denied default judgment because “RHRC has filed bankruptcy and apparently has no insurance coverage.” 6 No. 88347-0-I/7 DISCUSSION The Estate argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. It contends that expert testimony, combined with circumstantial evidence, creates genuine issues of material fact as to whether Dr. Bhumkar’s entry into RHRC while COVID-19 positive proximately caused Ghebrehiwet’s COVID-19 infection and death. In its reply brief, the Estate also contends that Dr. Bhumkar owed Ghebrehiwet a common law duty to not enter the facility while having a known or suspected COVID-19 positive status because it was foreseeable that doing so would spread COVID-19 to vulnerable residents. We review summary judgment orders de novo. Gardens Condo. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2 Wn.3d 832, 838, 544 P.3d 499 (2024). Accordingly, the appellate court engages in the same inquiry as the trial court. Haley v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, 25 Wn. App. 2d 207, 216, 522 P.3d 80 (2022). Additionally, “ ‘[w]e may affirm a trial court’s disposition of a motion for summary judgment . . . on any ground supported by the record.’ ” Johnson v. Liquor & Cannabis Bd., 197 Wn.2d 605, 611, 486 P.3d 125 (2021) (quoting Washburn v. City of Federal Way, 178 Wn.2d 732, 753 n.9, 310 P.3d 1275 (2013)). “Summary judgment is properly granted when ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Haley, 25 Wn. App. 2d at 216 (quoting CR 56(c)). “A ‘material fact’ is a fact upon which the outcome of the litigation depends, in whole or in part.” Morris v. McNicol, 83 Wn.2d 491, 494, 519 P.2d 7 (1974) (quoting CR 7 No. 88347-0-I/8 56(c)). On summary judgment, the court “must consider all evidence in favor of the nonmoving party.” Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358, 368, 357 P.3d 1080 (2015). “[T]he trial court may not weigh the evidence, assess credibility, consider the likelihood that the evidence will prove true, or otherwise resolve issues of material fact.” Haley, 25 Wn. App. 2d at 217. A party that moves for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing the absence of an issue of material fact. Young v. Key Pharms., 112 Wn.2d 216, 225, 770 P.2d 182 (1989). A defendant moving for summary judgment can submit affidavits to demonstrate that no issue of material fact exists or can demonstrate to the trial court that the “plaintiff lacks competent evidence to support an essential element of [their] case.” Guile v. Ballard Cmty. Hosp., 70 Wn. App. 18, 23, 851 P.2d 689 (1993) (citing Young, 112 Wn.2d at 225). When the moving party satisfies the initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party. Id. The nonmoving party must sufficiently demonstrate “the existence of an element essential to [their] case, and on which [they] will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Young, 112 Wn.2d at 225. The failure to make such a showing will result in the trial court granting summary judgment. Id. To prevail on a common law negligence claim, a plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a duty to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) a resulting injury, and (4) the breach as the proximate cause of the injury. Lowman v. Wilbur, 178 Wn.2d 165, 169, 309 P.3d 387 (2013). Likewise, “[i]n a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must satisfy traditional tort elements of proof: duty, breach, injury, and proximate cause.” Dunnington v. Virginia Mason Med. Ctr., 187 Wn.2d 629, 636, 389 P.3d 498 (2017). A plaintiff must establish an issue of material fact as to each element of negligence to 8 No. 88347-0-I/9 defeat a motion for summary judgment dismissal. Walter Family Grain Growers, Inc. v. Foremost Pump & Well Servs., LLC, 21 Wn. App. 2d 451, 460, 506 P.3d 705 (2022). I. Direct Transmission Theory of Causation As an initial matter, the parties dispute whether the Estate’s wrongful death claim based on the direct transmission theory—i.e., that Dr. Bhumkar directly infected Ghebrehiwet—is controlled by the medical negligence statute, RCW 7.70, or by common law. The Swenson Defendants argue that the direct transmission theory necessarily places the claim under RCW 7.70 because the statute “exclusively governs claims of injury related to the provision of healthcare.” Furthermore, the Swenson Defendants contend that the Estate conceded the issue of whether Dr. Bhumkar directly infected Ghebrehiwet at the hearing for the renewed motion for summary judgment, and even if it did not, the claim nevertheless fails for insufficient evidence that her breach caused Ghebrehiwet’s death. The Estate counters that it has pleaded a common law negligence claim, not based on health care but “on actions Dr. Bhumkar took outside the scope of her patient-physician relationship with Ms. Ghebrehiwet”—specifically, “Dr. Bhumkar’s entry into RHRC while positive, without disclosure, and under Dr. Swenson’s directive” and that its expert opinions establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding causation. A plaintiff may bring a claim under RCW 7.70 for an “injury occurring as the result of health care” if they can establish “[t]hat injury resulted from the failure of a health care provider to follow the accepted standard of care.” RCW 7.70.030(1). “Health care” is “ ‘the process in which [the physician] was utilizing the skills which he had been taught in examining, diagnosing, treating or caring for the plaintiff as his patient.’ ” Beggs v. 9 No. 88347-0-I/10 Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 171 Wn.2d 69, 79, 247 P.3d 421 (2011) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Estate of Sly v. Linville, 75 Wn. App. 431, 439, 878 P.2d 1241 (1994)). To prove a claim under RCW 7.70.040, a plaintiff must prove that “(a) The health care provider failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, and learning expected of a reasonably prudent health care provider at that time in the profession or class to which he or she belongs, in the State of Washington, acting in the same or similar circumstances” and that “(b) Such failure was a proximate cause of the injury complained of.” RCW 7.70.040(1).5 We need not resolve whether the Estate’s claim is a RCW 7.70 “health care” claim to determine that summary judgment dismissal based on a direct transmission theory was proper because the Estate conceded that it lacked evidence that Dr. Bhumkar directly transmitted the infection and thereby caused Ghebrehiwet’s death. During the hearing on the renewed motion for summary judgment, this exchange occurred: 5 In 2021, recognizing “the realities of the challenging practice conditions” during the pandemic, the legislature amended “the current standard of care governing health care providers to give special consideration to additional relevant factors.” LAWS OF 2021, ch. 241, § 1(2), (3). The amended statute specifies the necessary elements of proof that injury resulted from the failure of a health care provider to follow the accepted standard of care in acting or failing to act following the proclamation of a state of emergency in all counties in the state of Washington by the governor in response to the COVID-19 pandemic on February 29, 2020, and until the state of emergency is terminated, including that “[s]uch failure was a proximate cause of the injury complained of.” RCW 7.70.040(2)(a)(B)(ii). The amendment went in effect “immediately,” i.e., on May 10, 2021. L AWS OF 2021, ch. 241, § 3. The Swenson Defendants rely on the amended statute, but neither party discusses whether the amendments apply here, when the conduct that is the basis of the claims in this case occurred in March 2020, before these amendments went into effect. However, these statutory provisions apply “only if relevant to the determination of whether the health care provider followed the standard of care, as determined by the court.” RCW 7.70.040(2)(b). Based on our resolution of this claim, we need not address whether the amendments apply retroactively to the actions at issue here. 10 No. 88347-0-I/11 THE COURT: So are you - - I was confused by the way the characterization of your claim kind of shifted a bit. And I’m – you are not bringing a medical negligence claim [under RCW 7.70] though, right? [THE ESTATE]: Yeah, we - - we didn’t even plead that in the complaint. .... [THE ESTATE]: Well, yeah, we’re not - - we’re not . . . well, I’m going to concede . . . we cannot prove by a preponderance of evidence that the decedent got directly infected by Dr. Bhumkar examining her on [March 25]. (Emphasis added.) The Estate continued its argument, then the court interrupted and asked again, “So you are claiming medical negligence. I’m confused,” to which the Estate responded, “No. No, I - - I’ve already conceded that . . . Plaintiff cannot prove by a preponderance of evidence that this was a direct infection.”6 (Emphasis added.) “CR 2A and RCW 2.44.010 grant an attorney the authority to bind [their] client to agreements or stipulations made on behalf of the client.” Nguyen v. Sacred Heart Med. Ctr., 97 Wn. App. 728, 734, 987 P.2d 634 (1999); RCW 2.44.010(1) (attorney has authority to bind client by agreement made in open court). An attorney’s admission binds their client if it is “ ‘distinct and formal, and made for the express purpose of dispensing with the formal proof of some fact at the trial.’ ” Dodge v. Stencil, 48 Wn.2d 619, 622, 296 P.2d 312 (1956) (quoting State v. Wheeler, 93 Wash. 538, 541, 161 P. 373 (1916)). In this case, the Estate distinctly and formally acknowledged in open court that it could not prove Dr. Bhumkar directly infected Ghebrehiwet by a preponderance of the evidence. While the Estate attempts to distinguish Nguyen because that case “did not involve a mere evidentiary acknowledgment,” here, the Estate’s acknowledgment that it 6 The Estate reiterated this again shortly thereafter: “And I concede that the plaintiff cannot prove by a preponderance of evidence that this was the result of Dr. Bhumkar directly examining her.” 11 No. 88347-0-I/12 lacked evidence of direct infection is the equivalent of an acknowledgment that its claim based on theory of direct transmission could not survive summary judgment. Without proof of direct infection, there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the essential element of causation based on a direct transmission theory. Therefore, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment dismissal of the Estate’s claims to the extent they relied on a direct transmission theory of causation. II. Indirect Transmission Theory of Causation Here, as an alternative theory of causation, the Estate alleges that Dr. Bhumkar indirectly transmitted COVID-19 to Ghebrehiwet and thereby caused her death. The Estate claims the court below erred by concluding a jury would be left to speculate as to causation, because two of their experts, Drs. Phillips and Dhillon, provided competent testimony that Dr. Bhumkar likely initiated a “chain of transmission” that through an intermediary ultimately infected Ghebrehiwet and caused her death. 7 In a negligence case, a plaintiff must show that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, and whether a duty exists is a threshold inquiry. Martinez v. Wash. State Univ., 6 Wn.3d 776, 792, 593 P.3d 762 (2026). Whether a duty exists is a question of law we review de novo. Id. “The question of duty is dispositive—‘No defendant is liable for negligence unless he is under a legal duty to use care.’ ” Ehrhart v. King County, 195 Wn.2d 388, 396, 460 P.3d 612 (2020) (quoting Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden & Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts § 251, at 1 (2d ed. 2011) (footnote omitted)). Only after a 7 The Estate also submitted the report of a third expert, Dr. Goldman, who did not testify about causation, but opined as to whether Drs. Swenson and Bhumkar “fell below the standard of care of a reasonably prudent healthcare provider working in Washington in March of 2020, even if Dr. Bhumkar allegedly complied with the DOH guidelines.” Dr. Goldman was asked during his deposition, “[Y]ou’re not going to be testifying that the entry on March 13th . . . caused the decedent to pass away; is that true?” Dr. Goldman confirmed he was “not commenting at all what the decedent passed away from.” 12 No. 88347-0-I/13 duty is established do we address whether the defendant breached the duty and whether that breach was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, which “are normally questions of fact.” Yonker v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 85 Wn. App. 71, 76, 930 P.2d 958 (1997). Accordingly, we first address the threshold inquiry of duty. Determining whether a duty exists involves weighing “ ‘considerations of logic, common sense, justice, policy, and precedent.’ ” Barlow v. State, 2 Wn.3d 583, 589, 540 P.3d 783 (2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stalter v. State, 151 Wn.2d 148, 155, 86 P.3d 1159 (2004)). A duty of care may exist by virtue of the common law or a statute. Matthis v. Ammons, 84 Wn. App. 411, 416-17, 928 P.2d 431 (1996). The determination of whether there is a common law duty “involves reference to the principles reflected in Restatement of Torts.” Barlow, 2 Wn.3d at 589. “Duty has three facets. (1) By whom is it owed? (2) To whom is it owed? (3) What is the standard of care? Gall v. McDonald Indus., 84 Wn. App. 194, 202, 926 P.2d 934 (1996). “Once it is determined that a legal duty exists, it is generally the jury’s function to decide the foreseeable range of danger, thus limiting the scope of that duty.” Briggs v. Pacificorp, 120 Wn. App. 319, 322, 85 P.3d 369 (2003). See also McKown v. Simon Prop. Grp., Inc., 182 Wn.2d 752, 764, 344 P.3d 661 (2015) (concluding that foreseeability as a question of whether a duty is owed is ultimately for the court to decide, whereas foreseeability as a question regarding the scope of the duty is a question of fact for the jury). The Estate did not address whether a duty existed until its reply brief. There, it argues that “Dr. Bhumkar owed Ms. Ghebrehiwet . . . a common law duty to not enter 13 No. 88347-0-I/14 the facility while having a known or suspected COVID-19 positive status because such entry could foreseeably cause . . . COVID-19 . . . for the residents.” 8 More specifically, the Estate asks this court to “recognize a duty owed by those who know or suspect they are positive with COVID-19 to high risk, vulnerable individuals inside a contained environment they are unable to leave (in such a situation, the number of unidentified intermediaries within the environment is irrelevant).” In oral argument before this court, the Estate elaborated on the first two facets of duty, who owes the duty and to whom. It stated that “anybody entering a facility” owed the duty “to everybody, but it’s specifically to the residents and the staff at the nursing home.” 9 Further, the Estate posits that Dr. Bhumkar breached this duty by “entering the facility full of vulnerable adults while knowingly positive with COVID-19, failing to 8 At the summary judgment hearing before the trial court, the Estate elaborated, Covid . . . was a new, scary thing. We knew that people in China and Italy were dying from it. We -- what we did know was that elderly people and immunocompromised people were at particularly heightened risk. And if you were sick or concerned you might be sick, you had a duty to let others know and to stay isolated and shelter in place.” And in oral argument before this court, in response to a question about the common law duty, the Estate similarly argued, [I]f you . . . suspected that you had COVID or you knew you had COVID you were supposed to isolate and you were supposed to shelter in place. And it was also known that nursing homes with vulnerable residents who were at particularly high risk for COVID-19 so you had a duty . . . if you even suspected that you had COVID you still needed to inform the facility that you had symptoms or that you tested positive before they would let you in. Wash. Ct. of Appeals oral arg., Amanuel Redda, et ano v. Renton Healthcare Rehab. Ctr., et al., No. 88347-0-I (Apr. 22, 2026), at 2 min., 27 sec. through 2 min., 57 sec., video recording by TVW, Washington State’s Public Affairs Network, https://tvw.org/video/division-1-court-of-appeals- 2026041177/?eventID=2026041177. 9 Wash. Ct. of Appeals oral arg., supra, at 3 min., 23 sec. through 4 min., 10 sec. Further, at oral argument, the Estate agreed that the duty was owed by “anybody who walked in, it could have been a visitor, or relative of a patient” or “a vendor even.” Id. at 4 min., 30 sec., through 4 min., 50 sec. 14 No. 88347-0-I/15 disclose that status before entering, lying on the visitor questionnaire forms upon entry, and thereby exposing staff and residents.”10 “The general rule is that people and businesses have no duty to aid or protect others from harm.” Barlow, 2 Wn.3d at 589 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §314). The Estate does not suggest that Dr. Bhumkar had an affirmative duty as a health care provider working with a vulnerable population. Cf. Anderson v. Grant County, 6 Wn.3d 69, 71, 585 P.3d 87 (2026) (“jailers owe a special common law duty of care to those they guard”). Nor does it suggest that the Swenson Defendants owed a duty to protect Ghebrehiwet from Dr. Bhumkar as a third party based on a special relationship with Ghebrehiwet. Cf. H.B.H. v. State, 192 Wn.2d 154, 178, 429 P.3d 484 (2018) (State “stands in a special relationship with foster children in its charge” that “supports recognition of a duty in tort to protect [them] from foreseeable harms at the hands of foster parents”); see also Barlow, 2 Wn.3d at 589 (noting that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 acknowledges exceptions to general rule that there is no duty to protect others from third-party conduct: when a special relationship exists between the actor and the perpetrator or between the actor and the plaintiff/victim). Rather, the Estate claims Dr. Bhumkar breached a duty of ordinary care, such that any person entering RHRC had a duty to all residents therein.11 10 At oral argument, the Estate further explained its theory that Dr. Bhumkar breached her common law duty by “not informing them that she had just received a positive COVID-19 test.” Moreover, the Estate agreed a breach could be proved by “evidence that [someone] had the sniffles in March of 2020 and they signed in . . . and they denied” that they had it, as Dr. Bhumkar did. Wash. Ct. of Appeals oral arg., supra, at 4 min., 40 sec., through 4 min., 50 sec. 11 The Estate clarified that it is not suggesting that Dr. Bhumkar had a duty “to third parties outside the facility (such as a staff member’s spouse at home).” 15 No. 88347-0-I/16 The Estate cites to the AVAA12 to support the proposition that “Washington policy favors protecting vulnerable adults.”13 But it does not argue that the AVAA imposed a duty on Dr. Bhumkar owed to Ghebrehiwet. Nor does the Estate specifically argue that the local or state guidance on COVID- 19 imposed a duty of care on Dr. Bhumkar that was owed to Ghebrehiwet. Indeed, in its opposition to the Swenson Defendants’ summary judgment motion, the Estate stated, “Whether or not the Swenson Defendants followed the Washington Department of Health guidelines is not an issue.” Instead, the Estate points to its experts’ opinions that Dr. Bhumkar failed to follow such guidance in support of its claim, 14 which the Swenson 12 The Estate’s complaint and briefing refer to the AVAA as the vulnerable adult statute (VAS). 13 Chapter 74.34 RCW concerns the abuse of vulnerable adults, and RCW 74.34.005 states the following legislative findings: The legislature finds and declares that: (1) Some adults are vulnerable and may be subjected to abuse, neglect, financial exploitation, or abandonment by a family member, care provider, or other person who has a relationship with the vulnerable adult; (2) A vulnerable adult may be home bound or otherwise unable to represent himself or herself in court or to retain legal counsel in order to obtain the relief available under this chapter or other protections offered through the courts; (3) A vulnerable adult may lack the ability to perform or obtain those services necessary to maintain his or her well-being because he or she lacks the capacity for consent; (4) A vulnerable adult may have health problems that place him or her in a dependent position; (5) The department and appropriate agencies must be prepared to receive reports of abandonment, abuse, financial exploitation, or neglect of vulnerable adults; (6) The department must provide protective services in the least restrictive environment appropriate and available to the vulnerable adult. 14 One of the Estate’s experts, Dr. Dhillon, opined that Dr. Bhumkar’s use of PPE “may not have provided sufficient protection against potential transmission from an infected individual,” and he challenged Dr. Bhumkar’s adherence to local regulations at the time, arguing that Dr. Bhumkar did not consult a physician as was required. Another of the Estate’s experts, Dr. Phillips, PhD, an epidemiologist familiar with the COVID-19 virus and Washington state guidelines, similarly stated in her declaration that entering the facility on March 13, 2020, three days after the onset of symptoms and three days before seeking out a COVID-19 test on March 16, 2020, due to the persistence of symptoms, Dr. Bhumkar was in violation of US Post Acute’s own advice and the guidance of almost all US public health agencies at the time. 16 No. 88347-0-I/17 Defendants counter with their own expert’s opinion that Dr. Bhumkar did not violate any guidelines.15 The Swenson Defendants contend that there is no common law duty applicable here, pointing to decisions from other jurisdictions that declined to impose a duty to avoid transmitting COVID-19 on public policy grounds. See Kuciemba v. Victory Woodworks, Inc., 14 Cal.5th 993, 1033, 531 P.3d 924 (2023) (holding “[a]n employer does not owe a duty of care under California law to prevent the spread of COVID-19 to employees’ household members”); Reish v. Visiting Angels, 2023 WL 6157332, 305 A.3d 1000 (table) (Pa. Super. Ct. 2023) (declining to recognize a common law duty “for personal care providers to take precautions against spreading COVID-19 to customers”); Ruiz v. Conagra Foods Packaged Foods LLC, 606 F. Supp. 3d 881, 890 (E.D. Wisc. 2022) (granting motion to dismiss claim against employer by employee contracted COVID-19 at work and passed virus to wife, who died; based on public policy considerations, imposing liability “would impose too great a burden on the defendant and would enter a field with no reasonable or principled stopping point”); Est. of Madden v. Sw. Airlines, Co., No. 1:21-cv-00672-SAG, 2021 WL 2580119, at *8 (D. Md. 2021) (Southwest Airlines owed no duty to husband of flight attendant who contracted COVID-19 at work due to allegedly insufficient precautions and passed it on to him). She added that it was her understanding that “Dr. Bhumkar had a known exposure or exposures to COVID-19” and that “[g]uidance for persons with known exposure to COVID-19 in March 2020 was to quarantine for 14 days while monitoring for symptoms.” 15 The Swenson Defendants’ expert, Dr. Hashisaki, a board-certified Internal Medicine physician practicing in Washington with a subspecialty in infectious diseases, stated in his declaration that the “Washington State Medical Commission concluded that Dr. Bhumkar violated no guidelines or policies when she returned to work on March 25, 2020, nor did she violate any guidelines when she visited RHRC on March 13, 2020.” 17 No. 88347-0-I/18 In reply, the Estate distinguishes the cases cited by the Swenson Defendants, alleging that Dr. Bhumkar knowingly failed to disclose a positive COVID-19 test before entering RHRC. But otherwise, the Estate does not meaningfully engage with these cases or provide other legal authority to support its argument that here, Dr. Bhumkar owed a duty to Ghebrehiwet beyond an ordinary duty of care to third parties. “Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.” DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962). See also Cowiche Canyon Conserv. v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992) (argument unsupported by citation to authority will not be considered). Ultimately, however, the parties’ dispute about Dr. Bhumkar’s compliance with COVID-19 guidelines does not create a question of fact regarding whether Dr. Bhumkar owed a duty to Ghebrehiwet, because whether she owed a duty is a question of law. “Whether the defendant is a governmental entity or a private person, to be actionable, the duty must be one owed to the injured plaintiff, and not one owed to the public in general.” Taylor v. Stevens County, 111 Wn.2d 159, 163, 759 P.2d 447 (1998). But regarding the existence and source of a duty here, the Estate states only that “[l]ogic, justice, and precedent support duty; policy does not bar it as a matter of law.” The Estate’s failure to identify the “precedent support[ing] duty” to which it refers is fatal to its claim of common law negligence. “On summary judgment review, we may affirm the trial court’s decision on any basis within the record.” Davidson Serles & Assocs. v. City of Kirkland, 159 Wn. App. 616, 624, 246 P.3d 822 (2011). We hold that Dr. Bhumkar did not owe a duty of care to 18 No. 88347-0-I/19 Ghebrehiwet. Because the Estate cannot establish the threshold requirement of a duty, we need not reach the issue of causation to affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the wrongful death negligence claim. Finally, as to the remaining claims against the Swenson Defendants for lost chance of survival and violation of the AVAA, the Estate addresses neither on appeal. For their part, the Swenson Defendants argue that the Estate’s experts do not provide the requisite medical expert testimony to scientifically quantify the loss of chance claim and that the AVAA claim fails for lack of sufficient causation evidence, as well as for lack of evidence of “neglect,” as defined in RCW 74.34.020(15). 16 In reply, the Estate merely notes that the Swenson Defendants’ “extraneous arguments on non-decided issues fail,” but it does not engage substantively in the issues. Because the Estate provides no argument regarding the trial court’s dismissal of these claims, we decline to address them. RAP 10.3(a)(6); Cowiche Canyon Conserv., 118 Wn.2d at 809 (argument unsupported by reference to the record or citation to authority will not be considered). CONCLUSION We hold that Dr. Bhumkar did not owe a common law duty of care to Ghebrehiwet not to enter RHRC after testing positive for COVID-19. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the Estate’s claims against the Swenson Defendants on summary judgment. 16 RCW 74.34.020 has been amended since the events of this case transpired. Because these amendments do not impact the statutory language relied on by this court, we refer to the current statute. 19 No. 88347-0-I/20 WE CONCUR: 20