Robert Mathers v. Agency for Health Care Administration
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledMay 17, 2021
Docket1D19-4407
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D19-4407
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ROBERT MATHERS,
Appellant,
v.
AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE
ADMINISTRATION,
Appellee.
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An appeal from a Final Order of the Division of Administrative
Hearings.
Cathy Sellers, Administrative Law Judge.
May 17, 2021
RAY, C.J.
Robert Mathers appeals the dismissal of his amended petition
to determine the Medicaid lien amount that the Agency for
Healthcare Administration (“AHCA”) may recover from his
personal injury settlement. Because the Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) correctly interpreted the law in dismissing the
petition as untimely, we affirm.
In May 2013, Mathers was seriously injured in an automobile
accident. He suffered catastrophic damage to his spinal cord that
left him disabled and dependent on others for daily living. Florida’s
Medicaid program paid $221,862.52 for his medical care.
Mathers sued the alleged tortfeasors to recover his damages
from the accident. The parties eventually reached a confidential
settlement and in February 2016, Mathers deposited the proceeds
in a trust account for the benefit of AHCA. AHCA had asserted a
lien against Mathers’ settlement proceeds for the full amount of
the Medicaid benefits paid related to his injuries from the accident.
More than three years later, in May 2019, Mathers filed a
petition with the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”)
contesting the amount that AHCA could recover from his personal
injury settlement to satisfy its lien. The ALJ dismissed the petition
as untimely because Mathers did not file it within twenty-one days
after he placed his settlement proceeds in a trust account, as
required by section 409.910(17)(b), Florida Statutes (2015).
On appeal, Mathers claims the ALJ erred by dismissing his
petition as untimely, because he was not put on notice that the
statutory deadline to file a DOAH petition applied to him. He
argues that the twenty-one-day deadline found in section
409.910(17)(b) was never triggered because AHCA did not first
apply the statutory formula found in section 409.910(11)(f),
Florida Statutes (2015), to designate the recoverable amount of
past medical expenses paid by Medicaid. We find no factual or
statutory basis for these arguments.
When there is a recovery by a Medicaid recipient in a tort
action, AHCA’s reimbursement is determined by a statutory
formula set forth in section 409.910(11)(f). “However, the
paragraph (11)(f) allocation is merely a default allocation . . . .”
Eady v. State, 279 So. 3d 1249, 1254 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). Section
409.910(17)(b) provides an administrative procedure for a
Medicaid recipient to rebut the presumptively appropriate lien
amount. In relevant part, the statute provides:
A recipient may contest the amount designated as
recovered medical expense damages payable to the
agency pursuant to the formula specified in paragraph
(11)(f) by filing a petition under chapter 120 within 21
days after the date of payment of funds to the agency or
after the date of placing the full amount of the third-party
benefits in the trust account for the benefit of the agency
pursuant to paragraph (a). The petition shall be filed with
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the Division of Administrative Hearings. For purposes of
chapter 120, the payment of funds to the agency or the
placement of the full amount of the third-party benefits
in the trust account for the benefit of the agency
constitutes final agency action and notice thereof. Final
order authority for the proceedings specified in this
subsection rests with the Division of Administrative
Hearings. This procedure is the exclusive method for
challenging the amount of third-party benefits payable to
the agency. In order to successfully challenge the amount
payable to the agency, the recipient must prove, by clear
and convincing evidence, that a lesser portion of the total
recovery should be allocated as reimbursement for past
and future medical expenses than the amount calculated
by the agency pursuant to the formula set forth in
paragraph (11)(f) or that Medicaid provided a lesser
amount of medical assistance than that asserted by the
agency.
(Footnotes omitted).
Here, it is undisputed that Mathers did not file his petition
“within 21 days” after “placing the full amount of the third-party
benefits in the trust account for the benefit of [AHCA]” as required
by the first sentence of the statutory provision quoted above. As
the statute explains, “[t]his procedure is the exclusive method for
challenging the amount of third-party benefits payable to the
agency.” Still, Mathers claims the twenty-one-day filing deadline
did not apply to him because the record does not show that AHCA
applied the statutory formula to its lien on his tort settlement. We
disagree.
To begin with, Mathers’ claims stray from the allegations of
his petition. Below, he alleged: “[AHCA] has maintained that it is
entitled to application of Section 409.910’s formula to determine
the lien amount. . . . The only reduction AHCA has offered is the
statutory reduction, which would be zero dollars ($0) given the
amount of the settlement and a twenty five percent (25%) fee.” He
also alleged: “In the instant case, blind application of the formula
in 409.910(11)(f) requires Mathers to pay back Medicaid all of its
claimed lien . . . .” Thus, Mathers’ own pleading suggests that
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AHCA applied the statutory formula to its lien determination, and
that the result of the formula requires repayment of the entire lien
amount.
Moreover, under the plain language of the statute, the twenty-
one-day time frame for contesting the formula-based allocation
was triggered when Mathers placed his settlement proceeds in
trust for the benefit of AHCA. See Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217,
219 (Fla. 1984) (“[C]ourts of this state are without power to
construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend,
modify, or limit, its express terms or its reasonable and obvious
implications.”) (quoting Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Fla. v.
Williams, 212 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)). Because
Mathers filed his DOAH petition much later, the ALJ properly
concluded that he waived his right to a hearing contesting the
amount payable to AHCA. Aleong v. State, Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l
Regul., 963 So. 2d 799, 802 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (explaining that
the “failure to timely file [a] request for an administrative hearing
operate[s] as a waiver of [one’s] right to such a hearing”).
AFFIRMED.
ROBERTS and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Sean C. Domnick of Domnick Cunningham & Whalen, West Palm
Beach, for Appellant.
Alexander R. Boler of Boler Legal, PLLC, Tallahassee, for
Appellee.
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