Full Opinion

IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION TWO A.B., Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, Respondent. No. 2 CA-SA 2026-0076 Filed November 6, 2026 Special Action Proceeding Pima County Cause No. JMH162846 The Honorable Dawn R. Walton, Judge JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF DENIED COUNSEL Pima County Office of Children’s Counsel, Tucson By Bethany R. Munson Counsel for Petitioner Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General By Dawn R. Williams, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Respondent A.B. v. DEP’T OF CHILD SAFETY Opinion of the Court OPINION Vice Chief Judge Eppich authored the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Vásquez and Chief Judge Staring concurred. E P P I C H, Vice Chief Judge: ¶1 In this special action, sixteen-year-old A.B. seeks review of the juvenile court’s order granting a motion to admit him for inpatient psychiatric acute care services. A.B. argues A.R.S. § 8-272(H) requires the court to complete a mental health hearing within seventy-two hours of the motion being filed and the court failed to do so. We accept special-action jurisdiction because this case involves an issue of statewide importance, first impression, and the welfare of a child and that tends to evade review. However, because we disagree that the statute requires completion of the hearing within seventy-two hours, we deny relief. Factual and Procedural Background ¶2 As part of a juvenile dependency proceeding, A.B. was committed to the care, custody, and control of the Department of Child Safety (DCS). A.B. suffers from autism, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and disruptive mood dysregulation disorder. He was placed in a group home in July 2026, but he ran away and was subsequently found at the Arizona-Mexico border, having just returned from Mexico. At that time, he was under the influence of substances but was unsure what drugs he had taken, and he became aggressive and made suicidal statements. ¶3 A.B. was admitted to Oasis Behavioral Health on August 26, 2026, at 9:59 p.m. Two days later, on August 28, 2026, DCS filed an emergency motion for approval of a seventy-two-hour admission for inpatient assessment. Later that day, the juvenile court signed the order. Chad Done, a psychiatric mental health nurse practitioner, completed an assessment of A.B. and recommended inpatient psychiatric acute care services. Done observed that A.B. had not been taking his medication and was “engaging in high-risk behaviors, acute impulsivity, [and] severe emotional dysregulation.” Indeed, while at Oasis, A.B. assaulted two staff members and was consequently restrained and secluded. However, Done’s inpatient assessment report was not sent to DCS until September 4, 2026. 2 A.B. v. DEP’T OF CHILD SAFETY Opinion of the Court ¶4 On September 8, 2026, at 3:40 p.m., DCS filed a motion for approval of inpatient psychiatric acute care services for A.B. DCS requested that the juvenile court set a hearing on the motion within seventy-two hours as required by § 8-272(H). The court set the hearing for September 11, 2026, at 11 a.m., within the required timeframe. At that hearing, DCS sought to admit A.B.’s medical reports, but A.B. objected to their admission without the author available to testify. DCS requested a continuance after an Oasis social worker who was present explained that the providers were not available at that time. A.B. objected to continuing the hearing beyond the seventy-two hours under § 8-272(H), also arguing that doing so violated his right to due process. Over his objection, the court continued the hearing to the following Monday, September 14, 2026, at 9:30 a.m. The court further ordered that a provider from Oasis be present to testify and directed that A.B. remain at Oasis until the hearing. ¶5 At the hearing on September 14, 2026, Done testified as to his inpatient assessment report, which the juvenile court then admitted. At the end of the hearing, the court granted DCS’s motion and approved the admission of A.B. to Oasis for inpatient psychiatric acute care services. This petition for special action followed. Discussion ¶6 A.B. argues that § 8-272(H) requires the juvenile court to “complete” a mental health hearing within seventy-two hours of the filing of a motion for inpatient psychiatric acute care services. Because the court continued the hearing in this case beyond the seventy-two hours to allow Done to testify, A.B. reasons that the court violated the statute and his right to due process. A.B. therefore requests his “immediate release” from Oasis.1 ¶7 Because the issue presented here involves the interpretation of § 8-272(H) and constitutional concerns, our review is de novo. See Johnson Utils., L.L.C. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 249 Ariz. 215, ¶ 11 (2020). “Absent ambiguity, we interpret statutes according to their plain language.” In re Drummond, 257 Ariz. 15, ¶ 5 (2024). We view a statute’s plain language in its broader statutory context. S.D. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 259 Ariz. 105, ¶ 11 (2025). Thus, when construing a specific 1As of the review hearing on October 2, 2026, A.B. was still placed at Oasis, and the juvenile court found that placement to be appropriate and in A.B.’s best interests. 3 A.B. v. DEP’T OF CHILD SAFETY Opinion of the Court provision, we look to the statute as a whole and may consider the statutes “that are in pari materia—of the same subject or general purpose—for guidance and to give effect to all of the provisions involved.” Id. (quoting Stambaugh v. Killian, 242 Ariz. 508, ¶ 7 (2017)). ¶8 Section 8-272 governs psychiatric acute care services for children. As relevant here, an entity such as DCS may request that a child receive an inpatient assessment based on behavior that indicates the child is suffering from a mental disorder or is a danger to self or others. § 8-272(A). The entity has twenty-four hours after the child’s admission to an inpatient facility to request an assessment. § 8-272(D). A psychologist, psychiatric and mental health nurse practitioner, psychiatrist, or physician must then complete an inpatient assessment and provide it to the requesting entity within seventy-two hours after the child is admitted to the facility. § 8-272(C). If it is recommended that the child be “[a]dmitted to a psychiatric acute care facility for inpatient psychiatric acute care services,” § 8-272(C)(1), the entity must file a motion for such services no later than twenty-four hours after receiving the assessment, § 8-272(F). ¶9 If a motion is filed pursuant to § 8-272(F), “the [juvenile] court shall hold a hearing on the motion within seventy-two hours after the motion is filed, excluding weekends and holidays.”2 § 8-272(H). “If the child has been admitted for an inpatient assessment, the child may remain at the inpatient assessment facility until the court rules on the motion.” Id. However, if “a child is admitted for an inpatient assessment and an entity fails to file a motion pursuant to and within the time limit prescribed in [§ 8-272(F)], the child shall be discharged from the inpatient assessment facility.” § 8-272(I). ¶10 The issue here turns on the meaning of “hold” a hearing, as used in § 8-272(H). “Hold” is not defined in the statutory scheme. See A.R.S. § 8-201. We therefore turn to dictionary definitions for the word’s ordinary meaning. See Drummond, 257 Ariz. 15, ¶ 7. “Hold” has many dictionary definitions, but, as relevant here, it commonly means “to cause to be conducted.” Hold, Merriam-Webster (Oct. 16, 2026), https://www.merriam-webster.com; see also Hold, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“[t]o direct and bring about officially; to conduct according to law” or “[t]o conduct or preside at; to convoke, open, and direct the operations of”). This definition suggests that a hearing needs to be 2When calculating the time limits under § 8-272(C), (D), and (F), weekends and holidays are also excluded. 4 A.B. v. DEP’T OF CHILD SAFETY Opinion of the Court “conducted” within seventy-two hours of the motion being filed, but it does not necessarily require that the hearing be completed within that time frame. Compare Conduct, Merriam-Webster (Oct. 16, 2026), https://www.merriam-webster.com (“to direct or take part in the operation or management of”), with Complete, Merriam-Webster (Oct. 20, 2026), https://www.merriam-webster.com (“having all necessary parts, elements, or steps”; “fully carried out”). ¶11 Rule 703(f), Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct., which governs hearings under § 8-272(H) supports this interpretation. It provides that the juvenile court “must set a hearing no later than 72 hours after the filing of the motion, excluding weekends and holidays, as provided in A.R.S. § 8-272(H).” Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 703(f). Thus, instead of “hold,” the rule requires the court to “set” a hearing within seventy-two hours of the motion being filed. Similar to “hold,” “set” has many definitions, but the one most relevant here is “to fix or decide on as a time, limit, or regulation.” Set, Merriam-Webster (Oct. 18, 2026), https://www.merriam-webster.com. Based on this definition, the court must choose a time for a hearing that occurs within seventy-two hours of the filing of the motion. But like “hold,” “set” does not necessarily require completion of the hearing within that time frame. ¶12 This interpretation is also bolstered by the fact that § 8-272(H) does not provide a consequence for the failure to hold a hearing within seventy-two hours of a motion being filed. “[O]ur courts generally apply the interpretative principle that ‘if a statute states the time for performance of an official duty, without any language denying performance after a specified time, it is directory’ rather than mandatory.” Joshua J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 230 Ariz. 417, ¶ 18 (App. 2012) (quoting Forino v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 191 Ariz. 77, 81 (App. 1997)). For example, in Joshua J., the juvenile court failed to complete a dependency adjudication hearing within the required ninety-day time limit set by A.R.S. § 8-842(D).3 Id. ¶¶ 3, 6, 10. This court recognized that § 8-842(D) uses the word “shall” and that the legislature generally intended compliance with the time limit. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. However, we concluded that “shall” was not mandatory in this context because neither § 8-842(D) nor the corresponding rule specified “any consequence—such as rendering the tardy determination void or depriving 3Section 8-842 has been revised and reorganized since Joshua J., but those revisions are not material to this opinion. Compare 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 214, § 3, with § 8-842(D). We therefore cite the current version of the statute. 5 A.B. v. DEP’T OF CHILD SAFETY Opinion of the Court the court of jurisdiction—for failing to meet the deadlines imposed.” Id. ¶ 18. In addition, we noted that the legislature “did not intend to require automatic dismissal of dependency proceedings when the statutory time limit is exceeded” because if that were so “some children might then be returned to unsafe environments.” Id. ¶ 19. ¶13 Similarly, here, there is no required statutory denial of a motion for inpatient psychiatric acute care services if the corresponding hearing is not held within seventy-two hours of the motion being filed. See § 8-272(H). Nor does the failure to hold a timely hearing deprive the juvenile court of jurisdiction. See id.; see also A.R.S. § 8-202(B). And, generally, mandating the discharge of mentally vulnerable children when the seventy-two-hour requirement is violated would elevate a technical or procedural mistake over the children’s best interests. See A.R.S. § 8-451(B) (primary purpose of DCS is to protect children); see also Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 27 (“No cause shall be reversed for technical error in pleadings or proceedings when upon the whole case it shall appear that substantial justice has been done.”). ¶14 Notably, § 8-272(I) requires that a child be released from an inpatient assessment facility if the entity fails to timely file a motion for inpatient psychiatric acute care services. But there is no such provision in § 8-272(H) for when the juvenile court fails to “hold a hearing” within seventy-two hours. See Estate of Dominguez v. Dominguez, 259 Ariz. 404, ¶ 17 (2025) (legislature’s failure to include similar limiting language in statute demonstrates legislature purposefully omitted such language). And we will not read such a provision into the statute. See Dep’t of Child Safety v. Lang, 254 Ariz. 539, ¶ 11 (App. 2023) (we lack authority to add statutory requirements not included by legislature). ¶15 Indeed, as stated above, § 8-272(H) also provides: “If the child has been admitted for an inpatient assessment, the child may remain at the inpatient assessment facility until the court rules on the motion.” The legislature thus anticipated situations where the juvenile court would not be able to rule on a motion for inpatient psychiatric acute care services within seventy-two hours of a motion being filed. If the court need not rule on the motion within seventy-two hours, it may also presumably continue the hearing beyond the seventy-two hours. ¶16 A.B. nevertheless contends that the failure to complete the hearing within seventy-two hours violated his right to due process. As part of this argument, A.B. also points out that DCS failed to file its motion for approval of the inpatient assessment within twenty-four hours after A.B.’s 6 A.B. v. DEP’T OF CHILD SAFETY Opinion of the Court admission to Oasis and that Oasis did not provide its report to DCS within the required seventy-two hours, thus violating § 8-272(C) and (D). He maintains that “[d]ue process cannot be an empty promise.” ¶17 As an initial matter, A.B. has failed to meaningfully support or develop his due process argument. We could therefore deem it waived. See J.W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 184, ¶ 11 (App. 2021) (“Arguments that are unsupported by legal authority and adequate citation to the record are waived.”). In any event, no due process violation occurred. ¶18 Generally, due process requires “notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Gish v. Greyson, 253 Ariz. 437, ¶ 48 (App. 2022) (quoting Curtis v. Richardson, 212 Ariz. 308, ¶ 16 (App. 2006)). However, due process is a flexible concept and requires only the procedural protections demanded by a given situation. Samiuddin v. Nothwehr, 243 Ariz. 204, ¶ 20 (2017); see also Lang, 254 Ariz. 539, ¶ 9 (“The Legislature created certain protections for minors with mental health issues that guard their due process rights, notify appropriate parties of the minors’ location, and ensure that the court retains proper control over the proceedings.”). ¶19 Here, A.B. does not dispute that he was given notice of DCS’s motion for inpatient psychiatric acute care services. He appeared, through counsel, at the hearing on September 11, 2026, and challenged DCS’s evidence, thus prompting the continued hearing, at which he also appeared, through counsel. A.B.’s counsel cross-examined DCS’s witness and was given an opportunity to present her own evidence. A.B. was therefore given notice and an opportunity to be heard. ¶20 DCS admits that it filed the motion for approval of the inpatient assessment in this case more than twenty-four hours after A.B.’s admission to Oasis and that Oasis did not provide its report to DCS within seventy-two hours. See § 8-272(C), (D). However, these “procedural errors” require a showing of prejudice to warrant relief. Joshua J., 230 Ariz. 417, ¶ 22; see State v. Lemming, 188 Ariz. 459, 462 (App. 1997) (actual prejudice necessary to establish due process violation); State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 299 (1983) (in determining whether delay constitutes violation of due process, predominant concern is prejudice to defendant). A.B. has asserted no such prejudice, and we fail to see how the outcome of the proceeding would have been different but for the delays. See Joshua J., 230 Ariz. 417, ¶ 25; cf. Fuller v. Olson, 233 Ariz. 468, ¶¶ 13-15 (App. 2013) (finding prejudice where delay denied party mental-health treatment that could have expedited release). 7 A.B. v. DEP’T OF CHILD SAFETY Opinion of the Court ¶21 In sum, § 8-272(H) does not require a juvenile court to complete a hearing on a motion for inpatient psychiatric acute care services within seventy-two hours of the filing of a § 8-272(F) motion. Accordingly, in this case, the court did not err by continuing A.B.’s hearing to the next business day to hear necessary testimony as to DCS’s motion. Disposition ¶22 For the foregoing reasons, we accept special-action jurisdiction but deny relief. 8