Knife River Corp. - NW v. Dept. of State Lands
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketA187383
JudgeKamins
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
No. 1129 November 18, 2026 131
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
KNIFE RIVER CORPORATION - NW,
Petitioner,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE LANDS,
Respondent.
Department of State Lands
WD20210131;
A187383
Argued and submitted October7, 2026.
Reilley D. Keating argued the cause for petitioner. Also
on the briefs were Michael R. Campbell and Stoel Rives LLP.
Carson L. Whitehead, Assistant Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Dan
Rayfield, Attorney General, and Paul L. Smith, Solicitor
General.
Before Kamins, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge,
and Pagán, Judge.
KAMINS, P. J.
Affirmed.
132 Knife River Corp. - NW v. Dept. of State Lands
KAMINS, P. J.
Petitioner Knife River Corporation seeks judicial
review of a final order of the Oregon Department of State
Lands (“DSL”) asserting regulatory jurisdiction over fea-
tures of a surface sand and gravel mine owned by petitioner
under Oregon’s Removal-Fill Law, ORS 196.800 to 196.900.
Petitioner raises four assignments of error, contending that
DSL’s interpretation of the Removal-Fill jurisdiction regula-
tion, OAR 141-085-0515, is implausible and an impermissi-
ble expansion of the rule and, therefore, that DSL erred in
applying that interpretation. Because that interpretation is
plausible, is not an impermissible expansion, and was not
applied erroneously, we affirm.1
The relevant facts are uncontested. Petitioner’s
property borders the Willamette River. The property includes
several areas identified as wetlands (Wetlands A through F)
and excavated mining pits (Mining Pits 1 through 5). The
mining pits contain water throughout the year. At issue in
this case are Wetland F and Mining Pits 2 through 5 (“fea-
tures”). Those features were created for the purpose of sur-
face mining, and when they were created, they did not con-
nect to the Willamette River. Currently, at least five times
a year, the water level of the Willamette rises enough to
create a surface water connection with the features. During
those times, the main part of the river flows over and into
the features for up to five days each time.
Petitioner sought a jurisdictional determination
from DSL. DSL’s initial jurisdictional determination identi-
fied the features as “waters of the state” for the purposes of the
Removal-Fill Law due to their connection to the Willamette
River and, thus, subject to DSL’s jurisdiction. Petitioner
sought reconsideration, and DSL affirmed. Petitioner then
requested a contested case hearing. Following the contested
case hearing, the ALJ issued a proposed order concluding
that the features were not “waters of the state” because they
1
Our resolution obviates the need to address petitioner’s third assignment
of error, in which petitioner contends that DSL’s conclusion that several mining
pits at issue are not “ponds” is incorrect as a matter of law and lacks substantial
reason. Our determination that DSL did not err in categorizing the mining pits as
part of the Willamette River means that they would come under DSL’s jurisdiction
as being part of the river, regardless of whether they fit the definition of “ponds.”
Cite as 355 Or App 131 (2026) 133
were created entirely from uplands for the purpose of surface
mining, falling under an exemption from DSL’s jurisdiction.
DSL then issued a final order reversing the ALJ’s determi-
nation, concluding instead that, because the features are
part of the Willamette River for jurisdictional purposes,
they are subject to DSL’s Removal-Fill Law jurisdiction.
We review an agency’s interpretation of law for legal
error. ORS 183.482(8)(a). Where that interpretation of law is
the agency’s interpretation of its own rule, we defer to the
agency’s plausible interpretation so long as it is not “incon-
sistent with the wording of the rule itself, or with the rule’s
context, or with any other source of law.” Don’t Waste Oregon
Com. v. Energy Facility Siting, 320 Or 132, 142, 881 P2d 119
(1994). “In construing an administrative rule, we apply the
same analytical framework that applies to the construction
of statutes.” State v. Hogevoll, 348 Or 104, 109, 228 P3d 569
(2010).
The issue before us is a narrow one. We consider
whether DSL’s interpretation of OAR 141-085-0515 is plau-
sible in two respects: (1) that the jurisdictional boundaries of
a river include surface connections below the ordinary high
water line and (2) that categorization as a jurisdictional water-
body applies, even if the feature also qualifies as another type
of waterbody otherwise exempt from DSL’s jurisdiction. We
begin by providing an overview of the statute and regulation.
Under the Removal-Fill Law, a permit issued by
DSL is required in order to “remove any material from the
beds or banks of any waters of this state or fill any waters
of this state.” ORS 196.810(1)(a). The policy of the Removal-
Fill Law is to “centralize authority in the Director of [DSL],
and implement control of the removal of material from the
beds and banks or filling of the waters of this state.” ORS
196.805(1). “Waters of the state” is defined statutorily as
including many types of waterbodies, including all natural
waterways, intermittent streams, and wetlands.2 Former
2
In full, those waterbodies include:
“all natural waterways, tidal and nontidal bays, intermittent streams, con-
stantly flowing streams, lakes, wetlands, that portion of the Pacific Ocean
that is in the boundaries of this state, all other navigable and nonnaviga-
ble bodies of water in this state and those portions of the ocean shore, as
defined in ORS 390.605, where removal or fill activities are regulated under
134 Knife River Corp. - NW v. Dept. of State Lands
ORS 196.800(15) (2013), renumbered as ORS 196.800(16)
(2023). OAR 141-085-0515 “describes the types and juris-
dictional limits of the waters of this state” that are regu-
lated by DSL under the Removal-Fill Law. Two catego-
ries of waterbodies in that rule are relevant in this case:
(1) rivers and (2) artificially created wetlands and ponds.
Rivers “are jurisdictional to the ordinary high water line
(OHWL).” OAR 141-085-0515(3). Ordinary high water line
refers to “the line on the bank or shore to which the high
water ordinarily rises.” OAR 141-085-0510(70). That can be
determined by “direct observation of the annual high water
event” among other methods. OAR 141-085-0515(3). The
second type of waterbody, artificially created wetlands and
ponds, may be jurisdictional if certain conditions are met
and specific exemptions do not apply. Artificially created
wetlands and ponds “are jurisdictional when they are: (a)
[e]qual to or greater than one acre in size; (b) [c]reated, in
part or in whole, in waters of this state; or (c) [i]dentified in
an authorization as a mitigation site.” OAR 141-085-0515(6).
However, “[a]rtificially created wetlands and ponds created
entirely from upland, regardless of size, are not waters of
this state if they are constructed for the purpose of * * *
[s]urface mining, even if the site is managed for interim
wetlands functions and values.” OAR 141-085-0515(7)(g).
FIRST AND SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Petitioner contends that DSL’s interpretation of OAR
141-085-515(3), (6), and (7) to determine that the features are
part of the river and therefore subject to DSL’s jurisdiction,
regardless of their status as otherwise exempt waterbod-
ies, is implausible.3 Petitioner specifically challenges DSL’s
a state-assumed permit program as provided in 33 U.S.C. 1344(g) of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended.”
Former ORS 196.800(15) (2013), renumbered as ORS 196.800(16) (2023).
3
Petitioner additionally contends that DSL’s interpretation of OAR 141-085-
0515(3) was impermissible rulemaking. However, an agency may adopt “a general
policy applicable to the case and subsequent cases of like nature” in deciding
a contested case without engaging in formal rulemaking. ORS 183.355(6); see
PNW Metal Recycling, Inc. v. DEQ, 371 Or 673, 678, 540 P3d 523 (2023) (“[I]n a
contested case proceeding, an agency may make a statement that otherwise has
the character of a rule—because it is an ‘adoption of a general policy’ applicable
not only to the case but to ‘cases of like nature.’ ”). Here, DSL adopted such a
general policy in deciding a contested case, as allowed by statute. During the con-
tested case hearing, DSL provided a declaration explaining how DSL interpreted
Cite as 355 Or App 131 (2026) 135
interpretation that rivers are jurisdictional “anywhere that
the water flows (meaning anywhere that there is a hydro-
logic surface connection) up to the ordinary high water line.”
Based on the text and context of the rule and its statutory
authority, DSL’s interpretation—that an artificially created
waterbody may become part of a river when the boundaries
of the waterway change—is plausible. Hogevoll, 223 Or App
at 532 (“At the first level of analysis, we examine the text
and context of the rule to discern the intent of the agency.”).
As defined by the text of the regulation, the bound-
ary of what is considered a “river” and therefore subject to
DSL’s jurisdiction, is up to the ordinary high water line.
OAR 141-085-0515(3). Among other methods, the ordinary
high water line can be determined by “direct observation of
the annual high water event.” Id. It is undisputed that the
features are below the ordinary high water line and some-
times have a surface connection to the river, meaning they
are periodically covered by the river. Based on the plain
meaning of the text, it is not implausible to interpret “river”
as including waterbodies that have an intermittent surface
connection to the main waterbody of the river and are below
the ordinary high water line.
Petitioner contends that the text indicates that
DSL’s interpretation is implausible because, even if the fea-
tures could be considered part of the river, they fall under the
exception for artificially created wetlands and ponds. Under
petitioner’s reasoning, OAR 141-085-0515(3) provides a gen-
eral rule that rivers, intermittent and perennial streams,
lakes, and ponds are jurisdictional to the ordinary high water
line. OAR 141-085-0515(6) and (7)(g) provide a more specific
exception to that general rule, providing limits on jurisdiction
for artificial wetlands and ponds. See Smith v. Multnomah
County Board of Commissioners, 318 Or 302, 309, 865 P2d
356 (1994) (explaining that where provisions that are “partic-
ular, special and specific in their directions” could contradict
more general provisions, the specific provision governs and
is considered an exception to the general rule). Under that
more specific rule, as argued by petitioner, waterbodies like
OAR 141-085-0515(3), (6), and (7)(g). The final order adopted that construction as
applicable to this case, as the agency is entitled to under ORS 183.355(6).
136 Knife River Corp. - NW v. Dept. of State Lands
the features that were created from upland for the purpose of
surface mining are exempt from DSL’s jurisdiction. However,
based on the text, an exception that applies to one type of
waterbody (wetlands and ponds) does not apply to a differ-
ent type of waterbody (river). An exemption for wetlands and
ponds cannot exempt a river. To consider the features part
of the river means that the application of DSL’s jurisdiction
under OAR 141-085-0515(3) does not conflict with OAR 141-
085-0515(6) and (7). While it may also be plausible to consider
the areas artificially created wetlands and ponds, “[o]ne plau-
sible interpretation does not ipso facto render other interpre-
tations implausible.” OR-OSHA v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,
312 Or App 424, 441, 494 P3d 959 (2021).
Petitioner also contends that, even if the features
might currently be considered part of the river, the use of
past tense in the text of the artificial wetland and pond
exemption indicates that the exemption for artificial wet-
lands and ponds was intended to be applied based on the
original purpose of their creation. Because the regulation
exempting artificial wetlands and ponds describes their
creation using the past tense—”[a]rtificially created wet-
lands and ponds created entirely from upland * * * are not
waters of this state if they are constructed” for surface min-
ing, petitioner argues that for jurisdictional purposes past
conditions—the creation and construction—dictate whether
the exemption applies. OAR 141-085-0515(7)(g) (empha-
sis added). However, the text that applies to rivers indi-
cates current conditions are considered in determining if a
waterbody falls within the jurisdictional category: Rivers
“are jurisdictional to the ordinary high water line (OHWL).
The OHWL can be determined by direct observation of the
annual high water event, using local gauge data to estimate
bankfull stage, and/or by using readily identifiable field
indicators.” OAR 141-085-0515(3) (emphasis added). “Direct
observation” and “using” refer to considering present condi-
tions to determine the jurisdictional boundary of a river.
The context also supports DSL’s argument that
in making a jurisdictional determination, it considers the
waterbody as it currently is. The rules explaining the policy
of the Remove-Fill Law provide that “[b]ecause waters of this
Cite as 355 Or App 131 (2026) 137
state can be affected over time by both natural changes and
human activities, jurisdictional determinations are valid for
a limited period of time.” OAR 141-090-0015(3). Similarly,
a jurisdictional determination may be revised prior to expi-
ration if site conditions change. OAR 141-090-0045(1)(a).
Further, an applicant requesting DSL to reissue a permit
must demonstrate that the jurisdictional boundaries remain
accurate. OAR 141-090-0045(5). Those provisions support
the conclusion that, while the features were initially artifi-
cially created wetlands and ponds, it is plausible that DSL’s
jurisdictional determination should account for changed
conditions, like an intermittent surface connection with the
Willamette River below the ordinary high water line.
Petitioner also contends that DSL’s interpretation is
not plausible because it reads a broad exception into the rule
regarding artificially created wetlands and ponds. Petitioner
argues that if such intermittent connections were intended
to provide an exception to the exclusion of artificial wetlands
and ponds created for surface mining from DSL’s jurisdic-
tion, the regulation would say so. In support, petitioner relies
on the inclusion of such an exception for jurisdictional ditches
that are created from upland and have “a free and open con-
nection to waters of this state.” OAR 141-085-0515(8). That
exception defines a “free and open connection” as “ a con-
nection by any means * * * to or between natural waterways
and other navigable and non-navigable bodies of water that
allows the interchange of surface flow at bankfull stage or
ordinary high water.” Id. Petitioner also points to a prior ver-
sion of the regulation that included an explicit exception to
the exemption of gravel ponds from DSL’s jurisdiction if the
gravel ponds had “established aquatic life and habitats” and
“a free and open connection to waters of the state,”4 arguing
that the removal of that provision indicates that an excep-
tion was not intended. Former OAR 141-95-010(17) (1984).
4
That regulation, former OAR 141-95-010(17) (1984), provided that “natu-
ral waterways” as used in defining DSL’s jurisdiction “do not include wastewater
treatment lagoons, created drainage ditches, irrigation ditches, farm ponds, stock
ponds, settling ponds, gravel ponds, cooling ponds, log ponds or other ponds exca-
vated from upland, unless they have established aquatic life and habitats and
there is a free and open connection to waters of the state.” Former OAR 141-95-
010(12) (1984). That provision was clarified in the subsequent 1991 version of the
regulation and removed in the 2009 version, as applied to wetlands and ponds.
138 Knife River Corp. - NW v. Dept. of State Lands
Petitioner’s argument misapprehends the issue.
DSL’s jurisdiction does not stem from the fact that the fea-
tures’ intermittent surface connection to the river removes
them from the rule’s definition of artificial wetlands and
ponds. If it did, petitioner would be correct that the inter-
pretation would create a broad exception to the exemption
along the lines of that provided for jurisdictional ditches.
But it does not. Rather, that connection categorizes the fea-
tures as part of the river. That interpretation is based on the
jurisdictional boundaries of the river (below the ordinary
high water line),5 not an exception.
Finally, DSL’s interpretation is consistent with its
statutory authority to regulate removal “from the beds or
banks of any waters of this state,” which include “all nat-
ural waterways” including “intermittent streams.” ORS
196.800(16); ORS 196.810(1)(a). The Removal-Fill Law’s
policy “centralize[s] authority in the Director of [DSL]” and
grants DSL broad authority over “control of the removal of
material from the beds and banks or filling of the waters of
this state.” ORS 196.805(1). That broad authority is consis-
tent with DSL’s interpretation.6
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
In petitioner’s fourth assignment of error, it con-
tends that DSL erred by applying its “erroneous interpreta-
tion” of OAR 141-085-0515. As discussed above, we disagree
that DSL’s interpretation was erroneous, and therefore,
5
In addition to having a separate source, DSL’s jurisdiction as to rivers is
more narrow than the exception for ditches in OAR 141-085-515(8) because that
exception applies to any ditch with a free and open connection, regardless of
whether part of the ditch rises above the ordinary high water line. In contrast,
DSL’s jurisdiction over rivers is only up to the ordinary high water line.
6
Amicus curiae Oregon Concrete & Aggregate Producers Association, Inc.
(“OCAPA”) raises two arguments regarding DSL’s interpretation conflicting
with other sources of law. First, OCAPA’s argument regarding the application
of DSL’s jurisdiction as conflicting with the regulatory authority of the Oregon
Department of Geology and Mineral Industries is unpreserved, as it was not
raised or argued before the trial court. Second, we do not address OCAPA’s argu-
ment that DSL’s interpretation conflicts with the statutory definition of “waters
of the state” because petitioner did not assign error on that basis. See ORAP
5.45(1) (“No matter claimed as error will be considered on appeal unless the claim
of error was preserved in the lower court and is assigned as error in the opening
brief.”); see also State v. Cabanilla, 351 Or 622, 631 n 10, 273 P3d 125 (2012)
(declining to address arguments raised by amicus curiae where they were not
raised below or by the parties on appeal).
Cite as 355 Or App 131 (2026) 139
defer to that plausible interpretation. Because, at the time
of the jurisdictional determination, the features shared an
intermittent surface connection with the Willamette River
below the ordinary high water line, OAR 141-085-0515(3)
applies, and DSL did not err in applying it.
To the extent other provisions might be applica-
ble, we disagree that “the only possible conclusion” is that
the features are not subject to DSL’s regulatory jurisdic-
tion. Borrowing from the rules of statutory construction,
apparently conflicting rules should be construed to “give
effect to all” if possible. Powers v. Quigley, 345 Or 432, 438,
198 P3d 919 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
There are two paths to DSL’s jurisdiction: (1) as a river and
(2) as a qualifying wetland or pond not subject to an exemp-
tion. To “give effect to all” while deferring to DSL’s plausible
interpretation of its jurisdictional boundaries requires con-
sidering the features to be part of the river for purposes of
DSL’s jurisdiction. As acknowledged by DSL, Wetland F is
also a wetland. As a wetland, it could be considered within
the exception exempting artificially created wetlands con-
structed for the purpose of surface mining from DSL’s juris-
diction, OAR 141-085-0515(7)(g).
Thus, the two paths to DSL’s jurisdiction have oppo-
site outcomes: (1) jurisdictional as a river and (2) not juris-
dictional as a wetland.
To “give effect to all,” we must consider each path
to jurisdiction independently. To do otherwise would require
reading the possible paths as conflicting and choosing to
give effect to one over the other. Said another way, OAR
141-085-0515(3) defines rivers as jurisdictional and OAR
141-085-0515(6) and (7)(g) define artificial wetlands and
ponds created for surface mining as not jurisdictional. If
both apply, determining that the features are not jurisdic-
tional would require first determining that the provisions
regarding rivers and artificial wetlands and ponds conflict,
and then applying the exception regarding artificial wet-
lands and ponds instead of giving effect to all provisions.
Because it is possible to give effect to all provisions by treat-
ing them independently, we do so. See Powers, 345 Or at 438
(“In short, if the court can give full effect to both statutes, it
140 Knife River Corp. - NW v. Dept. of State Lands
will do so, and if not, it will treat the specific statute as an
exception to the general.”).
Thus, because the features are within DSL’s juris-
diction as a river, DSL did not err in applying OAR 141-085-
0515 and concluding that the features were subject to DSL’s
jurisdiction.
Affirmed.